“UO 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 12 | LUIS VILLEGAS CV 20-7291-RSWL-ASx ORDER re: Plaintiff’s 13 Plaintiff, Application for Default 14 v. Judgment [18] 15 WONG-ONE, LLC, a 16 | California Limited Liability Company; DZUBAK 17 | INVESTMENTS, LLC, a 18 California Limited Liability Company; and 19 | DOES 1 to 10, 20 Defendants. 21 22 Plaintiff Luis Villegas (“Plaintiff”) claims 23 | Defendant Wong-One, LLC and Defendant Dzubak 94 | Investments, LLC, (collectively, “Defendants”) violated 95 | the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”) and 26 | California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act (the “Unruh Act”). 97 | Plaintiff filed this Application for Default Judgment 22 [18] on March 5, 2021 (the “Application”).

1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS

2 Plaintiff’s Application as to the ADA claim and DECLINES

3 to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s 4 Unruh Act Claim. 5 I. BACKGROUND 6 A. Factual Background 7 Plaintiff is a paraplegic who uses a wheelchair for 8 mobility. Compl. ¶ 1, ECF No. 1. Defendant Wong-One, 9 LLC owned or owns the real property located at 130 N. 10 Robertson Blvd., Beverly Hills, California. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. 11 Defendant Dzubak Investments, LLC owned or owns Beverly 12 Hills Mercantile & Liquor (the “Store”), which is 13 located at the subject property. Id. ¶¶ 2—5. 14 On or about July 28, 2020, Plaintiff visited the 15 Store with the intention to avail himself of its goods. 16 Compl. ¶ 10; Pl.’s Appl. for Default J. (“Appl.”) Ex. 2 17 (“Pl.’s Decl.”) ¶ 3, ECF No. 18-4. As a result of his 18 physical disabilities, however, Plaintiff alleges he was 19 denied full and equal access to the property when he 20 encountered no wheelchair accessible sales counters in 21 compliance with ADA standards. Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 4. 22 On or about August 4, 2020, an investigator with 23 the Center for Disability Access visited the Store to 24 survey and photograph the property. Appl. Ex. 3 (“Louis 25 Decl.”) ¶¶ 1—2, ECF No. 18-5. In addition to finding no 26 wheelchair accessible sales counters, the investigator 27 28 1 discovered no wheelchair accessible dining surfaces.1

2 Id. ¶¶ 3—4.

3 B. Procedural Background 4 Plaintiff filed his Complaint [1] on August 13, 5 2020, asserting violations of the ADA and Unruh Act. 6 Plaintiff served Defendants [10, 13] on August 20, 2020. 7 To date, Defendants have not appeared in the Action. 8 Following Plaintiff’s Requests for Entry of Default [14, 9 15], the Clerk entered default [16, 17] on September 15, 10 2020. 11 On March 5, 2021, Plaintiff filed the present 12 Application [18]. Plaintiff seeks an order requiring 13 Defendants to provide ADA-compliant sales counters and 14 dining surfaces. Appl. 2:23—26, ECF No. 18. Plaintiff 15 additionally seeks an award totaling $8,000.00 in 16 statutory damages, plus $4,074.50 in attorneys’ fees and 17 costs. Id. at 2:27—3:3; Appl. Ex. 1 (“Handy Decl.”), 18 Billing Summary, ECF No. 18-3. 19 II. DISCUSSION 20 A. Legal Standard 21 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 55(b) 22 authorizes a district court to grant default judgment 23 after the clerk enters default under Rule 55(a). Fed. 24 R. Civ. P. 55(b). Before a court can enter default 25 1 Plaintiff did not actually encounter the dining surfaces 26 in July 2020. Compl. ¶ 17; Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 5. Plaintiff learned from the pre-filing investigator that the Defendants failed to 27 provide wheelchair accessible dining surfaces due to toe 28 clearance issues. Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 5; Louis Decl. ¶ 4. 1 judgment against a defendant, the plaintiff must satisfy

