1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 LEON DAVIS, JR., No. 2:20-cv-01393 TLN AC PS 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF

CHILD SERVICES,

15 Defendant. 16 17 18 Plaintiff is proceeding in this action pro se. This proceeding was referred to the 19 undersigned by Local Rule 302(c)(21). Plaintiff has paid the filing fee and filed a certificate of 20 service. ECF No. 4. On August 20, 2020, plaintiff moved for a cease and desist order of child 21 support. ECF No. 5. Upon review of the complaint, the undersigned concludes that the court 22 lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case and recommends that it be dismissed. The 23 motion at ECF No. 5 should be denied as moot. 24 I. The Complaint 25 Plaintiff is suing the California Department of Child Support Services, asserting federal 26 question jurisdiction under “29 CFR 1614(a) and (a)(1)” and the Fair Debt Collection Practices 27 Act. ECF No. 1 at 2-4. Plaintiff seeks five million dollars in damages for the violation of his 28 civil rights, discrimination, and unlawful actions in violation of federal law, a grant of full 1 custody of his child, prosecution of the child’s mother for perjury, and a return of child support 2 payments made in the amount of $15,000. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff alleges that DCSS discriminates 3 against African American males and does not follow the laws for fathers to get equal treatment. 4 Id. at 5. 5 Substantively, plaintiff alleges he has had fifty percent custody of his child since 2015, but 6 in 2018 the child’s mother committed perjury and stated that he was with his child less than the 7 agreed amount of time. Id. at 7. After a significant delay, and without considering plaintiff’s 8 paperwork, the court ordered back child support payments and “stole money from the sale of my 9 condo in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practice Act.” Id. at 8. Plaintiff alleges that 10 “DCSS violated federal law; Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, when it administered a false 11 order of child support and stated I owed eleven thousand in back child support putting a lien on 12 the sale of my condo and never informed me of my debt, then garnishing my wages to continue 13 this illegal order.” Id. 14 II. Analysis 15 1. Sua Sponte Dismissal for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 16 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; a federal court generally has jurisdiction 17 over a civil action when: (1) a federal question is presented in an action “arising under the 18 Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States” or (2) there is complete diversity of 19 citizenship between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 20 1331, 1332(a). Absence of subject matter jurisdiction requires a federal court to dismiss a case. 21 See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (recognizing that “Article III 22 generally requires a federal court to satisfy itself of its jurisdiction over the subject matter before 23 it considers the merits of a case”). Thus, “a court may raise the question of subject matter 24 jurisdiction, sua sponte, at any time during the pendency of the action.” Snell v. Cleveland, Inc., 25 316 F.3d 822, 826 (9th Cir. 2002). The “presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is 26 governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists 27 only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded 28 complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 1 2. This Case is Barred by the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 2 Although plaintiff’s complaint is cast in terms of federal law violations, it is clear from the 3 content of the complaint and the remedies sought (specifically, return of child support payments 4 made, full custody of his child, and production of his child’s mother) that he is essentially 5 contesting the state court judgment regarding his child support and custody obligations. This 6 amounts to a de facto appeal of the state court judgment. See Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 7 777–78 (9th Cir. 2012) (“To determine whether an action functions as a de facto appeal, we pay 8 close attention to the relief sought by the federal-court plaintiff.”). The court does not have 9 jurisdiction to hear such a case. 10 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits federal district courts from hearing cases “brought 11 by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the 12 district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those 13 judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). To 14 determine if the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a case a court must first determine if the federal 15 action contains a forbidden de facto appeal of a state court judicial decision. Noel v. Hall, 341 16 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003). If it does not, “the Rooker-Feldman inquiry ends.” Bell v. City 17 of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013). If a court