1 O 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 Case No.: 2:22-cv-08982-MEMF-KS 11 SHEIK M. MORGAN EL,

12 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS [ECF NO. 26] 13 v.

14

15 HOLLY J. MITCHELL, et al., Defendants. 16 17

18 19 20 Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants County of Los Angeles, Holly 21 J. Mitchell, Brandon T. Nichols, and Fesia Davenport. ECF No. 26. For the reasons stated herein, the 22 Court DENIES the Motion to Dismiss. 23 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 I. Background 2 A. Factual Background1 3 Plaintiff Brother M. Morgan El, Sheik (“Morgan El”) is an individual residing in California. 4 Compl. at 1, 3. Brother Morgan El has a daughter, Sister M. Morgan-El (“Sister Morgan El”). See id. 5 at 5. 6 Defendant California Department of Children and Family Services (“DCFS”) is a 7 government organization. See id. at 2. Defendant Brandon T. Nichols (“Nichols”) is an individual 8 residing in California and is a director of DCFS. See id. Defendant County of Los Angeles 9 (“COLA”) is a government entity. Defendants Holly J. Mitchell (“Mitchell”) and Fesia Davenport 10 (“Davenport”) are individuals residing in California who work in various roles for COLA. 11 On December 21, 2016, a Los Angeles County family court awarded Morgan El sole custody 12 of Sister Morgan El. See id. at 5; see also id. at 8–16 (court’s judgment attached an as exhibit to the 13 Complaint). To date, no further court order exists that limits Morgan El’s rights. See id. Morgan El 14 wishes to raise Sister Morgan El “according to his religion, Islamism, tribal culture, Moorish- 15 American, and identity, Moslem.” Id. at 5. Morgan El includes a section entitled “Religious 16 Doctrine” in his Complaint which expands upon his beliefs. See id. 17 On approximately September 2, 2022, DCFS, under direction from Nichols, Mitchell, and 18 Davenport, began violating Morgan El’s parental rights. See id. Without Morgan El’s consent, DCFS 19 “extracted teeth” from Sister Morgan El, vaccinated her, and enrolled her in a school. See id. Morgan 20 El was notified after the fact. See id. Morgan El sent a cease and desist letter to DCFS on October 6, 21 2022. See id. This letter references a case number at Edelman Children’s Court. See id. at 22. DCFS 22 has not responded. 23 B. Procedural History 24 Morgan El filed his Complaint on December 12, 2022. See Compl. Morgan seeks a 25 declaratory judgment that “absent a court order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction under due 26

