1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 THOMAS ZILL HANLEY, No. 2:20-CV-0995-TLN-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the court is plaintiff’s complaint. See ECF No. 1. 19 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 20 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 21 § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or 22 malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief 23 from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, 24 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that complaints contain a “. . . short and plain 25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This 26 means that claims must be stated simply, concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 27 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the 28 complaint gives the defendant fair notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it 1 rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because plaintiff must allege 2 with at least some degree of particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the 3 claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is 4 impossible for the court to conduct the screening required by law when the allegations are vague 5 and conclusory. 6 7 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 8 The plaintiff, Thomas Zill Hanley, is an inmate incarcerated at California Health 9 Care Facility. Plaintiff names the following defendants: (1) the State of California, (2) the County 10 of San Francisco, and (3) Child Protective Services (CPS). Plaintiff claims defendants violated his 11 Eighth Amendment right to be free of cruel and unusual punishment by housing him with an 12 abusive guardian when he was a child. 13 Plaintiff suffers from fetal alcohol syndrome and complex post-traumatic stress 14 disorder. Plaintiff’s therapists and case workers repeatedly reported plaintiff’s foster mother to 15 defendant CPS due to her abusive behavior towards plaintiff and refusal to provide plaintiff with 16 access to psychotherapy or prescription medication. CPS did not take any action in response to 17 the reports. Defendants State of California, CPS, and County of San Francisco terminated 18 plaintiff’s access to his therapeutic support system when he turned eighteen years old despite 19 clear evidence that plaintiff still needed the services. Plaintiff claims that defendants’ inaction and 20 revocation of resources led him to murder his legal guardian and receive a lengthy jail sentence. 21 22 II. DISCUSSION 23 Plaintiff’s suit cannot pass screening. First, the Eleventh Amendment bars plaintiff 24 from filing a lawsuit against the State of California or California’s Child Protective Services. 25 Second, plaintiff cannot sue the County of San Francisco for the individual actions of its social 26 workers because municipalities are not liable for respondeat superior liability in § 1983 actions. 27 Third, plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim cannot stand because the Heck doctrine bars § 1983 28 actions that challenge the nature or duration of an inmate’s confinement. 1 A. Claims Against State of California and Child Protective Services 2 The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought 3 against a state both by its own citizens, as well as by citizens of other states. See Brooks v. 4 Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991). This prohibition 5 extends to suits against states themselves, and to suits against state agencies. See Lucas v. Dep’t 6 of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th 7 Cir. 1989). 8 Plaintiff’s allegations against the State of California cannot stand because the 9 Eleventh Amendment bars plaintiff from suing states. The Eleventh Amendment also bars 10 plaintiff’s claims against California’s Child Protective Services. Child Protective Services is a 11 branch of the California Department of Social Services. The Department of Social Services 12 operates as an agency of the state and thus has the same Eleventh Amendment protections as the 13 state. See Caldwell v. LeFaver, 928 F.2d 331, 332 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Fed. R. Evid. 201 14 (allowing court to take judicial notice of matters of both state court records and its own record).

15 B. Claim Against the County of San Francisco for the Individual Actions of Its Social Workers 16 17 Municipalities and other local government units are among those “persons” to 18 whom § 1983 liability applies. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). 19 Counties and municipal government officials are also “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See id. at 20 691; see also Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). A local 21 government unit, however, may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees or officials 22 under a respondeat superior theory of liability. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 23 397, 403 (1997). Thus, municipal liability must rest on the actions of the municipality, and not of 24 the actions of its employees or officers. See id. To assert municipal liability, therefore, the 25 plaintiff must allege that the constitutional deprivation complained of resulted from a policy or 26 custom of the municipality. See id. A claim of municipal liability under § 1983 is sufficient to 27 withstand dismissal even if it is based on nothing more than bare allegations that an individual 28 defendant’s conduct conformed to official policy, custom, or practice. See Karim-Panahi v. Los 1 Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988). 2 Plaintiff’s claim against the County of San Francisco contains allegations based on 3 the individual actions of the social workers assigned to his case.1 Plaintiff’s claims that are based 4 on the individual actions of social workers are not cognizable because a municipality is not liable 5 for the conduct of its employees. Plaintiff can only pursue a § 1983 action against the County of 6 San Francisco for municipal policies or customs that denied plaintiff his constitutional rights. No 7 such allegations are stated by plaintiff.

