Case 5:22-cv-00188-RAO Document 24 Filed 11/30/22 Page 1 of 12 Page ID #:3482

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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 HECTOR M. C., Case No. EDCV 22-00188-RAO

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

ORDER

14 KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social 15 Security, Defendant. 16 17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 Plaintiff Hector M. C.1 (“Plaintiff”) challenges the Commissioner’s denial of 19 his Social Security Disability (“SSD”) benefits under Title II of the Social Security 20 Act. For the reasons stated below, the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED. 21

II. SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS

22 On July 26, 2012, Plaintiff initiated an application for SSD benefits alleging a 23 disability onset date of August 11, 2003. (Administrative Record (“AR”) 209.) The 24 Commissioner denied the claim by initial determination on December 28, 2012, and 25

26 1 Plaintiff’s name is partially redacted in compliance with Federal Rule of Civil

27 Procedure 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United 28 States. Case 5:22-cv-00188-RAO Document 24 Filed 11/30/22 Page 2 of 12 Page ID #:3483

1 upon reconsideration on June 11, 2013. (AR 78-85, 87-95.) Plaintiff requested a 2 hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on June 21, 2013. (AR 112- 3 13.) Hearings were held on February 2, 2014, and June 27, 2014. (AR 28-77.) The 4 ALJ issued an unfavorable decision September 26, 2014. (AR 9-27.) The ALJ’s 5 decision became the Commissioner’s final decision on March 3, 2016, when the 6 Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (AR 1-6.) Plaintiff filed a 7 civil action in this Court on May 10, 2016. (AR 594-98.) The Court issued an order 8 remanding the matter for further proceedings pursuant to a stipulation of voluntary 9 remand. (AR 603-06.) On March 20, 2017, the Appeals Council issued an order 10 remanding the matter to the ALJ. (AR 619-20.) 11 On June 28, 2017, a second ALJ issued a second unfavorable decision. (AR 12 546-69.) Plaintiff filed a second civil action in this Court on September 8, 2017. (AR 13 817-18.) On March 1, 2018, this Court issued an order remanding the matter for 14 further administrative proceedings pursuant to a stipulation of voluntary remand. 15 (AR 850-54.) The Appeals Council subsequently issued an order remanding the case 16 to the ALJ. (AR 862-63.) 17 On January 30, 2019, a third hearing was held before a third ALJ. (AR 748- 18 92.) On March 13, 2019, the ALJ issued a third unfavorable decision. (AR 725-40.) 19 Plaintiff filed a third civil action in this Court on May 21, 2019. (AR 1808.) On 20 February 28, 2020, this Court issued an order reversing the third ALJ’s decision and 21 remanding the matter for further proceedings. (AR 1811-26.) In its order dated May 22 19, 2020, the Appeals Council vacated the previous final decision and remanded the 23 matter for further proceedings before an ALJ. (AR 1831.) 24 On September 9, 2021, a fourth hearing was held before an ALJ. (AR 1761- 25 805.) On October 26, 2021, the ALJ issued a fourth unfavorable decision. (AR 1732- 26 60.) On January 21, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant action. (Dkt. No. 1.) 27 In reaching a fourth determination, the ALJ followed the familiar five-step 28 sequential evaluation process to assess whether Plaintiff was disabled under the

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1 Social Security Act. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 828 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995). At step 2 one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity during 3 the period from his alleged onset date of August 10, 2003 through June 30, 2008, his 4 date last insured (“DLI”). (AR 1740.) At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had 5 the severe impairments of degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine; carpal tunnel 6 syndrome in the upper right extremity, post-status surgery; and obesity. (AR 1741.) 7 At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff “did not have an impairment or 8 combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the 9 listed impairments in 20 [C.F.R] Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 [C.F.R.] 10 §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525 and 404.1526).” (Id.) 11 Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual 12 functional capacity (“RFC”) to: 13 [P]erform light work . . . . Specifically, the [Plaintiff] could lift and/or carry ten pounds frequently, twenty pounds occasionally; he could stand 14 and/or walk in intervals of thirty minutes at a time for a total of two 15 hours out of an eight-hour workday; he could sit for one hour at a time for a total of six hours out of an eight hour workday; he could ambulate 16 on a level field but could not balance enough to walk on an uneven 17 surface; he could occasionally climb ramps and stairs; he could not climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds; he could occasionally operate foot 18 pedals with either foot; he could occasionally stoop and crouch; he could 19 not kneel or crawl; he was to avoid concentrated exposure to vibration and unprotected heights; he was to avoid all exposure to working around 20 moving machinery; and he was to avoid [the] use of handheld vibratory 21 tools with the right hand. 22 (AR 1742-43.) At step four, based on Plaintiff’s RFC and the vocational expert’s 23 testimony, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work 24 through the DLI. (AR 1751.) At step five, considering Plaintiff’s age, education, 25 work experience, and residual functional capacity, the ALJ found that “there were 26 jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant 27 could have performed.” (AR 1752.) Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff 28