2 the procedural requirements set forth in Local Rule 55-

3 1. Pursuant to L.R. 55-1, the movant for default 4 judgment must submit a declaration establishing: (1) 5 when and against which party the default was entered; 6 (2) on which pleading the default was entered; (3) 7 whether the defaulting party is a minor, incompetent 8 person, or active service member; (4) that the 9 Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 3931, 10 does not apply; and (5) that the defaulting party was 11 properly served with notice. 12 It is within the district court’s discretion to 13 grant or deny an application of default judgment. 14 Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092—93 (9th Cir. 15 1980). In determining whether default judgment is 16 proper, a court considers the “Eitel factors”: (1) the 17 possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff; (2) the 18 merits of the plaintiff’s substantive claim; (3) the 19 sufficiency of the complaint; (4) the sum of money at 20 stake; (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning 21 material facts; (6) whether the defendant’s default was 22 due to excusable neglect; and (7) the strong policy 23 favoring decision on the merits. Eitel v. McCool, 782 24 F.2d 1470, 1471—72 (9th Cir. 1986). 25 After entry of default by the clerk, all factual 26 allegations in the complaint, except those relating to 27 damages, are assumed as true. See TeleVideo Sys., Inc. 28 v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917—18 (9th Cir. 1987) 1 (quoting Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557, 560

2 (9th Cir. 1977)). Thus, the plaintiff is required to

3 provide evidence of all damages he seeks to recover in 4 the complaint. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 5 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1175 (C.D. Cal. 2002). When default 6 judgment is granted, the relief reward “must not differ 7 in kind from, or exceed in amount, what is demanded in 8 the [complaint].” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c). 9 B. Discussion 10 1. Jurisdiction 11 When a party moves for default judgment, a court 12 must examine both subject matter and personal 13 jurisdiction. In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 14 1999). 15 a. ADA Claim 16 The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 17 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 for violations of the ADA. See 18 Civil Rights Educ. & Enf’t Ctr. v. Hosp. Props. Tr., 867 19 F.3d 1093, 1098 (9th Cir. 2017). Further, the Court has 20 personal jurisdiction over Defendants because they have 21 “minimum contacts” with California such that “the suit 22 does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and 23 substantial justice.’” Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 24 788 (1984) (quotation omitted). More specifically, 25 Defendants own the real property and/or Store located at 26 130 N. Robertson Blvd., Beverly Hills, California, where 27 the incident giving rise to this Action occurred. 28 Compl. ¶¶ 4—5; Appl. Ex. 9 (“Gutierrez Decl.”) ¶¶ 3—4, 1 ECF No. 18-11.

2 b. Unruh Act Claim

3 The court has supplemental jurisdiction over 4 “claims that are so related to claims in the action 5 within such original jurisdiction that they form part of 6 the same case or controversy under Article III of the 7 United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). 8 However, even if supplemental jurisdiction exists, the 9 Court may exercise its discretion to decline 10 supplemental jurisdiction “in exceptional circumstances” 11 or where “there are other compelling reasons for 12 declining jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(4). 13 The Unruh Act provides that “[a]ll persons within 14 the jurisdiction of [California] are free and equal, and 15 no matter what their . . . disability . . . status are 16 entitled to the full and equal accommodations, 17 advantages, facilities, privileges, or services in all 18 business establishments of every kind whatsoever.” Cal. 19 Civ. Code § 51(b). The Unruh Act also provides that any 20 violation of the ADA constitutes a violation of § 51 of 21 the Unruh Act. Cal. Civ. Code § 51(f). Moreover, 22 unlike the ADA, the Unruh Act allows a plaintiff to 23 recover statutory damages for each offense. Cal. Civ. 24 Code at § 52(a). 25 In 2012, California adopted a heightened pleading 26 standard for actions brought under the Unruh Act “to 27 combat the influx of baseless claims and vexatious 28 litigation in the disability access litigation sphere.” 1 Langer v. Al Sunset, LLC, No. 2:21-CV-03594-FLA-AFM,

2 2021 WL 2038372, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2021). These

