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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6 TRIXIA GUERRERO, Case No. 5:23-cv-00242-SSS-SPx 7 8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

MOTION TO REMAND [DKT. 15]

9 v. 10 MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC, et 11 al., 12 Defendants.

13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 1 Before the Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand this Case to the Superior 2 Court of the State of California for the County of Riverside (the “Motion”). [Dkt. 3 25]. For the following reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED. 4 I. BACKGROUND 5 On or about September 19, 2021, Plaintiff purchased a pre-owned vehicle 6 from Mercedes-Benz of Temecula. On December 3, 2022, Plaintiff filed an 7 action against Defendant Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (“Mercedes-Benz”) in the 8 Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Riverside. [Dkt. 15 9 at 3]. Guerrero alleges two federal causes of action and three state law causes of 10 action. Both federal causes of action arise under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty 11 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(l)(B). Mercedes- Benz removed the case from 12 Riverside Superior Court on February 14, 2023, asserting federal question 13 jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. [Dkt. 1]. 14 II. LEGAL STANDARD 15 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, “[t]he district courts shall have original 16 jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of 17 the United States.” Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), “any civil action brought in a 18 State court of which the district courts of the United States have original 19 jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant . . . to the district court of the 20 United States[.]” 21 The removal statutes are strictly construed and remand to the state court is 22 to be granted where there are doubts as to the right of removal. Jordan v. 23 Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 781 F.3d 1178, 1182 (9th Cir. 2015). District courts 24 must remand the case “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the 25 district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see also 26 Smith v. Mylan, Inc., 761 F.3d 1042, 1044 (9th Cir. 2014). 27 1 III. DISCUSSION 2 Plaintiff argues this Court does not have jurisdiction because Defendant 3 has not established that the amount in controversy is greater than $50,000, as 4 required in order to establish federal jurisdiction under the Magnuson-Moss 5 Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(B).1 In order for file a claim in district 6 court under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, the amount in controversy must 7 be at least $50,000. See 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(B). If the amount of 8 controversy is less than $50,000, the plaintiff must instead file its Magnuson- 9 Moss Warranty Act claim in any State or in the District of Columbia. 15 U.S.C. 10 §§ 2310(d)(1)(A)–(B), 2310(d)(3)(B). For the purposes of the Magnuson-Moss 11 Warranty Act, the amount in controversy is excludes interests and costs and is 12 “computed on the basis of all claims to be determined in th[e] suit.” Id. 13 § 2310(d)(3)(B). 14 Here, Plaintiff alleges that pursuant to the Song-Beverly Consumer 15 Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(c), Plaintiff is entitled to a civil penalty of 16 two times the amount of her actual damages. [Dkt. 1-1 ¶ 28]. The two-time 17 civil penalty Plaintiff seeks is not an “interest[] or cost[]” and may thus be 18 included as part of the computation “of all claims to be determined” in the case. 19 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(3)(B); see also Brady v. Mercedes-Benz USA, Inc., 243 F. 20 Supp. 2d 1004, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (including the Song-Beverly Act’s civil 21 penalty of up to two times the amount of actual damages for the purposes of 22 calculating amount in controversy under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act). 23 In the complaint, Plaintiff seeks, inter alia, restitution, incidental and 24 consequential damages, actual and statutory damages, and a civil penalty of two 25

26 1 Plaintiff mentions that Defendant was required to satisfy the procedural 27 requirements of removal, but does not raise any substantive arguments noting Defendant’s failure to complete any procedural requirements. [See Dkt. 15 at 1] times Plaintiff's actual damages. [Dkt. 1-1 at 16]. In its Notice of Removal, 2 || Defendant provides evidence to suggest that the value of the vehicle in dispute 3 || was at least $23,201.00 at the time of purchase, [Dkt. 1-2], which means 4] Plaintiffs prayer for restitution is approximately worth $23,201.00.” 5 || Additionally, the two-time civil penalty Plaintiff seeks to recover under the 6 || Song-Beverly Act is worth approximately $46,602.00. [Dkt. 1-1 § 28]. Thus, a 7 || reasonable estimate for the amount in controversy is at least $69,603.00, which 8 || exceeds the $50,000 required amount under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. 9] Thus, this Court has federal question jurisdiction over the case. 10] IV. IV. CONCLUSION 11 Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to remand is DENIED. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. 13 él fh " 4 14 || Dated: June 20, 2023 15 Cinited States Drotriet Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 □ 27|| 2 In Plaintiff's Reply brief, Plaintiff concedes “the agreed upon value of the 28 vehicle is $38,388.00,” [Dkt. 18 at 4], which means the amount in controversy is likely even greater than the Court’s estimate.