Case 2:22-cv-08629-GW-JPR Document 11 Filed 12/21/22 Page 1 of 2 Page ID #:144

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. CV 22-8629-GW-JPRx Date December 21, 2022 Title Frank Galeas v. Syncreon Technology USA LLC, et al.

Present: The Honorable GEORGE H. WU, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Javier Gonzalez None Present Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder Tape No. Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants: None Present None Present

PROCEEDINGS (IN CHAMBERS): ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REGARDING

AMOUNT-IN-CONTROVERSY CALCULATION

This action is presently set for a Scheduling Conference on January 12, 2023. By January 6, 2023, defendant Syncreon Technology (USA) LLC (“Defendant”) shall submit a filing addressing the following questions bearing upon its calculation of the requisite amount-in-controversy under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”): 1) why it is reasonable for the Defendant to assume – along with citation to published, precedential, cases demonstrating that it is reasonable to assume – that, based merely upon the allegations contained in the Complaint, the second cause of action (for overtime wages) represents an attempt “to recover at least five hours of overtime wages per workweek (one hour of overtime per shift) for all Putative Class Members,” Docket No. 1, at 11:6-8; and 2) what information Defendant has demonstrating that its employees worked shifts/hours of sufficient length to require meal periods – let alone five such shifts per week – under California law, see Complaint ¶¶ 72-73 (alleging requirement of meal periods for employees working more than five/ten hours), given that Defendant has neither identified any allegation in the Complaint nor provided any information bearing upon the question of shift-length,1 see id. at 11:16-12:4. See generally Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197-98 (9th Cir. 2015) (indicating that “a defendant cannot establish removal jurisdiction by mere speculation and conjecture, with unreasonable assumptions,” and therefore requiring a defendant to “us[e] reasonable assumptions underlying the defendant’s theory of damages exposure”). 1Although the Court is less-concerned with questions about calculations related to the Complaint’s rest period claim, the same comment may be made regarding the lack of information in Defendant’s Notice of Removal regarding information demonstrating employees always worked shifts long enough to entitle them to such rest periods. See Complaint ¶ 94 (indicating that rest periods are due where employee works four hours or a major fraction thereof). For the sake of completeness, Defendant may consider it a wise course to supply the Court with shift-length information (or relevant allegations in the Complaint) bearing upon this question too. : Initials of Preparer JG CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 1 of 2 Case 2:22-cv-08629-GW-JPR Document 11 Filed 12/21/22 Page 2 of 2 Page ID #:145

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL

Case No. CV 22-8629-GW-JPRx Date December 21, 2022 Title Frank Galeas v. Syncreon Technology USA LLC, et al. If the Court were to ignore the calculations presented in the Notice of Removal with respect to these two claims, Defendant would be left with calculations reflecting an amount-in-controversy of $2,639,537.50 (the totals for the other three claims calculated in the Notice of Removal plus 25% of that figure as attorneys’ fees, see id. at 12:5-15:24). That amount, by itself, is insufficient for purposes of basing jurisdiction on CAFA.2 It is not the job of this Court to come up with, or justify, a reasonable assumption. See Jauregui v. Roadrunner Transp. Servs., Inc., 28 F.4th 989, 996 (9th Cir. 2022); Harris v. KM Industrial, Inc., 980 F.3d 694, 701 (9th Cir. 2020). If plaintiff Frank Galeas would like to offer any input bearing upon the aforementioned questions, he is free to do so on the same timeline (though the burden of establishing a proper basis for this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction rests solely on Defendant’s shoulders). It is so ordered.

2As this Court has repeatedly-observed – a statutory fact that, for whatever reason, the Ninth Circuit frequently ignores, see, e.g., Jauregui v. Roadrunner Transp. Servs., Inc., 28 F.4th 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2022) – there is no one-year limit on diversity-based removals under CAFA. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (“A class action may be removed to a district court of the United States in accordance with section 1446 (except that the 1-year limitation under section 1446(c)(1) shall not apply) . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1) (providing for a one-year-from-commencement limitation on removals based upon jurisdiction conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1332). Why, then, defendants (and certain courts, see, e.g., id.) feel that defendants simply must rely upon assumptions when calculating an amount-in-controversy under CAFA is a black box-type mystery. It is almost as if certain entities and individuals believe this rather-incredible flexibility offered in class actions is simply inconvenient to the ultimate goal of making sure that certain types of lawsuits wind up – quickly – in federal court. : Initials of Preparer JG CV-90 (06/04) CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL Page 2 of 2