3 heightened pleading requirements apply to actions 4 alleging “construction-related accessibility claims,” 5 which California law defines as “any civil claim in a 6 civil action with respect to a place of public 7 accommodation . . . based wholly or in part on an 8 alleged violation of any construction-related 9 accessibility standard.” Cal. Civ. Code § 55.52(a)(1). 10 Moreover, California law imposes additional 11 limitations on “high-frequency litigants,” defined as “a 12 plaintiff who has filed ten or more complaints alleging 13 construction-related accessibility violation within the 14 twelve-month period immediately preceding the filing of 15 the current complaint alleging a construction-related 16 accessibility violation.” Cal. Civ. Code § 17 425.55(b)(1). 18 By enacting restrictions on the filing of 19 construction-related accessibility claims, district 20 courts have expressed their interest in limiting the 21 financial burdens California businesses may face for 22 claims of statutory damages against them under the Unruh 23 Act. See Ghadiri v. Tacos Queretaro Mexican Food et 24 al., No. 8:21-CV-00740-JLS-KES, 2021 WL 2073478, at *1 25 (C.D. Cal. May 21, 2021). Thus, district courts should 26 consider fairness and comity when determining whether to 27 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over construction- 28 related claims under the Unruh Act. See, e.g., Schutza 1 v. Cuddeback, 262 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1031 (S.D. Cal.

2 2017) (“[T]he Court finds it improper to allow Plaintiff

3 to use federal court as an end-around to California’s 4 pleading requirements. Therefore, as a matter of comity, 5 and deference to California’s substantial interest in 6 discouraging unverified disability discrimination 7 claims, the Court declines supplemental jurisdiction 8 over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act Claim.”). For a high- 9 frequency litigant seeking relief under the Unruh Act, 10 it would be improper to allow a plaintiff to use federal 11 court as an “end-around” to California’s heightened 12 pleading requirements. Id. 13 Here, Plaintiff is a high-frequency litigant who 14 has filed 134 cases in the Central District, including 15 twenty-five complaints in the twelve-month period 16 immediately preceding the filing of this current 17 Action.2 As such, and because of California’s 18 2 See Villegas v. Van Chau et al., No. 2:20-CV-07292-VAP-PD 19 (filed Aug. 13, 2020); Villegas v. Farsight, Inc., No. 2:20-CV- 05090-RSWL-PD (filed June 9, 2020); Villegas v. Attina Co. et 20 al., No. 2:20-CV-03301-DMG-SK (filed Apr. 9, 2020); Villegas v. Whittier, LLC et al., No. 2:20-CV-00728-CJC-MAA (filed Jan. 24, 21 2019); Villegas v. Snow et al., No. 2:19-CV-10768-SK (filed Dec. 22 20, 2019); Villegas v. Zagros Inv., LLC et al., No. 2:19-CV- 10456-ODW-JC (filed Dec. 11, 2019); Villegas v. Rashid et al., 23 2:19-CV-09847-DMG-KS (filed Nov. 18, 2019); Villegas v. Ora Prop., LLC et al., No. 2:19-CV-09616-ODW-FFM (filed Nov. 8, 24 2019); Villegas v. Haroon et al., No. 2:19-CV-09224-SVW-AFM (filed Oct. 28, 2019); Villegas v. Tran et al., No. 2:19-CV- 25 09223-MWF-RAO (same); Villegas v. Tedwin S & B, LLC et al., No. 26 2:19-CV-09191-SVW-AGR (filed Oct. 25, 2019); Villegas v. Baltagi Enter., LLC et al., No. 2:10-CV-09145-JAK-SK (filed Oct. 24, 27 2019); Villegas v. 310 E. Manchester Ave. Assoc., LLC et al., No. 2:19-CV-09055-JFW-FFM (filed Oct. 21, 2019); Villegas v. Weiss et 28 al., No. 2:19-CV-09054-CJC-AFM (same); Villegas v. Webb Energy 1 substantial interest in discouraging unverified

