I. BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY

18 On October 23, 2018, plaintiff Hassan Musa Mack, a state prisoner who is 19 proceeding pro se and has been granted leave to proceed without prepayment of the 20 filing fee (“IFP”), filed a Civil Rights Complaint (“Complaint”) apparently pursuant 21 to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against officials connected with the inmate classification 22 committee at the California Men’s Colony where plaintiff was previously housed. 23 As plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding IFP on a civil rights complaint against 24 governmental defendants, the assigned Magistrate Judge screened the Complaint to 25 determine if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which 26 relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune 27 from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. §1997e(c). 28 1 On March 17, 2020, the Magistrate Judge issued an Order Dismissing 2 Complaint with Leave to Amend and Directing Plaintiff to Respond to Order 3 (“March Order”).1 The March Order advised plaintiff that the Complaint was 4 deficient for reasons described in the March Order, dismissed the Complaint with 5 leave to amend, and directed plaintiff, within fourteen days (i.e., by March 31, 6 2020), to file one of the following: (1) a first amended complaint which cures the 7 pleading defects described in the March Order; (1) a notice of dismissal; or (3) a 8 notice of intent to stand on the Complaint.2 The March Order expressly cautioned 9 10 1Absent consent by all parties, including unserved defendants, a magistrate judge cannot 11 issue dispositive orders, including an order dismissing a claim. Branch v. Umphenour, 936 F.3d 994, 1004 (9th Cir. 2019); see also Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 2017) 12 (“[C]onsent of all parties (including unserved defendants) is a prerequisite to a magistrate 13 judge’s jurisdiction to enter dispositive decisions under § 636(c)(1).”); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)-(B). However, “the dismissal of a complaint with leave to amend is a 14 non-dispositive matter.” McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 798 (9th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). Accordingly, a magistrate judge may dismiss a complaint with leave to amend without 15 the approval of a district judge. See id. at 797 (“While the magistrate can dismiss complaints 16 with leave to amend, the district court necessarily must review that decision before dismissing the entire action.”). Additionally, a plaintiff who disagrees with a magistrate judge’s order, 17 including a nondispositive order dismissing a pleading with leave to amend, may file an 18 objection with the district judge. See Bastidas v. Chappell, 791 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Hunt v. Pliler, 384 F.3d 1118, 1124 (9th Cir. 2004) (“District court review of even these 19 nondispositive matters . . . can be compelled upon objection of the party against whom the magistrate has ruled.”) (quoting McKeever, 932 F.2d at 798). The March Order expressly 20 notified plaintiff that (1) the March Order constituted non-dispositive rulings on pretrial matters; 21 (2) to the extent a party disagreed with such non-dispositive rulings, such party may seek review from the District Judge within a specified time frame; (3) to the extent a party believed that the 22 rulings were dispositive, rather than non-dispositive, such party had the right to object to the determination that the rulings were non-dispositive within a specified time frame; and (4) a party 23 would be foreclosed from challenging the rulings in the March Order if such party did not seek 24 review thereof or object thereto. (March Order at 20 n.6). 25 2Specifically, the Magistrate Judge advised plaintiff, albeit in greater detail and with citation to authorities, that the Complaint (1) violated Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil 26 Procedure because it did not name all (or indeed any) of the parties in the caption or allege 27 claims in sequentially numbered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances; (2) failed to state a viable claim for damages against defendants, to the extent 28 (continued...) 2 1 plaintiff that the failure timely to file a first amended complaint, a notice of 2 dismissal, or a notice of intent to stand on the Complaint may be deemed plaintiff’s 3 admission that amendment is futile and may result in the dismissal of this action on 4 the grounds set forth in the March Order, on the ground that amendment is futile, 5 for failure diligently to prosecute, and/or for failure to comply with the March 6 Order. The foregoing March 27, 2020 deadline expired without any action by 7 plaintiff. Plaintiff has not sought review of, or filed any objection to the March 8 Order and has not communicated with the Court since it was issued. 