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1 had not been under a disability from the alleged onset date, August 10, 2003, through 2 the DLI, June 30, 2008. (Id.) 3 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 4 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a district court may review the Commissioner’s 5 decision to deny benefits. A court must affirm an ALJ’s findings of fact if they are 6 supported by substantial evidence, and if the proper legal standards were applied. 7 Mayes v. Massanari, 276 F.3d 453, 458-59 (9th Cir. 2001). “Substantial evidence . 8 . . is ‘more than a mere scintilla[,]’ . . . [which] means—and means only—‘such 9 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 10 conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill, __ U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154, 203 L. Ed.2d 11 504 (2019) (citations omitted); Revels v. Berryhill, 874 F.3d 648, 654 (9th Cir. 2017). 12 An ALJ can satisfy the substantial evidence requirement “by setting out a detailed 13 and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his 14 interpretation thereof, and making findings.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 725 15 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). 16 “[T]he Commissioner’s decision cannot be affirmed simply by isolating a 17 specific quantum of supporting evidence. Rather, a court must consider the record 18 as a whole, weighing both evidence that supports and evidence that detracts from the 19 Secretary’s conclusion.” Aukland v. Massanari, 257 F.3d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) 20 (citations and internal quotations omitted). “‘Where evidence is susceptible to more 21 than one rational interpretation,’ the ALJ’s decision should be upheld.” Ryan v. 22 Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 528 F.3d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Burch v. Barnhart, 23 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)); see also Robbins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 466 F.3d 24 880, 882 (9th Cir. 2006) (“If the evidence can support either affirming or reversing 25 the ALJ’s conclusion, we may not substitute our judgment for that of the ALJ.”). The 26 Court may review only “the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability 27 determination and may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.” 28 Orn v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 625, 630 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Connett v. Barnhart, 340

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1 F.3d 871, 874 (9th Cir. 2003)). 2 IV. DISCUSSION 3 Plaintiff raises two issues for review: (1) whether the ALJ failed to properly 4 consider relevant medical evidence in assessing the RFC; and (2) whether the ALJ 5 properly considered Plaintiff’s subjective testimony and complaints when 6 determining the RFC. (JS at 9.) For the reasons stated below, the Court affirms. 7 A. The ALJ Properly Considered Medical Opinion Evidence 8 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not properly consider the limitations set forth 9 by his treating orthopedist, Dr. Doty, in determining his RFC. (JS at 11.) 10 Additionally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly placed the opinions of the 11 medical expert, Dr. Lorber, “above all other medical opinions.” (JS at 15.) The 12 Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly evaluated and weighed the conflicting 13 and diverging medical opinion in the record. (JS at 20-21.) For the reasons stated 14 below, the Court agrees with the Commissioner. 15 1. Applicable Legal Standards 16 Courts give varying degrees of deference to medical opinions based on the 17 provider: (1) treating physicians who examine and treat; (2) examining physicians 18 who examine, but do not treat; and (3) non-examining physicians who do not examine 19 or treat. 2 Valentine v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 692 (9th Cir. 2009). 20 Most often, the opinion of a treating physician is given greater weight than the 21 opinion of a non-treating physician, and the opinion of an examining physician is 22 given greater weight than the opinion of a non-examining physician. See Garrison 23 v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1012 (9th Cir. 2014). 24 The ALJ must provide “clear and convincing” reasons to reject the ultimate 25 conclusions of a treating or examining physician. Embrey v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 418,

26 2 For applications filed on or after March 27, 2017, the Social Security 27 Administration eliminated the use of the term “treating source,” and no longer gives deference to treating source medical opinions. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a); Woods 28 v. Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 789-90 (9th Cir. 2022).

