Case 5:22-cv-01056-SSS-MAA Document 18 Filed 09/30/22 Page 1 of 11 Page ID #:544

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 10 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 11 12 SANJUANITA RODRIGUEZ, Case No. 5:22-cv-01056-SSS-MAAx

13 Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

14 v. MOTION TO REMAND [Dkt. 9] 15 FORD MOTOR COMPANY et al., 16

17 Defendants. 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 Case 5:22-cv-01056-SSS-MAA Document 18 Filed 09/30/22 Page 2 of 11 Page ID #:545

1 Before the Court is Plaintiff Sanjuanita Rodriguez’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion 2 to Remand (“Motion”). [Dkt. 9]. 3 Plaintiff originally filed this action in San Bernadino County Superior 4 Court on August 31, 2021. On June 27, 2022, Defendant Ford Motor Company 5 (“Defendant” or “FMC”) filed a Notice of Removal in this Court. It asserts that 6 federal jurisdiction over this matter is proper under 28 U.S.C. §1332 (a)(1), 7 which provides that “the district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all 8 civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of 9 $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between…citizens of different 10 States.” [Dkt. 1 at ¶ 3]. On July 29, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion opposing 11 removal. 12 Plaintiff does not contest that there is complete diversity between the 13 parties. She argues only that Defendants have not demonstrated a sufficient 14 amount in controversy to establish federal jurisdiction. Defendant maintains 15 that it is clear from the face of Plaintiff’s Complaint that she seeks more than 16 $75,000 in damages. [Id. at ¶ 8]. In the alternative, Defendant argues that it has 17 provided sufficient extrinsic evidence to demonstrate that the damages Plaintiff 18 has alleged, if awarded, would more than likely exceed this jurisdictional 19 minimum. [Id. at ¶ 9-20]. 20 Plaintiff also submits two Requests for Judicial Notice (“RJNs”) [Dkt. 10, 21 15] in connection with her Motion, as well as an Evidentiary Objection to the 22 Declaration submitted by Defendant’s attorney Michael Mortenson in support of 23 Defendant’s Notice of Removal [Dkt. 1-1]. [Dkt. 14-1]. Defendant has 24 requested the Court take judicial notice of one exhibit filed with its Notice of 25 Removal. [Dkt. 12 at 9 n.1; Dkt. 12-1 at ¶ 5]. 26 The Motion is fully briefed. [Dkt. 12, 19]. After considering the papers, 27 the Court finds it appropriate for resolution without a hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. 28 -2- Case 5:22-cv-01056-SSS-MAA Document 18 Filed 09/30/22 Page 3 of 11 Page ID #:546

1 P. 78; L.R. 7-15. For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion is 2 DENIED. 3 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 4 In February 2017, Plaintiff purchased a Ford Fusion (the “Vehicle”) from 5 car dealership Sunland Ford. The Vehicle was manufactured and distributed by 6 FMC. [Dkt. 1-2 at ¶ 4, 5, 9]. 7 Plaintiff alleges that, during the Vehicle’s warranty period, it began to 8 exhibit defects that “substantially impair[ed] [its] use, value or safety[.]” [Id. at 9 ¶ 11]. She returned the Vehicle to Sunland Ford or another in-state agent of 10 FMC (the Complaint does not specify) who has not successfully repaired the 11 Vehicle, provided a replacement, or offered either restitution or any other 12 remedy. [Id. at ¶ 12]. 13 Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in San Bernadino Superior Court. 14 See Sanjuanita Rodriguez. v. Ford Motor Co., et al., Case No. CIVSB2125348. 15 She brought seven total Causes of Action against FMC and Sunland Ford. Five 16 of the seven arise under California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, 17 which allows "any buyer of consumer goods who is damaged by a failure to 18 comply with any obligation under [the Act] or under an implied or express 19 warranty or service contract [to]… bring an action for the recovery of damages 20 and other legal and equitable relief." Cal. Civ. Code § 1794. Plaintiff seeks 21 relief including actual damages, civil penalties of double her actual damages as 22 authorized under Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(c) and/or (e), and attorney’s fees. [Dkt. 23 1-2 at ¶ 13-17, 21-25, 29, 34, 48]. 24 On May 27, 2022, Plaintiff dismissed Sunland Ford from the suit. [Dkt. 25 1-5]. Defendant filed its Notice of Removal with this Court one month later. 26 [Dkt. 1]. 27 /// 28 /// -3- Case 5:22-cv-01056-SSS-MAA Document 18 Filed 09/30/22 Page 4 of 11 Page ID #:547

