1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JAMIE PETER SWART, Case No. 5:22-cv-01544-DSF (AFM)

12 Plaintiff,

ORDER DISMISSING SECOND

13 v. AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH 14 LEAVE TO AMEND

LYLE FOREHAND,

15 Defendant. 16 17 On September 1, 2022, plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this civil rights action 18 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff is presently being held at the 19 John Benoit Detention Center in Indio, California (“Detention Center”). Plaintiff 20 also filed a Request to Proceed Without Prepayment of Filing Fees, which was 21 granted. (ECF Nos. 2, 4, 6.) 22 23 In the caption of the Complaint, plaintiff named as defendants “Dr. Lyle 24 Forehand” and “Riverside Sheriff’s Office.” (ECF No. 1 at 1.) In the body of the 25 pleading, plaintiff named as defendants “Lyle Forehand, Staff Psychiatrist for 26 Riverside County,” and an “RSO employee” in the position of “intake release.” Both 27 defendants were named in their official as well as individual capacities. (Id. at 3.) 28 1 Plaintiff listed three incident dates of September 9, 2021, March 11, 2022, and April 2 15, 2022. (Id.) Plaintiff appeared to raise only one claim, but he alleged that he had 3 “been released on 4 separate ocassions [sic] without [his] mental health meds.” (Id. 4 at 6.) Plaintiff sought monetary damages and “to be given the medication prescribed 5 to [him] in property [sic] on release.” (Id. at 5.) 6 In accordance with the mandate of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 7 (“PLRA”), the Court screened the Complaint prior to ordering service to determine 8 whether the action is frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim on which relief may 9 be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such 10 relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A, 1915(e)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1). Following 11 careful review of the Complaint, the Court concluded that the Complaint failed to 12 comply with Rule 8 because it did not include a short and plain statement of each 13 claim sufficient to give any defendant fair notice of what plaintiff’s claims are and 14 the grounds upon which they rest. (ECF No. 7; “Court’s First Order.”) Further, the 15 factual allegations appeared insufficient to state a federal civil rights claim on which 16 relief may be granted against any defendant. Accordingly, the Complaint was 17 dismissed with leave to amend to correct the deficiencies as discussed in the Court’s 18 First Order. See, e.g., Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (“A 19 district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to amend unless it 20 is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by 21 amendment.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff was ordered, if he wished 22 to pursue this action, to file a First Amended Complaint remedying the deficiencies 23 discussed in the Court’s First Order. (ECF No. 7.) 24 On October 17, 2022, plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 10; 25 “FAC”), the caption of which named the only defendant as “Dr. Lyle Forehand 26 riverside Sheriff [sic] Office.” (Id. at 1 (capitalization as in original).) In the body 27 of the pleading, plaintiff also listed one defendant, Dr. Lyle Forehand, identified there 28 1 as “Staff psychiatrist for riverside county.” (Id. at 3 (capitalization as in original).) 2 Plaintiff’s FAC listed March 11, 2022, as the only incident date. (Id.) Within the 3 body of the FAC, plaintiff raised one claim for cruel and unusual punishment arising 4 from the failure of Dr. Forehand to “order post release medication.” (Id. at 5.) 5 Plaintiff sought an “injunction to provide supply of medication in release property 6 [sic].” Plaintiff did not appear to seek damages. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff signed and dated 7 the FAC on October 14, 2022. (Id.) Attached to the pleading (but not referenced 8 therein) was a three-page attachment that began with a page with a caption indicating 9 that it was the “First Amended Complaint” in this action. In the caption, plaintiff 10 appeared to name as defendants “Dr. Lyle Forehand, et al.”. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff 11 appeared to seek monetary damages in his attachment. (Id. at 8.) However, it was 12 not clear if the attachment was purporting to raise a separate claim because plaintiff 13 referenced two dates therein -- March 11, 2022, and April 15, 2022. (Id. at 7.) 14 Once again, pursuant to the PLRA the Court screened the pleading (including 15 the attachment) prior to ordering service to determine whether the action is frivolous 16 or malicious; fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary 17 relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. Following careful review 18 of the FAC, the Court found that plaintiff’s pleading failed to comply with Rule 8 19 because it did not include a short and plain statement of plaintiff’s claims sufficient 20 to give defendant(s) fair notice of what plaintiff’s claims are and the grounds upon 21 which they rest. (ECF No. 13; “Court’s Second Order.”) Further, the factual 22 allegations appeared insufficient to state a federal civil rights claim on which relief 23 may be granted against any defendant. Accordingly, the FAC was dismissed with 24 leave to amend to correct the deficiencies as discussed in the Court’s Second Order. 25 On January 30, 2023, plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint (ECF No. 26 15; “SAC”), the caption of which names the only defendant as “Dr. Lyle Forehand.” 