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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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9 10 JOANNE GILLIES, Case No. EDCV 19-2113-JGB (KKx) 11 Petitioner(s), 12 v. ORDER REMANDING CASE TO

STATE COURT

13 ANTHONY KANDARE, ET AL., 14 Respondent(s). 15 16 17 I. 18 INTRODUCTION 19 Respondent Anthony Kandare (“Respondent”) has removed this action, which 20 was originally filed by Petitioner Joanne Gillies (“Petitioner”) in the California 21 Superior Court for the County of Riverside, to this Court on the basis of diversity 22 jurisdiction. ECF Docket No. (“Dkt.”) 1. The underlying state court action seeks an 23 Elder or Dependent Adult Abuse Restraining Order protecting Valerie Kandare 24 (“Protected Person”), who is Petitioner and Respondent’s mother, from alleged 25 financial abuse by Respondent. Id. 26 This Court sua sponte REMANDS this action to the California Superior Court 27 for the County of Riverside for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as set forth below. 1 II. 2 APPLICABLE LAW 3 “The right of removal is entirely a creature of statute and ‘a suit commenced in 4 a state court must remain there until cause is shown for its transfer under some act of 5 Congress.’” Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (quoting 6 Great N. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276, 280 (1918)). Generally, where Congress 7 has acted to create a right of removal, those statutes are strictly construed against 8 removal jurisdiction. Id.; Nevada v. Bank of Am. Corp., 672 F.3d 661, 667 (9th Cir. 9 2012); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). 10 Unless otherwise expressly provided by Congress, a defendant may remove 11 “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United 12 States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a); Dennis v. Hart, 724 F.3d 1249, 13 1252 (9th Cir. 2013). The removing defendant bears the burden of establishing 14 federal jurisdiction. Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 682 (9th Cir. 15 2006); Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566-67. “Under the plain terms of § 1441(a), in order 16 properly to remove [an] action pursuant to that provision, [the removing defendant] 17 must demonstrate that original subject-matter jurisdiction lies in the federal courts.” 18 Syngenta Crop Prot., 537 U.S. at 33. Failure to do so requires that the case be 19 remanded, as “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction may not be waived, and . . . the district 20 court must remand if it lacks jurisdiction.” Kelton Arms Condo. Owners Ass’n v. 21 Homestead Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003). “If at any time before final 22 judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case 23 shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). It is “elementary that the subject matter 24 jurisdiction of the district court is not a waivable matter and may be raised at anytime 25 by one of the parties, by motion or in the responsive pleadings, or sua sponte by the 26 trial or reviewing court.” Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1194 n.2 (9th 27 Cir. 1988). 1 “In actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief, it is well established that the 2 amount in controversy is measured by the value of the object of the litigation.” Hunt 3 v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 347, 97 S. Ct. 2434, 53 L. Ed. 2d 4 383 (1977). “The test for determining the amount in controversy is the pecuniary 5 result to either party which the judgment would directly produce.” Corral v. Select 6 Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 878 F.3d 770, 775 (9th Cir. 2017). 7 III. 8 DISCUSSION 9 Respondent is asserting jurisdiction on the basis of diversity and, therefore, 10 bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount 11 in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 12 Respondent argues the amount in controversy is the amount he is alleged to 13 have improperly taken from the protected person, i.e., $380,950. See Dkt. 1 at 3-4. 14 However, pursuant to the state court pleadings attached to the Notice of Removal, 15 Petitioner seeks only the following relief: 16 (1) Personal Conduct Orders that respondent not do any of the 17 following to petitioner or the protected person: (a) physically abuse, 18 financially abuse, intimidate, molest, attack, strike, stalk, threaten, assault 19 (sexually or otherwise), hit, harass, destroy the personal property of, or 20 disturb the peace of the person; and (b) contact the person, either 21 directly or indirectly, in any way, including, but not limited to, in person, 22 by telephone, in writing, by public or private mail, by interoffice mail, by 23 e-mail, by text message, by fax, or by other electronic means. 24 (2) Stay-Away Orders that respondent stay at least 100 yards away 25 from the protected person, petitioner, and the protected person’s home, 26 job or workplace, and vehicle. 27 Dkt. 1 at 13. 1 The relief sought by Petitioner does not appear to have an obvious monetary 2 | value. The allegations that Respondent took money from the protected person 3 | appear to be solely related to showing that financial abuse occurred in order to 4 | support the prospective injunctive relief sought. It is, therefore, not clear that a 5 | judgement in favor of Petitioner would result in a pecuniary benefit to Petitioner or a 6 | detriment to Respondent. See Corral, 878 F.3d at 775. Hence, Respondent has failed 7 | to satisfy his burden to plausibly allege that the amount in controversy requirement 8 | has been met. 9 IV. 10 ORDER 11 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this matter be, and hereby is, 12 | REMANDED to the California Superior Court for the County of Riverside for lack 13 | of subject matter jurisdiction. 14 15 Dated: November 7, 2019 see HONGRABLE JESUS6r □□ KNAL 16 UnitfdjStates District Judge 17 Presented by: 18 19 Conlyie— 20 |KENLYKIYAKATO □□□ United States Magistrate Judge 22 23 24 25 26 27 28