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8 United States District Court 9 Central District of California

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11 METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE Case № 2:18-CV-09577-ODW (JPRx)

COMPANY,

12 Plaintiff-in-Interpleader, ORDER GRANTING MICHELE 13 v. TRUJILLO’S MOTION FOR 14 SUMMARY JUDGMENT [59]

KRISTINA TRUJILLO, ALEC

15 TRUJILLO, TERA TRUJILLO, and

MICHELE TRUJILLO,

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17 Defendants-in-Interpleader. 18 I. INTRODUCTION 19 Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”) filed by 20 Defendant-in-Interpleader Michele Trujillo.1 (Mot. Summ. J. (“Mot.”), ECF No. 59.) 21 The Motion was fully briefed as of January 27, 2020. (Kristina Trujillo’s Opp’n to 22 Mot. (“Opp’n”), ECF No. 63; Reply in Supp. of Mot., ECF No. 65.)2 The Court 23 initially denied the Motion because Michele failed to authenticate critical evidence. 24 (Order Den. Mot. (“MSJ Order”), ECF No. 67.) Michele then moved the Court to 25 reconsider the MSJ Order, arguing in part that her counsel’s authentication errors were 26 excusable neglect. (Michele’s Mot. for Recons. (“Recons. Mot.”), ECF No. 70.) 27 1 As all Defendants-in-Interpleader share the same surname, the Court respectfully refers to their 28 given names. 2 Only Defendant-in-Interpleader Kristina Trujillo opposed the Motion. 1 Michele contemporaneously submitted declarations and a request for judicial notice 2 purporting to authenticate the Motion’s underlying evidence. (Decl. of Goldy Berger 3 (“Berger Decl.”), ECF No. 70-1; Decl. of Michele Trujillo, ECF No. 70-2; Michele’s 4 Req. Jud. Notice (“RJN”), ECF No. 71.) Kristina opposed the Reconsideration 5 Motion, and Michele replied. (Kristina’s Opp’n to Recons. Mot., ECF No. 73; Reply 6 in Supp. of Recons. Mot., ECF No. 75.) On June 1, 2020, the Court granted the 7 Reconsideration Motion pursuant to the Court’s inherent authority and Federal Rule of 8 Civil Procedure 54(b), stating that it would reconsider the Motion in light of evidence 9 now properly before the Court. (Order Granting Recons. Mot. (“Recons. Order”), 10 ECF No. 79.) 11 Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the 12 Court deems the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed R. Civ. 13 P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS the 14 Motion. (ECF No. 59.) 15 II. BACKGROUND 16 Michele and Victor Trujillo (“Decedent”) were married for seventeen years and 17 had two children together, Alec and Tera. (See Mot. 8.) They divorced in 2012. (See 18 RJN Ex. 1 (“Dissolution J.”), ECF No. 71.) Their Dissolution Judgment, signed by 19 Michele and Decedent as well as the Los Angeles Superior Court of California, 20 required Decedent to maintain a life insurance policy in Michele’s favor with a benefit 21 of $400,000. (Dissolution J. ¶¶ 4.5.1–2.) Beginning in August 2016, the required 22 benefit would reduce each year by $25,000 until it reached $300,000. (Id. ¶¶ 4.2, 23 4.5.1.) This obligation was “non-modifiable until [Decedent] retire[d] or the parties 24 commence[d] receiving [Decedent’s] retirement payments.” (Id. ¶¶ 4.5.1–2.)3 25 3 Specifically, the Dissolution Judgment provides: 26 As additional (though non-deductible) spousal support, and as security for future spousal support and the [Los Angeles County Employees Retirement Association 27 (“LACERA”)] pension, [Decedent] is ordered to maintain in full force and effect his 28 presently existing policy or policies of life insurance or an equivalent policy or policies with a total death benefit of not less than $400,000.00. The total death 1 The Dissolution Judgment further provides, “Each party is ordered to promptly 2 notify the other in writing when, for any reason set forth in this Judgment, the other’s 3 liability for support of any kind or maintenance of any insurance policy or payment 4 of any obligation is terminated or reduced.” (Id. ¶ 4.9.) The Dissolution Judgment 5 states it is the “final, complete and exclusive Judgment of the parties concerning the 6 subject matters covered[,] and the rights and duties set forth may not be waived, 7 altered, amended, or modified except by an instrument in writing executed by the 8 parties.” (Id. ¶ 1.12.) 9 Plaintiff-in-Interpleader Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“MetLife”) 10 issued a life insurance policy to Decedent’s employer, the Los Angeles County 11 Sheriff’s Department, with an individual certificate to Decedent. (See Mot. Ex. A 12 (2011 MetLife Group Variable Universal Life Insurance Policy (the “Policy”)), ECF 13 No. 59-1; see also Berger Decl. ¶ 5.) On June 5, 2018, shortly before his death, 14 Decedent changed the Policy’s beneficiary designation, thereby removing former wife 15 Michele and instead designating his second wife Kristina for 60% of the Policy 16 benefit, his adult son Alec for 20%, and his adult daughter Tera for 20%. (Michele’s 17 Statement of Uncontroverted Facts (“SUF”) 2, ECF No. 59; Mot. Ex. D (“MetLife 18 Beneficiary Designation Form”), ECF No. 59-1; see also Berger Decl. ¶ 8.) Decedent 19 died four days later on June 9, 2018. (SUF 1.) 20 Upon Decedent’s death, a $980,000 benefit on the Policy became payable to the 21 proper beneficiary. (SUF 2; see generally Policy.) Kristina, Alec, and Tera claimed 22 their respective portions of the total benefit pursuant to the June 5, 2018 beneficiary 23