27 (Id. at 1.) In the body of the pleading, plaintiff also lists one defendant, Dr. Lyle 28 Forehand, who is identified as a “staff psychiatrist employed by Riverside County 1 Sheriffs [sic].” (Id. at 3.) Dr. Forehand is named in his official as well as individual 2 capacity. Plaintiff’s SAC lists March 11, 2022, as the only incident date. (Id.) 3 Within the SAC, plaintiff does not clearly raise any claim. Attached after the third 4 page of the SAC is a page with a partial caption for this action with a title of “2nd 5 Ammended [sic] complaint” and a number “1” in the top left corner. (Id. at 4.) The 6 page does not have line numbers, does not reference the earlier pages of the pleading, 7 and does not indicate that plaintiff is raising any specific claims. Following the page 8 numbered “1” are pages numbered “2” and “3.” These pages also do not have line 9 numbers and do not appear to raise any specific claims. (Id. at 5-6.) No separate 10 demand for the relief that plaintiff is seeking is set forth in the pleading. The bottom 11 of the last page of plaintiff’s filing has a date of January 26, 2023, and a partial 12 signature that appears to be from plaintiff. (Id. at 6.) 13 In the pages attached to plaintiff’s pleading that are numbered 1 through 3, 14 plaintiff sets forth a narrative about his mental health issues, medication, and arrest 15 history that begins in 2016. (Id. at 4-6.) Included within the account are references 16 to plaintiff’s release from custody in 2016, at which time “the County” provided 17 plaintiff with a “30 day [sic] supply of psychiatric medications post release.” (Id. at 18 4.) Plaintiff also writes about his sentence to serve time in state prison in 2017, which 19 was followed by his release in 2020. At his release, the state prison “provided 20 plaintiff with a 30-day supply of the necessary psychiatric medication.” (Id. at 5.) 21 Then, plaintiff was arrested for a parole violation in “late February 2022,” following 22 which he was incarcerated at the Detention Center. (Id.) Plaintiff indicates that he 23 was a “California state prisoner” at the time of the February 2022 arrest because he 24 was arrested for a parole violation. (Id.) 25 Regarding the only named defendant in this action, plaintiff alleges that he was 26 “interviewed by Dr. Lyle Forehand, a psychiatrist employed by the Riverside County 27 Sheriff’s Dept.” on an unspecified date. (Id. at 5.) Further, plaintiff alleges that 28 Dr. Forehand “had possession of [plaintiff’s] 2016 County medical records and made 1 the prescription [sic] as in 2016.” (Id.) Plaintiff also states without any factual 2 support that “Dr. Forehand was fully aware of plaintiff’s severe PTSD also [sic] fully 3 aware that the abrubt [sic] cessation of psychiatric medications would cause 4 plaintiff’s condition” to worsen. (Id.) Within the narrative, plaintiff alleges that 5 Dr. Forehand acted with “deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s serious and 6 documented medical condition, [and] failed to prescribe a 30 day [sic] post release 7 prescription for the medication Dr. Forehand knew plaintiff required to address [his] 8 documented serious medical condition.” (Id.; see also at 6 (“Dr. Forehand failed, 9 due to his deliberate indifference prescribe [sic] the 30-day post release 10 medications.”).) Plaintiff also alleges that it was “Dr. Forehand’s duty, as plaintiff’s 11 treating psychiatrist to provide a prescription for [a] 30 day [sic] supply.” (Id. at 6.) 12 Plaintiff additionally alleges that he “was released from County custody on his 13 parole violation” on March 11, 2022. (Id. at 5.) “Plaintiff was not provided with a 14 30-day supply of psychiatric medication upon his release.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that 15 this failure by unspecified County officials to provide plaintiff with medication at the 16 time of his release was “in violation of state law.” (Id. at 5-6.) Plaintiff also alleges 17 that he suffered a “psychotic breakdown” at some point in time because of the failure 18 by unspecified County officials to provide a 30-day supply of medication on 19 March 11, 2022, and he was again arrested on April 4, 2022. (Id. at 6.) Further, 20 plaintiff alleges that he has suffered and “continues to suffer great and irreparable 21 injury including loss of freedom and financial loss.” (Id.) Plaintiff’s narrative 22 includes a sentence in which plaintiff states that he “seeks a judgment from this Court 23 declaring that Dr. Forehand’s failure to prescribe the necessary psychiatric 24 medication … constituted deliberate indifference and awarding plaintiff monetary 25 damages.” (Id.) 26 Pursuant to the PLRA, the Court now has screened the SAC (including the 27 attachment) prior to ordering service to determine whether the action is frivolous or 28 malicious; fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary 1 relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. The Court’s screening of 2 the pleading is governed by the following standards. A complaint may be dismissed 3 as a matter of law for failure to state a claim for two reasons: (1) lack of a cognizable 4 legal theory; or (2) insufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. See, 5 e.g., Kwan v. SanMedica Int’l, 854 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2017); see also Rosati, 6 791 F.3d at 1039 (when determining whether a complaint should be dismissed for 7 failure to state a claim under the PLRA, the court applies the same standard as applied 8 in a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)). In