1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 PRINCE PAUL RAYMOND WILLIAMS, Case No. 1:21-cv-00434-NONE-EPG 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. SCREENING ORDER 14 FRESNO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF ORDER FOR PLAINTIFF TO: CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES, et al., 15 (1) FILE A SECOND AMENDED Defendants. COMPLAINT; OR 16 (2) NOTIFY THE COURT THAT HE 17 WISHES TO STAND ON HIS FIRST

AMENDED COMPLAINT

18 (ECF No. 5) 19

THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

20 21 Plaintiff Prince Paul Raymond Williams (“Plaintiff”) is proceeding pro se and in forma 22 pauperis in this action. Plaintiff filed the Complaint commencing this action on March 16, 2021. 23 (ECF No. 1.) On April 6, 2021, before the Court screened Plaintiff’s complaint, Plaintiff filed a 24 First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). (ECF No. 5.) The FAC’s claims relate to various child 25 support and wage and income withholding orders issued by the state court. (Id.) The Court finds 26 that the Complaint fails to state any cognizable claims. 27 After Plaintiff reviews this order, Plaintiff can decide to file an amended complaint, which 28 the Court will screen in due course. Plaintiff can also notify the Court that he wants to stand on 1 his complaint, in which case this Court will issue findings and recommendations to the district 2 judge assigned to the case recommending that Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed for the reasons 3 in this order. If Plaintiff does not file anything, the Court will recommend that the case be 4 dismissed.

I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

5 As Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court screens this complaint under 28 6 U.S.C. § 1915. “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, 7 the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that the action or appeal fails to 8 state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 9 A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that 10 the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not 11 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 12 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell 13 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual 14 matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting 15 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this 16 plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are not 17 required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 18 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a plaintiff’s legal 19 conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 20 Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal 21 pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that 22 pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal). 23 II. ALLEGATIONS IN THE COMPLAINT Plaintiff’s complaint alleges as follows: 24 On October 17, 2012, attorney John Dyer “brought forth false claims of debt owed” while 25 Commissioner Jamileh L. Schwartzbart, Court Clerk E. Lozano, and Deputy C. Centeno were 26 present and Commissioner Schwartzbart entered “an uncontested and unconstitutional 27 administrative order” in Raenna Johnson v. Prince Paul Raymond Williams, Case No. 28 1 11CEFL1829, in the Superior Court of California for the County of Fresno. On November 7, 2 2012, attorney John Dyer “brought forth false claims of debt owed” with Commissioner 3 Schwartzbart, Court Clerk D. Flautz, and Deputy C. Centeno present and Commissioner 4 Schwartzbart entered “an uncontested and unconstitutional administrative order” Raenna Johnson v. Prince Paul Raymond Williams, Case No. 11CEFL1829, in the Superior Court of California for 5 the County of Fresno. On January 6, 2015, attorney Maria L. Costa “brought forth false claims of 6 debt owed” with Commissioner Leanne Le Mon, Court Clerk A. Livesay, and Deputy T. 7 MCutcheon present, and Commissioner Le Mon entered “an uncontested and unconstitutional 8 administrative order” in County of Fresno v. Prince Paul Raymond Williams, Case No. 9 14CEFS01741, in the Superior Court of California for the County of Fresno. 10 On October 3, 2017, February 20, 2018, September 1, 2018, and January 21, 2021, D. 11 Villagrana,. J. Vista, Tiffany Brubeck, Ka Moua, Janet Ziadeh, and another unnamed “child 12 support representative” for Fresno County Department of Child Support Services claimed to be a 13 “Judge/Issuing Official” and sent an income withholding order to Plaintiff’s former employer 14 “without a wet signature from a judge.” In November of 2019, after Plaintiff questioned both 15 “SOLANO, FRESNO COUNTY OF DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES” and 16 his former employer about the withholding of his earned wages, Plaintiff suffered an eviction 17 because he could not afford to pay for living expenses. 18 On December 23, 2019, Plaintiff received a letter from Denice Ponce claiming that her 19 “office follows the Title IV of Security Act, Section 459, which permits the issuance of a wage 20 withholding in order to enforce a child support order.” Plaintiff sent a complaint to the Fresno 21 County of Department of Child Support Services on January 13, 2020, providing “notice . . . that 22 Plaintiff had not been afforded the necessary safeguards of due process.” Plaintiff received a letter 23 on January 21, 2020, from Kari Gilbert and/or Lisa Sprague, claiming that there was insufficient evidence that Plaintiff had been discriminated against. On December 29, 2020, January 20, 2021, 24 and February 11, 2021, Plaintiff sent notices to “SOLANO, FRESNO COUNTY OF 25 DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES, with the sole purpose to resolve the 26 matter(s).” On January 26, 2021, Plaintiff received a letter from Janet Siadeh containing false 27 claims of an “arrears balance of $1,142.56.” 