NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 11 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

KARLA BIVIAANA MATIAS MIRANDA, No. 20-71623

Petitioner, Agency No. A088-318-147

v.

MEMORANDUM*

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted December 7, 2022** Submission Vacated December 12, 2022 Resubmitted June 7, 2024 Phoenix, Arizona

Before: WARDLAW and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and ZOUHARY,*** District Judge.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Jack Zouhary, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Ohio, sitting by designation. Karla Matias Miranda (Matias), an ethnically indigenous native and citizen of

Guatemala, petitions for review of an immigration judge’s (IJ) decision affirming

the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) determination that she lacks a

reasonable fear of persecution or torture in her country of removal. We have

jurisdiction to review a negative reasonable fear determination under 8 C.F.R.

§ 208.31(g)(1). Bartolome v. Sessions, 904 F.3d 803, 811 (9th Cir. 2018). We deny

the petition.

1. Matias first argues that the IJ erred in determining that she failed to

establish a reasonable fear of persecution or torture. We review an IJ’s reasonable

fear determination for substantial evidence. Id. The record does not compel a

finding that Matias established a “subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable”

fear of future persecution or torture. Id. at 809. To support her claim of reasonable

fear, Matias testified that, in November 2019, a group of unknown individuals

targeted her for extortion and another group of unknown individuals harassed her

after leaving a Catholic Church. But with the group of would-be extortionists,

Matias confirmed that they targeted her “only because of the money.” Thus, this

episode was not on account of any protected ground. See id. at 814. And while she

testified to being harassed and grabbed by the arm as she left church, Matias was not

harmed and her family and fellow local congregants did not face similar treatment.

Matias has had no problems with the Guatemalan police or government officials,

2 even if she subjectively believes that the government will be unable to protect her.

Her testimony does not compel the conclusion that she will be targeted for

persecution or torture if removed to Guatemala.

2. Matias also contends that the IJ violated her right to due process by (1) not

considering her case de novo, (2) failing to develop the record, and (3) failing to

fully consider her claim. We review claims of due process violations de novo.

Benedicto v. Garland, 12 F.4th 1049, 1058 (9th Cir. 2021). To successfully attack

immigration court proceedings on due process grounds, the petitioner must show

“that the proceedings were manifestly unfair and that the actions of the [IJ] were

such as to prevent a fair investigation.” Shin v. Mukasey, 547 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th

Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). In considering reasonable fear review

hearings, we are mindful that they are not “full evidentiary hearings” and are

“intended to be expedited and efficient.” Bartolome, 904 F.3d at 813.

The record does not support Matias’ due process complaints. The IJ

confirmed that Matias was comfortable proceeding without counsel and that she

could understand her translator. Matias affirmed the information that she provided

to the asylum officer. The IJ found that the asylum officer diligently obtained and

recorded the information in Matias’ case. The IJ invited Matias to present evidence

that she didn’t share with the asylum officer. The IJ stated that she reviewed all the

evidence de novo, and the record supports that statement. Matias’ IJ proceedings

3 were not “manifestly unfair;” nor did they “prevent a fair investigation.” See Shin,

547 F.3d at 1024.

PETITION DENIED.

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