determining whether 9 the pleading states a claim on which relief may be granted, its allegations of fact must 10 be taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff. See, e.g., 11 Soltysik v. Padilla, 910 F.3d 438, 444 (9th Cir. 2018). However, the “tenet that a 12 court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable 13 to legal conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Rather, a court 14 first “discount[s] conclusory statements, which are not entitled to the presumption of 15 truth, before determining whether a claim is plausible.” Salameh v. Tarsadia Hotel, 16 726 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2013); see also Chavez v. United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 17 1108 (9th Cir. 2012). Nor is the Court “bound to accept as true a legal conclusion 18 couched as a factual allegation or an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed- 19 me accusation.” Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1243 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal 20 quotation marks and citations omitted). 21 Because plaintiff is appearing pro se, the Court must construe the allegations 22 of the pleading liberally and must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. See Hebbe 23 v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010); see also Alvarez v. Hill, 518 F.3d 1152, 24 1158 (9th Cir. 2008) (because plaintiff was proceeding pro se, “the district court was 25 required to ‘afford [him] the benefit of any doubt’ in ascertaining what claims he 26 ‘raised in his complaint’”) (alteration in original). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 27 has held that “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to 28 relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 1 elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must be enough to 2 raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the 3 allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atlantic Corp. 4 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted, alteration in 5 original); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (To avoid dismissal for failure to state a 6 claim, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state 7 a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ . . . A claim has facial plausibility when 8 the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 9 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” (internal citation 10 omitted)). 11 In addition, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (“Rule 8”) states: 12 A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s 13 jurisdiction . . .; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim 14 showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in 15 the alternative or different types of relief. 16 17 (Emphasis added). Rule 8(d)(1) provides: “Each allegation must be simple, concise, 18 and direct. No technical form is required.” Although the Court must construe a 19 pro se plaintiff’s pleadings liberally, a plaintiff nonetheless must allege a minimum 20 factual and legal basis for each claim that is sufficient to give each defendant fair 21 notice of what plaintiff’s claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. See, e.g., 22 Brazil v. U.S. Dep’t of the Navy, 66 F.3d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1995); McKeever v. Block, 23 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991) (a complaint must give defendants fair notice of 24 the claims against them). If a plaintiff fails to clearly and concisely set forth factual 25 allegations sufficient to provide defendants with notice of which defendant is being 26 sued on which theory and what relief is being sought against them, the pleading fails 27 to comply with Rule 8. See, e.g., McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177-79 (9th Cir. 28 1996); Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981). A 1 claim has “substantive plausibility” if a plaintiff alleges “simply, concisely, and 2 directly [the] events” that entitle him to damages. Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 3 U.S. 10, 12 (2014). Failure to comply with Rule 8 constitutes an independent basis 4 for dismissal of a pleading that applies even if the claims are not found to be “wholly 5 without merit.” See McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1179. 6 Following careful review of the SAC, the Court finds that plaintiff’s pleading 7 once again does not comply with Rule 8 because it fails to include a short and plain 8 statement of any claim that is sufficient to give the sole defendant fair notice of what 9 plaintiff’s claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. Further, the factual 10 allegations appear insufficient to state any federal civil rights claim on which relief 11 may be granted against the named defendant. Accordingly, the SAC is dismissed 12 with leave to amend to correct the deficiencies as discussed in this Order, the Court’s 13 Third Order. See, e.g., Rosati, 791 F.3d at 1039. 14 If plaintiff desires to pursue this action, he is ORDERED to file a Third 15 Amended Complaint no later than May 15, 2023, remedying the deficiencies 16 discussed herein. Plaintiff is admonished that, if he fails to timely file a Third 17 Amended Complaint or fails to remedy the deficiencies of his pleading, the Court 18 will recommend that this action be dismissed without further leave to amend.1 19 A. RULE 8 20 Plaintiff’s pleading violates Rule 8 in that it fails to allege a minimum factual 21 and legal basis for any claim that is sufficient to give Dr. Forehand fair notice of what

