NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 29 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ALIM URMANCHEEV, No. 22-15701

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 1:19-cv-00791-DAD-BAK

v.

MEMORANDUM*

HUNTER; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Dale A. Drozd, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted March 26, 2024**

Before: TASHIMA, SILVERMAN, and KOH, Circuit Judges.

Former California state prisoner Alim Urmancheev appeals pro se from the

district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging access-to-

courts and deprivation of property claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. We review de novo. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)); Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d

443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Urmancheev’s access-to-courts claim

because Urmancheev failed to show actual injury to a nonfrivolous legal claim.

See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 348-53 (1996) (explaining that an access-to-

courts claim requires a plaintiff to show that defendants’ conduct caused an actual

injury to a nonfrivolous legal claim); see also Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S.

403, 415-17 (2002) (to plead an actual injury for an access-to-courts claim, the

complaint “should state the underlying claim . . . just as if it were being

independently pursued”).

The district court properly dismissed Urmancheev’s deprivation of property

claim because Urmancheev failed to allege facts sufficient to show that a

meaningful post-deprivation remedy was unavailable to him. See Hudson v.

Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 532-33 (1984) (a deprivation of property, whether random

or intentional, is not actionable if the state provides a meaningful post-deprivation

remedy); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (“California

[l]aw provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for any property

deprivations.”).

2 22-15701 We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.

3 22-15701