28 1 On February 23, 2021, attorney Michael Varin “brought forth claims of a debt owed” with 2 Commissioner Jennifer Hamilton and Deputy Bezaleel Carrillo present. Plaintiff made a special 3 appearance to resolve the claims in Raenna Johnson v. Prince Paul Raymond Williams and 4 County of Fresno v. Prince Paul Raymond Williams. Commissioner Hamilton called the matter at approximately 8:30 a.m. Plaintiff asked Commissioner Hamilton and Attorney Varin to “have 5 either a living man or woman provide written proof of the Court’s delegation of authority over 6 Plaintiff, as well as written proof that Plaintiff was in an Article 3 Court of law. Plaintiff’s 7 requests were disregarded by all acting officials.” Commissioner Hamilton asked Plaintiff to step 8 outside and Plaintiff refused “as personal jurisdiction was not established.” Deputy Bezaleel 9 Carrillo, Deputy Javier Rivera, and Deputy Raul Cervantez surrounded Plaintiff “using 10 intimidation tactics to force Plaintiff out of the courtroom” and Deputy Carrillo attempted to take 11 Plaintiff’s cell phone from his hand. Plaintiff attempted to reenter the courthouse only to be 12 “wrongfully denied re-entry by Rivera” and when Plaintiff asked why he could not enter, Rivera 13 stated that Plaintiff was “done dude” without any further explanation. 14 On March 1, 2021, Plaintiff received a letter from Monica Cantu “claiming a false debt 15 owed . . . in the amount of $338 per month with court-ordered arrears payment of $25 per month, 16 and a total balance owed of $13,067.17.” On March 5, 2021, Plaintiff received a letter from 17 Monica Morales stating, “Court hearing dated 2/23/2021 regarding Earnings Assignment, notes 18 are showing that the Motion was denied.” On March 9, 2021, Plaintiff received a letter from Lisa 19 Sprague “claiming a false debt owed.” On March 24, 2021, Plaintiff received a letter from Janet 20 Ziadeh stating “Our Office has sent a written request to STATE STREET, in order to obtain 21 income verification.” 22 As of March 30, 2021, “Plaintiff has not been provided a resolution or minute orders by a 23 court of competent jurisdiction regarding the matter, with a wet ink signature from a judge.” As of March 30, 2021, “SOLANO, FRESNO DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES 24 has continued to send statements to Plaintiff’s home, claiming a false debt[.]” 25 Plaintiff names twenty-six individuals whom he alleges are all “agents of SOLANO, 26 FRESNO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES” as defendants. The 27 complaint asserts claims for defamation, fraud, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional 28 1 distress and is interspersed with references to a variety of state and federal statutes, constitutional 2 amendments, and case law. 3 III. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS 4 A. Pleading Standards As set forth above, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) (“Rule 8(a)”) requires a 5 complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 6 to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although a complaint is not required to include detailed factual 7 allegations, it must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 8 that is plausible on its face.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). It must 9 also contain “sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the 10 opposing party to defend itself effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). 11 Moreover, Plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally participated in the 12 deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. 13 A court may dismiss a complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8(a) if it is “verbose, 14 confusing and conclusory.” Nevijel v. N. Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981); 15 Brosnahan v. Caliber Home Loans, Inc., 765 F. App’x 173, 174 (9th Cir. 2019). Additionally, a 16 court may dismiss a complaint for failure to comply with Rule 8(a) if it is “argumentative, prolix, 17 replete with redundancy, and largely irrelevant.” McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 18 1996). 19 Plaintiff’s complaint violates Rule 8(a). The allegations in the FAC are confusing and 20 unclear, making it difficult for the Court to determine what, if any, cognizable claims are included 21 in the FAC. Although the Federal Rules employ a flexible pleading policy, Plaintiff must give fair 22 notice to the defendants and must allege facts that support the elements of the claim plainly and 23 succinctly. It is Plaintiff’s duty to articulate his claims, not the Court’s or the defendants’ duty to try to decipher what claims Plaintiff is asserting in the action. 24 It is unclear what entities and individuals Plaintiff is attempting to name as defendants. In 25 the caption of the FAC, Plaintiff names “SOLANO, FRESNO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF 26 CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES” but, where Plaintiff provides a list of the defendants, Plaintiff 27 does not include this defendant. Instead, the FAC lists twenty-six individuals, including what 28 1 appear to be various attorneys, state court staff, and “Child Support Representative[s]” as 2 defendants. Additionally, in the portion of the FAC where Plaintiff sets forth his claims, he only 3 identifies “BRUBECK, CANTU, Costa, DYER, MORALES, MOUA, PONCE, SPRAGUE, 4 VARIN, VILLAGRANA, VISTA, and ZIADEH” as defendants. There are no allegations pertaining to what, if anything, many of the individuals named as defendants did. Further, it is 5 unclear whether “SOLANO, FRESNO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT 6 SERVICES” is intended to refer to one entity or two different entities, i.e. the Child Support 7 Services department for the County of Solano and/or the Child Support Services department for 8 the County of Fresno. 