22 1 Plaintiff is advised that this Court’s determination herein that the allegations in the Second 23 Amended Complaint are insufficient to state a particular claim should not be seen as dispositive of 24 that claim. Accordingly, although this Court believes that you have failed to plead sufficient factual matter in your pleading, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face, you 25 are not required to omit any claim or defendant in order to pursue this action. However, if you decide to pursue a claim in a Third Amended Complaint that this Court has found to be insufficient, 26 then this Court, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636, ultimately may submit to the assigned district judge a recommendation that such claim be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a 27 claim, subject to your right at that time to file Objections with the district judge as provided in the 28 Local Rules Governing Duties of Magistrate Judges. 1 claims are raised against him and which factual allegations in the pleading give rise 2 to any federal civil rights claim. 3 Initially, plaintiff is admonished that, irrespective of his pro se status, he must 4 comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules of the United 5 States District Court for the Central District of California (“L.R.”). See, e.g., Briones 6 v. Riviera Hotel & Casino, 116 F.3d 379, 382 (9th Cir. 1997) (“pro se litigants are 7 not excused from following court rules”); L.R. 1-3; L.R. 83-2.2.3 (“Any person 8 appearing pro se is required to comply with these Local Rules and with” the Federal 9 Rules.). Plaintiff should file an amended pleading that contains only one title page. 10 Further, plaintiff’s SAC violates, inter alia, L.R. 11-3.2, 11-3.3, and L.R. 11-5.2, 11 which require that all pages of a pleading be numbered consecutively and contain no 12 more than 28 lines of text per page. Additionally, if plaintiff wishes to proceed with 13 this action, then he must clearly and legibly sign his pleading. (See L.R. 11-1.) 14 Further, the SAC violates Rule 8 because it fails to include a “short and plain 15 statement” of any claim, is not “simple, concise, and direct,” and fails to include a 16 clear and separate “demand for the relief sought.” To the contrary, plaintiff’s 17 pleading does not state that it is raising any claim against the sole named defendant. 18 Plaintiff’s SAC references “deliberate indifference” (ECF No. 15 at 5-6), a “serious 19 and documented medical condition” (id. at 5), Dr. Forehand’s failure “to prescribe a 20 30 day [sic] post release prescription” (id.), an unspecified “violation of state law” 21 (id. at 6), and “Dr. Forehand’s failure to prescribe the necessary psychiatric 22 medication” (id.). Construing plaintiff’s allegations liberally, it appears that plaintiff 23 may be purporting to raise a claim under the Eighth Amendment against 24 Dr. Forehand for failing to provide constitutionally adequate medical care. Plaintiff, 25 however, fails to set forth specific factual allegations regarding what medical 26 treatment was provided to plaintiff by Dr. Forehand during plaintiff’s brief detention 27 at the Detention Center in February and March 2022. Plaintiff’s SAC does not include 28 any facts concerning the dates on which plaintiff was provided with medical 1 treatment by Dr. Forehand or any allegation that plaintiff ever made a request for 2 medical care that Dr. Forehand failed to provide. 3 In order to state a federal civil rights claim against a particular defendant, a 4 pleading must set forth specific facts alleging that such defendant, acting under color 5 of state law, deprived plaintiff of a right guaranteed under the United States 6 Constitution or a federal statute. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). “A 7 person deprives another ‘of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, 8 if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to 9 perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which 10 [the plaintiff complains].’” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988) 11 (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)) (emphasis and 12 alteration in original). Here, plaintiff’s only specific factual allegations against Dr. 13 Forehand are that plaintiff “was interviewed by Dr. Lyle Forehand” at an unspecified 14 time after plaintiff’s arrest in “late February 2022,” and Dr. Forehand “had possession 15 of [plaintiff’s] county medical records.” (ECF No. 15 at 5.) Plaintiff also appears to 16 allege that Dr. Forehand prescribed plaintiff medication at the time that he 17 “interviewed” plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff does not allege that he had any further 18 interactions with Dr. Forehand prior to plaintiff’s release from the Detention Center 19 on March 11, 2022 (or at any other time). (Id.) 20 Further, in the body of the pleading, plaintiff lists only one incident date, 21 March 11, 2022. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that he was released from custody on 22 that date. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff, however, does not allege that Dr. Forehand took any 23 action or failed to take any action on the day of plaintiff’s release. Plaintiff 24 additionally does not allege that Dr. Forehand was present when plaintiff was 25 released, that Dr. Forehand was aware that plaintiff was going to be released, or that 26 Dr. Forehand was legally required to take any specific action each time a state 27 prisoner who was detained on a parole violation was released from the Detention 28 Center. Although plaintiff alleges that Dr. Forehand “failed” to “prescribe the 30- 1 day post release medications” (id. at 6) and that Dr. Forehand failed “to provide for 2 a continued post release prescription (id.), plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing 3 that Dr. Forehand failed to take a specific action that he was legally required to take 4 in connection with plaintiff’s release from the Detention Center. The Court discounts 5 plaintiff’s “conclusory statements” that are unsupported by specific factual 6 allegations while “determining whether a claim is plausible.” Salameh, 726 F.3d at 7 1129. Similarly, the Court does not accept as true plaintiff’s unadorned, the- 8 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation[s]” against Dr. Forehand. Keates, 883 9 F.3d at 1243. 10 As in plaintiff’s FAC, the SAC does not set forth specific factual allegations 11 against Dr. Forehand sufficient to raise a plausible inference that the actions taken, 12 or the failure to take an action, by Dr. Forehand caused plaintiff to be released from 13 custody without necessary medication. In addition, the SAC does not include simple 14 and concise factual allegations showing that Dr. Forehand failed to provide 15 constitutionally adequate medical care to plaintiff at any specific time. 16 Further, the SAC names Dr. Forehand as the sole defendant. In his pleading, 17 plaintiff alleges that this defendant was a “staff psychiatrist” employed by the 18 Riverside County’s Sheriff’s Department. (ECF No. 15 at 3, 5.) To the extent that 19 plaintiff is intending to hold Dr. Forehand liable as a supervisor for the Detention 20 Center, supervisory personnel are not liable under § 1983 on a theory of respondeat 21 superior. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Government officials may not be held 22 liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of 23 respondeat superior”); Redman v. Cnty. of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 24 1991) (en banc); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011). 25 Plaintiff’s SAC does not allege any facts showing that Dr. Forehand set “in motion a 26 series of acts by others,” or “knowingly refus[ed] to terminate a series of acts by 27 others, which [the supervisor] knew or reasonably should have known would cause 28 others to inflict a constitutional injury.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207-08. 1 In addition, plaintiff alleges a violation by an unspecified official of an 2 unspecified state law that “requires that state prisoners be provided with a 30-day 3 supply of all medications upon his release.” (ECF No. 15 at 6.) To the extent that 4 plaintiff is purporting to raise a federal civil rights claim against any official at the 5 Detention Center for violating state law, allegations that a defendant failed to comply 6 with state law cannot give rise to a federal civil rights claim. See, e.g., Galen v. Cnty. 7 of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 662 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Section 1983 requires [a plaintiff] 8 to demonstrate a violation of federal law, not state law.”); see also Cousins v. 9 Lockyer, 568 F.3d 1063, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2009). 10 Following careful review of the SAC, it is unclear to the Court what or how 11 many federal civil rights claims plaintiff intends to allege in this action. As currently 12 pled, the factual allegations in plaintiff’s SAC fail to plausibly allege that the only 13 named defendant took an affirmative act, participated in another’s affirmative act, or 14 failed to take an action that he was legally required to do that caused plaintiff to suffer 15 a specific constitutional deprivation on the day that plaintiff was released from the 16 Detention Center in March 2022. To state a claim against an individual defendant, 17 plaintiff must allege sufficient factual allegations against that defendant to nudge 18 each claim plaintiff wishes to raise “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” 19 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see also McHenry, 84 F.3d at 1177 (Rule 8 requires 20 at a minimum that a pleading allow each defendant to discern what he or she is being 21 sued for). 22 Accordingly, the Court concludes that plaintiff again has failed to meet his 23 pleading burden of alleging that a named defendant deprived him of a right 24 guaranteed under the United States Constitution or a federal statute. The Court is 25 mindful that, because plaintiff is appearing pro se, the Court must construe the 26 allegations of the pleading liberally and must afford plaintiff the benefit of any doubt. 27 That said, the Supreme Court has made clear that the Court has “no obligation to act 28 as counsel or paralegal to pro se litigants.” Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225, 231 (2004). 1 In addition, the Supreme Court has held that, while a plaintiff need not plead the 2 exact legal basis for a claim, plaintiff must allege “simply, concisely, and directly 3 events” that are sufficient to inform each defendant of the factual grounds for each 4 claim. Johnson, 574 U.S. at 12. In the SAC, plaintiff fails to do so. As currently 5 pled, it is not clear what action at what time by Dr. Forehand is alleged to have caused 6 plaintiff to suffer an identifiable constitutional deprivation. Plaintiff’s SAC fails to 7 set forth any factual allegations supporting a plausible federal civil rights claim 8 against the sole named defendant. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Therefore, 9 plaintiff’s pleading violates Rule 8 because it fails to set forth a minimal factual and 10 legal basis for any claim sufficient to give the only named defendant fair notice of 11 what plaintiff’s claims are and the grounds upon which they rest. 12 If plaintiff wishes to state a federal civil rights claim against a particular 13 official at the Detention Center, then plaintiff should set forth in a Third Amended 14 Complaint a separate, short, and plain statement of the actions that each such 15 defendant is alleged to have taken, or failed to have taken, at a particular time that 16 caused a specific violation of a right guaranteed under the federal Constitution. See, 17 e.g., Johnson, 574 U.S. at 12. 18 B. EIGHTH AMENDMENT CLAIM(S) 19 To the extent that plaintiff’s SAC is purporting to raise a claim under the 20 Eighth Amendment for cruel and unusual punishment arising from the failure of 21 Dr. Forehand to provide plaintiff with necessary post-release medication, as set forth 22 above, the SAC fails to set forth a minimal factual basis for any such claim. Plaintiff 23 alleges no facts to raise a plausible inference that Dr. Forehand acted as a “treating 24 psychiatrist” for plaintiff at any time during plaintiff’s few weeks at the Detention 25 Center in February and March 2022. To the contrary, the only specific fact alleging 26 any contact between plaintiff and Dr. Forehand is that Dr. Forehand “interviewed” 27 plaintiff at an unspecified time following plaintiff’s arrest in “late February 2022.” 28 (ECF No. 15 at 5.) Further, it appears that plaintiff alleges that Dr. Forehand 1 prescribed medication to treat plaintiff’s mental health conditions in connection with 2 that interview. (Id.) Because plaintiff alleges that he was released on March 11, 3 2022 (id.), plaintiff appears to have been held at the Detention Center for no more 4 than one month. Plaintiff’s SAC does not allege that plaintiff had any other encounter 5 with Dr. Forehand, or that plaintiff sought any treatment from Dr. Forehand, during 6 this brief period of detention. 7 To the extent that plaintiff wishes to allege a claim or claims against 8 Dr. Forehand for constitutionally inadequate medical care under the Eighth 9 Amendment, a prisoner must show that a specific defendant was deliberately 10 indifferent to his serious medical needs. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 11 (1993); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). “This includes both an objective 12 standard -- that the deprivation was serious enough to constitute cruel and unusual 13 punishment -- and a subjective standard -- deliberate indifference.” Colwell v. 14 Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1066 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 15 To meet the objective element of a deliberate indifference claim, a prisoner 16 “must demonstrate the existence of a serious medical need.” Colwell, 763 F.3d at 17 1066. “A medical need is serious if failure to treat it will result in significant injury 18 or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Peralta v. Dillard, 744 F.3d 1076, 19 1081 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). In his SAC, 20 plaintiff alleges that he has been diagnosed as suffering from “severe PTSD and 21 schizophrenia,” and he has been prescribed several types of medication for these 22 conditions. (ECF No. 15 at 4.) Accordingly, plaintiff’s SAC alleges sufficient facts 23 to allow the Court to draw an inference that plaintiff was suffering from a serious 24 medical need during the relevant time he was held at the Detention Center in 2022. 25 To meet the subjective element of a deliberate indifference claim, “a prisoner 26 must demonstrate that the prison official acted with deliberate indifference.” See 27 Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks 28 omitted). Deliberate indifference may be manifest by the intentional denial, delay, 1 or interference with a prisoner’s medical care. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. The 2 prison official, however, “must not only ‘be aware of facts from which the inference 3 could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists,’ but that person ‘must 4 also draw the inference.’” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1057 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 5 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)); see also Colwell, 763 F.3d at 1066 (a “prison official is 6 deliberately indifferent . . . only if the official knows of and disregards an excessive 7 risk to inmate health and safety” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, an 8 inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care, negligence, a mere delay in 9 medical care (without more), or a difference of opinion over proper medical 10 treatment, are all insufficient to constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. See 11 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105-07; Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1059-60; Sanchez v. Vild, 891 F.2d 12 240, 242 (9th Cir. 1989); Shapley v. Nevada Bd. of State Prison Comm’rs, 766 F.2d 13 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985). Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional 14 violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. 