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1 422 (9th Cir. 1988); Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. When a treating or examining 2 physician’s opinion is contradicted by another opinion, the ALJ may reject it only by 3 providing specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence in the 4 record. Orn, 495 F.3d at 633; Lester, 81 F.3d at 830; Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. 5 Admin., 533 F.3d 1155, 1164 (9th Cir. 2008). “An ALJ can satisfy the ‘substantial 6 evidence’ requirement by ‘setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts 7 and conflicting evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings.’” 8 Garrison, 759 F.3d at 1012 (citation omitted). 9 2. Discussion 10 Plaintiff contends the ALJ did not properly consider his treating physician’s 11 medical opinion precluding Plaintiff from heavy lifting, repetitive or forceful 12 gripping, grasping with the right hand, and torquing use the right upper extremity. 13 (JS at 11; AR 349.) 14 A treating physician's opinion is generally given the most weight and may be 15 “controlling” if it is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory 16 diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in 17 the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); Revels, 874 F.3d at 654 (citation omitted). 18 Here, the ALJ assigned “little weight” to Dr. Doty’s medical opinion. (AR 1748.) 19 The ALJ found that Dr. Doty’s right-hand restrictions —precluding Plaintiff from 20 heavy lifting, repetitive or forceful gripping or grasping with the right hand (AR 21 349)— were “vague and do not include specific functional limitations associated with 22 the term heavy work and repetitiveness of right-hand limitations.” (AR 1748.) The 23 ALJ further found a complete limitation to all repetitive hand motions was not 24 supported by the record. (Id.) The ALJ considered Dr. Doty’s report finding that 25 Plaintiff’s right-hand had improved with release surgery and postoperative physical 26 therapy. (AR 333, 1748.) The ALJ also considered Dr. Doty’s report from May 2005 27 that found no tenderness, atrophy, allodynia, inflammation, spasm, local swelling, 28 thenar, or hypothenar muscle wasting in Plaintiff’s elbows and wrists. (AR 334-35,

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1 1748.) The same report showed Plaintiff had a normal range of motion in the wrists 2 and hands, and only a trace positive Tinel’s sign in the right wrist. (AR 345-46, 3 1748.) The ALJ identified inconsistencies between Dr. Doty’s medical examinations 4 and the prescribed right-hand limitation, ultimately finding that Dr. Doty’s opinions 5 do not merit controlling weight. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1043 (9th 6 Cir. 2008) (finding an ALJ may reject a physician’s opinion where the opinion is 7 inconsistent with the medical record). 8 Plaintiff disagrees with the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Doty’s terminology was 9 vague. (JS at 11-12.) Plaintiff contends that Dr. Doty set forth work restrictions in 10 worker compensation terminology, and “this [ALJ] has simply refused to translate 11 [them] into specific Social Security restrictions.” (JS at 12.) Plaintiff further 12 contends that Dr. Doty’s “worker’s compensation terminology” restriction “is 13 equivalent to a restriction to no more than occasional use” of Plaintiff’s right-upper 14 extremity in Social Security terms.3 (Id.) Plaintiff does not cite, nor is the Court 15 aware of, any binding authority requiring the ALJ to translate worker’s compensation 16 terminology into social security terminology, or any binding authority that Plaintiff’s 17 worker’s compensation restrictions are equivalent to a restriction of occasional use. 18 “The terms employed in worker’s compensation disability rating are not equivalent 19 to Social Security disability terminology.” Bowser v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 121 F. 20 App'x 231, 242 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Desrosiers v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 21 846 F.2d 573, 576 (9th Cir. 1988)). The objective medical findings are to be 22 evaluated as any other medical opinion. Id. As discussed above, the ALJ properly 23 evaluated Dr. Doty’s medical findings and assigned them little weight. 24 The Court concludes that the ALJ set out a detailed summary of the conflicting 25 3 To the extent Plaintiff tries to find support for a more restrictive RFC in the third 26 non-disability determination (see JS at 12), the Court notes that the third ALJ 27 determination was reversed (see AR 1811-26), and the Appeals Council vacated the decision (see AR 1831). Thus, the reversed and vacated decision provides little, if 28 any, support for Plaintiff’s contention.