9 The FAC also lists various issues related to child support and wage and earning 10 withholding orders, contains several legal conclusions regarding the validity of those orders, and 11 cites to a variety of state and federal statutes, constitutional provisions, and case law. The FAC is 12 concerned primarily with descriptions of various child support proceedings including who was 13 present for those proceedings, who sent letters to Plaintiff, and when those events occurred. 14 However, it does not clearly state Plaintiff’s federal claims and many of Plaintiff’s conclusions 15 regarding the validity of the state court orders lack factual support as to how his due process 16 rights were violated or in what way they are “false” or “fraudulent.” Taken as a whole, the Court 17 cannot determine what, if any, cognizable claims Plaintiff is attempting to bring in the FAC and 18 against which defendant(s). 19 The requirement of a clear and plain statement is especially important in this case because 20 this Court is not an appellate court for the state superior court. This Court does not review 21 whether the state superior court acted properly according to its own rules and procedures. If 22 Plaintiff wishes to challenge a decision from a state superior court, he must file an appeal with the 23 state appellate court (which may be subject to time limitations and other rules). The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint so that he can state his claims 24 more clearly. If Plaintiff chooses to amend his complaint, he must allege facts and a cause of 25 action that outlines his claims. Plaintiff must allege the who, what, when, where, and why of his 26 claim against each of the defendants. Simply listing the parties and providing unclear recitations 27 of legal terms and statutory provisions is not sufficient. 28 1 B. Legal Standards 2 The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend. In the event Plaintiff amends his complaint, 3 the Court provides the following legal standards which may be relevant to his action: 4 1. Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and their power to adjudicate is limited to 5 that granted by Congress. U.S. v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1009 (9th Cir. 2000). Federal courts are 6 presumptively without jurisdiction over civil actions, and the burden to establish the contrary 7 rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 8 (1994). Generally, there are two bases for subject matter jurisdiction: 1) diversity jurisdiction; and 9 2) federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. 10 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332, federal district courts have diversity jurisdiction over civil 11 actions “where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000,” and where the 12 matter is between “citizens of different states.” 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). 13 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal district courts have federal question jurisdiction 14 over “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” “A 15 case ‘arises under’ federal law either where federal law creates the cause of action or ‘where the 16 vindication of a right under state law necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal law.” 17 Republican Party of Guam v. Gutierrez, 277 F.3d 1086, 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting 18 Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1983)). The 19 presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is governed by the “well-pleaded complaint 20 rule.” Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). Under this rule, “federal 21 jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly 22 pleaded complaint.” Id. 23 The FAC states that federal question and diversity jurisdiction both exist in this action. As to federal question jurisdiction, the FAC appears to only allege state law claims for defamation, 24 fraud, negligence, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Although the complaint cites to 25 various federal statutes, it is not clear which, if any, of these references are intended to allege a 26 claim against the named defendants or what the basis of those claims may be. As to diversity 27 jurisdiction, Plaintiff alleges that he and all defendants reside in California. Therefore, there is no 28 1 diversity of citizenship. If Plaintiff elects to amend his complaint, he must allege facts 2 establishing the existence of subject matter jurisdiction to proceed in federal court. 3 2. Section 1983 4 Although the FAC does not appear to allege a claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Civil Cover Sheet filed with the initial complaint cited to § 1983 as one of the statutes under 5 which Plaintiff was filing. (See ECF No. 1-1.) Section 1983, known as the Civil Rights Act, 6 provides: 7 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 8 custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the 9 United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 10 Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.... 11

