facts sought exist; and (3) the sought after facts are essential to oppose summary

judgment.” Stevens v. Corelogic, Inc., 899 F.3d 666, 678 (9th Cir. 2018) (citation

omitted). Mrs. Palmer failed to meet this burden because she merely speculated

that the sought-after testimony and documents might contradict the evidence

already before the district court. See id. (“[F]or purposes of a Rule 56(d) request,

the evidence sought must be more than ‘the object of pure speculation.’”) (quoting

California v. Campbell, 138 F.3d 772, 779–80 (9th Cir. 1998)).

3. The district court properly granted summary judgment to HSBC because

the undisputed evidence established that HSBC lawfully accessed Mr. Palmer’s

information solely in order to make a firm offer of credit. See Nayab, 942 F.3d at

488 (The FCRA “allows a third-party to obtain a consumer’s credit report . . . ‘if

the transaction consists of a firm offer of credit’”) (quoting 15 U.S.C.

§ 1681b(a)(3)(A)). Here, HSBC mailed Mr. Palmer a “‘prescreened’ offer of

credit” to apply for HSBC’s Gold Mastercard. HSBC informed Mr. Palmer that

3 the offer was “based on information in your credit report indicating that you meet

certain criteria. This offer is not guaranteed if you do not meet our criteria.” Brian

Ahearn, HSBC’s corporate witness, testified that HSBC approved credit to 59

percent of applicants who responded to its offer, and would have approved credit

to Mr. Palmer as well, provided that he continued to meet the credit-related criteria

by which his information was first obtained. The FCRA explicitly allows HSBC to

condition “firm offer[s] of credit” upon “verification” that the customer “continues

to meet the specific criteria used to select the consumer for the offer.” See 15

U.S.C. § 1681a(l)(2). Thus, HSBC did not violate the FCRA by approving only 59

percent of those who responded to its offer because only 59 percent of those who

responded continued to meet the criteria used to select that potential customer for

the offer. Nor is there any evidence that HSBC accessed Mr. Palmer’s data for any

unlawful purpose.1 To the contrary, Ahearn testified that HSBC acquired Mr.

Palmer’s information for “the sole use” of offering him credit.

4. The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that Mrs.

1 Mrs. Palmer contends that HSBC’s duplicity is evidenced by the facts that (1) HSBC accessed Mr. Palmer’s name, address, credit score, email address, phone number, and social security number; (2) HSBC stored Mr. Palmer’s information in a “data warehouse;” and (3) HSBC sent out different offers to consumers. However, Mrs. Palmer provides no evidence or authority to show that HSBC accessed any more information than necessary to determine continued eligibility for credit, that warehousing Mr. Palmer’s data violated the FCRA, or that making different offers of credit to consumers violates the FCRA. See Nelson v. Prima Cmty. College, 83 F.3d 1075, 1081–82 (9th Cir. 1996).

4 Palmer was an inadequate class representative and striking the class allegations.

The district court properly determined that Mr. Palmer’s claim for punitive

damages abated upon his death. Castillo v. Bank of America, NA, 980 F.3d 723,

729 (9th Cir. 2020) (A class representative’s claims must be “reasonably co-

extensive with those of absent class members”). Moreover, factual questions

unique to Mrs. Palmer’s case, such as whether HSBC made Mr. Palmer a firm

offer of credit, created significant obstacles to her adequacy as class representative.

See Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 984 (9th Cir. 2011) (A

representative’s claims are not typical of the class “if there is a danger that absent

class members will suffer if their representative is preoccupied with defenses

unique to it”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court’s order was not premature. The district court was not

required to wait for a motion for class certification or for additional discovery

before addressing Mrs. Palmer’s class allegations. See Vinole v. Countrywide

Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2009) (“District courts have broad

discretion to control the class certification process, and ‘[w]hether or not discovery

will be permitted . . . lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.’”)

(alteration and omission in original) (quoting Kamm v. Cal. City Dev. Co., 509

F.2d 205, 209 (9th Cir. 1975)). Mrs. Palmer did not attempt to add a new

representative despite being advised of the court’s concerns. And because Mr.

5 Palmer had already received leave to amend his complaint on two prior occasions,

the district court was not required to permit Mrs. Palmer any additional time to add

class representatives. See Griggs v. Pace American Group, Inc., 170 F.3d 877, 879

(9th Cir. 1999).

5. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Mrs. Palmer’s

motion to substitute as to Mr. Palmer’s state law claims. Mrs. Palmer failed to

comply with California’s requirements for substitution. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code

§§ 377.30; 377.32. Although the district court repeatedly identified the

deficiencies in her motion, Mrs. Palmer made no effort to remedy the problems.

Thus, the district court properly dismissed Mr. Palmer’s state law claims. See

Tatum v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1093 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006)

(“[T]he decedent’s ‘successor in interest’ may prosecute the survival action if the

person purporting to act as successor in interest satisfies the requirements of

California law.”) (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 377.30, 377.32).

AFFIRMED.

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