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1 evidence in evaluating Dr. Doty’s opinion and provided specific and legitimate 2 reasons supported by substantial evidence in assigning little weight to Dr. Doty’s 3 opinion. 4 1. Medical examiner testimony 5 Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ improperly relied on the opinion of the 6 medical expert, Dr. Lorber, weighing it above all other medical opinions in the 7 record. (JS at 15.) Additionally, Plaintiff argues that there are “numerous opinions 8 in this record by medical doctors as to what Plaintiff’s limitations were prior to his 9 [DLI].” (Id.) Finally, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s sole basis for determining 10 Plaintiff’s RFC is Dr. Lorber’s testimony. (Id.) 11 Although Plaintiff might have intended to argue that treating physicians’ 12 medical opinions deserve some deference over non-treating or non-examining 13 medical opinions, Plaintiff does not present any actual argument concerning the 14 ALJ’s analysis, identify any errors, or include even one citation to the record. Indeed, 15 even though Plaintiff states that there are numerous medical opinions establishing 16 Plaintiff’s RFC, he does not provide any citations. Thus, no such argument has been 17 properly presented.4 See Carmickle, 533 F.3d at 1161 n.2 (declining to address 18 challenge to ALJ’s finding when claimant failed to argue the issue with any 19 specificity); see also Nazarian v. Berryhill, No. CV 17-1114 JC, 2018 WL 2938581, 20 at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2018) (collecting cases). The Court declines to address 21 Plaintiff’s argument regarding Dr. Lorber’s opinion testimony.

22 4 Similarly, Plaintiff states that during the 2021 hearing the ALJ was “extremely 23 difficult to understand”; that medical expert, Dr. Lorber “clearly did not want to testify . . . [and] was incredibly frustrated on multiple occasions”; the Spanish 24 interpreter “was clearly having his own difficulties understanding everyone’s 25 testimony”; and the hearing transcript contains numerous inaudible notations. (JS at 11.) However, Plaintiff does not cite to any case authority or present any actual 26 argument concerning the 2021 hearing. (See id.) Furthermore, Plaintiff did not 27 object during the hearing and instead Plaintiff’s attorney intervened to assist in the testimony. (AR 1774-75.) The Court declines to address any challenge to the 2021 28 hearing.

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1 B. The ALJ Provided Specific, Clear, and Convincing Reasons for 2 Discounting Plaintiff’s Subjective Symptom Testimony 3 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed legal error by improperly discounting 4 Plaintiff’s subjective complaints based on his daily activities. (JS at 29.) The 5 Commissioner contends that the ALJ properly discounted Plaintiff’s subjective pain 6 testimony by considering Plaintiff’s daily activities, Plaintiff’s conservative 7 treatment, and objective medical testimony. (JS at 34.) For the reasons discussed 8 below, the Court agrees with the Commissioner. 9 3. Applicable Legal Standards 10 Where, as here, the claimant has presented evidence of an underlying 11 impairment and the ALJ did not make a finding of malingering (see AR 1741), the 12 ALJ must “evaluate the intensity and persistence of [the] individual’s symptoms . . . 13 and determine the extent to which [those] symptoms limit [his or her] . . . ability to 14 perform work-related activities.” Soc. Sec. Ruling (“SSR”) 16-3p, 2017 WL 15 5180304, at *4. In assessing the intensity and persistence of symptoms, the ALJ 16 “examine[s] the entire case record, including the objective medical evidence; an 17 individual’s statements . . . ; statements and other information provided by medical 18 sources and other persons; and any other relevant evidence in the individual’s case 19 record.” Id. at *4. The ALJ must provide “specific, clear and convincing reasons” 20 for rejecting the claimant’s statements. Lambert v. Saul, 980 F.3d 1266, 1277 (9th 21 Cir. 2020) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Trevizo v. 22 Berryhill, 871 F.3d 664, 678 (9th Cir. 2017). The ALJ must identify what testimony 23 was found not credible and explain what evidence undermines that testimony. 24 Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1208 (9th Cir. 2001). “General findings are 25 insufficient.” Lester, 81 F.3d at 834. 26 4. Discussion 27 The ALJ identified four reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s subjective 28 testimony as inconsistent with the record. The ALJ considered (1) Plaintiff’s daily

