1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CARLA S. SEKULA, No. 1:17-cv-00460-DAD-JLT 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES, COSTS, AND

14 FCA US LLC, a Delaware Limited EXPENSES IN PART Liability Company, and DOES 1 through 15 10 inclusive, (Doc. No. 88) 16 Defendants. 17 18 This matter came before the court on May 7, 2019 for hearing on plaintiff Carla Sekula’s 19 motion for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses. (Doc. No. 88.) Attorney Sepehr Daghighian 20 appeared telephonically on behalf of plaintiff, and attorney Leon Roubinian appeared 21 telephonically on behalf of defendant FCA UC LLC (“FCA”). The court has considered the 22 parties’ briefs and oral arguments and, for reasons set forth below, will grant plaintiff’s motion in 23 part. 24 BACKGROUND 25 On June 20, 2016, plaintiff commenced this action against FCA by filing suit in Tulare 26 County Superior Court. (See Doc. No. 1-1.) Plaintiff alleged that a new Dodge Durango that she 27 purchased in 2013 was delivered to her with serious defects and nonconformities to warranty. 28 (Id. at 5.) The complaint asserted causes of action for: (1) breaches of express and implied 1 warranties, in violation of the Song-Beverly Act, California Civil Code § 1790 et seq.; and 2 (2) fraudulent inducement or concealment. (Id. at 25–29.) On March 20, 2017, FCA removed the 3 action to this federal court. (Doc. No. 1.) Thereafter, a February 26, 2019 trial date was set. 4 (Doc. No. 10.) 5 On February 25, 2019, the parties informed the court that they had reached a settlement. 6 (Doc. No. 78.) Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, FCA offered to allow judgment to 7 be entered against it and in favor of plaintiff in the sum of $142,000.00 to be paid to plaintiff. 8 (Doc. No. 79 at 2.) Plaintiff accepted the Rule 68 offer. (Id. at 4.) The offer noted that FCA 9 would provide plaintiff with “attorney’s fees based on actual time reasonably incurred in 10 connection with . . . this action . . ., to be determined by the court if the parties cannot agree.” (Id. 11 at 2.) 12 Apparently unable to agree on the appropriate amount of attorney’s fees to be paid to 13 plaintiff’s counsel, on April 8, 2019, plaintiff filed the pending motion for attorneys’ fees, costs, 14 and expenses. (Doc. No. 88.) On April 23, 2019, FCA filed its opposition to the pending motion, 15 and on April 30, 2019, plaintiff filed her reply thereto. (Doc. Nos. 89, 90.) 16 LEGAL STANDARD 17 Under California’s Song-Beverly Act, “if [a] buyer prevails in an action . . ., the buyer 18 shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate 19 amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, 20 determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the 21 commencement and prosecution of such action.” Cal. Civ. Code. § 1794(d). “The plain wording 22 of the statute requires the trial court to base the fee award upon actual time expended on the case, 23 as long as such fees are reasonably incurred—both from the standpoint of time spent and the 24 amount charged.” Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of CA, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 785, 25 817 (2006). 26 It requires the trial court to make an initial determination of the actual time expended; and then to ascertain whether under all the 27 circumstances of the case the amount of actual time expended and the monetary charge being made for the time expended are 28 reasonable. These circumstances may include, but are not limited to, 1 factors such as the complexity of the case and procedural demands, the skill exhibited and the results achieved. If the time expended or 2 the monetary charge being made for the time expended are not reasonable under all the circumstances, then the court must take this 3 into account and award attorney fees in a lesser amount. A prevailing buyer has the burden of showing that the fees incurred were 4 allowable, were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount. 5 6 Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor Am., 31 Cal. App. 4th 99, 104 (1994) (citation and internal 7 quotation marks omitted); see also Goglin v. BMW of North America, LLC, 4 Cal. App. 5th 462, 8 470 (2016). Under a contingent fee arrangement, “a prevailing buyer represented by counsel is 9 entitled to an award of reasonable attorney fees for time reasonably expended by his or her 10 attorney.” Nightingale, 31 Cal. App. 4th at 105 n.6. 11 “The determination of what constitutes a reasonable fee generally begins with the 12 ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly 13 rate.” Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 140, 154 (2006) (quoting PLCM 14 Group, Inc. v. Drexler, 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095 (2000)). The court will apply the lodestar method 15 to the Song-Beverly Act because “the statutory language of section 1794, subdivision (d), is 16 reasonably compatible with a lodestar adjustment method of calculating attorney fees, including 17 use of fee multipliers.” Robertson, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 818; see also Warren v. Kia Motors 18 America, Inc., 30 Cal. App. 5th 24, 35 (2018). Moreover, because “[the California] Supreme 19 Court has held that the lodestar adjustment method is the prevailing rule for statutory attorney fee 20 awards to be applied in the absence of clear legislative intent to the contrary, [the lodestar 21 adjustment method] . . . is applicable to attorney fee awards under section 1794, subdivision (d).” 22 Robertson, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 818–19 (citing Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1135–36 23 (2001); see also Warren, 30 Cal. App. at 35–36.). 24 [T]he lodestar is the basic fee for comparable legal services in the community; it may be adjusted by the court based on factors 25 including, as relevant herein, (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the 26 extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, (4) the contingent nature of the fee 27 award. The purpose of such adjustment is to fix a fee at the fair market value for the particular action. In effect, the court determines, 28 retrospectively, whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or 1 required extraordinary legal skill justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market rate for 2 such services. 3 * * * 4 As we [have] explained . . .: “ ‘[a] contingent fee contract, since it involves a gamble on the result, may properly provide for a larger 5 compensation than would otherwise be reasonable.’ ” 6 Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1132 (internal citation omitted). 7 If a fee request is opposed, “[g]eneral arguments that fees claimed are excessive, 8 duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” Etcheson v. FCA US LLC, 30 Cal. App. 5th 831, 848 9 (2018) (quoting Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys. v. Cal. Ins. Guarantee Assoc., 163 Cal. App. 4th 550, 10 564 (2008)). Instead, the opposing party must demonstrate that the hours claimed are duplicative 11 or excessive. Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys., 163 Cal. App. 4th at 562, 564; see also First American 12 Title Ins. Co v. Spanish Inn, Inc., 239 Cal. App. 4th 598, 606 (2015) (“Although defendants 13 argued to the trial court that the ‘amount claimed for attorneys fees is not reasonable,’ defendants 14 did not respond to First American’s evidence with evidence of their own, as required.”); Gorman 15 v. Tassajara Dev. Corp., 178 Cal. App. 4th 44, 101 (2009) (“The party opposing the fee award 16 can be expected to identify the particular charges it considers objectionable.”). 17 With this guidance in mind, the court turns to consider plaintiff’s pending motion.1 18 ANALYSIS 19 Plaintiff, as the auto buyer who prevailed in this suit, is entitled to reasonably incurred 20 attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses. See Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(d). Here, plaintiff seeks: (1) an 21 award of attorneys’ fees in the amount of $67,627.50; (2) a lodestar multiplier of 0.5, in the 22 amount of $33,813.75; and (3) an award of actual costs and expenses incurred in the amount of 23 $22,488.21. (Doc. No. 88-1 at 7.) Plaintiff seeks a total award of $123,929.46. (Id.) FCA 24 contends that the lodestar requested by plaintiff is unreasonable and that an upward multiplier is 25 ///// 26 1 Each party objects to evidence presented by the other in support of or in opposition to the 27 pending motion. The court has read and considered these boilerplate evidentiary objections and, to the extent that the court considers any such evidence to which an objection has or objections 28 have been made, those objections are overruled. 1 not warranted in this case. (Doc. No. 89 at 6.) FCA also objects to various costs and expenses 2 for which plaintiff seeks reimbursement. (Doc. No. 87.) 3 A. Attorneys’ Fees Request 4 Plaintiff was represented by two law firms in this matter: the Knight Law Group (“Knight 5 Law”), who commenced this action on plaintiff’s behalf and provided legal services leading up to 6 trial, and Hackler Daghighian Martino & Novak, P.C. (“HDMN”), who associated into this action 7 to provide services relating to and in anticipation of the trial of this matter. (Doc. No. 88-1 at 14.) 8 Knight Law billed a total of $38,652.50 and HDMN billed a total of $28,975.00. (Id.) 9 1. Number of Hours to be Awarded 10 The billing records indicate that Knight Law attorneys expended 103.5 billable hours on 11 this action and that HDMN attorneys expended 79.25 billable hours on this action. (Doc. Nos. 12 88-2 at 28; 88-3 at 8–12.) A total of ten Knight Law attorneys and a total of three HDMN 13 attorneys billed in this matter. (Doc. Nos. 88-2 at 28; 88-3 at 8–12.) 