2 discrimination claims, the Court declines to exercise

3 supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act 4 claim. A significant number of judges in the Central 5 District of California and elsewhere have similarly 6 declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 7 construction-related claims asserted by high-frequency 8 litigants.3 9 Moreover, the Court will not be depriving Plaintiff 10 of any remedies because his ADA claim remains pending 11 before the Court. Appl. 2:23. If Plaintiff so chooses, 12

13 Holdings, LLC et al., No. 2:19-CV-09024-VAP-MRW (same); Villegas v. Azalea Joint Venture, LLC et al., No. 2:19-CV-09022-AB-AS 14 (same); Villegas v. Park et al., No. 2:19-CV-09021-PSG-RAO (same); Villegas v. Montebello Ctr., No. 2:19-CV-07760-CBM-AS 15 (filed Sept. 9. 2019); Villegas v. Glendale I Mall Assoc., LP et al., No. 2:19-CV-07720-PSG-MAA (filed Sept. 6, 2019); Villegas v. 16 G & M GAPCO, LLC et al., No. 2:19-CV-07530-JFW-AGR (filed Aug. 17 30, 2019); Villegas v. Thrifty Payless, Inc et al., No. 2:19-CV- 07186-AB-PJW (filed Aug. 19, 2019); Villegas v. White et al., No. 18 8:19-CV-01564-JVS-KES (filed Aug. 14, 2019); Villegas v. Valaskantzis et al., 2:19-CV-07019-VAP-AS (filed Aug. 13, 2019); 19 Villegas v. Teshima et al., No. 2:19-CV-07012-AB-RAO (same); Villegas v. Conzonire et al., No. 2:19-CV-07011-FMO-GJS (same). 20

21 3 See, e.g., Lammy v. Leung et al., No. CV 19-4579-GW-ASX, 22 2020 WL 7861967 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2020) (Wu, J.); Marquez v. Carwood Ctr., LLC et al., No. 2:20-CV-05948-VAP-JEMX, 2020 WL 23 8816340 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2020) (Phillips, J.); Madriz v. Villalobos et al., No. CV 20-00202-CJC(KKX), 2020 WL 4006524 24 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2020) (Carney, J.); see also Langer v. Petras, No. 19-cv-1408-CAB-BGS, 2019 WL 3459107 (S.D. Cal. July 25 31, 2019) (Bencivengo, J.); Reyes v. Flourshings Plus, Inc., No. 26 19cv261 JM (WVG), 2019 WL 1958284 (S.D. Cal. May 2, 2019) (Miller, J.); Schutza v. Alessio Leasing, Inc., No. 18cv2154- 27 LAB(AGS), 2019 WL 1546950 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2019) (Burns, J.). 28 1 he may pursue his Unruh Act claim in state court.4

2 2. Local Rule 55-1

3 Plaintiff has satisfied the procedural requirements 4 for entry of default judgment under Local Rule 55-1. 5 See Gutierrez Decl. The Clerk entered default against 6 Defendants on September 15, 2020 for failure to respond 7 to Plaintiff’s Complaint. Id. ¶ 5. Defendants are not 8 infants, incompetent persons, or exempted under the 9 Servicemembers Civil Relief Act. Id. ¶ 2. Lastly, 10 Plaintiff served Defendants with notice of this 11 Application on March 5, 2021. Id. ¶ 6. 12 3. Requested Relief 13 When seeking default judgment, a Plaintiff “is 14 required to prove all damages sought in the 15 [C]omplaint.” Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld 16 Prods., 219 F.R.D. 494, 498 (C.D. Cal. 2003). Here, 17 Plaintiff seeks an injunction, damages, and attorneys’ 18 fees and costs. 19 a. Injunctive Relief 20 Under the ADA, a plaintiff is entitled to 21 injunctive relief to make “facilities readily accessible 22 to and usable by individuals with disabilities.” 42 23 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(2). Here, Plaintiff requests an order 24