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1 activities (AR 1743-44), (2) the objective medical evidence (AR 1743-47), (3) the 2 conservative treatment history during the relevant period (AR 1741, 1744-45), and 3 (4) Plaintiff’s failure to follow treatment recommendation (AR 1750). 4 Plaintiff argues the ALJ improperly focuses on Plaintiff’s ability to care for his 5 children during the relevant time period as a basis for rejecting his “subjective 6 statements, testimony under oath, and credibility.” (JS at 29.) Plaintiff’s argument 7 is without merit. 8 An ALJ may use inconsistencies between a claimant’s testimony and his or 9 her other statements, conduct, and daily activities as a basis for discounting his or her 10 testimony. See Tonapetyan v. Halter, 242 F.3d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 2001); Light v. 11 Soc. Sec. Admin., 119 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1997). Courts in this circuit have relied 12 on evidence of daily activities to find subjective allegations not credible. See Fair v. 13 Bowen, 885 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding the ALJ properly discredited 14 claimants pain allegations based on his ability to care for all of his own personal 15 needs, to perform routine household maintenance and shopping chores, to ride public 16 transportation, and to drive his own car); see also Rollins v. Massanari, 261 F.3d 853, 17 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming an ALJ’s adverse credibility determination reasonable 18 despite “equivocal” testimony about how regularly the claimant engaged in her 19 activities); Burch, 400 F.3d at 680 (affirming the ALJ’s adverse credibility 20 determination where claimant could care for her own personal needs, cook, clean, 21 shop, and interact with her nephew and boyfriend). Here, the ALJ found Plaintiff’s 22 ability to care for his children by himself discredits his allegations of requiring help 23 with his own personal care. (AR 1744.) Additionally, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s 24 daily activities of caring for his infant and toddler children are generally inconsistent 25 with Plaintiff’s allegation that he required a cane to ambulate. (Id.) Even if the 26 evidence of Plaintiff’s daily activities could also be interpreted to be more favorable 27 to Plaintiff, the ALJ’s interpretation is rational and should be upheld. See Burch, 400 28 F.3d at 680.

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1 Plaintiff also contends that the extent to which Plaintiff participated in caring 2 for his young children is unclear from the testimony. (JS at 32.) However, the ALJ 3 specifically considered Plaintiff’s statements that he was capable of bathing his 4 children and changing their diapers. (AR 1743-44.) Plaintiff also argues that his 5 ability to provide minimal care for his children does not “translate into an ability to 6 perform occupations including production worker, table worker, and production 7 inspector.” (JS at 33.) “While transferability of skills to a work setting is one way 8 in which an ALJ may consider [Plaintiff]’s daily activities, an ALJ may also discount 9 [Plaintiff] testimony where reported daily activities contradict the [Plaintiff]’s 10 alleged extent of [his] limitations.” Burkett v. Berryhill, 732 F. App’x 547, 552 (9th 11 Cir. 2018) (citing Orn, 495 F.3d at 639). 12 Plaintiff argues that there is not enough information from his testimony to 13 substantiate the ALJ’s “complete reliance upon this particular issue” as a basis to 14 discredit Plaintiff’s subjective testimony. (JS at 32.) The ALJ did not solely rely on 15 Plaintiff’s daily activities to discredit his subjective testimony, the ALJ also relied on 16 the objective medical evidence, Plaintiff’s conservative treatment, and Plaintiff’s 17 failure to follow prescribed treatment. The ALJ considered several normal 18 examination findings without persistent positive clinical signs in his back and 19 extremities. (AR 1743-47.) Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s claim that he 20 is unable to grasp and hold things is in direct contrast with the medical records that 21 show his right-hand pain had improved after surgery, he had no tenderness, atrophy, 22 inflammation, spams, swelling, and he had normal range of motion in his wrists and 23 hands.5 (AR 1751.) The ALJ also found that Plaintiff “received mostly routine, 24 conservative, and non-emergency treatment.” (AR 1744.) Lastly the ALJ found that 25 Plaintiff’s decision not to undergo lumbar surgery suggests that his symptoms are not

26 5 Although Plaintiff argues that the lack of supporting objective evidence cannot form 27 the sole basis for discounting Plaintiff’s symptom testimony (JS at 30), here the ALJ also relied on daily activities, conservative treatment, and the failure to follow 28 prescribed treatment.

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1 as debilitating as alleged. (AR 1745-46.) The ALJ did not solely rely on Plaintiff’s 2 testimony to discredit his subjective statements. The Court finds that the ALJ 3 properly relied on Plaintiff’s daily activities, and provided specific, clear, and 4 convincing reasons for discrediting Plaintiff’s subjective testimony. 5 The Court finds that the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff was not disabled 6 during the relevant time period is supported by substantial evidence. 7 V. CONCLUSION 8 IT IS ORDERED that Judgment shall be entered AFFIRMING the decision of 9 the Commissioner denying benefits. 10 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court serve copies of this 11 Order and the Judgment on counsel for both parties. 12 13 DATED: November 30, 2022 /s/

ROZELLA A. OLIVER

14

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

15

16

17 NOTICE

18 THIS DECISION IS NOT INTENDED FOR PUBLICATION IN WESTLAW,

LEXIS/NEXIS, OR ANY OTHER LEGAL DATABASE.

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