12 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely 13 provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 14 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see also 15 Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los Angeles, 16 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 2012); 17 Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006). 18 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted under color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the Constitution or 19 federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Marsh 20 v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing “under color of state 21 law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the meaning of § 1983, ‘if he 22 does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act, or omits to perform an act which 23 he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.’” Preschooler 24 II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 25 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The requisite causal connection may be established when an 26 official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should 27 know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional harms.” Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 28 1 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of causation “closely resembles the standard 2 ‘foreseeability’ formulation of proximate cause.” Arnold v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 3 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 4 2008). Additionally, a plaintiff must demonstrate that each named defendant personally 5 participated in the deprivation of his rights. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77. In other words, there must 6 be an actual connection or link between the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged 7 to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 8 691, 695 (1978). 9 Supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of their 10 employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant holds a 11 supervisory position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional violation must be 12 specifically alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 13 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). To state a claim for relief under 14 § 1983 based on a theory of supervisory liability, a plaintiff must allege some facts that would 15 support a claim that the supervisory defendants either personally participated in the alleged 16 deprivation of constitutional rights; knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them; or 17 promulgated or “implement[ed] a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of 18 constitutional rights' and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Hansen v. Black, 19 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Taylor v. List, 20 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989). For instance, a supervisor may be liable for his “own 21 culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision, or control of his subordinates,” “his 22 acquiescence in the constitutional deprivations of which the complaint is made,” or “conduct that 23 showed a reckless or callous indifference to the rights of others.” Larez v. City of Los Angeles, 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991) (internal citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). 24 a. State Actor Requirement in Section 1983 25 Section 1983 imposes civil liability on an individual who “under color [of state law] . . . 26 subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any 27 rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Private 28 1 parties are not generally acting under color of state law for the purposes of § 1983. Price v. 2 Hawaii, 939 F.2d 702, 707–08 (9th Cir. 1991) (“Careful adherence to the ‘state action’ 3 requirement preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and 4 federal judicial power. It also avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility 5 for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed”). 6 Nevertheless, in some circumstances, the actions of a private actor may render them liable 7 under § 1983. Under the “public function test,” private individuals or entities may be deemed 8 state actors for purposes of § 1983 when they perform a public function that has been 9 “traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State.” Rendell–Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 842 10 (1982) (citations and quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original). “That a private entity 11 performs a function which serves the public does not make its acts state action.” Id. Under the joint action test, a private individual may be liable as a state actor under § 1983 12 if he or she was part of a conspiracy or was a “willful participant in [other] joint action” with 13 a state actor that caused the constitutional violation. Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 445 (9th Cir. 14 2002). “To prove a conspiracy between private parties and the government under § 1983, an 15 agreement or ‘meeting of the minds’ to violate constitutional rights must be shown.” Fonda 16 v. Gray, 707 F.2d 435, 438 (9th Cir. 1983). “To be liable as a co-conspirator, a private defendant 17 must share with the public entity the goal of violating a plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Franklin, 18 312 312 F.3d at 445. “The Ninth Circuit requires a ‘substantial degree of cooperation’ between 19 the government and a private citizen before finding such a conspiracy.” Annan-Yartey v. 20 Honolulu Police Dep’t, 475 F.Supp.2d 1041, 1046 (D. Haw. 2007)(quoting Franklin, 312 F.3d at 21 445). 