24 benefit of the policy shall be reduced by $25,000.00 each year once [Decedent]’s spousal support obligation is reduced to zero [on August 1, 2016], however the total 25 death benefit of the policy shall remain at $300,000.00 until such time as [Decedent] 26 retires or the parties commence receiving the retirement payments from LACERA, whichever shall first occur. Once [Decedent] retires and [Michele] is eligible to 27 receive retirement payments from LACERA[,] [Decedent’s] obligation to maintain any life insurance shall terminate. 28 (Dissolution J. ¶¶ 4.2, 4.5.1.) 1 designation. (See Compl. ¶¶ 12, 17, ECF No. 1.) Michele also claimed $350,000 of 2 the total Policy benefit pursuant to the Dissolution Judgment, on the basis that neither 3 of the conditions that would have allowed Decedent to remove her as beneficiary had 4 occurred. (Compl. ¶¶ 16, 18.) In light of the competing claims, MetLife paid 5 Kristina, Alec, and Tera their respective percentages of the uncontested $630,0004 6 Policy benefit—$378,000 to Kristina (60% of $630,000); $126,000 to Alec (20% of 7 $630,000); and $126,000 to Tera (20% of $630,000). It then initiated this interpleader 8 action against the four Defendants-in-Interpleader Michele, Kristina, Alec, and Tera, 9 regarding disposition of the $350,000 contested Policy benefit. (See Compl. ¶ 16, 22, 10 29.)5 11 Kristina asserted Cross-Claims: first, Kristina seeks Declaratory Relief that she 12 is entitled to 60% of the entire policy benefit and that any fees or costs arising from 13 this action must be paid from the remaining 40%; and second, Kristina asserts a claim 14 for Money Had and Received against Alec and Tera, asserting that she is entitled to 15 their portions of the benefit as well, if for any reason this Court finds the June 5, 2018 16 beneficiary designation invalid. (See Kristina’s Cross-Claim, ECF No. 19.) No other 17 Defendant-in-Interpleader asserted claims. 18 Michele moves for summary judgment on the grounds that the undisputed facts 19 establish she is entitled to the contested funds as a matter of law. (See Mot.) 20 III. LEGAL STANDARD 21 A court “shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 22 genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 23 matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The burden of establishing the absence of a 24 genuine issue of material fact lies with the moving party, see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 25