25 4 Plaintiff encountered the barrier on July 28, 2019. Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 3. The statute of limitations has not yet lapsed, and 26 Plaintiff is able to bring his Unruh Act claim in state court. See Harris v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. CV 18-924-BTM-AHG, 2019 WL 27 6683367, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2019) (finding that Unruh Act 28 claims “are subject to a two-year statute of limitations”). 1 requiring Defendants to comply with the ADA by providing

2 wheelchair accessible sales counters and dining

3 surfaces. Thus, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to 4 require Defendants to provide wheelchair accessible 5 sales counters in compliance with the ADA. 6 To prove discrimination stemming from failure to 7 remove an architectural barrier, however, the fourth 8 factor requires a plaintiff to actually encounter the 9 architectural barrier that precluded him or her full and 10 equal access to the facility. See Ho v. Mlynarski 11 Inv’rs, LLC, SACV-18-00371-CJC-JDEX, 2019 WL 4238872, at 12 *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2019). Here, Plaintiff did not 13 actually encounter the non-ADA compliant dining 14 surfaces. Pl.’s Decl. ¶ 5. Although Plaintiff failed 15 to meet this factor, one form of discrimination is 16 failure to remove architectural barriers unless they are 17 not readily achievable to remove. See 42 U.S.C. § 18 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv); Grove v. De La Cruz, 407 F. Supp. 2d 19 1126, 1130 (C.D. Cal. 2005). Because Defendants failed 20 to appear and argue whether the architectural barriers 21 were readily achievable to remove, the Court GRANTS 22 Plaintiff’s request to require Defendants to provide 23 wheelchair accessible dining surfaces.5 24 25 5 The dining services include one foldable table and two 26 foldable chairs. Even if Defendants had appeared and answered to Plaintiff’s complaint, it is hard to imagine that the Court would 27 find these architectural barriers as not readily achievable to 28 remove. See Appl. Ex. 4 at 33, ECF No. 18-6. 1 b. Damages

2 Plaintiff seeks a total of $8,000.00 in statutory

3 damages for Defendants’ alleged violation of the Unruh 4 Act. Because the Court declines to exercise 5 supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act 6 claim, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for 7 statutory damages. 8 c. Attorneys’ Fees & Costs 9 The ADA authorizes attorneys’ fees in this matter. 10 42 U.S.C. § 12205; Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a); see also 11 Jankey v. Poop Deck, 537 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2008) 12 (“A prevailing plaintiff under the ADA should ordinarily 13 recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances 14 would render such an award unjust.”) (internal quotation 15 marks omitted). For ADA cases, reasonable attorneys’ 16 fees are determined by reference to the lodestar method. 17 Vogel v. Harbor Plaza Center, LLC, 893 F.3d 1152 (9th 18 Cir. 2018) (finding that it was an abuse of discretion 19 for the district court to treat the Local Rule 55-3 fee 20 schedule, which is ordinarily used in instances of 21 default judgment, as presumptively reasonable, rather 22 than using a lodestar approach to calculate attorneys’ 23 fees for ADA and Unruh civil rights cases). A court 24 “must first determine the presumptive lodestar figure by 25 multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on 26 the litigation by the reasonable hourly rate.” Secalt 27 S.A. v. Wuxi Shenxi Constr. Mach. Co., 668 F.3d 677, 689 28 (9th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). The fee applicant 1 must “produce satisfactory evidence—in addition to the

2 attorney’s own affidavits—that [his] requested [hourly]