22 Although Plaintiff alleges that all of the individual defendants are “agents of SOLANO, 23 FRESNO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES,” it is unclear whether 24 all of these individuals are officers or employees of a governmental entity or whether some may 25 be private actors. For example, some individuals are described as a “Child Support Attorney,” but 26 it is unclear whether these individuals are attorneys for “Solano, Fresno County Department of 27 Child Support Services” or for private parties. Likewise, there is no description of defendant 28 Raenna Johnson’s relationship to “Solano, Fresno County Department of Child Support 1 Services.” If Plaintiff amends his complaint, any claim pursuant to § 1983 should allege facts 2 establishing whether each defendant is a state or private actor and whether any private actors’ 3 conduct is fairly attributable to the government. 4 b. Municipal Liability in Section 1983 5 “[A] local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its 6 employees or agents.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Instead, a governmental entity may be held liable 7 under § 1983 only where a policy, practice, or custom of the entity can be shown to be a moving 8 force behind a violation of constitutional rights. Id. (“Instead, it is when execution of a 9 government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts 10 may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity 11 is responsible under § 1983.”). 12 To state a claim for governmental entity liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege 13 facts demonstrating “(1) that [the plaintiff] possessed a constitutional right of which he was 14 deprived; (2) that the municipality had a policy; (3) that this policy amounts to deliberate 15 indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) that the policy is the moving force 16 behind the constitutional violation.” Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. No. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 17 438 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted; alterations in original). 18 Plaintiff has not alleged that any policy or custom of “Solano, Fresno County Department 19 of Child Support Services” caused him injury. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint 20 and is claiming that a governmental entity has a policy or custom giving rise to liability under § 21 1983, he must include facts in his amended complaint showing that he was deprived of a 22 constitutional right; that the governmental entity has a policy; that this policy is deliberately 23 indifferent to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights; and that the policy is the reason or “moving force” 24 behind the violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. 3. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 25 Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a party may not seek appellate review in federal 26 court of a decision made by a state court. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 27 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Typically, the Rooker- 28 1 Feldman doctrine bars federal courts from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over a 2 proceeding in which a party losing in state court seeks what in substance would be appellate 3 review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party's claim 4 that the state judgment itself violates the losers' federal rights. Doe v. Mann, 415 F.3d 1038, 5 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 6 284 (2005) (the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes a district court from appellate review of 7 “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments 8 rendered before the district court proceeding commenced[.]”). Accordingly, the district court 9 lacks jurisdiction over “claims . . . ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court's decision such 10 that the adjudication of the federal claims would undercut the state ruling.” Bianchi v. 11 Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483, 485); see, e.g., Moore v. County of Butte, 547 Fed. Appx. 826, 829 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding a plaintiff's 12 claims challenging the outcome of custody proceedings were properly dismissed); Rucker v. 13 County of Santa Clara, State of California, 2003 WL 21440151, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 17, 2003) 14 (finding the plaintiff's claims were “inextricably intertwined” with the state court's rulings where 15 the plaintiff “challenge[d] his original child support order on jurisdictional grounds, dispute[d] his 16 total child support arrearages, and allege[d] that Santa Clara County's garnishment order against 17 his disability benefits payments is invalid”); see also Ignacio v. Judges of U.S. Court of Appeals, 18 453 F.3d 1160, 1165-66 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming the district court's dismissal of the case 19 “because the complaint is nothing more than another attack on the California superior court's 20 determination in [the plaintiff's] domestic case”). 