26 4 $980,000 total Policy benefit – $350,000 contested benefit = $630,000 uncontested benefit. 5 After MetLife deposited $360,969.86 in contested Policy benefit with the Court, the Court 27 dismissed MetLife from this action. (Financial Entry, ECF No. 51; Order Granting Discharge & 28 Dismissal, ECF No. 62.) The deposited amount constitutes the $350,000 in dispute plus interest accrued at the time of the deposit. (See Notice of Deposit, ECF No. 48.) 1 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986), and the court must view the facts and draw reasonable 2 inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 3 U.S. 372, 378 (2007); Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 4 2000). A disputed fact is “material” where the resolution of that fact might affect the 5 outcome of the suit under the governing law, and the dispute is “genuine” where “the 6 evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 7 party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Conclusory or 8 speculative testimony in affidavits is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and 9 defeat summary judgment. Thornhill Publ’g Co. v. GTE Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 738 10 (9th Cir. 1979). Moreover, though the Court may not weigh conflicting evidence or 11 make credibility determinations, there must be more than a mere scintilla of 12 contradictory evidence to survive summary judgment. Addisu, 198 F.3d 1134. 13 Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party cannot simply 14 rest on the pleadings or argue that any disagreement or “metaphysical doubt” about a 15 material issue of fact precludes summary judgment. See Celotex Corp, 477 U.S. 16 at 322–23; Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986); 17 Cal. Architectural Bldg. Prods., Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., 818 F.2d 1466, 18 1468 (9th Cir. 1987). A “non-moving party must show that there are ‘genuine factual 19 issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may 20 reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.’” Cal. Architectural Bldg. Prods., 21 818 F.2d at 1468 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250). “[I]f the factual context makes 22 the non-moving party’s claim implausible, that party must come forward with more 23 persuasive evidence than would otherwise be necessary to show that there is a genuine 24 issue for trial.” Id. (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus., 475 U.S. at 586–87). 25 “[U]ncorroborated and self-serving” testimony will not create a genuine issue of 26 material fact. Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 27 2002). 28 1 IV. REQUESTS FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE AND OBJECTIONS 2 Michele asks the Court to take judicial notice of (1) the Dissolution Judgment, 3 and (2) a Stipulated Domestic Relations Order addressing division of Decedent’s 4 LACERA benefits (“Stipulated Order”), also issued in the state court divorce 5 proceedings, which the Dissolution Judgment incorporates by reference. (See RJN; 6 Dissolution J. ¶ 6.7.2; RJN Ex. 2 (“Stip. Order”), ECF No. 71.) A court may take 7 judicial notice of court filings and other matters of public record. Harris v. Cnty. of 8 Orange, 682 F.3d 1126, 1132 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that a court may take judicial 9 notice of “undisputed matters of public record”); Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa 10 USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (taking judicial notice of pleadings, 11 memoranda, and other court filings); see also United States v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 12 1041 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting judicial notice of proceedings in other courts is proper “if 13 those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue.”). Because the documents 14 in Michele’s RJN fall into the aforementioned categories, the Court GRANTS 15 Michele’s RJN. The Court does not, however, take judicial notice of reasonably 16 disputed facts in the judicially noticed documents. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 17 F.3d 668, 688–89 (9th Cir. 2001). 18 Kristina requests judicial notice of a Notice of Electronic Filing and of Orders 19 in this action. (See Kristina’s RJNs, ECF Nos. 66-1, 73-5.) The Court DENIES 20 Kristina’s RJNs because the Notice of Electronic Filing is not relevant to the 21 disposition of the Motion, and the Court need not take judicial notice to consider its 22 own Orders in this matter. 23 Next, Kristina objects to certain evidence offered by Michele. (Kristina’s Evid. 24 Objs., ECF Nos. 63-2, 73-3.) The Court OVERRULES all boilerplate objections. 25 (See Scheduling and Case Mgmt. Order 8–9, ECF No. 49.) To the extent the Court 26 relies on evidence to which Kristina has objected, the Court OVERRULES the 27 relevant objections. Burch v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 433 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1118–19 28 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (“[O]bjections to evidence on the ground that it is irrelevant, 1 speculative, and/or argumentative, or that it constitutes an improper legal conclusion 2 are all duplicative of the summary judgment standard itself.”). As to the remaining 3 objections, the Court need not rule on them because it does not rely on the disputed 4 evidence. 5 V. DISCUSSION6 6 Michele moves for summary judgment on the ground that she is entitled to the 7 contested funds pursuant to the Dissolution Judgment. (See generally Mot.) She 8 argues the Dissolution Judgment obligated Decedent to maintain a life insurance 9 policy in her favor until (1) he retired or (2) both Decedent and Michele began 10 receiving his LACERA retirement payments—neither of which occurred before 11 Decedent passed—and that the required benefit at the time of Decedent’s death was 12 $350,000. (See Mot. 25; SUF 7.) Kristina does not appear to dispute that Decedent 13 was required to maintain a life insurance policy in favor of Michele until he retired or 14 that the value of the benefit to Michele at the time of Decedent’s death was $350,000. 15 (See Opp’n 10; see also Kristina’s Statement of Genuine Disputes (“SGD”) 7, ECF 16 No. 63-4.) Instead, Kristina argues that Decedent had retired before his death and that 17 Michele began receiving the retirement payments as of the date of Decedent’s death. 18 (See Opp’n 12–14, 15–17.) Consequently, according to Kristina, Michele is not 19 entitled to the life insurance benefit, and Kristina recovers 60% of the contested funds 20 per the beneficiary designation. (See Opp’n 12–14; SGD 7.) 21 As discussed below, the undisputed facts and evidence establish that Michele is 22 correct: (A) Decedent was required to maintain a life insurance policy in Michele’s 23 favor until (1) he retired or (2) both he and Michele began receiving his retirement 24 payments, and (B) neither terminating event occurred before his death. Therefore, 25 Michele is entitled to the contested proceeds. See In re Marriage of O’Connell, 8 Cal. 26

