INTRODUCTION

19 On March 12, 2020, Plaintiff Peter Kleidman (“Plaintiff”) filed a 20 complaint (Dkt. 1, “Complaint”) alleging violations of various provisions of 21 the United States Constitution and the California Constitution, as well as 22 violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983” or “§ 1983”), 28 U.S.C. § 2201, 23 and Cal. Gov. Code § 68081, against the California Court of Appeal, Second 24 Appellate District, Division Four of the California Court of Appeal, Second 25 Appellate District, the Supreme Court of California, the Judicial Conference of 26 California, which Plaintiff alleges was established by the California 27 28 Constitution and is part of the “judicial branch” (collectively, the “California 1 Courts”) and several current and former Judges and Justices of the California 2 Courts (collectively, “Judicial Officers”). 3 II. 4 THE RELEVANT ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT 5 Plaintiff alleges in 2013 he filed a lawsuit in Los Angeles County 6 Superior Court and the court in that case set a trial date of April 20, 2015. 7 Complaint, ¶ 8. Plaintiff claims that in 2014, “the clerks” advised him that the 8 trial was no longer set for April 20, 2015, and he was sent a document showing 9 the case was dismissed. Id., ¶ 9. However, “the clerks erred” and the April 10 2015 trial remained on calendar. Id., ¶ 10. Unaware, Plaintiff did not appear 11 for the trial and judgment was entered against him as to non-arbitrable claims. 12 Id. In August 2015, the superior court awarded his opponent $41,200 in 13 attorney’s fees. Id., ¶ 11. Plaintiff’s subsequent attempts to set aside the 14 judgment and fee award were unsuccessful. Id., ¶¶ 12-13. Plaintiff sought relief 15 in the California Courts, but was unsuccessful. Id., ¶¶ 14-18. Plaintiff had 16 previously been unsuccessful in the California Courts. Id., ¶ 19. 17 Plaintiff thereafter alleges misconduct by the defendants, alleging, for 18 example, that certain defendants “were motivated solely by their own personal 19 sensitivities (independent and irrespective of the law) to decide what they 20 wanted the ultimate outcome to be, and then proceeded with a results- 21 oriented, ends-justify-the-means, ad hoc approach, contriving and concocting 22 23 specious legal arguments which supposedly lead to the result they desired at 24 the outset,” even though those arguments were “ill-conceived, meritless, 25 invalid and unreasoned, the produce solely of the judicial will, not judicial 26 integrity.” Complaint, ¶ 26. In so doing, Plaintiff alleges, the defendants 27 violated his First, Fourteenth Amendment rights, Section 1983, and various 28 provisions of California law. He seeks declaratory relief, costs, and injunctions 1 “commanding” that proceedings before the California Courts be “reopened” 2 and continue “in a manner which preserve’s Plaintiff’s Constitutional right to 3 due process,” complies with California law, results in an opinion “with full, 4 precedential and persuasive value on par with all published, court of appeals 5 opinions,” and in particular, “commanding the California Supreme Court to 6 hear and determine [the proceedings at issue] on the merits.” Id. at pp. 58-59. 7 III. 8

THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE

9 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See, e.g., Owen Equip. 10 & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978). “A federal court is 11 presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case unless the contrary 12 affirmatively appears.” Stock W., Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville 13 Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). The plaintiff bears the 14 burden of proving that her case is within federal jurisdiction. See, e.g., In re 15 Ford Motor Co. / Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 264 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2001) 16 (citing McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)). 17 District courts may properly raise lack of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte. 18 Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999). Indeed, “courts 19 have an independent obligation to determine whether subject matter 20 jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Id.; see 21 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (requiring the court to dismiss the action if subject 22 23 matter jurisdiction is lacking). 24 Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal district court may not 25 exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over a de facto appeal from a state court 26 judgment. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Rooker v. 27 Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 28 (1983)). Congress, in 28 U.S.C. § 1257, vests the United States Supreme Court, 1 not the lower federal courts, with appellate jurisdiction over state court 2 judgments. Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463 (2006) (per curiam). “Review 3 of such judgments may be had only in [the Supreme] Court.” Feldman, 460 4 U.S. 462, 482 (1983). The doctrine bars a district court from exercising 5 jurisdiction not only over an action explicitly styled as a direct appeal, but also 6 over the “de facto equivalent” of such an appeal. Noel, 341 F.3d at 1155. 7 The doctrine governs “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of 8 injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court 9 proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of 10 those judgments.” Mothershed v. Justices of the Sup. Ct., 410 F.3d 602, 606 11 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Bk. Indus. Corp., 544 12 U.S. 280, 285 (2005)). To determine whether an action functions as a de facto 13 appeal, courts “pay close attention to the relief sought by the federal-court 14 plaintiff.” Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal 15 quotation marks and citation omitted). “It is a forbidden de facto appeal under 16 Rooker–Feldman when the plaintiff in federal district court complains of a 17 legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court, and seeks relief from the 18 judgment of that court.” Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163 “Under Rooker-Feldman, 19 lower federal courts are without subject matter jurisdiction to review state 20 court decisions, and state court litigants may therefore only obtain federal 21 review by filing a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court of the 22 23 United States.” Id. 24 Here, the relief Plaintiff seeks—injunctions “compelling” the California 25 Courts and the Judicial Officers to reopen cases, issue new orders, and decide 26 matters “on the merits” that were not previously so decided—constitutes a de 27 facto appeal of the rulings of the California Courts. The Complaint seeks 28 precisely the type of relief that the Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have 1 ||instructed is outside the subject-matter jurisdiction of district courts. See 2 || Rooker; Feldman; Mothershed; Noel. Thus, Plaintiff's claims appear to be 3 ||barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 4 IV. 5 ORDER 6 Plaintiff is therefore ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why this action 7 || should not be dismissed by filing a written response within fourteen (14) days 8 || from the date of this Order setting forth any valid legal and/or factual reasons ? Hor arguments why the Court should not find that it lacks subject matter 10 jurisdiction over this action under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. i Instead of filing a written response to the matters addressed in this 12 Order, Plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss the action by filing a Notice of IS Dismissal form pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Clerk is directed to provide Plaintiff with a blank Notice of Dismissal Form (CV-009). 7 A failure to timely file a response to this Order may result in the 18 dismissal of the action as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and for 19 failure to prosecute and comply with Court orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) 20 IT IS SO ORDERED. 21 ZL 22 Dated: March 17,2020 23 JOHN D. EARLY 94 nited States Magistrate Judge 25 26 27 28