3 rates [were] in line with those prevailing in the 4 community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably 5 comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Grove v. 6 Wells Fargo Fin. Cal., Inc., 606 F.3d 577, 583 (9th Cir. 7 2010) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n.11 8 (1984)). The fee applicant bears “the burden of 9 documenting the appropriate hours expended in the 10 litigation” and of “submit[ting] evidence in support of 11 those hours worked.” USW v. Ret. Income Plan for 12 Hourly-Rated Emps. of ASARCO, Inc., 512 F.3d 555, 565 13 (9th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). Here, Plaintiff 14 requests deviation from the default fee schedule in 15 Local Rule 55-3, seeking $3,244.50 in attorneys’ fees 16 and $830.00 in costs, totaling $4,074.50. See Handy 17 Decl., Billing Summary. 18 Here, Plaintiff’s counsel staffed four attorneys on 19 this case: Russell Handy (“Handy”), Mark Potter 20 (“Potter”), Amanda Seabock (“Seabock”), and Faythe 21 Gutierrez (“Gutierrez”). Handy Decl. ¶¶ 3—6. Plaintiff 22 seeks hourly rates of $595.00 for partner-level senior 23 attorneys Handy and Potter, $450.00 for Seabock, and 24 $400.00 for Gutierrez. Id. In support of this request, 25 Plaintiff relies on the declarations by Handy, 26 highlighting the attorneys’ qualifications by their 27 experience in disability litigation, other legal 28 experience, success in law school, and involvement in 1 disability-related organizations. Id. Plaintiff also

2 submits declarations from Richard Pearl and John

3 O’Connor, two attorneys’ fees experts, as well as 4 excerpts from the 2018 Real Rate Report, to support the 5 fees requested.6 See Appl. Exs. 6—8, ECF Nos. 18-8 to 6 18-10. 7 This Action is a routine ADA case in which 8 Plaintiff’s counsel has reused the same documents and 9 “carbon-copy complaints” in other cases. Tate v. Deoca, 10 No. CV 14-08739-SJO-MRW, 2018 WL 5914220, at *8 (C.D. 11 Cal. July 31, 2018). Indeed, “[a] simple comparison of 12 the filings in this case with the filings in thousands 13 of other cases filed by Plaintiff’s counsel in this 14 district reveals almost no original work.” Id. 15 This Court is guided not by the amount requested 16 but by the “fees awarded by other judges in the same 17 locality in similar cases.” Moreno v. City of 18 Sacramento, 534 F.3d 1106, 1115 (9th Cir. 2008) 19 (citation omitted). Given that this Action appears to 20 be nearly identical to the thousands of other cases 21 filed by Plaintiff’s counsel, and after reviewing awards 22 6 Other district courts have found these reports limited in 23 use. See Johnson v. Jun, 19-CV-06474-BLF, 2020 WL 6507995, at *9 24 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2020) (finding that Pearl’s declaration and the Real Rate Report failed to consider the nature of work done 25 and the skill or reputation of the attorneys in each case); Johnson v. Cortese, 5:19-CV-02671-EJD, 2020 WL 7495164, at *9 26 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2020) (finding Pearl’s report “to be of limited use in determining the prevailing market rate”) (quoting 27 Johnson v. Progreso Dev., LLC, No. 5:20-CV-02167-EJD, 2020 WL 28 6136093, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2020)). 1 in similar cases, the Court reduces Plaintiff’s

2 requested hourly rates as follows: $425.00/hour for both

3 Handy and Potter, $350.00/hour for Seabock, and 4 $250.00/hour for Gutierrez.7 5 The next issue is whether the hours billed in this 6 Action are reasonable. “[A] district court should 7 exclude hours ‘that are excessive, redundant, or 8 otherwise unnecessary.’” McCown v. City of Fontana, 9 5565 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Hensly v. 10 Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983)). Plaintiff 11 submitted an itemized billing statement which reflects 12 that Plaintiff’s attorneys spent 6.5 hours on this case. 13 See Handy Decl., Billing Summary at 1. 14 Potter, a senior attorney and founding partner, 15 billed 0.7 hours for using “[G]oogle satellite images, 16 street view, website and/or [Y]elp” to examine the Store 17 in order to inform the investigator which photos and 18 measurements he wanted to obtain. Id. at 2. Potter’s 19 online research is excessive given the site’s relatively 20 small size and “the obvious and blatant nature of the 21 barriers.” Compl. ¶ 21. Accordingly, the Court reduces 22 7 See Garcia v. Padilla, No. 2:20-cv-03033-SVW-JPR, 2020 WL 23 8027786, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2020) (reducing hourly rates 24 to $425.00 for Handy and Potter, $350.00 for Seabock, and $250.00 for Gutierrez.); Langer v. Anaya, No. CV19-01075 PA(SHKx), 2020 25 WL 687611, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2020) (same for Handy, Potter, and Seabock); Lopez v. Silvia, No. CV18-4813 PSG(JEMx), 26 2020 WL 2619163, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2020) (granting $250/hour for similarly experienced attorneys as Gutierrez at 27 Counsel’s firm); Langer v. Garcia, No. 218CV02374VAPFFMX, 2019 WL 28 8013124, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2019) (same). 1 this time to 0.4 hours.