6 The Court is compelled to note that both Kristina and Michele submit papers that are disorganized, 27 nonsensical, and at times incoherent. Both Kristina and Michele raise facts and arguments irrelevant 28 to the issue at hand and make unsupported requests. Here, the Court focuses on the relevant issue— the proper recipient of the disputed funds—and disregards extraneous matters. 1 App. 4th 565, 577 (1992) (explaining that a court-ordered beneficiary is entitled to 2 recover insurance proceeds even where the insured ignores the court order); Wright v. 3 Wright, 276 Cal. App. 2d 56, 59–61 (1969) (finding that decedent’s children and 4 former wife were entitled to recover where the divorce property settlement agreement 5 required decedent to maintain life insurance policies in their favor, but decedent had 6 cashed out and cancelled the policies instead). 7 A. Terms Governing Disbursement of Contested Funds 8 “Marital settlement agreements incorporated into a dissolution judgment are 9 construed under the statutory rules governing the interpretations of contracts 10 generally.” State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Brockett, 737 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1152 (E.D. 11 Cal. 2010) (quoting In re Marriage of Iberti, 55 Cal. App. 4th 1434, 1439 (1997)); see 12 also In re Verner, 77 Cal. App. 3d 718, 724 (1978) (“The same rules apply in 13 ascertaining the meaning of a court order or judgment as in ascertaining the meaning 14 of any other writing.”). “When the language of the judgment incorporating the marital 15 settlement agreement is clear, explicit, and unequivocal, and there is no ambiguity, the 16 court will enforce the express language.” Brockett, 737 F. Supp. 2d at 1152 (quoting 17 In re Marriage of Iberti, 55 Cal. App. 4th at 1440). “Summary judgment is 18 appropriate when the contract terms are clear and unambiguous, even if the parties 19 disagree as to their meaning.” Id. (quoting United States v. King Features Ent., 843 20 F.2d 394, 398 (9th Cir. 1988)). 21 The Dissolution Judgment plainly required Decedent to maintain a life 22 insurance policy in Michele’s name until he retired or both he and Michele began 23 “receiving the retirement payments.” (Dissolution J. ¶¶ 4.5.1–4.5.2.) The requisite 24 benefit to Michele at the time of Decedent’s death was $350,000. (See id. ¶¶ 4.2, 25 4.5.1; Compl. ¶¶ 16, 22, 29; SUF 7.) The Dissolution Judgment constituted the “final, 26 complete and exclusive Judgment” governing disbursement of the disputed funds and 27 could not be amended “except by an instrument in writing executed by” Decedent and 28 Michele. (Dissolution J. ¶ 1.12.) The Dissolution Judgment also required Decedent 1 “to promptly notify [Michele] in writing when [his] liability for support of any kind or 2 maintenance of any insurance policy or payment of any obligation [wa]s terminated or 3 reduced.” (Id. ¶ 4.9.) Kristina does not point to any “instrument in writing executed” 4 by Decedent and Michele that could relieve either parties’ obligations under the 5 Dissolution Judgment, nor any mutual agreement that could take precedence over their 6 “final, complete and exclusive” agreement. Lightbourne v. Printroom Inc., 122 F. 7 Supp. 3d 942, 948 (C.D. Cal. 2015) (“Faced with this clear and unambiguous 8 contractual language, its interpretation is a question of law, and [plaintiff’s] internal 9 understanding—to the extent it differs—is irrelevant.”). 10 Michele and Kristina both point to text messages and emails, either between 11 Michele and Decedent or among the parties, seemingly to demonstrate Michele and 12 Decedent’s intent underlying the Dissolution Judgment. Yet these text messages and 13 emails came after the Dissolution Judgment and many came after Decedent’s death. 14 These subsequent self-authored text messages and emails do not and cannot aid the 15 Court’s interpretation of the Dissolution Judgment’s clear terms. (See, e.g., Mot. 16 Exs. I–M, P, ECF No. 59-1); Block v. eBay, Inc., 747 F.3d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 2014) 17 (“If a contract is reduced to writing, the intention of the parties is to be ascertained 18 from the writing alone, the words being interpreted in their ordinary and popular 19 sense, provided that the language is clear and explicit, and does not involve an 20 absurdity.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Wright, 276 Cal. App. 21 2d at 59 (rejecting parties’ arguments regarding intentions underlying property 22 settlement agreement where those intentions were not expressed in the agreement). 23 Hence, despite the parties’ subsequent quarreling and interpretation of its terms, the 24 Dissolution Judgment required Decedent to maintain a life insurance policy for 25 Michele’s benefit, valued according to the terms of the Dissolution Judgment, until 26 (1) he retired or (2) both he and Michele began receiving his retirement payments. 