determines that the action is a “forbidden 18 de facto appeal,” however, the court cannot hear the de facto appeal portion of the case and, [a]s 19 part of that refusal, it must also refuse to decide any issue raised in the suit that is ‘inextricably 20 intertwined’ with an issue resolved by the state court in its judicial decision.” Noel, 341 F.3d at 21 1158; see also Bell, 709 F.3d at 897 (“The ‘inextricably intertwined’ language from Feldman is 22 not a test to determine whether a claim is a de facto appeal, but is rather a second and distinct step 23 in the Rooker-Feldman analysis.”). A complaint is a “de facto appeal” of a state court decision 24 where the plaintiff “complains of a legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court, and seeks 25 relief from the judgment of that court.” Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163. 26 In seeking a remedy by which this court invalidates a state court decision and amends the 27 state court record, plaintiff is clearly asking this court to “review the final determinations of a 28 state court in judicial proceedings,” which is at the core of Rooker-Feldman’s prohibition. In re 1 Gruntz, 202 F.3d 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000). Requests to vacate a family court order and child 2 support debt are generally considered de facto appeals. Riley v. Knowles, No. 1:16-CV-0057- 3 JLT, 2016 WL 259336, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2016). Indeed, requests to the federal courts to 4 reverse the outcomes of family law issues, such as divorce proceedings or child custody 5 determinations, are generally treated as de facto appeals barred by Rooker-Feldman. See Moore 6 v. County of Butte, 547 Fed. Appx. 826, 829 (9th Cir. 2013). Accordingly, plaintiff’s action 7 constitutes a “forbidden de facto appeal” and the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the 8 case. 9 3. There is No Federal Question Jurisdiction 10 Even if the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not deprive this court of subject matter 11 jurisdiction, the court would be required to find that subject matter jurisdiction does not exist. 12 This is because the allegations of the complaint do not plausibly identify any violation of a 13 federal law. Plaintiff predicates his claims on two federal laws, neither of which support a cause 14 of action. 15 As to plaintiff’s first reference to federal law, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 16 federal courts have repeatedly rejected application of this statute to the collection of child support 17 payments. See Mabe v. G.C. Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 32 F.3d 86 (4th Cir. 1994), Battye v. Child 18 Support Servs., Inc., 873 F. Supp. 103, 105 (N.D. Ill. 1994), Adymy v. Erie County Child Support 19 Enf’t Unit, No. 03-CV-0955E(SC), 2006 WL 1174322, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. May 2, 2006). Child 20 support payments “do not qualify as ‘debts’ under the FDCPA because they were not incurred to 21 receive consumer goods or services. Rather, the [state agency responsible for collecting child 22 support] imposed these obligations upon appellants to force them to fulfill their parental duty to 23 support their children.” Mabe, 32 F.3d at 88. Because plaintiff’s FDCPA claim is based solely 24 on his child support obligations and the FDCPA therefore does not apply, this statute cannot 25 provide the basis for federal question jurisdiction. 26 Plaintiff’s second reference to federal law, 29 CFR § 1614, likewise fails to support 27 federal question jurisdiction. This regulation, promulgated under the Labor Code, is entitled 28 “Federal Sector Equal Employment Opportunity.” Neither the regulation nor the Labor Code wOAOe 2 OU UVM EVV PRINCE MVOC OC OP ee TOY VI

1 | have any potential relationship to the child custody and child support issues that give rise to 2 | plaintiffs complaint. Because this provision of federal law does not relate the facts presented in 3 || the complaint, it does not support federal question jurisdiction. Again, the undersigned finds this 4 | court has no jurisdiction to hear this case. 5 II. Conclusion 6 Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that this case be DISMISSED for lack of 7 || subject matter jurisdiction, and that the pending motion (ECF No.5) be DENIED as moot. 8 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 9 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twenty-one days 10 | after being served with these findings and recommendations, plaintiff may file written objections 11 | with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Id.; see also Local Rule 304(b). Such a document 12 | should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure 13 | to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’ 14 | order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998), as amended on denial of □□□□ □ (Nov. 15 | 24, 1998); Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991) 16 | DATED: August 25, 2020 ~ 17 Httven—

ALLISON CLAIRE

18 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28