I. Background

The following facts are drawn from Plaintiff’s Complaint (“Compl.”) (Dkt. 1-2). This action concerns Plaintiff’s 2014 purchase of a Jeep Grand Cherokee manufactured or distributed by Defendant FCA US, LLC (“Defendant”). Compl. ¶ 9. Plaintiff alleges that the car developed defects during the warranty period requiring replacement and repair of various parts. Id. ¶ 11.

Plaintiff originally filed suit in the Superior Court of California, County of Orange, on April 20, 2021. On October 19, 2021, Defendant removed the action to this Court, asserting diversity jurisdiction. Notice of Removal (Dkt. 1). Plaintiff filed this Case 8:21-cv-01730-DOC-DFM Document 29 Filed 01/25/22 Page 2 of 5 Page ID #:813

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. SA CV 21-01730-DOC-DFM Date: January 25, 2022 Page 2

Motion to Remand on December 1, 2021. Defendant filed its Opposition (“Opp’n”) on December 13, 2021 (Dkt. 16), and Plaintiff filed his Reply on December 20, 2021 (Dkt. 21).

II. Legal Standard

“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Removal of a case from state court to federal court is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441, which provides in relevant part that “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed . . . to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441. This statute “is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction,” and the party seeking removal “bears the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction.” Ethridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Federal diversity jurisdiction requires that the parties be citizens of different states and that the amount in controversy exceed $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). For diversity jurisdiction purposes, a corporation is “deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). The presence of any single plaintiff from the same state as any single defendant destroys “complete diversity” and strips the federal courts of original jurisdiction over the matter. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553 (2005).

Generally, a removing defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy satisfies the jurisdictional threshold. Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 2008). If the complaint affirmatively alleges an amount in controversy greater than $75,000, the jurisdictional requirement is “presumptively satisfied.” Id. In that situation, a plaintiff who then tries to defeat removal must prove to a “legal certainty” that a recovery of more than $75,000 is impossible. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288-89 (1938); Crum v. Circus Enters., 231 F.3d 1129, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000). This framework applies equally to situations where the complaint leaves the amount in controversy unclear or ambiguous. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 567 (9th Cir. 1992); Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 403-04 (9th Cir. 1996). Case 8:21-cv-01730-DOC-DFM Document 29 Filed 01/25/22 Page 3 of 5 Page ID #:814

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. SA CV 21-01730-DOC-DFM Date: January 25, 2022 Page 3

A removing defendant “may not meet [its] burden by simply reciting some ‘magical incantation’ to the effect that ‘the matter in controversy exceeds the sum of [$75,000],’ but instead, must set forth in the removal petition the underlying facts supporting its assertion that the amount in controversy exceeds [$75,000].” Richmond v. Allstate Ins. Co., 897 F. Supp. 447, 450 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting Gaus, 980 F.2d at 567). If the plaintiff has not clearly or unambiguously alleged $75,000 in its complaint or has affirmatively alleged an amount less than $75,000 in its complaint, the burden lies with the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the jurisdictional minimum is satisfied. Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhotka ex rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 1106-07 (9th Cir. 2010); Guglielmino, 506 F.3d at 699.

While the defendant must “set forth the underlying facts supporting its assertion that the amount in controversy exceeds the statutory minimum,” the standard is not so taxing so as to require the defendant to “research, state, and prove the plaintiff’s claims for damages.” Coleman v. Estes Express Lines, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1148 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (emphases added). In short, the defendant must show that it is “more likely than not” that the amount in controversy exceeds the statutory minimum. Id. Summary judgment-type evidence may be used to substantiate this showing. Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090–91 (9th Cir. 2003); Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 373, 377 (9th Cir. 1997). For example, defendants may make mathematical calculations using reasonable averages of hourly, monthly, and annual incomes of comparable employees when assessing the amount in controversy in a wrongful termination suit. Coleman, 730 F. Supp. 2d. at 1148–49.

If the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, any action it takes is ultra vires and void. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 534 (2005); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94, 101–02 (1998). The lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time by either the parties or the court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). If subject matter jurisdiction is found to be lacking, the court must dismiss the action, id., or remand pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). A court may raise the question of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte. See Snell v. Cleveland, Inc., 316 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2002).

III. Discussion

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks $25,000.01 in actual damages, additional consequential and incidental damages, and a civil penalty of twice the actual damages. Opp’n at 4. Defendant also argues that the restitution sought is $36,899.02, and that the Court should include statutory civil penalties and attorneys’ fees in its calculation of the amount in controversy. Opp’n at 5-7. Case 8:21-cv-01730-DOC-DFM Document 29 Filed 01/25/22 Page 4 of 5 Page ID #:815

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. SA CV 21-01730-DOC-DFM Date: January 25, 2022 Page 4

Plaintiff’s Complaint specifically alleges that he “suffered damages in a sum to be proven at trial in an amount that is not less than $25,001.00.” Compl. ¶ 12. It does not specify that those are his actual damages. A number of courts have found that this language does not sufficiently support diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., Mahlmeister v. FCA US LLC, No. 21-cv-564-AB, 2021 WL 1662578, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2021); Limon-Gonzalez v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., No. 20-cv-4381-PA, 2020 WL 3790838, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 7, 2020); Schneider v. Ford Motor Co., 441 F. Supp. 3d 909, 913 (N.D. Cal. 2020); Steeg v. Ford Motor Co., No. 19-cv-5833-LHK, 2020 WL 2121508, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2020).

The Court will not include speculative civil penalties or attorneys’ fees to meet the amount in controversy requirement. See Galt G/S v. JSS Scandinavia, 142 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 1998) (“We hold that where an underlying statute authorizes an award of attorneys’ fees, either with mandatory or discretionary language, such fees may be included in the amount in controversy.”) (emphasis added). The Court finds that Defendant has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Thus, the Court finds that it lacks diversity jurisdiction over this matter.

When remanding a case, a court may, in its discretion, “require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see also Jordan v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 781 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2015). Typically, a court may only award fees and costs when “the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal.” Id. (quoting Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141 (2005)). In making this determination, courts should look at whether the removing party’s arguments are “clearly foreclosed” by the relevant case law. Lussier v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 518 F.3d 1062, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 2008). The Ninth Circuit has further clarified that “removal is not objectively unreasonable solely because the removing party’s arguments lack merit,” id. at 1065, though a court need not find the removing party acted in bad faith before awarding fees under § 1447(c), Moore v. Permanente Med. Grp., 981 F.2d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 1992). Here, while the Court finds that removal was improper, the Court concludes that it was not so inconceivable as to meet the “objectively unreasonable” standard. As a result, the Court declines to award Plaintiff attorneys’ fees. Case 8:21-cv-01730-DOC-DFM Document 29 Filed 01/25/22 Page 5 of 5 Page ID #:816

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. SA CV 21-01730-DOC-DFM Date: January 25, 2022 Page 5

IV. Disposition

For the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby REMANDS this case to the Superior Court of California, County of Orange. The hearing currently set for January 31, 2022 is accordingly VACATED.

The Clerk shall serve this minute order on the parties.

MINUTES FORM 11 Initials of Deputy Clerk: kdu

CIVIL-GEN