1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 KAMARIA STRANGE-DAVISON, No. 2:23-CV-1354-DMC-P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 SOLANO COUNTY JUSTICE DETENTION FACILITY, et al., 15 Defendants. 16

17 18 Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to 19 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s original complaint, ECF No. 1. 20 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief 21 against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. 22 § 1915A(a). This provision also applies if the plaintiff was incarcerated at the time the action was 23 initiated even if the litigant was subsequently released from custody. See Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. 24 Dep’t of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1282 (9th Cir. 2017). The Court must dismiss a complaint or 25 portion thereof if it: (1) is frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim upon which relief can 26 be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 27 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that 28 complaints contain a “. . . short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 1 entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This means that claims must be stated simply, 2 concisely, and directly. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177 (9th Cir. 1996) (referring to 3 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1)). These rules are satisfied if the complaint gives the defendant fair notice 4 of the plaintiff’s claim and the grounds upon which it rests. See Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 5 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Because Plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of particularity 6 overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims, vague and conclusory allegations fail 7 to satisfy this standard. Additionally, it is impossible for the Court to conduct the screening 8 required by law when the allegations are vague and conclusory. 9 10 I. PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGATIONS 11 Plaintiff names the following as defendants: (1) Solano County Justice Center 12 Detention Facility; (2) Sgt. K. Betterncourt; (3) Lt. Haben; and (4) Officer K. Wilson. See ECF 13 No. 1, pgs. 1-2. Plaintiff states his allegations relate to disciplinary proceedings. See id. at 3. 14 Plaintiff alleges as follows:

15 Solano County Justice Center has an unfair classification procedure regarding disciplinary proceedings. Sgt. K. Bettencourt abuses her power 16 by picking and choosing which inmates have to follow classification procedures. For starters, regarding inmate-on-inmate mutual combat, 17 inmate Vega was reclassed back to medium status within two weeks of being maximum security. Classification planned to rehire her as an inmate 18 mod worker post-fight. Inmate Rader was also reclassed as max post- mutual combat & subsequently reclassed to medium & rehired as a 19 laundry worker. Not to mention, inmate Rader was found with drugs in her system upon being tested at the hospital when her & her roomates [sic] 20 room was shook down by Sgt.s & officers of JCDF. Inmate Rader still kept her job & was ultimately rehoused as a medium on a non-medium 21 status mod. Rader did not even get a “write up.” I am told I have to be max for 31 days before being considered reclassable [sic] to medium. Sgt. 22 Bettencourt is a racist and is very discriminatory. JCDF does not even follow their own rules regarding disciplinary procedures/hearings. Per the 23 rules: all hearings are to be heard by an impartial person and hearings are to be held no sooner than 24 hrs., however, I was heard in 12 hours by the 24 same classification officer (K. Wilson aka Lopez) who responded to my initial mutual combat incident. How is that impartial? Lt. Hagen 25 continues the abuse of power by finding my legitimate grievances “unfounded,” making a mockery of inmate rights. 26 ECF No. 1, pg. 3. 27 28 / / / 1 II. DISCUSSION 2 As discussed in more detail below, the Court finds a number of defects with 3 Plaintiff’s complaint. First, as to Defendant Solano County Justice Center Detention Facility 4 (JCDF), Plaintiff has not alleged sufficient facts to establish municipal liability. Second, Plaintiff 5 has not alleged facts to state any claim against Defendant Bettencourt. Third, Plaintiff’s 6 complaint fails to state how Defendants Wilson or Hagen violated Plaintiff’s rights. 7 A. JCDF 8 Plaintiff names as a defendant JCDF, which is the jail for Solano County. 9 Municipalities and other local government units are among those “persons” to whom § 1983 10 liability applies. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Counties and 11 municipal government officials are also “persons” for purposes of § 1983. See id. at 691; see also 12 Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1443 (9th Cir. 1989). A local government unit, 13 however, may not be held responsible for the acts of its employees or officials under a respondeat 14 superior theory of liability. See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997). 15 Thus, municipal liability must rest on the actions of the municipality, and not of the actions of its 16 employees or officers. See id. To assert municipal liability, therefore, the plaintiff must allege 17 that the constitutional deprivation complained of resulted from a policy or custom of the 18 municipality. See id. 19 According to Plaintiff, Defendant JCDF has an unfair classification procedure. 20 This allegation alone does not show the existence of any specific policy or custom which caused 21 Plaintiff’s rights to be violated. Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegation that he was harmed because 22 Defendant Bettencourt “abuses her power” seems to belie the notion that Plaintiff’s rights were 23 violated by a municipal custom or policy. Nonetheless, Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity 24 to amend the complaint to allege further facts in support of municipal liability of JCDF. 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 B. Bettencourt 2 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege an actual 3 connection or link between the actions of the named defendants and the alleged deprivations. See 4 Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). “A 5 person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of 6 § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts, or omits to perform 7 an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” 8 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations 9 concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See 10 Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Rather, the plaintiff must set forth 11 specific facts as to each individual defendant’s causal role in the alleged constitutional 12 deprivation. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). 13 The bulk of Plaintiff’s allegations relating to Defendant Bettencourt appear to 14 surround Plaintiff’s perception of how Bettencourt treated other inmates, specifically inmates 15 Rader and Vega. Plaintiff does not allege any facts which would indicate how Bettencourt treated 16 Plaintiff. Plaintiff thus fails to establish a causal connection between Bettencout and any 17 constitutional violation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. Finally, Plaintiff’s allegation 18 that Defendant Bettencourt is a racist is completely conclusory and also fails to establish how 19 Plaintiff suffered discrimination caused by Bettencourt. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity 20 to amend. 21 C. Wilson 22 Plaintiff claims that Defendant Wilson was not an impartial hearing officer in the 23 context of a disciplinary proceeding. Plaintiff also alleges that a disciplinary hearing was held 24 within 12 hours instead of the minimum 24 hours. 25 With respect to prison disciplinary proceedings, due process requires prison 26 officials to provide the inmate with: (1) a written statement at least 24 hours before the 27 disciplinary hearing that includes the charges, a description of the evidence against the inmate, 28 and an explanation for the disciplinary action taken; (2) an opportunity to present documentary 1 evidence and call witnesses, unless calling witnesses would interfere with institutional security; 2 and (3) legal assistance where the charges are complex or the inmate is illiterate. See Wolff, 418 3 U.S. at 563-70. Due process is satisfied where these minimum requirements have been met, see 4 Walker v. Sumner, 14 F.3d 1415, 1420 (9th Cir. 1994), and where there is “some evidence” in the 5 record as a whole which supports the decision of the hearing officer, see Superintendent v. Hill, 6 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985). The “some evidence” standard is not particularly stringent and is 7 satisfied where “there is any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached.” 8 Id. at 455-56. However, a due process claim challenging the loss of good-time credits as a result 9 of an adverse prison disciplinary finding is not cognizable under § 1983 and must be raised by 10 way of habeas corpus. See Blueford v. Prunty, 108 F.3d 251, 255 (9th Cir. 1997). 11 With additional facts alleged, Plaintiff may be able to state a cognizable due 12 process claim against Defendant Wilson arising from a disciplinary proceeding. Plaintiff will 13 need to allege more specific facts relating to the nature of the disciplinary proceeding at issue, the 14 procedures which were employed in Plaintiff’s case, and the outcome, including whether a loss of 15 good-time credits was assessed. Plaintiff will be provided an opportunity to amend to allege 16 additional facts in this regard. 17 D. Hagen 18 Plaintiff’s claim against Hagen – that Hagen violated Plaintiff’s rights by findings 19 Plaintiff’s inmate grievances unfounded – fails to state a claim. Prisoners have no stand-alone 20 due process rights related to the administrative grievance process. See Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 21 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding 22 that there is no liberty interest entitling inmates to a specific grievance process). Because there is 23 no right to any particular grievance process, it is impossible for due process to have been violated 24 by ignoring or failing to properly process grievances. To the extent Plaintiff is claiming that 25 Defendant Hagen interfered with the grievance process resulting in a denial of access to the courts 26 or otherwise failed to adhere to proper practices in the course of a particular disciplinary 27 proceeding against Plaintiff, the Court will provide Plaintiff an opportunity to amend. 28 1 III. CONCLUSION 2 Because it is possible that the deficiencies identified in this order may be cured by 3 amending the complaint, Plaintiff is entitled to leave to amend prior to dismissal of the entire 4 action. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Plaintiff is 5 informed that, as a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See 6 Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992). Thus, following dismissal with leave to 7 amend, all claims alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended 8 complaint are waived. See King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Therefore, if 9 Plaintiff amends the complaint, the Court cannot refer to the prior pleading in order to make 10 Plaintiff's amended complaint complete. See Local Rule 220. An amended complaint must be 11 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. See id. 12 If Plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, Plaintiff must demonstrate how the 13 conditions complained of have resulted in a deprivation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See 14 Ellis v. Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). The complaint must allege in specific terms how 15 each named defendant is involved, and must set forth some affirmative link or connection 16 between each defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. See May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 17 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). 18 Finally, Plaintiff is warned that failure to file an amended complaint within the 19 time provided in this order may be grounds for dismissal of this action. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 20 1260-61; see also Local Rule 110. Plaintiff is also warned that a complaint which fails to comply 21 with Rule 8 may, in the Court’s discretion, be dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b). 22 See Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co., 651 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir. 1981). 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / ] Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 2 1. Plaintiffs original complaint is dismissed with leave to amend; and 3 2. Plaintiff shall file a first amended complaint within 30 days of the date of 4 | service of this order. 5 6 | Dated: July 24, 2023 Svc 7 DENNIS M. COTA 8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 10 1] 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28