JS-6

5 CLERK, US. DISTRICT COURT

4 oeeory 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA - SOUTHERN DIVISION 10 u ||MELANIE WALTHER AND EVELYN ) Case No.: SACV 20-02137-CJC(JDEx)

GARCIA,

1s Plaintiffs, 14 y. __|[pRooKDALE SENIOR LIVING —_-} ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFES' COMMUNITIES, INC., and DOES 1- 17 || 50, 18 Defendant. 19 20 21 22 23 || I. INTRODUCTION 24 25 Plaintiffs Melanie Walther and Evelyn Garcia, on behalf of themselves and all 26 || similarly situated individuals, bring this putative class action against Defendant 27 || Brookdale Senior Living Communities and unnamed Does. (Dkt. 1-5 at 9 [Complaint, 28 || hereinafter “Compl.”].) Plaintiffs, who worked at a senior living community, allege that

1 they were employed by Defendant from 2016 to 2017. (Id. ¶ 2.) However, Plaintiffs 2 were actually employed by Defendant’s sister company, BKD Twenty-One Management 3 Company, Inc. (“BKD Management”). (Dkt. 1 [Notice of Removal, hereinafter “NOR”] 4 at 3 n.1.; Dkt. 25-1 [Declaration of Joanne Leskowicz, hereinafter “Leskowicz Decl.”] ¶¶ 5 3–4.) Defendant asserts that since 2014, it has neither employed individuals in California 6 nor conducted any operations within the state. (Id. ¶ 4.) 7 8 Plaintiffs initially filed their claims in Orange County Superior Court, alleging the 9 following violations of the California Labor Code: (1) failure to pay all rest break wages, 10 (2) failure to pay all meal break wages, (3) failure to pay all overtime wages, (4) failure 11 to pay minimum wage, (5) failure to maintain accurate payroll records, (6) failure to pay 12 all wages upon termination of employment, and (7) failure to pay for sick days. (Compl.) 13 On November 4, 2020, Defendant removed the case to this Court, asserting jurisdiction 14 under the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”). Now before the Court is Plaintiffs’ 15 motion to remand. (Dkt. 14. [hereinafter “Mot.”].) For the following reasons, Plaintiffs’ 16 motion is GRANTED.1 17 18 II. LEGAL STANDARD 19 20 A defendant may remove a civil action filed in state court to a federal district court 21 when the federal court would have had original jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. 22 § 1441. “CAFA provides the federal district courts with ‘original jurisdiction’ to hear a 23 ‘class action’ if the class has more than 100 members, the parties are minimally diverse, 24 and the ‘matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000.’” Standard Fire 25 Ins. Co. v. Knowles, 568 U.S. 588, 592 (2013). “Congress designed the terms of CAFA 26

27 1 Having read and considered the papers presented by the parties, the Court finds this matter appropriate 1 specifically to permit a defendant to remove certain class or mass actions into federal 2 court . . . [and] intended CAFA to be interpreted expansively.” Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., 3 Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1197 (9th Cir. 2015). “[N]o antiremoval presumption attends cases 4 invoking CAFA, which Congress enacted to facilitate adjudication of certain class actions 5 in federal court.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 U.S. 81, 89 6 (2014). 7 8 III. DISCUSSION 9 10 The Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims because Defendant has failed to 11 show that Plaintiffs’ claims satisfy CAFA’s $5,000,000 amount-in-controversy 12 requirement. When a defendant removes a case to federal court, “the defendant’s 13 amount-in-controversy allegation should be accepted when not contested by the plaintiff 14 or questioned by the court.” Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co., LLC v. Owens, 574 15 U.S. 81, 87 (2014). But where “the plaintiff contests, or the court questions, the 16 defendant’s allegation” and “both sides submit proof,” the defendant must prove the 17 amount in controversy by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.; Salter v. Quality 18 Carriers, Inc., 974 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2020) (When a party “contests the truth of the 19 plaintiff’s factual allegations, usually by introducing evidence outside the pleadings . . . 20 the responding party must support her jurisdictional allegations with ‘competent proof’ 21 . . . under the same evidentiary standard that governs in the summary judgment 22 context.”). 23 24 Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs were not employed by Defendant, but rather by 25 Defendant’s sister company, BKD Management, which is not a named defendant in this 26 case. (NOR at 3 n.1; Leskowicz Decl. ¶¶ 3–4.) Consequently, Plaintiffs argue that 27 CAFA’s amount-in-controversy requirement is not met because Defendant cannot be held 1 satisfy CAFA’s amount-in-controversy requirement based on harms suffered by 2 employees who were employed by BKD Management. Because Defendant has presented 3 no evidence that it could be held liable for Plaintiffs’ claims, the Court concludes that 4 Plaintiffs’ claims fail to meet CAFA’s amount-in-controversy requirement. 5 6 Even though Defendant is not Plaintiffs’ actual employer, Defendant could still be 7 liable for Plaintiffs’ California Labor Code claims if an employment relationship existed 8 between Plaintiffs and Defendant. Ochoa v. McDonald’s Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 9 1232 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (citing Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal. 4th 35, 64–68 (2010). But 10 Defendant has failed to show that its amount-in-controversy calculations are based on 11 harms suffered by persons with whom it had an employment relationship. For an 12 employment relationship to exist where a defendant was not the plaintiff’s actual 13 employer, the defendant must have “(1) [] exercise[d] control over [the plaintiff’s] wages, 14 hours or working conditions,” (2) [] suffer[ed] or permit[ted] [the plaintiff] to work, or 15 (3) engage[d] [the plaintiff], thereby creating a common law employment relationship.” 16 Id. 17 18 Here, Defendant asserts that CAFA’s amount-in-controversy requirement is met 19 based on the number of hourly employees employed by BKD Management. (Dkt. 1-9 20 [Declaration of Brenda O’Keefe, hereinafter “O’Keefe Decl.”] ¶¶ 3–7.) But Defendant 21 provides no evidence that it had developed an employment relationship with these 22 employees. (Id.; Dkt. 19 [Opposition] at 9–11.) Instead, Defendant asserts that it has not 23 “conducted any operations in the state of California since [January 1, 2014]”—over two 24 years before Plaintiffs allege that they were employed by Defendant. (Leskowicz Decl. ¶ 25 4.) Accordingly, Defendant has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that it 26 could be held liable for Plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs’ claims therefore fail to meet 27 CAFA’s amount-in-controversy requirement. See Natividad Ausencio v. LVI Servs., Inc., 1 || requirement was not satisfied when “the Complaint, Notice of Removal, and the evidence 2 support of the Notice of Removal do not allege, or provide any basis for treating the 3 |}employees of [Defendants’ subsidiaries] as Defendants’ employees for purposes of 4 determining the amount in controversy”’). 5 6 || IV. CONCLUSION 7 8 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion to remand is GRANTED. 9 10 || DATED: January 15, 2021 Ko Le f 7

14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28