15 Here, construing the pleading liberally it appears that plaintiff is alleging a 16 claim or claims against Dr. Forehand pursuant to the Cruel and Unusual Punishment 17 Clause of the Eighth Amendment for constitutionally inadequate medical care. As 18 discussed above, however, the SAC, fails to set forth any factual allegations showing 19 that Dr. Forehand was aware that plaintiff was going to be released without adequate 20 medication, or that Dr. Forehand provided any medical care to plaintiff in connection 21 with his release from the Detention Center. In plaintiff’s third pleading filed in this 22 action, plaintiff once again fails to allege any facts showing that Dr. Forehand was 23 responsible for providing plaintiff with additional prescription medication, that Dr. 24 Forehand had personal knowledge that plaintiff was going to be released from the 25 Detention Center, that Dr. Forehand was aware that the prescription(s) that he had 26 provided to plaintiff at an unspecified earlier time following plaintiff’s arrest was 27 insufficient, or that Dr. Forehand was asked by plaintiff or any official at the 28 Detention Center to provide additional medication to plaintiff on (or prior to) March 1 11, 2022. 2 Further, plaintiff alleges that Dr. Forehand was his “treating psychiatrist,” but 3 plaintiff does not set forth any facts supporting that he ever received any mental 4 health treatment from Dr. Forehand during his brief period at the Detention Center 5 from late February to early March 2022. (ECF No. 15 at 6.) Rather, plaintiff alleges 6 that Dr. Forehand conducted one “interview” with plaintiff after plaintiff was 7 arrested and “made the prescription as in 2016,” apparently referencing the 8 medication that plaintiff had been prescribed by unspecified “psychiatrists” during 9 an unspecified period in the custody of the Riverside Sheriff’s Department six years 10 earlier, in 2016. (Id. at 4-5.) Plaintiff alleges that he was released from the custody 11 of Riverside County “in 2016,” and that “a 30 day [sic] supply of psychiatric 12 medications” was provided to him by unspecified officials in connection with that 13 earlier release. (Id. at 4.) No facts are alleged to link Dr. Forehand to plaintiff’s 14 detention in 2016, plaintiff’s mental health treatment in 2016, or the medication that 15 was provided to plaintiff at the time of his release from custody in 2016. Nor does 16 plaintiff allege that he sought or was provided treatment from Dr. Forehand in the 17 period between plaintiff’s arrest in late February 2022 and his release on March 11, 18 2022. Accordingly, to the extent that plaintiff may be intending to allege a claim 19 against Dr. Forehand for the provision of constitutionally inadequate medical 20 treatment during plaintiff’s brief time at the Detention Center prior to his release on 21 March 11, 2022, no facts are alleged in the SAC to raise more than a sheer possibility 22 that Dr. Forehand acted unlawfully in providing medical treatment to plaintiff during 23 this period. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (a plaintiff must plead “more than a 24 sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully”). 25 Finally, plaintiff’s minimal factual allegations pertaining to Dr. Forehand are 26 insufficient to raise a plausible inference that the only defendant named in this action 27 was aware of sufficient facts from which an inference could be drawn that plaintiff’s 28 release from the Detention Center on March 11, 2022, exposed plaintiff to a 1 substantial risk of serious harm arising from insufficient medication; that 2 Dr. Forehand drew such an inference; or that Dr. Forehand, knowing that plaintiff 3 faced a substantial risk of serious harm following his release, deliberately disregarded 4 plaintiff’s need for additional prescription medication. A pleading that merely 5 alleges “naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement” is insufficient to 6 state a claim against any defendant or to comply with Rule 8. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 7 (alteration in original, internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, following 8 three attempts, plaintiff’s SAC fails to nudge any claim under the Eighth Amendment 9 “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680. 10 C. CLAIM(S) PURSUANT TO MONELL 11 Plaintiff names Dr. Forehand, who is alleged to be employed by the County of 12 Riverside Sheriff’s Department, in his official as well as individual capacity. (See 13 ECF No. 15 at 3.) As the Court has previously admonished plaintiff, the Supreme 14 Court has held that an “official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be 15 treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). 16 Such a suit “is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest 17 is the entity.” Id. at 166 (emphasis omitted). Accordingly, any claim that plaintiff is 18 purporting to raise against Dr. Forehand as an employee of the County of Riverside 19 in his official capacity is the same as raising a claim against the County of Riverside. 20 The Supreme Court held in Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 21 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), that “a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an 22 injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a 23 government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose 24 edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the 25 government as an entity is responsible under § 1983.