2 Handy, another senior attorney and founding

3 partner, billed 0.8 hours to review the investigator’s 4 report and photographs and to “greenlight complaint 5 drafting or give investigator further instructions.” 6 Handy Decl., Billing Summary at 2. The Court finds that 7 Handy’s billed hours are excessive based on his ADA 8 expertise and the simple nature of the claim. The Court 9 therefores reduce this billed time to 0.4 hours. See 10 Chalmers v. City Los Angeles, 796 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th 11 Cir. 1986) (stating that billing hours may be reduced 12 “if the case was overstaffed and the hours duplicated” 13 or “if the hours are deemed excessive or otherwise 14 unnecessary”). 15 Handy then billed 0.3 hours in which he conducted 16 “[p]ublic records research to determine the identity of 17 the responsible parties and to determine if there had 18 been alterations or modifications that would have 19 triggered stricter Title 24 obligations for this 20 property.” Handy Decl., Billing Summary at 2. However, 21 “[a] basic public records search to identify the owner 22 of the Property is not the type of legal work that 23 should be billed by an attorney at $425.00 per hour.” 24 Love, 2017 WL 2927429, at *4. Because this billing item 25 was not “reasonably expended,” the Court excludes it 26 from the attorneys’ fee award. See Hensley v. 27 Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983) (“The district 28 court...should exclude from [its] initial fee 1 calculation hours that were not ‘reasonably

2 expended’...hours that are excessive, redundant, or

3 otherwise unnecessary.”). 4 Lastly, Handy billed 0.6 hours to “draft [the] 5 complaint and related initial filing doc[ument]s & 6 prepare interoffice barrier memo and service 7 instructions.” See Handy Decl., Billing Statement at 2. 8 Given that Plaintiff’s counsel files nearly identical 9 complaints and other related documents in all of its 10 cases, save for a few distinguishing details of fact, 11 the Court finds 0.6 hours to draft the complaint and 12 other related documents and instructions to be 13 unreasonable. See Arroyo v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., CV 14 19-7244-RSWL-SS, 2020 WL 1068246, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 15 31, 2020) (reducing billing item to 0.4 hours when the 16 Court found that 0.7 hours to draft the complaint and 17 interoffice memo was unreasonable). Accordingly, the 18 Court reduces this billing item to 0.3 hours. 19 Seabock billed 0.3 hours for reviewing court-issued 20 documents such as the Notice of Assignment and Notice to 21 Parties regarding ADA Disability Access Litigation. 22 Handy Decl., Billing Summary at 2. Because Plaintiff’s 23 counsel files a significant amount of similar cases in 24 this district, and considering Seabock’s experience 25 working with seasoned ADA-litigation attorneys Handy and 26 Potter since 2012, see Handy Decl. ¶ 5, the Court finds 27 this time expended reviewing routine and boilerplate 28 court notices excessive and reduce it accordingly to 0.1 1 hours.