27 1 The following factual background is derived from Plaintiff Brother M. Morgan El, Sheik’s Complaint. ECF No. 1. These allegations are included as background. At this stage of the litigation, the Court makes no 28 1 process of law” stating otherwise, Morgan El has the right to raise his child “according to the laws 2 and customs of his Moorish- American tribe and religion.” See id. at 6. 3 On June 29, 2023, COLA, Davenport, Mitchell, and Nichols (collectively, the “County 4 Defendants2”) filed the instant Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 26 (“Motion” or “Mot.”). Morgan El 5 filed an Opposition to the Motion on September 1, 2023. ECF No. 32 (“Opp’n”). The County 6 Defendants did not file any reply in support of the Motion. 7 The Court issued a tentative ruling on November 8, 2023, and the parties stipulated to accept 8 the tentative ruling and vacate the hearing scheduled for November 9, 2023. ECF No. 34. 9 II. Applicable Law 10 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and can only hear cases where there is a 11 valid basis for federal jurisdiction. Richardson v. United States, 943 F.2d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1991). 12 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) (“Rule 12(b)(1)”) authorizes a party to seek dismissal of an 13 action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). 14 “The jurisdiction of federal courts is defined and limited by Article III of the Constitution.” 15 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968). Under Article III, federal courts “may act only in the context 16 of a justiciable case or controversy.” Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Med. Comm. for Hum. Rts., 404 U.S. 17 403, 407 (1972). This requirement of a case or controversy “limit[s] the business of federal courts to 18 questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of 19 resolution through the judicial process.” Flast, 392 U.S. at 95 (1968). 20 Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional challenges can be either facial or factual. Safe Air for Everyone v. 21 Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). “In a facial attack, the challenger asserts that the 22 allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. 23 “By contrast, in a factual attack, the challenger disputes the truth of the allegations that, by 24 themselves, would otherwise invoke federal jurisdiction.” Id. “When the defendant raises a factual 25 attack, the plaintiff must support her jurisdictional allegations with competent proof under the same 26 27 2 Defendants DCFS is not a “County Defendant” and does not join in this Motion. Despite having been served 28 1 evidentiary standard that governs in the summary judgment context.” Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 2 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014) (emphasis added) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The court need 3 not accept the allegations in the complaint as true when considering a factual attack. See Safe Air for 4 Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject-matter jurisdiction by 5 a preponderance of the evidence. Leite, 749 F.3d at 1121. 6 III. Discussion 7 The County Defendants raise three arguments as to why there purportedly is a lack of subject 8 matter jurisdiction here: that declaratory relief is not appropriate, that Younger abstention applies, 9 and that Rooker–Feldman doctrine applies. See Mot. As described below, all three arguments fail. 10 Accordingly, The County Defendants’ Motion will be denied. 11 A. There is a case or controversy sufficient for declaratory relief. 12 Morgan El seeks a declaratory judgment that unless a court orders otherwise, he has a right to 13 raise his daughter according to his customs and religion. See Compl. at 6. The Declaratory Judgment 14 Act allows a federal court to “declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party 15 seeking such declaration” in “a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction [except specified 16 federal tax actions and bankruptcy proceedings].” See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). 17 In order to seek a declaratory judgment, a plaintiff “need only demonstrate an independent 18 basis of federal jurisdiction and an actual case or controversy.” Calderon v. Ashmus, 523 U.S. 740, 19 744 (1998). The Supreme Court has summarized the requirements a plaintiff must meet to obtain a 20 declaratory judgment as: “Basically, the question in each case is whether the facts alleged, under all 21 the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal 22 interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.” 23 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007). 24 Here, these requirements are met by Morgan El’s Complaint as pleaded. First, because 25 Morgan El asserts claims based on the First and Fourteenth Amendments, there is a basis for federal 26 jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil 27 actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). Second, there is a 28 case or controversy. Morgan El alleges that he wishes to raise his daughter a certain way, and that 1 various government entities and individuals associated with those entities are attempting to stop him. 2 There appears to be a direct dispute between Defendants and Morgan El as to what Morgan El’s 3 rights are with respect to Sister Morgan El. This is a “substantial controversy, between parties 4 having adverse legal interests.” See MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127. This controversy is real and not 5 hypothetical. See id. And Morgan El has a clear stake in it.3 6 The County Defendants arguments as to why declaratory relief is not permitted are not 7 persuasive. First, the County Defendants argue that whether to grant declaratory relief is a matter of 8 judicial discretion, and that it should only be granted when it will be useful to the parties in avoiding 9 uncertainty or clarifying rights. See Mot. at 9 (citing Eccles v. Peoples Bank of Lakewood Vill., Cal., 10 333 U.S. 426, 431 (1948); United States v. State of Wash., 759 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1985)). But 11 these principles do not counsel against hearing a claim for declaratory relief here. Based on the 12 record before the Court, it appears that a declaratory judgment will clarify to Morgan El and 13 Defendants what their respective rights are. Deciding this case on the merits will either allow 14 Morgan El to raise his daughter as he pleases without fear of intervention by the government, or 15 alternatively, if the Court rules for Defendants, will allow Defendants to take actions regarding Sister 16 Morgan El with greater certainty that their conduct is not unlawful. 17 Second, the County Defendants argue that a declaratory judgment is inappropriate in light of 18 the “the juvenile court’s ongoing action which directly pertains to plaintiff’s parental rights.” See 19 Mot. at 10. The Court will address the impact of this ongoing juvenile court action in separate 20 sections below. No authority suggests that the existence of another ongoing action results in this 21 action not being a case or controversy or makes declaratory relief per se inappropriate. 22 B. The Younger abstention doctrine does not apply. 23 Defendants argue that because a juvenile court action is ongoing, this Court must abstain 24 from adjudicating this case. See Mot. at 10–12. Younger abstention doctrine requires federal courts 25