14 FCA contends that the number of hours billed by both law firms are unreasonable. First, 15 FCA argues that it made two offers to settle this matter—one in July 2016 and one in January 16 2019—and therefore any attorneys’ fees incurred by plaintiff after either offer were not 17 “reasonably incurred” because plaintiff could have accepted either offer and resolved this matter, 18 instead of having her attorneys expend additional hours on it. (Doc. No. 89 at 4–5.) Second, 19 FCA contends plaintiff’s use of “two firms and a total of 13 attorneys” resulted in an “inherent 20 duplication of effort . . ., the cost of which should not be borne by Defendant.” (Id. at 7) 21 (emphasis omitted). FCA therefore asks the court to “exclude either the $38,652.50 incurred by 22 [Knight Law], or the $28,975.00 incurred by HDMN.” (Id.) (emphasis omitted). Third, FCA 23 asks the court to reduce the total number of hours attributed to HDMN lawyers due to the firm’s 24 practice of billing in quarter-hour increments. (Id. at 9.) The court addresses each of FCA’s 25 arguments in turn. 26 With respect to whether attorney time expended after FCA’s July 2016 and January 2019 27 settlement offers to plaintiff are unreasonable, the court first notes that FCA has failed to provide 28 the court with authority that supports its position that plaintiff not accepting those offers requires 1 discounting the hours expended in litigating this matter after those offers were made. As already 2 discussed, the law requires this court to first determine the actual amount of time expended by the 3 attorneys in this matter, and to then determine whether such an investment of time was 4 reasonable. Moreover, the court finds that it appears plaintiff was later shown to be justified in 5 rejecting the July 2016 and January 2019 settlement offers because her “ultimate settlement [of 6 $142,000.00] exceeded FCA’s prior January 30, 2019 Rule 68 Offer by $42,000.00, and its July 7 2016 section 998 offer by $79,000.00.” (Doc. No. 90 at 7.) The court notes that neither of FCA’s 8 earlier offers accounted for the civil penalties available under the Song-Beverly Act, which was a 9 remedy that plaintiff sought in this action. Indeed, plaintiff’s attorney Steve Mikhov of Knight 10 Law avers that his firm has accepted early settlement offers from FCA in other cases where such 11 offers recognized the allegedly willful conduct of FCA in selling defective vehicles to California 12 consumers. (Doc. Nos. 90 at 10; 90-1 at 2, 5–48.) 13 FCA also contends that $6,118.75—the amount in fees incurred by HDMN after having 14 received FCA’s February 21, 2019 Rule 68 offer—should be discounted because plaintiff’s 15 counsel “did not even review and analyze this offer until February 25, 2019.” (Doc. No. 89 at 8.) 16 The court is not persuaded by this argument. HDMN’s billing records indicate that HDMN 17 “[r]eceive[d] and review[ed] [the] defense Rule 68 Offer of Judgment” on February 21, 2019 and 18 “forward[ed] the same to co-counsel and client.” (Doc. No. 88-3 at 11.) Thus, the Rule 68 offer 19 was served on and received by plaintiff a mere five days before the date set for trial, February 26, 20 2019.2 The court will not fault HDMN for continuing to prepare for trial while plaintiff 21 considered defendant’s February 21 offer, especially because that offer was essentially made on 22 the eve of trial, and a prudent attorney must continue to prepare for trial until and unless the client 23 confirms that they wish to accept a settlement offer. 24 Next, defendant argues that plaintiff’s employment of two law firms and thirteen lawyers 25 to litigate this matter was unreasonable. (Doc. No. 89 at 7, 11.) Here, too, FCA has failed to 26

27 2 Despite the fact that a Rule 68 offer must be served at least fourteen days before the date set for trial, the parties here stipulated to waiving the fourteen-day service period required by the rule. 28 (See Doc. No. 82.) 1 provide any authority in support of its position that solely based upon the employing of two law 2 firms who assign multiple lawyers to a case, this court could reduce the number of hours 3 expended when considering an award for attorneys’ fees. To the contrary, it has been 4 “recognized that ‘the participation of more than one attorney does not necessarily constitute an 5 unnecessary duplication of effort.’” McGrath v. County of Nevada, 67 F.3d 248, 255 (9th Cir. 6 1995) (citing Kim v. Fujikawa, 871 F.2d 1427, 1435 n.9 (9th Cir.1989)). Moreover, FCA has not 7 identified any entries in Knight Law and HDMN’s billings that indicate a duplication of effort. 