9 As discussed below, this action is dismissed due to plaintiff’s failure to 10 comply with Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, his failure to state a 11 claim for relief, his unreasonable failure to prosecute and his failure to comply with 12 the March Order. 13 II. PERTINENT LAW 14 It is well-established that a district court may sua sponte dismiss an action 15 where the plaintiff has failed to comply with a court order and/or unreasonably 16 failed to prosecute. See Link v. Wabash Railroad Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-33 17 (1962); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir.) (as amended), cert. 18 19 2(...continued) 20 sued in their official capacities, because an official capacity suit is the equivalent of a suit against the State which has sovereign immunity and as to which the Eleventh Amendment bars such 21 relief; (3) failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim because the Complaint does not allege that 22 defendants were aware of and intentionally disregarded a substantial risk to plaintiff’s safety; (4) failed to state a Section 1983 claim based on the handling of plaintiff’s inmate grievances 23 because, among other reasons, a prison official’s processing of an inmate’s appeals, without more, cannot serve as a basis for Section 1983 liability; (5) failed to state a Fourteenth 24 Amendment Due Process claim because, among other things, inmates generally do not have a 25 liberty interest in being assigned a particular security classification and there was no indication that plaintiff’s classification inexorably impacted some other protected liberty interest, and 26 plaintiff did not allege a deprivation of a constitutionally adequate procedure; and (6) failed to 27 state a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim because plaintiff did not plausibly allege that any defendant intentionally discriminated against him based upon his membership in a 28 protected class, or that a defendant intentionally treated similarly situated individuals different than plaintiff without a rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. 3 1 denied, 506 U.S. 915 (1992); see also McKeever v. Block, 932 F.2d 795, 797 (9th 2 Cir. 1991) (district court may sua sponte dismiss action “only for an unreasonable 3 failure to prosecute”) (citations omitted); see also Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 4 F.3d 1058, 1065 (9th Cir. 2004) (sua sponte dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 41(b) proper sanction in cases where a plaintiff is notified of deficiencies in 6 complaint and is given “the opportunity to amend [the complaint] or be dismissed” 7 but the plaintiff “[does] nothing”) (citations omitted; emphasis in original). 8 In determining whether to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute or failure 9 to comply with court orders, a district court must consider several factors, namely 10 (1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need 11 to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to defendants; (4) the public policy 12 favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic 13 alternatives. See In re Eisen, 31 F.3d 1447, 1451 (9th Cir. 1994) (failure to 14 prosecute); Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260-61 (failure to comply with court orders). 15 Dismissal is appropriate under the foregoing analysis “where at least four factors 16 support dismissal . . . or where at least three factors ‘strongly’ support dismissal.” 17 Hernandez v. City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir. 1998) (citations 18 omitted). 19 Where a plaintiff is proceeding pro se, however, the court must first notify 20 the plaintiff of the deficiencies in the complaint so that the plaintiff has an 21 opportunity “to amend effectively.” Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261 (citation omitted). In 22 addition, where a Magistrate Judge originally dismissed the complaint with leave to 23 amend, the District Judge must review that decision before dismissing the entire 24 action. See McKeever, 932 F.2d at 797 (“While the magistrate can dismiss 25 complaints with leave to amend, the district court necessarily must review that 26 decision before dismissing the entire action.”). A district judge may not dismiss an 27 action for failure to comply with a court order (e.g., the Magistrate Judge’s order to 28 4 1 file an amended complaint) or for unreasonable failure to prosecute if the initial 2 decision to dismiss a complaint was erroneous. Yourish v. California Amplifier, 3 191 F.3d 983, 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing id.). 4 III. DISCUSSION AND ORDER 5 First, the Court has reviewed the March Order and finds that it adequately 6 and properly notified plaintiff of the deficiencies in the Complaint and afforded him 7 an opportunity to amend effectively. This Court agrees with and adopts the March 8 Order, and finds that the Magistrate Judge properly dismissed the Complaint with 9 leave to amend for the reasons discussed therein. 