1 LEGAL STANDARD 2 A defendant may remove any civil action over which the federal district 3 courts enjoy subject matter jurisdiction. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers 4 Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1983). It must remove to the district court for the 5 district and division embracing the location where the state court action is 6 pending. Id., see also 28 U.S.C. § 1441. 7 Any defendant asserting diversity jurisdiction as the basis for removal 8 must demonstrate that (1) no defendant is a citizen of the same state as any 9 plaintiff and (2) the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 10 1441(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 11 “[T]he amount in controversy ... is determined by the complaint operative 12 at the time of removal and encompasses all relief a court may grant on that 13 complaint if the plaintiff is victorious.” Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 14 F.3d 413, 414-15 (9th Cir. 2018). This includes any compensatory or punitive 15 damages alleged as well as any attorneys’ fees that may be awarded under fee 16 shifting statutes but does not encompass other “costs” of litigation or 17 prejudgment interest. Gonzales v. CarMax Auto Superstores, LLC, 840 F.3d 18 644, 648-49 (9th Cir. 2016). 19 Importantly, the amount in controversy is “not a prospective assessment 20 of [a] defendant's liability,” Lewis v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 400 21 (9th Cir. 2010). Rather, it is the amount plaintiff places at issue in her 22 complaint. Gonzales v. CarMax Auto Superstores, LLC, 840 F.3d 644, 648-49 23 (9th Cir. 2016). This means that a court conducting an amount-in-controversy 24 inquiry should not deduct from plaintiff’s demand any possible reductions 25 defendants might achieve by asserting available defenses to her claims. See 26 Geographic Expeditions, Inc. v. Estate of Lhota ex rel. Lhotka, 599 F.3d 1102, 27 1108 (9th Cir. 2010). 28 -4- Case 5:22-cv-01056-SSS-MAA Document 18 Filed 09/30/22 Page 5 of 11 Page ID #:548

1 Where a plaintiff moves to return a removed action to state court on the 2 grounds that the amount in controversy is not more than $75,000, defendant’s 3 burden in successfully resisting remand will vary depending on how plaintiff 4 has drafted the underlying complaint. Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 5 F.3d 696, 698-99 (9th Cir. 2007). If the complaint alleges, “on its face,” a 6 sufficient amount in controversy, defendant’s burden is presumptively satisfied 7 unless it appears to a “legal certainty” that the plaintiff cannot actually recover 8 that amount. Id.; see also Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 9 1992). 10 If it is “unclear or ambiguous from the face of a state-court complaint 11 whether the requisite amount in controversy is pled,” a “preponderance of the 12 evidence standard” will apply. Guglielmino, 506 F.3d at 699, citing Sanchez v. 13 Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996). The amount-in- 14 controversy inquiry will not be “confined to the face of the complaint.” Valdez 15 v. Allstate Ins. Co., 372 F.3d 1115, 1117 (9th Cir. 2004). Rather, both sides 16 may “submit proof,” which may include “summary-judgment-type evidence.” 17 Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 88 (2014); see 18 also Chavez, 888 F.3d at 416. The court then considers each parties’ evidence, 19 the complaint, and the removal petition to determine if defendant has 20 established that it is “more likely than not” that the amount placed in 21 controversy satisfies the jurisdictional requirement. Sanchez v. Monumental Life 22 Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir. 1996). 23 DISCUSSION 24 A. Requests for Judicial Notice and Plaintiff’s Evidentiary Objections. 25 Plaintiff requests judicial notice of ten remand orders issued in ‘lemon 26 law’ cases similar to, although distinguishable from, her own. [Dkt. 10, Dkt. 27 15]. Although Plaintiff does not discuss the purposes for which she proposes 28 -5- Case 5:22-cv-01056-SSS-MAA Document 18 Filed 09/30/22 Page 6 of 11 Page ID #:549

1 these materials be noticed, she has presumably offered them as examples she 2 wishes this Court to follow. 3 Rule 201 is a “means of establishing facts that are not reasonably subject 4 to dispute, not legal principles.” Derum v. Saks & Co., 95 F. Supp. 3d 1221, 5 1224 (S.D. Cal. 2015). A federal court may consider the reasoning and 6 conclusions of other federal courts without relying upon Rule 201. See McVey v. 7 McVey, 26 F. Supp. 3d 980, 984-85 (C.D. Cal. 2014). The Court denies 8 Plaintiff’s requests for judicial notice of these documents, although it may 9 consider them for whatever weight they may have as non-binding precedent. 10 Plaintiff also objects to portions of a Declaration submitted by 11 Defendant’s attorney concerning his estimate of the attorney’s fees Plaintiff may 12 be awarded if she prevails in this case. [Dkt. 14-1]. As set forth in greater 13 detail below, Defendants have adequately established a sufficient amount-in- 14 controversy based on actual and punitive damages alone. Because the instant 15 Motion is resolved without considering the Declaration, it is unnecessary to rule 16 upon Plaintiff’s objections to it and the request is denied. See Meador v. 17 Pleasant Valley State Prison, 312 F. App'x 954, 956 (9th Cir. 2009). (“Judicial 18 notice is inappropriate where the facts to be noticed are irrelevant.”). 19 Finally, Defendant requests that this Court take judicial notice of the 20 Sales Contract for Plaintiff’s Vehicle. [Dkt. 12 at 9 n.1; Dkt. 12-1 at ¶ 5]. But 21 the only information contained in the Sales Contract relevant in deciding this 22 Motion is the price Plaintiff paid for the Vehicle, and Plaintiff has already 23 provided this information in her Complaint. [Dkt. 12-2]. As the underlying 24 pleadings and exhibits attached thereto may be considered in connection with a 25 motion to remand without need for judicial notice and no other information 26 contained in the contract is necessary to address this matter, Defendant’s request 27 is also denied. 28 -6- Case 5:22-cv-01056-SSS-MAA Document 18 Filed 09/30/22 Page 7 of 11 Page ID #:550