8 FCA merely contends that some of HDMN’s time entries—e.g., 1.5 hours for reviewing repair 9 orders and parties’ document production; 0.5 hours for telephonic conference with plaintiff; and 10 1.5 hours to review the case file—are “[e]xamples of inherent duplication by HDMN.” (Doc. No. 11 89 at 7.) However, the fact that lawyers at HDMN had to review files and get up to speed on the 12 case to prepare it for trial does not constitute a duplication of effort since they were brought into 13 the case to represent plaintiff at trial and necessarily had to review files to do so. 14 Finally, FCA contends that HDMN’s total hours billed should be reduced across-the- 15 board, because the firm billed its time entries in quarter-hour increments. (Doc. Nos. 89 at 9; 88- 16 3 at 8–12.) A court may impose an across-the-board reduction on hours that are billed by quarter- 17 hour increments when such billing results in an attorney’s fees award request reflecting excessive 18 hours. See, e.g., Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 949 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming 19 district court’s twenty percent, across-the-board reduction of hours where this billing practice 20 resulted in inflated time records). In Welch, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s across- 21 the-board reduction in hours after the district court had found that “the hours were inflated 22 because counsel billed a minimum of 15 minutes for numerous phone calls and e-mails that likely 23 took a fraction of the time.” Id. The Ninth Circuit’s own review of the time records in Welch 24 revealed that they were “replete with quarter-hour or half-hour charges for the drafting of letters, 25 telephone calls and intra-office conferences.” Id. Here, the court also finds that HDMN’s 26 practice of billing by quarter-hour increments likely resulted in an inflated amount of attorney 27 time being billed to this matter. For example, HDMN’s billing statement indicates various email 28 and telephonic correspondences between HDMN lawyers and opposing counsel, inter-office 1 meetings, and correspondences with the court, plaintiff, and expert witnesses that were billed a 2 minimum of fifteen or thirty minutes. (Doc. No. 88-3 at 8–12.) The court finds that these time 3 entries are likely inflated “because counsel billed a minimum of 15 minutes for numerous phone 4 calls and e-mails that likely took a fraction of the time.” Welch, 480 F.3d at 949. The court will 5 therefore exercise its discretion and apply a twenty-percent, across-the-board reduction to the 6 number of hours awarded to HDMN attorneys in this case. See Hall v. FCA US LLC, No. 1:16- 7 cv-0684-JLT, 2018 WL 2298431, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 21, 2018) (Applying a twenty-percent, 8 across-the-board reduction to HDMN’s hours billed in quarter-hour increments for similar 9 reasons). 10 The court has also reviewed the Knight Law billing statements at issue here and concludes 11 that, generally, the time billed was reasonably incurred in the commencement and prosecution of 12 this action. However, the court will not award attorney Christopher Thoms the full five hours he 13 anticipatorily billed to prepare for and appear at the hearing for this motion (Doc. No. 88-2 at 28), 14 because he appeared telephonically and did not travel to Fresno for that hearing. Moreover, the 15 court will not award attorney Thoms the full four and a half hours that he anticipatorily billed to 16 review and analyze FCA’s opposition to this motion and to draft a reply thereto. (Id.) No 17 evidence of the time actually spent on these tasks was presented to the court, and the court 18 declines to speculate as to the actual time spent by counsel in reviewing defendant’s opposition, 19 drafting a reply, and preparing for and arguing the motion, as the burden is on the applicant to 20 present evidence to support the motion for attorney’s fees. Accordingly, attorney Thoms’ hours 21 will be reduced by eight hours. Based on the foregoing, the court will include in the award the 22 following hours to the Knight Law attorneys: 23 ///// 24 ///// 25 ///// 26 ///// 27 ///// 28 ///// 1 Knight Law Attorney Hours Hours Requested Awarded 2 Attorney Alastair Hamblin 7.6 7.6 3 Attorney Amy Morse 10.6 10.6 Attorney Christopher Thoms 16 8 4 Attorney Deepak Devabose 8.4 8.4 Attorney Diane Hernandez 18.0 18.0 5 Attorney Kristina Stephenson-Cheang 13.8 13.8 6 Attorney Mitchell Rosensweig 2.1 2.1 Attorney Michelle Lumasag 3.5 3.5 7 Attorney Russell Higgins 16.7 16.7 Attorney Steve Mikhov 6.8 6.8 8 Total Hours 103.5 95.5 9 The court has also reviewed the HDMN billing statements at issue here and concludes 10 that, generally, the time billed was reasonably incurred in the commencement and prosecution of 11 this action. However, as discussed above, the court will exercise its discretion and apply a 12 twenty-percent across-the-board reduction to HDMN’s billed hours due to HDMN’s practice of 13 billing in quarter-hour increments even with respect to various emails and telephone 14 conversations between HDMN lawyers and opposing counsel, inter-office meetings, and 15 correspondences with the court, plaintiff, and expert witnesses when those tasks almost certainly 16 consumed only a fraction of the time billed. Accordingly, the court finds the following hours 17 appropriately attributable to the efforts of HDMN attorneys: 18 HDMN Attorney/Paralegal Hours Hours 19 Requested Awarded Attorney Larry Castruita 10.75 8.6 20 Attorney Sepehr Daghighian 27.5 22.0 Attorney Eric Schmitt 37.0 29.6 21 Paralegal Andrea Plata 4 3.2 22 Total Hours 79.25 63.4 23 2. Hourly Rates to be Applied 24 Next, the court must determine whether the hourly rates requested by plaintiff’s attorneys 25 are reasonable. 