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; see 26 also Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011) (“under § 1983, local 27 governments are responsible only for their own illegal acts” (emphasis in original, 28 internal quotation marks omitted)). To state a claim arising from the execution of a 1 local entity’s policy or custom, a plaintiff must set forth factual allegations to show 2 that the execution of a specific policy, regulation, custom or the like was the 3 “actionable cause” of any alleged constitutional violation. See, e.g., Tsao v. Desert 4 Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1146 (9th Cir. 2012) (“a plaintiff must also show that 5 the policy at issue was the ‘actionable cause’ of the constitutional violation, which 6 requires showing both but-for and proximate causation”). Additionally, a Monell 7 claim may not be premised on an isolated or sporadic incident. See, e.g., Gant v. 8 Cnty. of Los Angeles, 772 F.3d 608, 618 (9th Cir. 2014) (a plaintiff does not establish 9 liability under Monell without showing that “a single incident of unconstitutional 10 actively” was more than an “isolated or sporadic” incident); Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 11 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on 12 isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient 13 duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method 14 of carrying out policy.”). 15 Here, to the extent that plaintiff is purporting to raise any claims against the 16 County of Riverside, plaintiff’s factual allegations appear to arise from one incident 17 in March 2022 when he alleges that he was released from detention at the Detention 18 Center without a 30-day supply of necessary medication. (ECF No. 15 at 5-6.) It is 19 unclear whether plaintiff is attempting to allege that this isolated incident was caused 20 by the execution of a specific policy, regulation, or custom of the County of 21 Riverside. However, the SAC alleges that the County of Riverside released plaintiff 22 from custody on an unspecified date in 2016 with “a 30 day [sic] supply of psychiatric 23 medications.” (Id. at 4.) Accordingly, plaintiff does not appear to be alleging that 24 the County of Riverside had a policy of releasing inmates from detention without an 25 advance supply of medication. One isolated incident of the release of a prisoner (by 26 unspecified employees who are not named as defendants in this action) without a 30- 27 day supply of medication is entirely insufficient to raise a reasonable inference that 28 specific unconstitutional actions by employees of the County of Riverside were of 1 sufficiently long duration or occurred frequently enough to be considered a 2 “traditional method of carrying out policy” by the County of Riverside. See, e.g., 3 Gant, 772 F.3d at 618 (liability under Monell requires more than “a single incident 4 of unconstitutional actively”); Trevino, 99 F.3d at 918. 5 Accordingly, it appears that the plaintiff is alleging the type of random or 6 isolated incident that simply cannot give rise to liability against the County of 7 Riverside pursuant to Monell. Therefore, plaintiff’s factual allegations in the SAC 8 remain entirely insufficient to raise a plausible inference that the County of Riverside 9 is liable for any alleged constitutional violation. See, e.g., Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 10 ************ 11 If plaintiff still desires to pursue this action, then he is ORDERED to file 12 a Third Amended Complaint no later than May 15,2023 remedying the pleading 13 deficiencies discussed above. The Third Amended Complaint should bear the 14 docket number assigned in this case; have only one title page with one caption, be 15 labeled “Third Amended Complaint”; and be complete in and of itself without 16 reference to the original Complaint, the First Amended Complaint, the Second 17 Amended Complaint, or any other pleading or document. 18 Plaintiff is admonished that, irrespective of his pro se status, if plaintiff wishes 19 to proceed with this action, then he must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil 20 Procedure and the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Central 21 District of California. See, e.g., L.R. 1-3; L.R. 83-2.2.3. 22 The clerk is directed to send plaintiff a blank Central District civil rights 23 complaint form, which plaintiff is encouraged to utilize. Plaintiff is admonished that 24 he must clearly sign and date the civil rights complaint form, and he must use the 25 space provided in the form to set forth all of the claims that he wishes to assert in a 26 Third Amended Complaint. Further, if plaintiff feels that any document is integral 27 to any of his claims, then he should attach such document as an exhibit at the end of 28 the Third Amended Complaint and clearly allege the relevance of each attached 1 || document to the applicable claim raised in the Third Amended Complaint. 2 In addition, if plaintiff no longer wishes to pursue this action, then he may 3 || request a voluntary dismissal of the action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 4 || Procedure 41(a). The clerk also is directed to attach a Notice of Dismissal form for 5 || plaintiff's convenience. 6 Plaintiff is further admonished that, if he fails to timely file a Third 7 | Amended Complaint, or if he fails to remedy the deficiencies of this pleading as 8 || discussed herein, the Court will recommend that the action be dismissed on the 9 || grounds set forth above and for failure to diligently prosecute. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 12 | DATED: 4/14/2023 (Wy Woe 13 14 ~ ALEXANDER F. MacKINNON 15 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 16 || Attachment: Civil Rights Complaint CV-066 17 Notice of Dismissal CV-09 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 20