2 Gutierrez billed 1.5 hours for “[a]mend[ing] the

3 default judgment template with all component[] parts.” 4 Handy Decl., Billing Summary at 3. Not only is this 5 time excessive, but it is redundant with the two 6 additional entries totaling 1.1 hours for “select[ing] 7 photos to be used in the default judgment packet” and 8 “work[ing] on declaration[s]” filed in support of the 9 instant Application. Id. Therefore, the Court reduces 10 the total time spent on the instant Application from 2.6 11 hours to 1.8 hours. 12 Considering Plaintiff’s counsel’s familiarity with 13 ADA cases, the simple nature of this case for 14 experienced attorneys, the redundancy of the work 15 involved, and the complete lack of opposition, the Court 16 reduces the total hours billed by Plaintiff’s counsel by 17 2.3 hours.8 See Arroyo v. Raspados Xpress LA, Inc., No. 18 CV 19-7016 PA (ASX), 2020 WL 6106314, at *3 (C.D. Cal. 19 Aug. 10, 2020) (finding that Plaintiff’s counsel “has 20 repeatedly misrepresented and hidden from all of the 21 courts in which it applied for fees the deceptive nature 22 of its billing practices,” which include intentionally 23 not keeping contemporaneous billing records and 24 “seek[ing] fees for work performed by paralegals at 25 hourly rates for work performed by attorneys”). 26 Therefore, the Court awards $1,425.00 in attorneys’

27 8 0.8 hours billed by Potter, 1.0 hours billed by Handy, 0.6 28 hours billed by Seabock, and 1.8 hours billed by Gutierrez. 1 fees.

2 Finally, as the prevailing party, Plaintiff is also

3 entitled to costs. 29 U.S.C. § 1920, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 54(d)(1); C.D. Cal. Local Rule 54-2. Plaintiff seeks to 5 recover $830.00 in costs, which includes $400.00 in 6 filing fees, $30.00 in service costs, and $400.00 for an 7 investigator. Handy Decl., Billing Summary at 1. 8 In recent similar cases, Plaintiff’s firm submitted 9 investigator costs of $100.00, as opposed to the 10 quadrupled amount of $400.00 in this present Action.9 11 Moreover, in cases where Plaintiff’s firm has submitted 12 investigator costs of $400.00, this Court has routinely 13 reduced these costs to $100.00.10 Because Plaintiff has 14 not provided any other supporting evidence to support 15 the quadrupled investigator expense besides the billing 16 statement, the Court awards Plaintiff $530.00 in costs. 17 18

19 9 See Uriarte-Limon v. Torres, No. 2:20-CV-02862-SVW-JC, 2020 WL 5260480, at *4 (C.D. Cal. July 15, 2020; Marquez v. 20 Chateau Hosp., Inc., No. CV200107FMORAOX, 2020 WL 5118077, at *8 (C.D. Cal. June 11, 2020); Whitaker v. Westside Properties-2, LLC 21 et al., No. 2:19-CV-07946-AB-RAO, 2020 WL 2614623, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2020); Lammey v. Plaza Segundo, LLC, No. 22 LACV1904484JAKPLAX, 2019 WL 8638804, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 23 2019); Sherfield v. Brite Spot, LLC, No. CV 19-6181-MWF-KS, 2019 WL 8160897, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2019). 24

25 10 See Cagle v. Multani, No. CV 20-3038-MWF (PDX), 2020 WL 7861969, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2020). Garcia v. Mouannes, No. 26 CV2002591ABAGRX, 2020 WL 6064024, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2020); Garcia v. Nouk, No. CV 20-2565-MWF-GJS, 2020 WL 6064029, at *3 27 (C.D. Cal. July 21, 2020); Garcia v. Sanchez, No. CV 20-18484- 28 MWF-PVC, 2020 WL 6064025, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2020). 1 III. CONCLUSION

2 Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS

3 Plaintiff’s Application as to the ADA claim and ORDERS 4 Defendant to provide ADA-compliant sales counters and 5 dining surfaces. The Court awards $1,425.00 in 6 attorneys’ fees and $530 in costs. The Court DECLINES 7 to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s 8 Unruh Act claim and thereby DISMISSES the claim without 9 prejudice. 10 11 IT IS SO ORDERED. 12 13 DATED: July 15, 2021 ______/s_/ R_o_n_al_d _S._W_. _Le_w_____________

HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW

14 Senior U.S. District Judge 15

16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28