10 Second, as explained in the March Order, the Complaint violates Rule 10 11 because, among other things, it does not (1) name all (or indeed any) of the parties 12 in the caption; or (2) allege claims in sequentially “numbered paragraphs, each 13 limited as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a)- 14 (b) (emphasis added). As plaintiff has been afforded an opportunity to comply with 15 Rule 10 and has not done so, dismissal on this basis is appropriate. See, e.g., 16 Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1263 (affirming dismissal of action based on failure to comply 17 with court order that complaint be amended to name all defendants in caption as 18 required by Rule 10(a)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 915 (1992). 19 Third, as also explained in the March Order, the Complaint fails to state a 20 claim for relief against any defendant. The March Order explained in detail what 21 plaintiff needed to do to cure the deficiencies in his pleading, ordered plaintiff to 22 respond to the March Order by filing a first amended complaint which cured the 23 identified pleading defects, or filing a notice of dismissal, or filing a notice of intent 24 to stand on Complaint, and cautioned plaintiff that his failure timely to respond to 25 the March Order may be deemed his admission that amendment is futile and may 26 result in the dismissal of this action on the grounds identified in the March Order, 27 on the ground that amendment is futile, for failure diligently to prosecute, and/or for 28 failure to comply with the March Order. In light of plaintiff’s failure to file any 5 1 response to the March Order as expressly directed or to communicate with the 2 Court since its issuance, this Court deems such failure plaintiff’s admission that 3 amendment of the Complaint is futile and concludes that plaintiff is unable or 4 unwilling to draft a complaint that states viable claims for relief. See, e.g., Knapp 5 v. Hogan, 738 F.3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 2013) (“When a litigant knowingly and 6 repeatedly refuses to conform his pleadings to the requirements of the Federal 7 Rules, it is reasonable to conclude that the litigant simply cannot state a claim.”) 8 (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 57 (2014). Accordingly, dismissal of 9 the instant action based upon plaintiff’s failure to state a claim is appropriate. 10 Fourth, dismissal is appropriate based upon plaintiff’s failure to comply with 11 the March Order and the failure to prosecute. The Court has considered the five 12 factor discussed above – the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation, 13 the court’s need to manage its docket, the risk of prejudice to defendants, the public 14 policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits, and the availability of less 15 drastic alternatives. The first two factors – the public’s interest in expeditiously 16 resolving this litigation and the Court’s interest in managing the docket – strongly 17 weigh in favor of dismissal. As noted above, plaintiff has been notified of the 18 deficiencies in the Complaint and has been given the opportunity to amend it, to 19 dismiss it, or to notify the Court that he wishes to stand thereon. He has done 20 nothing. See Edwards, 356 F.3d at 1065. The third factor, risk of prejudice to 21 defendants, also weighs strongly in favor of dismissal. See Anderson v. Air West, 22 Inc., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976) (prejudice to defendants presumed from 23 unreasonable delay) (citation omitted). The fourth factor, the public policy favoring 24 disposition of cases on their merits, is greatly outweighed by the factors in favor of 25 dismissal discussed herein. As for the fifth factor, since plaintiff has already been 26 cautioned of the consequences of his failure to prosecute and his failure to comply 27 with the March Order, and plaintiff has been afforded the opportunity to avoid such 28 consequences but has not responded, no sanction lesser than dismissal is feasible. 6 1 || See, e.g., Yourish, 191 F.3d at 989 (dismissal of action with prejudice not excessive 2 || sanction for plaintiffs’ failure timely to comply with court’s order to submit an 3 || amended complaint). 4 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this action is dismissed based upon 5 || plaintiff’s failure to comply with Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 6 || his failure to state a claim, his unreasonable failure to prosecute and his failure to 7 || comply with the March Order. 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 10 | DATED: May 11, 2020 HWY DD □ 11 12 | i | 13 MICHAEL W. FITZGERALD 14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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