1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 United States District Court 9 Central District of California 10 Western Division 11 12 ANNA DOLMAZYAN, CV 20-02132 TJH (KSx)

13 Plaintiff, 14 v. Order 15 SUBARU OF AMERICA, INC., 16 Defendant. 17 18 The Court has considered Plaintiff Anna Dolmazyan’s motion to remand, 19 together with the moving and opposing papers. 20 On January 30, 2020, Dolmazyan filed this action in the Los Angeles Superior 21 Court against Defendant Subaru of America, Inc. [“Subaru”] over a car Dolmazyan 22 leased from Subaru, alleging a violation of California’s Song-Beverly Consumer 23 Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1790, et seq. [“Song-Beverly”]. On March 4, 2020, 24 Subaru removed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. In its notice of removal, Subaru 25 alleged that: (1) The parties are sufficiently diverse because Dolmazyan is a citizen of 26 California and Subaru is a citizen of New Jersey; and (2) The amount in controversy 27 threshold is met given, inter alia, Dolmazyan’s request for attorneys’ fees. The basis 28 for Subaru’s allegation regarding Dolmazyan’s citizenship was her address on the 2017 1 lease agreement. 2 Dolmazyan, now, moves to remand. Dolmazyan, also, seeks attorneys’ fees for 3 the time expended on the motion to remand. 4 This Court has diversity jurisdiction over civil actions between parties who are 5 citizens of different states where the action involves an amount in controversy that 6 exceeds $75,000.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. As the removing party, Subaru bears the 7 burden of establishing that this Court has jurisdiction. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life 8 Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Any doubt about the right of removal must 9 be resolved in favor of remand. Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 10 1992). Dolmazyan argued that this action should be remanded because: (1) Subaru 11 failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish that she is a citizen of California; and 12 (2) The amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000.00. 13 As an initial matter, the parties’ arguments over Dolmazyan’s citizenship is 14 perplexing. In response to Subaru’s allegations in the notice of removal that 15 Dolmazyan is a citizen of California, she did not assert that she is not a citizen of 16 California but, rather, argued that the evidence Subaru used in support of its allegation 17 was three years old and insufficient to establish that she is, currently, a citizen of 18 California. In its opposition, rather than provide more current evidence, Subaru merely 19 argued that its three year old evidence was sufficient and ignored the rule that diversity 20 of citizenship must be determined as of the date of removal. See Strotek Corp v. Air 21 Transport Ass’n. of Am., 300 F.3d 1129, 1131-1132 (9th Cir. 2002). 22 Diversity of citizenship issues, aside, Subaru failed to establish that the amount 23 in controversy, here, exceeds $75,000.00. The parties agree that the total sum paid 24 under the lease agreement was $18,276.10. Assuming that Dolmazyan could recover 25 the total sum paid under the lease agreement, plus two times that amount for civil 26 penalties recoverable under Song-Beverly, those amounts add up to $54,828.30. In the 27 notice of removal, Subaru asserted that attorneys’ fee awards in Song-Beverly cases are 28 high and summarily concluded that “adding attorneys [sic] fees already incurred and 1 || prospective attorneys’ fees to the $54,828.30 figure... takes the amount in controversy 2 || figure beyond the statutory minimum of $75,000.00.” Although the Court must take 3 || into account attorneys’ fees in determining the amount in controversy, Subaru’s assertion that the amount of attorneys’ fees, here, would push the amount in 5 || controversy over $75,000.00 is speculative and conclusory. See generally, Sanchez v. 6 | Ford Motor Co., CV 18-08023-RGK-SKx, 2018 WL 6787354, *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 7 || 2018). Accordingly, Subaru failed to establish its burden that the amount in 8 || controversy threshold is met, here. See Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377. 9 Further, the Court declines to exercise its discretion to award attorneys’ fees. 10 || See Jordan v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, 781 F.3d 1178, 1184 (9th Cir. 2015). 11 12 Accordingly, 13 14 It is Ordsered that the motion to remand be, and hereby is, Granted. 15 16 It is further Ordsered that the request for attorneys’ fees be, and hereby is, 17 || Denies. 18 19 || Date: July 6, 2020 20 Fj 21 Feiss J. Hatter, <7 59 Senior United States District Jusge 23 24 25 26 27 28

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