26 Under California law, when awarding attorney’s fees under § 1794(d), the relevant inquiry 27 is whether “the monetary charge being made for the time expended [is] reasonable” under all the 28 circumstances including “factors such as the complexity of the case and procedural demands, the 1 skill exhibited and the results achieved.” Goglin v. BMW of North America, LLC, 4 Cal. App. 5th 2 462, 470 (2016) (quoting Nightingale, 31 Cal.App.4th at 104). California courts therefore focus 3 on the reasonable hourly rate for the work performed by the counsel performing that work, 4 regardless of the forum in which that work was performed and without regard to typical hourly 5 rates in the forum in which the matter was litigated.3 See Goglin, 4 Cal. App. 5th at 470 6 (affirming a fee award applying a hourly rate of $575 per hour in a Song-Beverly Act case on the 7 grounds that the trial court had considered the evidence that the client agreed to compensate 8 counsel at the rate of $575 an hour (later increased to $625), other state and federal courts had 9 awarded the attorney comparable rates in similar cases, and the trial court had observed the 10

11 3 The court is aware that, in awarding attorneys’ fees under the Song-Beverly Act, other district courts have required “[t]he fee applicant . . . [to] produc[e] satisfactory evidence that the 12 requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services of lawyers of reasonably comparable skill and reputation.” Base v. FCA US LLC, No. 17-cv-01532-JCS, 13 2019 WL 4674368, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2019) (citing Jordan v. Multnomah Cnty., 815 F.2d 1258, 1263 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also Self v. FCA US LLC, No. 1:17-cv-01107-SKO, 2019 WL 14 1994459, at *4–5 (E.D. Cal. May 6, 2019); Hall v. FCA US LLC, No. 1:16-cv-0684-JLT, 2018 15 WL 2298431, at *5–6 (E.D. Cal. May 21, 2018). Citing to Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent, these courts have stated that the “relevant community” in determining a prevailing 16 market rate is the forum in which the district court sits and then analyzed whether the rates requested by counsel are reasonable in light of rates paid to attorneys of similar skill and 17 experience in the forum district. See, e.g., Self, 2019 WL 1994459, at *4–6. This, however, is the framework that federal courts apply to motions seeking attorneys’ fees pursuant to a federal 18 statute. The court is aware of no authority holding that a federal court must apply that same 19 framework when awarding attorneys’ fees pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act, a California statute. Indeed, the California Court of Appeal in Goglin did not engage in that forum-based rate analysis 20 and, as evidenced by the many state court fee orders that the parties have pointed this court to, state courts generally do not engage in that analysis. The undersigned, therefore, considers the 21 pending motion under the standard articulated by the California Court of Appeal in Goglin and will determine “whether the monetary charge being made for the time expended [is] reasonable” 22 in light of “the complexity of the case and procedural demands, the skill exhibited and the results 23 achieved.” 4 Cal. App. 5th at 470 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This approach will appropriately result in plaintiff’s counsel being compensated at the same hourly rates they 24 would have received in state court rather than some lower rate based solely on the removal of the action to federal court. Finally, even if the rate determination framework utilized in motions 25 seeking attorneys’ fees pursuant to federal statutes were to apply in this case, the court notes that the hourly rates found to be reasonable by this order would be the same under that framework. 26 For, under the “relevant community”/“forum district” analysis, this court would look to the orders 27 of state courts within the Eastern District of California and conclude that those same rates are consistent with those prevailing in the community for similar services. See Tenorio v. Gallardo, 28 No. 1:16-cv-00283-DAD-JLT, 2019 WL 3842892, at *2 n.1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2019). 1 attorney’s skills first hand, while not even mentioning the prevailing rates in the trial court’s 2 area); see also Filiberto Negrete v. Ford Motor Co. et al., No. ED CV 18-1972-DOC (KKx), 3 2019 WL 4221397, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 5, 2019) (“Plaintiff has demonstrated that counsel has 4 been awarded attorneys’ fees at similar rates under the Song-Beverly Act. [citation omitted.] 5 Such evidence is generally sufficient to show that an attorney’s hourly rates are reasonable.”). 6 The fee applicant bears the burden of producing satisfactory evidence that the fees incurred were 7 “reasonable in amount.” Goglin, 4 Cal. App. 5th at 470 (quoting Nightingale, 31 Cal. App. 4th at 8 104); see also Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984). 9 The Knight Law attorneys request the following hourly rates for its attorneys who worked 10 on this matter:

