1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MYRA L. G.,1 Case No. 5:20-cv-00447 AFM 12 Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND

13 v.

ORDER AFFIRMING DECISION

14 KILOLO KIJAKZI, OF THE COMMISSIONER 15 Acting Commissioner of Social Security, 16 Defendant. 17 18 19 Plaintiff filed this action seeking review of the Commissioner’s final decision 20 denying her application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. In 21 accordance with the Court’s case management order, the parties have filed briefs 22 addressing the merits of the disputed issue. The matter is now ready for decision. 23 BACKGROUND 24 On August 29, 2011, Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and 25 disability insurance benefits alleging an inability to work since May 15, 2000. 26 1 Plaintiff’s name has been partially redacted in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 27 5.2(c)(2)(B) and the recommendation of the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United States. 28 1 (Administrative Record (“AR”) 138-39, 156.) Her application was denied initially 2 and upon reconsideration. (AR 125-28, 133-37.) A hearing was held before 3 Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) M.J. Adams on August 21, 2012. (AR 37-58.) 4 Plaintiff (represented by an attorney) and a vocational expert (“VE”) testified at the 5 hearing. (Id.) On January 17, 2013, ALJ Adams issued an unfavorable decision 6 finding Plaintiff not disabled. (AR 20-31.) Plaintiff requested review of the ALJ’s 7 decision by the Appeals Council, which denied review on August 20, 2020. (AR 6- 8 10.) Plaintiff then commenced a civil action. On May 16, 2017, this Court reversed 9 the Commissioner’s decision and remanded for further administrative proceedings. 10 (AR 1116-1124.) 11 On November 5, 2018, a supplemental administrative hearing was held on 12 Plaintiff’s claim before ALJ Derek Johnson. Plaintiff (represented by an attorney), a 13 VE and a medical expert testified at the supplemental hearing. (Id.) As accurately 14 summarized in Plaintiff’s opening brief in this matter, ALJ Johnson issued a decision 15 on February 19, 2019 that denied Plaintiff’s claim: 16 Gates met the insured status requirements of the Act through 17 December 31, 2005 and had not engaged in substantial gainful 18 activity since the alleged onset date of May 15, 2000. (A.R. 1023, 19 ¶1). The ALJ determined that Gates had not engaged in substantial 20 gainful activity since the alleged onset date and suffered from severe 21 impairments consisting of chronic pain syndrome secondary to a 22 1988 crush injury to the left femur, deep vein thrombosis, cervical 23 and lumbar spine degenerative disc disease, major depressive 24 disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder. (A.R. 1023, ¶¶ 2-3). The 25 ALJ found that Gates did not have an impairment that met or equaled 26 a listing. (A.R. 1023, ¶4). The ALJ determined that Gates retained 27 the residual functional capacity for sedentary work with occasional 28 pushing and pulling with the left lower extremity; no crawling or 1 climbing of ladders, ropes or scaffolds; occasional climbing ramps 2 and stairs, balancing, stooping, kneeling, and crouching; no exposure 3 to vibration or hazards such as unprotected heights or moving 4 machinery; and no interaction with the public. (A.R. 1026, ¶5). 5 Through the date last insured, the ALJ found that Gates was capable 6 of performing her past relevant work as a budget analyst and graphic 7 designer. (A.R. 1032, ¶6). As a result, the ALJ concluded that Gates 8 was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (A.R. 9 1033, ¶7). 10 (ECF No. 19 at 4.) Plaintiff again requested review by the Appeals Council, which 11 denied review on August 20, 2020. (AR 1011-1017.) This case was then commenced. 12 DISPUTED ISSUE 13 Whether the ALJ erred in accounting for Plaintiff’s mental limitations. 14 STANDARD OF REVIEW Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court only reverses the Commissioner’s 15 decision if its findings are based on legal error or are not supported by substantial 16 evidence. See Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2012), superseded by 17 regulation on other ground as recognized in, Sweets v. Kijakazi, 855 Fed. Appx. 325 18 (9th Cir. Aug. 9, 2021). As the Supreme Court has stated, “whatever the meaning of 19 ‘substantial’ in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not 20 high.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). Substantial evidence is 21 “more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 22 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rationale 23 interpretation, one of which supports the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s conclusion must 24 be upheld. See Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). As such, this 25 Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. See Jamerson v. 26 Chater, 112 F.3d 1064, 1065 (9th Cir. 1997). Even when the ALJ commits legal 27 error, the decision will be upheld where that error is harmless. Treichler v. Comm’r 28 1 of Soc. Sec. Admin., 775 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 2014). An error is harmless if it is 2 inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination. Id. 3 DISCUSSION 4 In assessing a claimant’s mental impairments, an ALJ is required to evaluate 5 the degree of mental limitation in four areas: (1) understand, remember, or apply 6 information; (2) interact with others; (3) concentrate, persist, or maintain pace; and 7 (4) adapt or manage oneself. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)-(d). Plaintiff makes a 8 single contention regarding error in this case: She urges that the ALJ erred because 9 even though the ALJ found a moderate mental limitation in adapting or managing 10 oneself, there was no corresponding work-related limitation in the ALJ’s residual 11 functional capacity (RFC) finding. Plaintiff further notes that the RFC includes a “no 12 public contact” limitation that accounts for the ALJ’s other moderate mental finding 13 concerning interacting with others. Because Plaintiff’s past work was of a highly 14 skilled nature, Plaintiff contends that the lack of an RFC limitation for adapting or 15 managing oneself was a material error. 16 In opposition, the Commissioner points to Hoopai v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 1071, 17 1077 (9th Cir. 2007).2 There, the Ninth Circuit upheld an ALJ’s determination that 18 “Hoopai’s depression was not sufficiently severe such that it significantly affects his 19 ability to work beyond the exertional limitations.” Id. at 1076. In Hoopai, there was 20 substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s determination. Two 21 psychological evaluations diagnosed claimant with only “moderately significant 22 forms of depression,” and a third found him to be moderately limited in “his ability 23 to perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual 24 25 2 The Commissioner also cites Lacroix v. Barnhart, 465 F.3d 881, 888 (8th Cir. 2006), in which 26 the Eighth Circuit affirmed an ALJ finding the claimant functioned satisfactorily in the work setting even though a doctor had noted moderate limitations in the ability to respond to work pressures. 27 Given the discussion herein, the Court need not analyze or rely on this decision outside the Ninth 28 Circuit. 1 | with customary tolerance; and his ability to complete a normal workday and 2 || workweek without interruption from psychologically-based symptoms ....” /d. at 3] 1077. The Ninth Circuit stated that it had “not previously held mild or moderate 4 || depression to be a sufficiently severe non-exertional limitation that significantly > || limits a claimant’s ability to do work beyond the exertional limitation.” Jd. The Ninth © || Circuit affirmed the ALJ’s RFC determination that contained only exertional ’ || limitations because “substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion. . . .” Jd. 8 Here, after discussing Plaintiff's moderate non-exertional limitation in 9 | “adapting or managing oneself,” the ALJ concluded, “there is insufficient evidence 10 | to establish that the claimant’s ability to regulate emotions, control behavior, or 11 | maintain well-being in a work setting independently, appropriately, effectively, and 12 | ona sustained basis were seriously limited.” (AR 1025.) In reaching this conclusion, 3 || the ALJ cited evidence from 2010 and 2012 that Plaintiff had no anxiety and no 14 | depression. (/d., citing AR 508, 518) The ALJ also discussed mental health evidence 15 |! Jater in the decision and referred to evidence that Plaintiff had normal orientation, 1© || affect, demeanor and mood. (AR 1031, citing AR 521.) The ALJ gave significant weight to the opinion of medical expert Dr. Glassmire, who opined that Plaintiff ‘8 || should have no interaction with the public’, a limitation that the ALJ included in the || RFC based in part on Dr. Glassmire’s opinion. (Ud; AR 1031.) Dr. Glassmire also 20 opined that the other paragraph “B” criteria would vot lead to functional limitations 21 | in the work setting: “Q. Okay. Do you have enough information to classify even those 22 | with mild social or cognitive deficits lead to any functional limitations in terms of 2° | \. The only limitation that I would recommend would be no interaction with public.” 24 25 || — cx“ 3 Dr. Glassmire recommended inclusion of the “no interaction with public” limitation “based on 26 my knowledge and my experience meeting individuals with depressive disorders. But there’s, as I 27 mentioned there’s not a lot of information about the severity in the record, so that’s a conservative recommendation to be safe.” (AR 1048.) Plaintiff has not challenged the ALJ’s reliance on 28 || Dr. Glassmire’s opinions.

1 | (AR 1048.) Thus, substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that 2 || Plaintiff's mental limitation in adapting or managing herself did not severely limit 3} her ability to do work and did not require an additional non-exertional limitation in 4 the RFC. See Hoopai, 499 F.3d at 1077. ° So long as an ALJ’s interpretation of the record is supported by substantial © || evidence — which it is here — the Court may not disturb it. See Lewis v. Astrue, 498 7 | F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[I]f evidence is susceptible of more than one rational 8 || interpretation, the decision of the ALJ must be upheld”); see generally Biestek, 139 2 |S. Ct. at 1154 (observing that in the social security context, the threshold for 10 | “substantial evidence” is “not high”). Accordingly, Plaintiff not shown reversible Il | error by the ALJ.

ORDER

13 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Judgment be entered affirming the ‘4 | decision of the Commissioner and dismissing this case with prejudice. 15 | DATED: 9/15/2021 . : Weck 18 ALEXANDER F. MacKINNON 20 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28