8 C. Eighth Amendment Claim to Be Free of Cruel and Unusual Punishment 9 10 When a state prisoner challenges the legality of his custody and the relief he seeks 11 is a determination that he is entitled to an earlier or immediate release, such a challenge is not 12 cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the prisoner’s sole federal remedy is a petition for a writ 13 of habeas corpus. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973); see also Neal v. Shimoda, 14 131 F.3d 818, 824 (9th Cir. 1997); Trimble v. City of Santa Rosa, 49 F.3d 583, 586 (9th Cir. 15 1995) (per curiam). Thus, where a § 1983 action seeking monetary damages or declaratory relief 16 alleges constitutional violations which would necessarily imply the invalidity of the prisoner’s 17 underlying conviction or sentence, or the result of a prison disciplinary hearing resulting in 18 imposition of a sanction affecting the overall length of confinement, such a claim is not 19 cognizable under § 1983 unless the conviction or sentence has first been invalidated on appeal, by 20 habeas petition, or through some similar proceeding. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483- 21 84 (1994) (concluding that § 1983 claim not cognizable because allegations were akin to 22 malicious prosecution action which includes as an element a finding that the criminal proceeding 23 was concluded in plaintiff’s favor); Butterfield v. Bail, 120 F.3d 1023, 1024-25 (9th Cir. 1997) 24 (concluding that § 1983 claim not cognizable because allegations of procedural defects were an 25 attempt to challenge substantive result in parole hearing); cf. Neal, 131 F.3d at 824 (concluding 26

27 1 Plaintiff also alleges that the County of San Francisco violated his constitutional rights through an official policy. The Heck doctrine bars this claim, as discussed in the following 28 section. 1 that § 1983 claim was cognizable because challenge was to conditions for parole eligibility and 2 not to any particular parole determination); cf. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74 (2005) 3 (concluding that § 1983 action seeking changes in procedures for determining when an inmate is 4 eligible for parole consideration not barred because changed procedures would hasten future 5 parole consideration and not affect any earlier parole determination under the prior procedures). 6 The Court acknowledges that plaintiff attempts to bring an Eighth Amendment 7 cruel and unusual punishment claim. However, § 1983 is not the appropriate vehicle of relief. 8 Plaintiff alleges that defendants’ inaction led him to commit a crime and receive a lengthy prison 9 sentence. This claim necessarily challenges the nature and duration of plaintiff’s confinement by 10 suggesting that plaintiff was not entirely responsible for the crime he committed. As a result, a 11 petition for writ of habeas corpus is the only federal relief available to plaintiff and plaintiff 12 cannot successfully establish a § 1983 claim based on the alleged events. 13 Moreover, to the extent plaintiff alleges defendant County of San Francisco is 14 liable based on customs or policies of the county, plaintiff cannot state a claim because those 15 customs or policies could not have been the moving force behind the alleged Eighth Amendment 16 violation. Here, plaintiff alleges he is suffering cruel and unusual punishment in the form of 17 confinement as a result of committing a crime which, in turn, plaintiff asserts he would not have 18 committed but for the county’s customs or policies. As discussed above, these allegations, at 19 best, suggest some mitigation for his crime, which would be an issue in challenging the fact or 20 duration of plaintiff’s confinement, not the conditions of that confinement. Plaintiff’s custom and 21 policy allegations against the county do not relate to the conditions of his current confinement, 22 which would be necessary for plaintiff to be able to establish the required link between the 23 allegedly deficient customs and/or policies and a violation of plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment 24 rights. 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// wOASe 2 OU UY YY PINON MUI I ee Yt VV

1 I. CONCLUSION 2 Because it does not appear possible that the deficiencies identified herein can be 3 | cured by amending the complaint, plaintiff is not entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of 4 | the entire action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 5 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that plaintiffs claims 6 | against all defendants be dismissed. 7 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 8 | Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 14 days 9 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 10 | objections with the court. Responses to objections shall be filed within 14 days after service of 11 | objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See 12 | Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 13 Dated: June 25, 2020 Ssvcqo_ 15 DENNIS M. COTA 16 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28