21 To the extent Plaintiff is asking this Court to review the child support and wage and 22 earning withholding orders issued by the state court, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this 23 Court lacks jurisdiction (authority) to review and reverse a state court’s decision. Accordingly, 24 any claim seeking to reverse the state court orders cannot proceed in this federal court. To the 25 extent Plaintiff seeks to have the state court decision reviewed, he must do so by filing a timely 26 appeal from that decision in a state appellate court. 27 \\\ 28 1 4. State Law Claims 2 Under the California Tort Claims Act (“CTCA”), a party seeking to recover money 3 damages from a public entity or its employees must submit a timely claim to the entity before 4 filing suit in court. See Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 905, 911.2, 945.4, and 950.2. Timely presentation of 5 claims subject to the CTCA is not merely a procedural requirement but is an element of the plaintiff’s cause of action. Shirk v. Vista Unified School District, 64 Cal.Rptr.3d 210, 216 (2007). 6 A plaintiff may bring its action against a public entity and its employees only after the entity has 7 acted upon or is deemed to have rejected the plaintiff’s claims. See id; see also Mangold v. 8 California Public Utilities Commission, 67 F.3d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The California Tort 9 Claims Act requires, as a condition precedent to suit against a public entity, the timely 10 presentation of a written claim and the rejection of the claim in whole or in part.”). 11 A plaintiff asserting a claim that is subject to the CTCA must affirmatively allege in his 12 complaint that he complied with the CTCA’s claims presentation procedure or circumstances 13 excusing such compliance. See Shirk, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 216; State of California v. Superior 14 Court (Bodde), 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 534, 541 (2004) (plaintiff must allege facts “demonstrating or 15 excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirement”). Compliance with the CTCA “is 16 mandatory and failure to file a claim is fatal to the cause of action.” City of San Jose v. Superior 17 Court, 115 Cal. Rptr. 797, 802 (1974) (internal citation omitted). The requirement to 18 affirmatively allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the CTCA’s claims 19 presentation requirement applies in federal court. Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep’t, 839 20 F.2d 621, 627 (9th Cir. 1988). 21 Here, Plaintiff is asserting various state law claims seeking to recover money damages 22 from what appears to be a public entity and public employees. Plaintiff has not alleged facts 23 demonstrating that he complied with, or excusing his compliance with, the CTCA claims presentation requirement for these state law claims. If Plaintiff amends his complaint, he should 24 allege facts demonstrating he complied with the CTCA or was excused from compliance. 25

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

26 The Court has screened Plaintiff’s complaint and finds that it fails to state any cognizable 27 claim. 28 1 Under Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “the court should freely give 2 leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Accordingly, the Court will provide Plaintiff with 3 time to file an amended complaint, so that Plaintiff can provide additional factual allegations. 4 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-30 (9th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint within thirty days. 5 If Plaintiff chooses to amend his complaint, in his amended complaint he must state what 6 each named defendant did that led to the deprivation of his constitutional or other federal rights. 7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). 8 Plaintiff should note that although he has been given the opportunity to amend, it is not for 9 the purpose of changing the nature of this suit or adding unrelated claims. George v. Smith, 507 10 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (no “buckshot” complaints). 11 Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint, Lacey v. 12 Maricopa County, 693 F 3d. 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc), and it must be complete in 13 itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading, Local Rule 220. Therefore, in an 14 amended complaint, as in an original complaint, each claim and the involvement of each 15 defendant must be sufficiently alleged. The amended complaint should be clearly and boldly 16 titled “First Amended Complaint,” refer to the appropriate case number, and be an original signed 17 under penalty of perjury. 18 Plaintiff has a choice on how to proceed. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint if he 19 believes that additional true factual allegations would state cognizable claim(s). If Plaintiff files 20 an amended complaint, the Court will screen that complaint in due course. Alternatively, Plaintiff 21 may choose to stand on his complaint subject to the Court issuing findings and recommendations 22 to a district judge consistent with this order. 23 Based on the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that: 1. Within thirty (30) days from the date of service of this order, Plaintiff shall either: 24 a. File a Second Amended Complaint; or 25 b. Notify the Court in writing that he wants to stand on this complaint; 26 2. If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, Plaintiff shall caption the 27 amended complaint “Second Amended Complaint” and refer to case number 1:21- 28 1 cv-00434-NONE-EPG; and 2 3. Failure to comply with this order may result in the dismissal of this action. 3 | IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: April 21, 2021 [see hey 5 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28