1 B. Plaintiff’s Motion for Remand. 2 Because federal courts’ jurisdiction is limited, it is the responsibility of 3 any court to which an action is removed to determine whether all prerequisites 4 for jurisdiction are met – not only those aspects that the parties may dispute. 5 Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 415 (9th Cir. 2018). The 6 Court begins by noting that complete diversity exists between the parties: 7 Plaintiff is an individual residing in California, while Defendant is a corporation 8 organized in Delaware and whose principal place of business is in Michigan. 9 [Dkt. 1-2 at ¶ 2, 4]. The remaining question, and the basis for this Motion, is 10 whether 28 U.S.C. §1332 (a)’s amount-in-controversy requirement is satisfied. 11 In its Notice of Removal, Defendant first argues that it is clear from the 12 face of Plaintiff’s Complaint that she has alleged an amount in controversy 13 exceeding $75,000. 14 Only once does the Complaint provide a specific dollar amount of 15 damages owed. In Plaintiff’s First Cause of Action, she alleges that Defendant 16 failed to meet its obligations to repair, replace, or provide restitution for the 17 unusable Vehicle as required by Cal. Civ. Code §1739.2(d) and §1739.1(a)(2). 18 [Id. at ¶ 13]. In the next line, she asserts that she “suffered damages in a sum to 19 be proven at trial in an amount not less than $25,001.00.” [Id. ¶ 14]. Then, after 20 identifying this quantity of “damages” owed, Plaintiff contends that Defendant’s 21 failure to comply with its obligations under the Song-Beverly Act was “willful,” 22 such that “Plaintiff is entitled to a civil penalty of two times [her] actual 23 damages” pursuant to Cal. Civ. Code §1794(c), or in the alternative, an 24 equivalent civil penalty under §1794(e). [Id. at ¶ 15-17]. 25 Defendant’s position is that this portion of Plaintiff’s Complaint should 26 be understood to mean that she has pled no less than $25,001.00 in actual 27 damages. It then reasons that this figure, combined with Song-Beverly Act’s 28 -7- Case 5:22-cv-01056-SSS-MAA Document 18 Filed 09/30/22 Page 8 of 11 Page ID #:551

1 civil penalties of double Plaintiff’s actual damages, would cross the $75,000 2 minimum threshold. [Dkt. 1 at 4]. 3 Plaintiff insists that Defendant misunderstands her allegations. She now 4 seeks to “clarify” that “damages,” as used in the context described above, was 5 meant to include not only actual damages but also civil penalties, attorneys’ 6 fees, and punitive damages. [Dkt. 9-3 at 13]. 7 Both Plaintiff and Defendant find support for their respective 8 interpretations in recent, albeit unpublished, decisions within this district. Faced 9 with pleadings virtually identical to those at issue here, some courts in the 10 Central District have agreed that “damages” could plausibly refer to both actual 11 damages and other monetary remedies sought such that the amount in 12 controversy cannot be readily determined from the face of the complaint. See 13 Mahlmeister v. FCA US LLC, No. 21-00564, 2021 WL 1662578 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 14 28, 2021); Edwards v. Ford Motor Company, 16-05852, 2016 WL 6583585 15 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2016). But others have reasoned that where Plaintiff alleges 16 she has “suffered damages in a sum to be proven at trial in an amount not less 17 than $25,001.00,” and separately seeks “a civil penalty of two times Plaintiff's 18 actual damages,” she necessarily “put[s] more than $75,000 in controversy” 19 such that Defendant’s burden is presumptively satisfied. Coronel v. Ford Motor 20 Company, No. 19-09841, 2020 WL 550690 at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2020); see 21 also McDonald v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. 17-2011, 2017 WL 5843385 (S.D. 22 Cal. Nov. 28, 2017). 23 While this Court is reluctant to reward Plaintiff’s imprecise drafting, it 24 acknowledges that there is precedent in this jurisdiction supporting her position. 25 As the Ninth Circuit requires that “any doubt about the right of removal” be 26 resolved “in favor of remand,” Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 27 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009), it finds that Defendant must satisfy the more 28 demanding preponderance standard in order to defeat Plaintiff’s Motion. -8- Case 5:22-cv-01056-SSS-MAA Document 18 Filed 09/30/22 Page 9 of 11 Page ID #:552