27 28 1 B. Whether A Terminating Condition Occurred 2 The evidence shows that neither terminating condition occurred. First, Michele 3 submits substantial evidence that Decedent had not retired at the time of his death, 4 including a letter from LACERA verifying that Decedent “passed away in active 5 service” and “did not retire from service before passing away.” (See Mot. Ex. E 6 (“July 3, 2018 LACERA Letter”), ECF No. 59-1, see also Berger Decl. ¶ 9.) Michele 7 also submits a series of pension verification forms from LACERA to Kristina—dated 8 December 8, 2018, March 2, 2019, and April 1, 2019, respectively—which list 9 Decedent’s “effective date of retirement” as July 1, 2018. (See Mot. Ex. G (“Pension 10 Verification Forms”), ECF No. 59-1; see also Berger Decl. ¶ 11.) 11 Although Kristina raises several arguments in response, none contradict 12 Michele’s competent evidence that Decedent did not retire before his death. For 13 instance, Kristina points to LACERA records listing Decedent’s retirement date as 14 June 9, 2018—the date of his death—but whether the retirement date is Decedent’s 15 date of death or a subsequent date does not refute that Decedent had not retired before 16 his death. Kristina also cites California disability law, Government Code 17 section 31720, to argue Decedent applied for a Disability Retirement Evaluation 18 before he died. (Opp’n 12–14.) But she does not explain how California disability 19 law can contradict that Decedent was in “active service” at the time of his death or 20 how unrealized eligibility for retirement based on disability could constitute 21 “retirement” under the Dissolution Judgment. Kristina noting that Decedent “was 22 given Retirement Counseling on 1/16/18” is a similarly disingenuous attempt to 23 introduce a factual dispute where none exists, as retirement counseling in no way 24 establishes that Decedent in fact retired. (Opp’n 14.) Finally, Kristina’s testimony 25 that she does not know when Decedent retired does not contradict Michele’s 26 competent evidence that Decedent remained in active service at the time of his death. 27 (Opp’n 15 (citing Opp’n Ex. 4 (“Kristina Dep.”), ECF No. 63-3).) Accordingly, even 28 1 drawing all reasonable inferences in Kristina’s favor, there is no genuine dispute that 2 Decedent had not retired at the time of his death. 3 Second, there is also no evidence to suggest that Michele or Decedent received 4 retirement payments before Decedent’s death. In fact, Kristina’s own documents 5 establish that Michele received retirement payments retroactive to the date of 6 Decedent’s death. (Opp’n 8 (citing Opp’n Ex. 14 (August 30, 2018 LACERA letter 7 informing Michele of coming retirement payments retroactive to June 10, 2018), ECF 8 No. 63-3); Opp’n 7, 17 (citing Opp’n Ex. 10 (“Michele Interrog. Resp. No. 16”) (“I 9 receive approximately $4,800.00 per month, which began at the Decedent’s date of 10 death.”), ECF No. 63-3).) Kristina tries to avoid summary judgment by arguing that 11 discrepancies exist among LACERA’s records regarding Decedent’s date of 12 retirement because some list June 9, 2018—the day Decedent passed—while others 13 list July 1, 2018. (Opp’n 7–8.) But as above, whether Decedent’s retirement date was 14 his date of death or a date thereafter, no evidence suggests that Michele received 15 retirement payments before Decedent’s death. Thus, even drawing all reasonable 16 inferences in Kristina’s favor, there is no genuine dispute that Michele did not receive 17 the retirement payments before Decedent’s death. 18 In summary, Michele submits evidence that Decedent was in active service at 19 the time of his death and that neither Decedent nor Michele received his retirement 20 benefits before his death. Kristina presents no evidence to the contrary. Accordingly, 21 Michele is entitled to the contested funds under the terms of the Dissolution 22 Judgment. 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 VI. CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Michele’s Motion for 3 | Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 59.) Michele is entitled to the $350,000 contested life insurance policy proceeds and any accumulated interest. Michele is directed to submit 5 || a proposed judgment and order addressing the disbursement of the interpleaded funds 6 || held by the Clerk of the Court within two weeks of this Order. 7 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 10 October 7, 2020 M1 SFr Ly

13 OTIS D. WRIGHT, II 14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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