26 3 Although the County Defendants do not explicitly raise any arguments as to whether this action is justiciable, the Court finds that it justiciable. Nothing in the record before the Court suggests that Morgan El 27 lacks standing, that the action is not ripe, that it has become moot, or that any other justiciability doctrine would preclude a finding that this action constitutes a case or controversy over which a federal court has 28 1 to abstain from certain cases “under the principles of federalism.” Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 2 U.S. 1, 10 (1987); see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Federal courts should not enjoin 3 state criminal prosecutions and should not intervene in civil state court proceedings “if the State’s 4 interests in the proceeding are so important that exercise of the federal judicial power would 5 disregard the comity between the States and the National Government.” Pennzoil Co., 481 U.S. at 6 10. Abstention is appropriate when four requirements are met: (1) “there is an ongoing state judicial 7 proceeding;” (2) “those proceedings implicate important state interests; (3) “there is an adequate 8 opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges;” and (4) the “requested relief 9 must seek to enjoin—or have the practical effect of enjoining—ongoing state proceedings.” 10 ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 758 (9th Cir. 2014). 11 Here, at least one requirement listed above is squarely not met, because the declaratory relief 12 that Morgan El seeks would not enjoin or have the actual or practical effect of enjoining the state 13 court proceedings. Crucially, Morgan El seeks declaratory relief as to his rights absent a court order 14 otherwise. See Compl. at 6 (Morgan El seeks “a declaratory judgment stating that absent a court 15 order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction under due process of law limiting Plaintiff s 16 parental rights, Plaintiff has the constitutionally-protected right to raise his minor child according to 17 the laws and customs of his Moorish-American tribe and religion . . . .” (emphasis added)). If this 18 Court were to grant such relief, it would not prohibit the state juvenile court from issuing orders as to 19 Morgan El’s rights. It would only limit Defendants’ actions up until the time when the state court 20 issued an order. Thus, the requested relief would not enjoin the state court. Regardless of whether 21 the other requirements are met, Younger abstention is not appropriate here. See ReadyLink 22 Healthcare, 754 F.3d at 758. 23 Defendants cite a series of cases on the function of juvenile courts and their ability to address 24 constitutional questions. But none of the cases cited address the critical issue identified above— 25 whether the relief Morgan El seeks would actually interfere with the state court proceedings. For 26 example, Defendants cite Moore v. Sims, which held that a federal court should not have adjudicated 27 the constitutionality of a state statute when doing so required enjoining state child-abuse 28 proceedings. See Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979). But in Moore, the federal court’s 1 decision enjoined ongoing state court proceedings, and caused some chaos in doing so. See id. at 434 2 (describing ways in which federal court orders allowed certain parties to circumvent a writ issued in 3 state court). Not so here. The Court finds that the relief Morgan El seeks would not enjoin or have 4 the practical effect of enjoining any state court litigation, and so finds that Younger does not require 5 abstention. 6 C. Rooker–Feldman doctrine does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction. 7 Defendants argue that Rooker–Feldman doctrine deprives the Court of jurisdiction. This 8 argument fails. 9 “Under Rooker–Feldman, a federal district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to 10 hear a direct appeal from the final judgment of a state court.” Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th 11 Cir. 2003) (citing Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 12 U.S. 462 (1983)). This applies to not just actual appeals of state court judgments, but also to the “de 13 facto equivalent” of appeals of such judgment, “when a losing plaintiff in state court brings a suit in 14 federal district court asserting as legal wrongs the allegedly erroneous legal rulings of the state court 15 and seeks to vacate or set aside the judgment of that court.” Id. at 1155–56. But here, Morgan El is 16 not seeking to appeal any state court decision. He has not lost in state court and is not seeking have 17 any judgment set aside or vacated. As described above, he seeks a declaration as to his rights until 18 another court decides the issue. See Compl. at 6. He is not appealing anything, actually or de facto. 19 Defendants cite a long series of cases that explain the principles behind Rooker–Feldman 20 doctrine and show that certain courts have applied the doctrine to juvenile court proceedings. But 21 none of the authorities cited demonstrate or suggest that an action that does not challenge any state 22 court decision is subject to Rooker–Feldman doctrine. If further facts show that Defendants were 23 acting pursuant to some court order when engaging in the challenged conduct, Rooker–Feldman 24 might deprive the Court of jurisdiction. But on the record before the Court here, there is no 25 indication that Rooker–Feldman applies. Morgan El explicitly alleges that no order has changed the 26 status of his parental rights since the 2016 order that gave him full custody. See Compl. at 5 (“To 27 date, no court order exists that limits or revokes Plaintiffs parental rights.”). He is not appealing or 28 challenging any judgment. The Court therefore holds that Rooker–Feldman doctrine does not apply.

IV. Conclusion

2 For the reasons stated herein, the Court finds that it has jurisdiction over this action. 3 || Defendants’ Motion is therefore DENIED. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. 5 Af 6 Dated: November 9, 2023 7 MAAME EWUSI-MENSAH FRIMPONG 8 United States District Judge 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28