11 Knight Law Attorney Requested Years of 12 Hourly Rate Experience Attorney Alastair Hamblin $325.00 3 years 13 Attorney Amy Morse $350.00 6 years Attorney Christopher Thoms $350.00 14 years 14 Attorney Deepak Devabose $275.00 5 years 15 Attorney Diane Hernandez $375.00 22 years Attorney Kristina Stephenson-Cheang $375.00 11 years 16 Attorney Mitchell Rosensweig $325.00 1 year Attorney Michelle Lumasag $200.00 4.5 years 17 Attorney Russell Higgins $450.00 16 years 18 Attorney Steve Mikhov $550.00 16 years (Doc. No. 88-2 at 8–10, 28.) The HDMN request the following hourly rates for its attorneys who 19 worked on this matter: 20

21 HDMN Attorney or Paralegal Requested Years of Hourly Rate Experience 22 Attorney Larry Castruita $350.00 8 years Attorney Sepehr Daghighian $400.00, $550.00 14 years 23 Attorney Erik Schmitt $250.00, $275.00 2 years 24 Paralegal Andrea Plata $75.00 2 years 25 (Doc. No. 88-3 at 2–4, 8.) 26 In support of the rates requested by her attorneys, plaintiff has submitted the declarations 27 of attorneys Daghighian and Mikhov and rate determinations in other cases for some of the 28 attorneys at issue. (Doc. Nos. 88-2, 88-3.) These declarations both state the rates that these 1 attorneys and other lawyers from their respective firms charged in this matter and aver that the 2 requested rates are reasonable. (See Doc. No. 88-2 at 7–11; 88-3 at 2–4.) Attached to attorney 3 Mikhov’s declaration and supplemental declaration are several hourly rate determinations by state 4 courts in Song-Beverly Act actions with respect to some of the attorneys who worked on this 5 case. (See Doc. Nos. 88-2 at 94–155; 94-1 at 67–143.) FCA has also attached to its supplemental 6 briefing hourly rate determinations by state courts in Song-Beverly Act actions where some of the 7 attorneys at issue have been awarded rates lower than those requested by them here. (See Doc. 8 No. 95 at Exs. A–H.) These attachments demonstrate that various superior courts in California 9 have awarded the following rates in Song-Beverly Act actions to the following attorneys at issue 10 here: attorney Mikhov has been awarded hourly rates between $300.00 and $500.00; attorney 11 Higgins has been awarded hourly rates between $350.00 and $400.00; attorney Morse has been 12 awarded hourly rates between $250.00 and $400.00; attorney Stephenson-Cheang has been 13 awarded hourly rates between $300.00 and $350.00; attorney Hamblin has been awarded an 14 hourly rate of $325.00; attorney Hernandez has been awarded an hourly rate of $350.00; attorney 15 Devabose has been awarded hourly rates between $200.00 and $250.00; and attorney Lumasag 16 has been awarded an hourly rate of $200.00. 17 Because “the reasonable value of attorney services is variously defined as the hourly 18 amount to which attorneys of like skill in the area would typically be entitled,” Ketchum, 24 Cal. 19 4th at 1133, the court finds that evidence of what some of the attorneys have previously been 20 awarded when litigating other Song-Beverly actions assists the court in determining what the 21 reasonable hourly rates should be in this case. See also Goglin, 4 Cal. App. 5th at 470; Filiberto 22 Negrete, 2019 WL 4221397, at *3. Having considered the various state court orders submitted by 23 both plaintiff and FCA as well as other evidence, the court concludes that the following hourly 24 rates as to each of plaintiff’s attorneys are reasonable: 25 ///// 26 ///// 27 ///// 28 ///// 1 Knight Law Attorney Hourly Rate to Years of 2 be Awarded Experience Attorney Alastair Hamblin $325.00 3 years 3 Attorney Amy Morse $350.00 6 years 4 Attorney Christopher Thoms $350.00 14 years Attorney Deepak Devabose $250.00 5 years 5 Attorney Diane Hernandez $350.00 22 years Attorney Kristina Stephenson-Cheang $350.00 11 years 6 Attorney Mitchell Rosensweig $200.00 1 year 7 Attorney Michelle Lumasag $200.00 4.5 years Attorney Russell Higgins $400.00 16 years 8 Attorney Steve Mikhov $500.00 16 years HDMN Attorney or Paralegal Hourly Rate to Years of 9 be Awarded Experience Attorney Larry Castruita $300.00 8 years 10 Attorney Sepehr Daghighian $500.00 14 years 11 Attorney Erik Schmitt $250.00 2 years Paralegal Andrea Plata $75.00 2 years 12 13 3. Lodestar Calculation 14 Based on the hours and hourly rates that the court has awarded plaintiff’s attorneys, the 15 lodestar here totals $54,630.00. The court’s calculations are reflected below:

16 Law Legal Professional Hours Hourly Rate Lodestar 17 Firm Awarded Awarded Knight Attorney Alastair Hamblin 7.6 $325.00 $2,470.00 18 Law Attorney Amy Morse 10.6 $350.00 $3,710.00 Attorney Christopher Thoms 8 $350.00 $2,800.00 19 Attorney Deepak Devabose 8.4 $250.00 $2,100.00 20 Attorney Diane Hernandez 18 $350.00 $6,300.00 Attorney Kristina Stephenson- 13.8 $350.00 $4,830.00 21 Cheang Attorney Mitchell Rosensweig 2.1 $200.00 $420.00 22 Attorney Michelle Lumasag 3.5 $200.00 $700.00 Attorney Russell Higgins 16.7 $400.00 $6,680.00 23 Attorney Steve Mikhov 6.8 $500.00 $3,400.00 24 HDMN Attorney Larry Castruita 8.6 $300.00 $2,580.00 25 Attorney Sepehr Daghighian 22.0 $500.00 $11,000.00 Attorney Erik Schmitt 29.6 $250.00 $7,400.00 26 Paralegal Andrea Plata 3.2 $75.00 $240.00 27 Total: $54,630.00 28 ///// 1 4. Lodestar Multiplier 2 Next, plaintiff urges this court to apply a multiplier of 0.5 to the lodestar. (Doc. No. 88-1 3 at 20.) Plaintiff argues that the contingent nature of this litigation warrants a 0.2 multiplier and 4 that the delay in payment warrants a 0.3 multiplier. (Id. at 22.) According to plaintiff, “there 5 always existed the possibility that Plaintiff would not prevail” and that “Plaintiff’s attorneys 6 advanced all litigation costs and expenses without reimbursement.” (Id. at 21–22.) FCA argues 7 that an upward multiplier is not warranted here. (Doc. No. 89 at 15–17.) For the reasons that 8 follow, the court chooses to not apply an upward multiplier. 9 As discussed, the lodestar may be “augmented or diminished by taking various relevant 10 factors into account, including (1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved and the 11 skill displayed in presenting them; (2) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded 12 other employment by the attorneys; and (3) the contingent nature of the fee award, based on the 13 uncertainty of prevailing on the merits and of establishing eligibility for the award.” Robertson, 14 144 Cal. App. 4th at 819; see also Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 30 Cal. App. 5th 24, 35 15 (2018). 16 Here, plaintiff does not contend that her attorneys were precluded from seeking other 17 employment, and the court finds that the questions involved in this action were not novel or 18 difficult, nor did the attorneys demonstrate exceptional skill in presenting the issues. Rather, 19 plaintiff argues that “[t]his case required a range of specialized knowledge including: (1) an 20 understanding of the full scope of consumer protection laws, . . .; (2) knowledge of the intricacies 21 of automobiles . . .; and (3) knowledge of auto manufactures’ and dealers’ policies and protocols 22 for repairing vehicles and complying with their legal obligations.” (Doc. No. 88-1 at 16.) 23 However, the fact that plaintiff’s attorneys had to become familiar with a case is not the type of 24 novelty or difficulty that ordinarily justifies an upward multiplier. Moreover, as plaintiff admits, 25 “plaintiff’s attorneys have acquired knowledge and insight about these [issues] over the course of 26 many years of litigation,” and the attorneys do not “spend unreasonable time preparing pleadings 27 because they are able to use documents from other cases that need only be edited.” (Id. at 17–18.) 28 Indeed, the issues presented by this case have recently been addressed in several cases before this 1 court, many of which involved the same attorneys who appeared in this action. See, e.g., Self, 2 2019 WL 1994459; Hall, 2018 WL 2298431; Garcia v. FCA US LLC, 1:16-cv-00730-JLT (E.D. 3 Cal. March 7, 2018). Finally, with respect to the skills displayed by plaintiff’s counsel, the court 4 has reviewed the pleadings filed in this action and finds that the skills displayed by counsel were, 5 on balance, average at best, given that it is readily apparent from the face of these pleadings that 6 counsel relied upon pleadings from other actions as templates and that some of their filings here 7 contained references to vehicles, individuals, and issues that had no relation to this action. The 8 court therefore finds that the first two factors that could justify the application of a multiplier are 9 not applicable here because this was a Song-Beverly action of ordinary complexity and 10 difficulty.4 11 Moreover, the court concludes that the contingent nature of this action does not weigh in 12 favor of an upward multiplier. “The purpose of a fee enhancement, or so-called multiplier, for 13 contingent risk is to bring the financial incentives for attorneys enforcing important constitutional 14 rights . . . into line with incentives they have to undertake claims for which they are paid on a fee- 15 for-services basis.” Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1132. 16 A contingent fee must be higher than a fee for the same legal services paid as they are performed. The contingent fee compensates the 17 lawyer not only for the legal services he renders but for the loan of those services. The implicit interest rate on such a loan is higher 18 because the risk of default (the loss of the case, which cancels the debt of the client to the lawyer) is much higher than that of 19 conventional loans. 20 Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). As an initial matter, the court notes that, at the 21 May 7, 2019 hearing on the pending motion, attorney Daghighian could not represent to the court 22 that neither the Knight Law or HDMN law firms would not be receiving a percentage of the 23 $142,000.00 settlement payment obtained on plaintiff’s behalf in this action. Accordingly, the 24 court finds that it would be inappropriate to apply an upward multiplier for contingent risk if the 25 law firms at issue are also receiving a percentage of the settlement fund. However, even if the 26

27 4 The undersigned also notes that its comments in this regard are limited to the written work produced by plaintiff’s attorneys in this case. Attorney Daghighian, for instance, has tried a Song 28 Beverly Act case before the undersigned and demonstrated notable trial skills in that matter. 1 law firms did not receive a percentage of the settlement amount, the court would still conclude 2 that an upward multiplier based on the contingent risk is not warranted here because that factor is 3 outweighed by the other factors the court has considered, namely that this case was not novel, 4 complex, or difficult, especially because the disputed facts and issues to be resolved were 5 minimal. 6 Similarly, the court finds that an upward multiplier due to any delay in payment of fees to 7 plaintiff’s counsel is unwarranted here. Plaintiff contends that “FCA dragged this case for thirty- 8 two months . . . [and that] [her] attorneys are not paid at all if they lose, and need to absorb 9 significant delay in being Plaintiff do[es] win.” (Doc. No. 88-1 at 22.) Be that as it may, the 10 court is not convinced that (1) FCA is solely to blame for the delay in resolving this action and 11 (2), even if it was, it does not appear to the court that any delay was so egregious so as to justify 12 an upward multiplier. 13 Accordingly, the court declines to apply an upward multiplier to the lodestar amount 14 under the circumstances of this case. 15 B. Costs and Expenses Request 16 Finally, plaintiff seeks an award for costs and expenses incurred by her counsel in 17 litigating this matter. Initially, plaintiff sought $22,488.21 in costs and expenses. (Doc. No. 88-1 18 at 23.) This initial sum, however, included costs that were properly pursued through a bill of 19 costs, which is processed by the court clerk, as opposed to a motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. 20 See 28 U.S.C. § 1920; Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d); Local Rule 242. Accordingly, at the May 7, 2019 21 hearing on the pending motion, the court instructed plaintiff to refile her request and eliminate 22 from her motion costs reimbursable through a separately filed bill of costs. On May 17, 2019, 23 plaintiff filed a bill of costs that was approved on June 26, 2019. (See Doc. Nos. 93, 96.) Now 24 pending before the court is plaintiff’s motion for reimbursement of costs and expenses in the 25 amount of $21,921.36. (Doc. No. 94-1 at 2.) FCA contends that the costs sought should be 26 reduced by $10,658.89, arguing that: travels costs sought by plaintiff were unreasonable and 27 unnecessary; some costs purportedly incurred are not supported by receipts or invoices; and 28 plaintiff’s expert witness fees are excessive and unreasonable. (Doc. No. 95.) 1 The court does not find FCA’s general arguments that the costs and expenses claimed are 2 || excessive, unreasonable, or unnecessary to be persuasive. Plaintiff's travel costs incurred were 3 | reasonably incurred in prosecuting this action. The court will however reduce the costs and 4 | expenses award by $84.20, to account for the few copying, parking, and meal expenses 5 || unsupported by any receipts or invoices. The court has reviewed the records for the remaining 6 || costs and expenses sought by plaintiff and finds them to be reasonably incurred. Accordingly, the 7 | court concludes that plaintiff is also entitled to a total of $21,837.16 in reimbursements for costs. 8 CONCLUSION 9 For the reasons set forth above: 10 1. Plaintiff's motion for attorneys’ fees and costs (Doc. No. 88) is granted in part; 11 2. The court awards $54,630.00 in attorneys’ fees based on the lodestar analysis; and 12 3. The court awards total costs in the amount of $21,837.16. 13 | IT IS SO ORDERED. si □ Dated: _ October 17, 2019 Y L ah yt 15 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 17