NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 29 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 22-50235

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 2:20-cr-00298-JAK-2 v.

CHANEL WILEY, MEMORANDUM*

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted February 6, 2024* Pasadena, California

Before: OWENS, BUMATAY, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges.

Chanel Wiley appeals from her conviction and sentence for conspiracy to

distribute methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. She argues that there

was insufficient evidence to support her conviction, and that she was convicted

“only by association” with her boyfriend, Scott Penner, who pled guilty to the

same charge. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. As the parties are

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We affirm.1

Normally, sufficiency of the evidence claims are reviewed under the Jackson

v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), standard: “[W]hether, after viewing the evidence

in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 319.

“However, because . . . [Wiley] did not move for acquittal,” we review for plain

error. United States v. Franklin, 321 F.3d 1231, 1239 (9th Cir. 2003). Under

either stringent standard, Wiley’s claim fails. The evidence that she conspired to

distribute methamphetamine was not insufficient.

The elements of a § 846 conspiracy are “(1) an agreement to accomplish an

illegal objective, and (2) the intent to commit the underlying offense.” United

States v. Moe, 781 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v.

Herrera-Gonzalez, 263 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 2001)). As a result, “[t]he

government ‘can prove the existence of a conspiracy through circumstantial

evidence that defendants acted together in pursuit of a common illegal goal.’”

United States v. Navarrette-Aguilar, 813 F.3d 785, 794 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting

United States v. Bishop, 1 F.3d 910, 911 (9th Cir. 1993)). For example, evidence

of a “shared stake” in a drug operation may disprove a defendant’s assertion that

1 We address Wiley’s argument that her due process rights were violated when her ankle monitor beeped during jury selection in a concurrently filed published opinion, in which we affirm.

2 she did not conspire to distribute, but merely purchased, drugs. See, e.g., United

States v. Mendoza, 25 F.4th 730, 736 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Moe, 781 F.3d at

1125).

The following evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the

government, indicates that Wiley and Penner had an agreement to distribute

methamphetamine and intended to distribute methamphetamine. First, Penner

packaged, weighed, and sold methamphetamine out of Wiley’s apartment, which a

rational juror could have concluded he would not have done “[a]bsent an

agreement.” See United States v. Mesa-Farias, 53 F.3d 258, 260 (9th Cir. 1995)

(“Absent an agreement, [the defendant’s co-conspirator] would not have allowed

an outsider to drive a car loaded with cocaine and heroin or sleep in an apartment

containing drug paraphernalia and substantial amounts of cash.”).

Second, a rational juror could have determined that Wiley initiated the sale

because she asked the buyer whether he “need[ed] crap,” which means

methamphetamine. Immediately afterward, Penner began weighing bags of

methamphetamine and discussing the price with the buyer.

Third, Penner structured the drug sale to financially benefit Wiley—he gave

the buyer a $50 discount on the price of the drugs in exchange for an equivalent

reduction in Wiley’s outstanding debt to the buyer. Thus, Wiley had a financial

“stake” in the sale of methamphetamine. Mendoza, 25 F.4th at 736 (quoting Moe,

3 781 F.3d at 1125). Wiley asserts that she played no part in the conversation about

reducing her debt. She argues she was not even in the room while Penner and the

buyer discussed the price of the methamphetamine. But a rational juror could have

found that she still heard their exchange because there were no doors in her

apartment except for the bathroom door. Even if she had not heard the

conversation, it would not have been irrational to view the fact that Penner

structured the transaction to benefit her as evidence corroborating her role in the

conspiracy.

Fourth, Wiley told the buyer that she had previously tested a batch of

methamphetamine for fentanyl. She believed that the methamphetamine the buyer

was purchasing was from that same batch and asked him to test it and let her know

if it was positive for fentanyl. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to

the government, a rational juror could have interpreted Wiley’s statements to

indicate that she and Penner had an ongoing agreement to test and sell

methamphetamine, and that she intended this sale as part of this conspiracy.

Finally, when the buyer returned to Wiley’s home to pay Penner for the

methamphetamine, the buyer left the money with Wiley. Wiley implies that this

conduct is not probative because the buyer did not tell Wiley the purpose of the

payment. But this assertion flips the Jackson standard on its head because Jackson

requires us to construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the government.

4 443 U.S. at 319. Under Jackson, a rational juror could have interpreted this

interaction as further evidence of Wiley and Penner’s ongoing agreement and

intent to sell methamphetamine because Wiley accepted payment for

methamphetamine on behalf of Penner.

Consequently, under either Jackson or plain-error review, the evidence that

Wiley conspired with Penner to distribute methamphetamine was not insufficient.

AFFIRMED.

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