I. BACKGROUND

25 This case arises out of Mireles’ purchase of a 2019 Chevrolet Bolt. [Dkt. 26 1-1 at 4]. Mireles claims he brought the Bolt new and that, after purchase, the 27 Bolt began to exhibit “defects, non-conformities, … , [and] malfunctions” in 1 violation of GM’s express and implied warranties. Id. at 5 and 10. Mireles filed 2 this action on July 27, 2023, asserting three causes of action under the Song- 3 Beverly Act, one for fraud, and one for violation of California’s Business & 4 Professions Code § 17200. [Dkt. 1 at 2]. GM removed this action to this Court 5 on August 23, 2023. 1 [Dkt. 1]. 6 Importantly, the suggested retail price for a 2019 Chevrolet Bolt is 7 $38,639. Id. at 4. In his Complaint, Mireles seeks a variety of remedies 8 including “rescission of the purchase contract,” a “civil penalty in the amount of 9 two times Plaintiff’s actual, incidental, and consequential damages,” and “for 10 restitution of all monies expended.” [Dkt. 1-1 at 20]. 11 II. STATEMENT OF LAW 12 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian 13 Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Thus, federal courts can only 14 hear cases if “there is a valid basis for federal jurisdiction.” Ayala v. Am. 15 Airlines, Inc., No. 2:23-cv-03571-MEMF-MAR, 2023 WL 6534199, at *1 (C.D. 16 Cal. Oct. 6, 2023) (citing Richardson v. United States, 943 F.2d 1107, 1112 (9th 17 Cir. 1991)). 18 When a plaintiff files their complaint in state court, a defendant may 19 remove the case to federal court if the case could have been brought originally 20 in federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). If a plaintiff contests the removability of 21 an action, the burden is on the removing party to show by a preponderance of 22 the evidence that the requirements for removal were met. See Dart Cherokee 23 Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 82 (2014); Emrich v. Touche 24 Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 1988). “Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, a 25 district court has original jurisdiction over a civil action where (1) the amount in 26

27 1 Because GM removed the action within 30 days of being served with the 1 controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and 2 costs, and (2) the dispute is between ‘citizens of different States.’” Jimenez v. 3 General Motors, LLC, No. 2:23-cv-06991 WLH (JPRx), 2023 WL 6795274, at 4 *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2023). 5 It is well settled that a corporation is a citizen of every state in which it 6 has been incorporated and of the state in which it has its principal place of 7 business. 3123 SMB LLC v. Horn, 880 F.3d 461, 462–63 (9th Cir. 2018); 28 8 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). A corporation’s principal place of business is the location 9 from which its “officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s 10 activities.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92–93 (2010). A Limited 11 Liability Corporation (“LLC”) “is a citizen of every state of which its 12 owners/members are citizens.” Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 13 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006). 14 If there is any doubt as to the right to removal, a court must remand the 15 action to state court. See Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) 16 (stating “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the 17 right of removal in the first instance”); see also Matheson v. Progressive 18 Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Gaus, 980 F.2d 19 at 566)). 20 III. DISCUSSSION 21 Here, Mireles’ position boils down to one simple argument, GM has 22 failed to meet its burden in establishing removal was proper. [Dkt. 17 at 7]. 23 Such an attack is a “facial challenge” to the removal, meaning it “accepts the 24 truth of the [removing party’s] allegations but asserts that they are insufficient 25 on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Dalton v. FCA US LLC, No. 8:20- 26 cv-00694-JLS-DFM, 2020 WL 3868389, at *1 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2020) (quoting 27 Ehrman v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., 932 F.3d 1223, 1228 (9th Cir. 2019)). 1 For the reasons stated below, Mireles’ argument fails. Thus, the Court 2 DENIES Mireles’ Motion. 3 A. GM Successfully Established Complete Diversity 4 Here, GM successfully established complete diversity between the 5 Parties. In the Notice of Removal, GM alleged Mireles is a citizen of 6 California, and GM is a citizen of Delaware and Michigan. [Dkt. 1 at 3]. In 7 support of these statements, GM provided a declaration from John Kim, GM’s 8 Assistant Corporate Secretary, that establishes GM is a citizen of Delaware and 9 Michigan by stating GM is wholly owned by General Motors Company, a 10 Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Michigan. [Dkt. 11 23-2 at 4; Dkt. 1 at 4]. Courts routinely find such declarations sufficient to 12 establish the citizenship of a corporate entity. See e.g., McDonald v. Gen. 13 Motors, LLC, 23-cv-01584-CJC (DFMx), 2023 WL 7019171, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 14 Oct. 25, 2023) (finding a defendant sufficiently established its principal place of 15 business was in Michigan by submitting a declaration of its counsel stating as 16 such); Deleon v. Gen. Motors, LLC, No. 23-cv-01590-CJC(DFMx), 2023 WL 17 7019169, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2023) (holding the same); Gonzales v. 18 Starwood Hotels, No. 16-cv-1068-GW (JEMx), 2016 WL 1611576, at *4 (C.D. 19 Cal. Apr. 21, 2016) (collecting cases).2 As such, the Court finds GM carried its 20 burden in establishing it is a citizen of Michigan and Delaware. 21 Thus, based on the record before the Court, the Court finds for purposes 22 of diversity jurisdiction that Mireles is a citizen of California, and GM is a 23 citizen of Delaware and Michigan. Because Mireles did not substantively 24 challenge GM’s allegations of citizenship, and the Parties are citizens of 25 different states, the Court finds GM established by a preponderance of the 26

