I. INTRODUCTION

1188 Plaintiff Orlando Garcia initiated this action against Defendant Apple Seven 1199 Services SPE San Diego (“Apple Seven”), which owns and operates the Courtyard by 2200 Marriott (“Marriott”) located at 2100 W. Empire Avenue, Burbank, California. (First 2211 Am. Compl. (“FAC”), ECF No. 9.) Garcia alleges that Marriott’s hotel reservations 2222 website lacks sufficient accessibility information and asserts two causes of action: 2233 (1) violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and (2) violation of the 2244 Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”). Apple Seven moves to dismiss Garcia’s 2255 complaint for failure to state a claim. (Mot. to Dismiss (“Motion” or “Mot.”, ECF 2266 2277 2288 1 No. 13.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Apple Seven’s 2 Motion.1 3 II. BACKGROUND 4 Garcia has physical disabilities and uses a wheelchair, walker, or cane for 5 mobility. (FAC ¶ 1.) In December 2020, Garcia planned on having a “staycation” 6 and went online to book a room at Marriott. (Id. ¶¶ 14–16.) Garcia alleges that he 7 was unable to make a reservation due to inadequate accessibility information on 8 Marriott’s website. (Id. ¶¶ 18–23.) Marriott’s reservation website provides 9 information regarding accessible amenities, facilities, and areas of the hotel, as well as 10 descriptions of accessible rooms. (See id. ¶¶ 19, 22.) The reservation website 11 describes the accessible room as having 32-inch-wide doorways, doors with lever 12 handles, and an accessible route from the public entrance. (Id. ¶ 27.) The website 13 further lists accessible amenities such as “Bathroom grab bars,” “Roll-in shower,” and 14 a “Toilet seat at wheelchair height.” (Id.) Garcia claims this information is 15 insufficient to allow him to assess whether the room actually suits his accessibility 16 needs. (Id. ¶¶ 23–29.) 17 III. LEGAL STANDARD 18 A court may dismiss a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) for lack of a cognizable legal theory or insufficient facts pleaded to 20 support an otherwise cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 21 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). To survive a dismissal motion, a complaint need 22 only satisfy the minimal notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)—a short and 23 plain statement of the claim. Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d 483, 494 (9th Cir. 2003). The 24 factual “allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 25 level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). That is, the complaint 26 must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that 27

