Case 8:22-cv-01302-CJC-DFM Document 16 Filed 09/06/22 Page 1 of 4 Page ID #:108

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 SOUTHERN DIVISION 11 ) 12 ) ) Case No.: SACV 22-01302-CJC (DFMx) 13 SEAN WAGENER, ) ) 14 ) Plaintiff, ) 15 ) ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S v. ) MOTION TO REMAND THE 16 ) MATTER TO STATE COURT AND ) REQUEST FOR MONETARY 17 ) SANCTIONS [Dkt. 12]

HILLSTONE RESTAURANT )

18 GROUP, INC., ) ) 19 ) ) 20 ) Defendant. ) 21 ) ) 22 ) 23 24 I. INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND 25 26 On March 3, 2022, Plaintiff Sean Wagener brought tort claims in California state 27 court against Hillstone Restaurant Group, Inc., and Gulfstream Restaurant. (See Dkt. 1-1, 28 Ex. A [Complaint] at 9.) Wagener resides in California, while Hillstone is a Delaware

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1 corporation headquartered in Arizona, and Gulfstream (Wagener alleged initially) is a 2 California-based institution. (See id. at 12; Dkt. 1 [Notice of Removal of Action Under 3 28 U.S.C. 1441(b)1 (Diversity); Declaration of Roger R. Bracken, hereinafter 4 “Removal”] ¶¶ 4–5 at 4.) Wagener served the complaint on March 8, 2022. (See 5 Removal ¶ 3 at 4; Dkt. 1-2 [Process Served in California] at 1.) As it turns out, however, 6 Gulfstream is not a distinct legal entity but rather a “doing business as” name (“DBA”) of 7 Hillstone. (See Removal ¶ 6 at 2; Dkt. 1-3, Ex. C [Defendant Hillstone Restaurant 8 Group, Inc.’s Answer to Complaint] at 1.) Wagener thus voluntarily dismissed his claims 9 against Gulfstream on June 20, 2022. (See Removal ¶ 7 at 5.) Then on July 12, 2022, 10 Hillstone removed the case to this Court, invoking its diversity jurisdiction. (See id. ¶ 7 11 at 2–3.) Now before the Court is Wagener’s motion to remand this case to state court for 12 failure to complete a timely removal and request for monetary sanctions. (See Dkt. 12 13 [Motion to Remand the Matter to State Court and Request for Monetary Sanctions]). For 14 the following reasons, the motion and request are DENIED.1 15 16 II. DISCUSSION 17 18 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” and possess “only that power 19 authorized by Constitution and statute.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) 20 (citation omitted). A civil action brought in state court may be removed by the defendant 21 only if the action could have been brought in federal court originally. See 28 U.S.C. 22 § 1441(a). Federal district courts have diversity jurisdiction over suits when more than 23 $75,000 is in controversy and the citizenship of each plaintiff is different from that of 24 each defendant. See id. § 1332(a). When a case is removed, the burden of establishing 25 subject matter jurisdiction falls on the defendant, and the removal statute is strictly 26

27 1 Having read and considered the papers presented by the parties, the Court finds this matter appropriate 28 for disposition without a hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; Local Rule 7-15. Accordingly, the hearing set for September 12, 2022, is hereby vacated and removed from the calendar.

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1 construed against removal jurisdiction. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th 2 Cir. 1992). “Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of 3 removal in the first instance.” Id. 4 5 The deadline for a defendant to remove a case from state to federal court is 6 generally thirty days after receipt of the initial pleading. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1)– 7 (b)(2)(A). But “if the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable,” a defendant 8 may remove the case thirty “days after receipt . . . of a copy of an amended pleading, 9 motion, order[,] or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one 10 which is or has become removable.” Id. § 1446(b)(3). 11 12 Wagener’s sole basis for remanding this matter to state court is that Hillstone’s 13 removal was untimely. Wagener argues that Hillstone and Gulfstream were always one 14 and the same, so diversity jurisdiction existed from the moment that he filed his 15 complaint. Thus, according to Wagener, the thirty-day removal clock started ticking on 16 March 8—when service was effectuated—and Hillstone’s removal on July 12 was too 17 late. 18 19 Not so. A “bright-line approach” based on an “objective analysis of the pleadings” 20 governs removability. Harris v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 697 (9th Cir. 21 2005). It “is determined through examination of the four corners of the applicable 22 pleadings, not through subjective knowledge or a duty to make further inquiry.” Id. at 23 694. Only when removability is “unequivocally clear and certain” does the Section 24 1446(b)(3) thirty-day countdown commence. Dietrich v. Boeing Co., 14 F.4th 1089, 25 1091 (9th Cir. 2021). So it matters not for removability whether a defendant listed in a 26 complaint, in fact, exists—only that it would appear from a complaint that a defendant 27 28

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1 || exists.2 Looking solely at Wagener’s state-court complaint, Gulfstream’s purported 2 || California citizenship would defeat diversity jurisdiction. Removability therefore becam 3 || unequivocally clear and certain after Wagener voluntarily dismissed Gulfstream on June 4 ||20, and Hillstone’s removal on July 12 was timely. 6 Wagener cries that removal is nonetheless improper because Hillstone knew that 7 Gulfstream was a DBA of Hillstone and thus had notice of removability well before the 8 || voluntary dismissal of Gulfstream. What Hillstone knew, however, is neither here nor 9 ||there. Again, removability is not determined “through subjective knowledge” but an 10 || “objective analysis of the pleadings.” Harris, 425 F.3d at 694, 697. Indeed, Wagener’s 11 |] gloss on the thirty-day limit would vitiate an express purpose of the “bright-line 12 || approach” to removability—“avoid[ing] the spectre of inevitable collateral litigation 13 |}over ... whether [a] defendant had subjective knowledge.” Jd. at 697. Wagener’s 14 || asserted grounds for remand thus lack merit.? 15 16 || IV. CONCLUSION 17 18 For the foregoing reasons, Wagener’s motion to remand and request for monetary 19 |] sanctions are DENIED. 20 21 DATED: September 6, 2022 Lo pe 22 ‘ Lf! ee 23 CORMAC J. CARKEY 24 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 25 26 An exception 1s that “the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names [is] disregarded” when 97 || “determining whether a civil action is removable on the basis of” diversity jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1). That exception does not apply here. 28 ||* Because remand is unwarranted, so is Wagener’s request for costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees, under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 4.