27 2 Mireles’ status as a citizen of California is established by his self- 1 evidence that there is complete diversity between the Parties. See Dalton, 2020 2 WL 3868389, at *1; [Dkt. 23-2 at 3–4]. 3 B. GM Successfully Established the Amount in Controversy Exceeds $75,000 4 For a case to be removable under diversity jurisdiction, the amount in 5 controversy must exceed $75,000. 28 U.S.C. 1332(a). As is the case here, 6 when the plaintiff’s state court complaint does not specify a particular amount 7 of damages, and the plaintiff attacks the defendant’s notice of removal on the 8 amount in controversy requirement, the burden is on the removing party to 9 establish by a preponderance of the evidence that that the amount in controversy 10 threshold is met. See Canela v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 971 F.3d 845, 849 (9th 11 Cir. 2020). 12 In the Ninth Circuit, “the amount in controversy includes all relief 13 claimed at the time of removal to which the plaintiff would be entitled if [they] 14 prevail[].” Chavez v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 418 (9th Cir. 15 2018). Importantly, when determining the amount in controversy, “courts are to 16 consider the ‘maximum recovery the plaintiff could reasonably recover’” 17 against a defendant. Selinger v. Ford Motor Comp., No. 2:22-CV-09993-SPG- 18 KS, 2023 WL 2813510, at 9 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2023) (quoting Arias v. 19 Residence Inn by Marriot, 936 F.3d 920, 927 (9th Cir. 2019)). 20 Here, GM has met its burden in establishing that the amount in 21 controversy exceeds $75,000. Because Mireles seeks rescission of the purchase 22 contract and restitution of all monies expended under the contract, the Court 23 finds Mireles has put the estimated price of a 2019 Chevrolet Bolt, $38.639, in 24 controversy for purpose of determining the amount in controversy calculation. 3 25 26 27 3 While Mireles’ Complaint does not specifically state the contract price of the 2019 Chevrolet Bolt he purchased, the Court finds the average price of $38,639, 1 See Selinger, 2023 WL 2813510, at *9 (noting by seeking recovery of the 2 contract price in the complaint, the plaintiff put the value of the contract at issue 3 for purposes of determining the amount in controversy). 4 Moreover, Mireles’s Complaint also seeks a civil penalty in the amount of 5 two times Mireles’ total damages. [Dkt. 1-1 at 20]. California Civil Code § 6 1794(c) allows for the recovery of a civil penalty, no greater than two times the 7 amount of actual damages, if a plaintiff can establish the defendant’s conduct 8 was “willful.” While courts in the Ninth Circuit disagree as to whether civil 9 penalties should be considered in calculating the amount in controversy, this 10 Court finds, because the Ninth Circuit has directed courts to consider the 11 maximum amount a plaintiff could reasonably recover, that when a plaintiff 12 pleads a defendant’s conduct in a Song-Beverly action was willful, civil 13 penalties should be considered in the amount in controversy. See Arias, 936 14 F.3d at 927; see also Selinger, 2023 WL 2813510, at *9 (collecting cases). 15 Here, Mireles plead in his Complaint that GM’s conduct was “willful.” 16 [Dkt. 1-1 at 9]. As such, Mireles could reasonably recover a civil penalty under 17 California Civil Code § 1794(c), and thus the Court finds it proper to consider 18 the civil penalties in considering the amount in controversy. 19 Setting aside Mireles’ other claimed damages such as attorney’s fees, and 20 focusing only on the contract price, the Court finds the civil penalty amount 21 would be $77,278. Because $77,278. exceeds the $75,000 threshold for 22 diversity jurisdiction, the Court finds GM met its burden in establishing the 23 amount in controversy requirement was met. 24 IV. CONCLUSION 25 Because GM established by a preponderance of the evidence that there is 26 complete diversity between the Parties, and the amount in controversy exceeds 27 1 || $75,000, the Court finds diversity jurisdiction existed over this case at the time of removal. 28 U.S.C. 1332(a). Thus, the Court finds removal was proper 3 || under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) and DENIES Mireles’ Motion to Remand. [Dkt. 4] 17]. 5 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7\| DATED: November 30, 2023 8 SUNSHINE S. ES United States District Judge 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28