28 1 Having carefully considered the papers filed in connection with the Motion, the Court deemed the matter appropriate for decision without oral argument. Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; C.D. Cal. L.R. 7-15. 1 is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal 2 quotation marks omitted). 3 The determination of whether a complaint satisfies the plausibility standard is a 4 “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 5 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. A court is generally limited to the 6 pleadings and must construe all “factual allegations set forth in the complaint . . . as 7 true and . . . in the light most favorable” to the plaintiff. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 8 250 F.3d 668, 679 (9th Cir. 2001). However, a court need not blindly accept 9 conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of fact, and unreasonable inferences. 10 Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001). 11 Where a district court grants a motion to dismiss, it should generally provide 12 leave to amend unless it is clear the complaint could not be saved by any amendment. 13 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a); Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 14 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). Leave to amend may be denied when “the court 15 determines that the allegation of other facts consistent with the challenged pleading 16 could not possibly cure the deficiency.” Schreiber Distrib. Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture 17 Co., 806 F.2d 1393, 1401 (9th Cir. 1986). Thus, leave to amend “is properly 18 denied . . . if amendment would be futile.” Carrico v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 19 656 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2011). 20 IV. JUDICIAL NOTICE 21 In connection with the Motion, Apple Seven requests the Court take judicial 22 notice of several documents, including images of Marriott’s accessible amenities 23 section on its website home page and the description of the accessible hotel room as it 24 appears on the reservation site. (Def.’s Req. for Judicial Notice ¶¶ 1–2, Exs. 1 25 (“Accessible Amenities”), 2 (“Accessible Room Description”), ECF No. 13-2.) 26 “[A] court may judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute 27 because it: (1) is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or 28 (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot 1 reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Courts may also take judicial notice 2 of “publicly accessible websites.” In re Yahoo Mail Litig., 7 F. Supp. 3d 1016, 1024 3 (N.D. Cal. 2014); see also Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 4 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding district court correctly considered publicly-available websites 5 where “Plaintiffs directly quoted the material posted on these web pages, thereby 6 incorporating them into the Complaint.”). 7 Here, Exhibits 1 and 2 are publicly accessible webpages that Garcia quotes in 8 his FAC and are directly related to matters at issue in this case. Thus, to the extent the 9 Court relies on Exhibits 1 and 2, it takes judicial notice of them. However, the Court 10 denies Apple Seven’s request for judicial notice as to its other proffered documents, as 11 the Court does not rely on them to resolve this Motion. 12 V. DISCUSSION 13 Garcia asserts two causes of action against Apple Seven for violation of 14 28 C.F.R. section 36.302(e) (“Reservations Rule”) under the ADA, and violation of 15 the Unruh Act. (See FAC ¶¶ 35–42.) As discussed below, Garcia fails to state a claim 16 against Apple Seven for violation of the Reservations Rule, and the Court declines to 17 exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his Unruh Act claim. 18 A. Americans with Disabilities Act (Claim One) 19 Garcia argues Marriott’s reservation system violates the ADA’s Reservation 20 Rule by failing to describe the hotel’s accessibility information with enough 21 specificity to allow him to determine whether the hotel’s public spaces and 22 guestrooms suit his particular needs. (See generally id.) Specifically, Garcia points to 23 a lack of information regarding guestroom entrances; maneuvering space at the bed, 24 toilet, sink, and bath; and accessible areas in the hotel. Apple Seven contends its 25 website complies with the ADA, as interpreted by the Department of Justice’s 2010 26 guidance (“DOJ 2010 Guidance”). (Mot. 7–10.) 27 The relevant portion of the ADA states, “a place of lodging shall . . . [i]dentify 28 and describe accessible features in the hotels and guest rooms offered through its 1 reservations service in enough detail to reasonably permit individuals with disabilities 2 to assess independently whether a given hotel or guest room meets his or her 3 accessibility needs.” 28 C.F.R § 36.302(e)(1)(ii). The DOJ 2010 Guidance analyzes 4 this section and clarifies that “a reservations system is not intended to be an 5 accessibility survey,” and that, “[b]ecause of the wide variations in the level of 6 accessibility that travelers will encounter[,] . . . it may be sufficient to specify that the 7 hotel is accessible” and provide basic facts about each accessible room. Id. The 8 DOJ 2010 Guidance goes on to provide, “[f]or hotels that were built in compliance 9 with the 1991 Standards, it may be sufficient . . . , for each accessible room, to 10 describe the general type of room . . . , the size and number of beds . . . , [and] the type 11 of accessible bathing facility.” 28 C.F.R. § Pt. 36, App. A, Section 36.302(e) Hotel 12 Reservations. 13 Marriott’s reservations website satisfies the articulated standard. On its 14 website, Marriott lists the accessible hotel areas and amenities and describes the 15 available accessible hotel rooms. The room description lists the room as “accessible” 16 and includes the size and number of beds (one king bed) and the type of accessible 17 bathing facility (roll-in showers). (See, e.g., Accessible Room Description.) The 18 Court finds that, based on the allegations in Garcia’s FAC and the judicially noticed 19 documents, the descriptions provided on Marriott’s website are sufficient to comply 20 with the ADA. 21 Garcia argues that merely stating something is “accessible” is conclusory and 22 does not provide enough information for an independent assessment, particularly 23 when it comes to the specific information that is important to him, such as the amount 24 of maneuvering space. (See Compl. ¶ 24.) However, courts have found that 25 describing something as “accessible” is sufficient because “accessible” is a term of art 26 used by the ADA Accessibility Guidelines to describe ADA-compliant facilities. See 27 Garcia v. Gateway Hotel, No. CV 20-10752-PA (GJSx), 2021 WL 936176 at *4 28 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2021) (collecting cases) (finding the use of term “accessible” is 1 not conclusory because it means that those features of the hotel comply with ADA 2 guidelines), appeal filed, No. 21-55227 (9th Cir. Mar. 10, 2021). The Court agrees 3 that “stating that the room is ‘accessible’ by definition means that the room complies 4 with the ADA requirements.” See id. 5 Accordingly, the Court finds that Marriott’s website complies with the ADA and 6 the Reservation Rule as a matter of law, and Garcia therefore fails to state a claim for 7 violation of the ADA. As the Court finds Marriott’s website ADA-compliant, any 8 amendment would be futile, and the Court DISMISSES the ADA claim with 9 prejudice. 10 B. Unruh Civil Rights Act (Claim Two) 11 A district court “‘may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction’ if it ‘has 12 dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.’” Sanford v. 13 MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)). 14 “[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the 15 balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial 16 economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to exercise 17 jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 18 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988); Wade v. Reg’l Credit Ass’n, 87 F.3d 1098, 1101 19 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Where a district court dismisses a federal claim, leaving only state 20 claims for resolution, it should decline jurisdiction over the state claims and dismiss 21 them without prejudice.”). 22 Garcia’s ADA claim provided the only basis for original jurisdiction. As the 23 Court has dismissed Garcia’s ADA claim, it declines to exercise supplemental 24 jurisdiction over his remaining state law claim. Accordingly, Garcia’s second cause of 25 action is DISMISSED without prejudice. 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 VI. CONCLUSION 2 For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Defendant Apple Seven’s 3 || Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 13.) The Court DISMISSES the ADA claim with 4|| prejudice. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh 5|| Act claim and DISMISSES that claim without prejudice. The Court will issue 6 || Judgment consistent with this Order. 7 8 IT IS SO ORDERED. 9 10 August 11, 2021 a . ll es Bf Yi, tie

B OTIS D. GHT, II

4 UNITED STATESDISTRICT JUDGE

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