1 Nevertheless, Defendant has met this heightened burden. Plaintiff’s 2 Complaint explicitly seeks both actual damages and punitive damages equal to 3 double the actual damages awarded. Under the Song-Beverly Act, actual 4 damages are calculated based upon the “amount equal to the actual price paid or 5 payable by the buyer,” less the reduction in value “directly attributable to use by 6 the buyer.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(B)-(C). In claims under the Act 7 concerning a consumer vehicle, this requires multiplying “the price of the 8 vehicle the buyer paid or will pay by a fraction—the denominator is 120,000, 9 and the numerator is the number of miles the buyer drove the car before the first 10 relevant repair.” Mullin v. FCA US, LLC, No. 20-2061, 2020 WL 2509081 at *2 11 (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2021). 12 The Sales Contract that Plaintiff included as an exhibit to her Complaint 13 reflects a contract price of $30,178.84. [Dkt. 12-2]. Defendant’s counsel 14 represents in his sworn declaration that, based upon his review of Plaintiff’s 15 allegations and the repair records provided by FMC and Sunland Ford, the 16 Vehicle had been driven 8,971 miles at the time it was first brought into a 17 dealership for a defect alleged in the Complaint. [Dkt. 12 at 20; Dkt. 12-1 at ¶ 18 6]. Identifying this mileage as the appropriate ‘numerator’ for the formula set 19 forth in the Song-Beverly Act, Defendant then estimates Plaintiff’s actual 20 damages to be $26,339.42. 21 Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendant identified the first relevant repair 22 “arbitrarily,” and that it failed to provide “any evidentiary basis” for its 23 calculation of actual damages, both disregards the evidence Defendant has in 24 fact provided and overstates Defendant’s burden at this stage of the proceedings. 25 [Dkt. 9-3 at 15-16]; see Treuhaft v. Mercedes-Benz, No. 20-11155, 2021 WL 26 2864877 at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 26, 2021) (a “plaintiff opposing removal” cannot 27 successfully mount a “factual attack” on the removing defendant by “simply 28 demanding evidence from [it].”). To avoid remand, Defendant need only set -9- Case 5:22-cv-01056-SSS-MAA Document 18 Filed 09/30/22 Page 10 of 11 Page ID #:553

1 forth “underlying facts” demonstrating that it is more likely than not that the 2 plaintiff has placed more than $75,000 in controversy. Coleman v. Estes 3 Express Lines, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1148 (C.D. Cal. 2010). It is “not 4 obligated to research, state, and prove the plaintiff's claims for damages.” Id. 5 (internal citations omitted, emphasis in original). Defendant has adequately 6 demonstrated that Plaintiff has alleged about $26,000 of actual damages in her 7 Complaint. 8 These actual damages, plus the civil penalties Plaintiff seeks, together 9 exceed the minimum amount in controversy. Plaintiff insists that the potential 10 penalties should not be included in this calculation because Defendant has failed 11 to provide evidence that she is likely to prevail on the claims that would entitle 12 her to punitive damages. [Dkt. 9-3 at 19]. But this argument misrepresents the 13 relevant law. The Ninth Circuit has made clear that the amount in controversy 14 encompasses the “maximum recovery the plaintiff could reasonably recover.” 15 Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott, 936 F.3d 920, 927 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal 16 citation omitted). Defendant has identified this maximum based upon its 17 estimate of actual damages. It need not also prove that Plaintiff is likely to win 18 civil penalties – only that it is not legally impossible that they will be awarded 19 to her. See, e.g., Brooks v. Ford Motor Company, No. 20-302, 2020 WL 20 2731830 at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 26, 2020). Certainly, Defendant has done as 21 much here. 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// -10- Case 5:42-cv-01056-SSS-MAA Document 18 Filed 09/30/22 Page 1lof11 Page ID #:554

1 CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's Motion to Remand is 3 || DENIED. This case will remain on this Court’s calendar. The hearing on this 4] Motion and the Scheduling Conference currently set for the same date have 5 || been vacated. [Dkt. 16, 17]. The Court will issue a Scheduling Order based 6 || upon the parties’ Rule 26(f) Report. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 || Dated: September 30, 2022 10 SUNSHINE S4SYKES 11 United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 -11-