1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MELISSA LEE MACQUARRIE, Case No. 1:21-cv-00072-CDB 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND

13 v. REMANDING ACTION FOR FURTHER

PROCEEDINGS UNDER SENTENCE FOUR

14 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL OF 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)

SECURITY,

15 (Doc. 15) Defendant. 16 17 18 Melissa Lee Macquarrie (“Plaintiff”) seeks judicial review of a final decision of the 19 Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner” or “Defendant”) denying her application for 20 disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. (Doc. 1). The matter is currently 21 before the Court on the certified administrative record (Doc. 11) and the parties’ briefs, which 22 were submitted without oral argument. (Docs. 15, 21-22).1 Plaintiff asserts the Administrative 23 Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred by rejecting the limitations endorsed by state agency physician Dr. 24 Megan Stafford, Psy. D., despite finding her opinion persuasive. (Doc. 15 at 5). Plaintiff 25 requests the decision of the ALJ be vacated and the case be remanded for further proceedings 26 including a de novo hearing and a new decision. Id. at 8. 27 1 Both parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge for all proceedings 28 in this action, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). (Doc. 10). 1 I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 2 A. Administrative Proceedings 3 On December 27, 2018, Plaintiff protectively applied for supplemental security income 4 benefits. (Administrative Record (“AR”) at 15, 273-90). Plaintiff alleges a period of disability 5 beginning September 1, 2005, and was 36 years old on the alleged disability onset date. Id. at 15, 6 159, 273, 293. Plaintiff claimed disability due to the following issues: arthritis on both knees, left 7 shoulder and neck, lower back pain, bone spurs, cholesterol, high blood pressure, fibromyalgia, 8 autoimmune gastritis, anxiety, and depression. Id. 9 The Commissioner denied Plaintiff’s application initially and again on reconsideration. 10 Id. at 178-83, 187-92. Plaintiff submitted a written request for a hearing before an ALJ. Id. at 11 193-95. On June 25, 2020, Plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared by telephone before ALJ 12 Debra M. Underwood. Id. at 71-121. Vocational expert Malcom J. Brodzinsky also testified at 13 the hearing via telephone. Id. at 74, 112-20. 14 B. Hearing Testimony and Medical Record 15 The relevant hearing testimony and medical record were reviewed by the Court and will 16 be referenced below as necessary to this Court’s decision. 17 C. The ALJ’s Decision 18 On August 28, 2020, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. 19 (AR at 15-29). The ALJ conducted the five-step disability analysis set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 20 404.1520(a). Id. The ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since 21 December 27, 2018, the application date (step one). Id. at 18. The ALJ held Plaintiff possessed 22 the following severe impairments: major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, 23 gastroparesis, chronic pain syndrome, degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine, 24 osteoarthritis of the knees, and obesity (step two). Id. Next, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not 25 have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of 26 one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 ("the Listings") (step 27 three). Id. at 18-22. 28 The ALJ then assessed Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). Id. at 22-34. The 1 ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the RFC:

2 “to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b) and 416.967(b) except she 3 could occasionally balance, stop, kneel, crouch, crawl, and climb ramps and stairs but should be precluded from climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She should avoid 4 concentrated exposure to extreme cold, vibrations, dampness, and very loud noise. She could perform unskilled work consisting of simple, routine tasks with frequent, 5 but not constant, face-to-face interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and the public.” 6 7 Id. at 22. 8 Although the ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff’s impairments could reasonably be 9 expected to cause her alleged symptoms, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s statements 10 concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her symptoms were not entirely 11 consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record. Id. at 23. 12 The ALJ reviewed Plaintiff’s treatment records. Id. at 23-27. Specifically, the ALJ 13 considered Dr. Stafford’s examination of Plaintiff in March 2020. Id. at 25-26. Dr. 14 Stafford determined Plaintiff had had no limitation with regard to the abilities to perform 15 simple and repetitive tasks or perform work activities on a consistent basis without special 16 or additional instructions. Id. at 25. Dr. Stafford claimed Plaintiff had mild limitations in 17 her abilities to perform detailed and complex tasks, accept instructions from supervisors, or 18 maintain regular attendance; and moderate limitations in the abilities to complete a normal 19 workday without interruptions or deal with usual workplace stress. Id. The ALJ found

20 “Dr. Stafford’s opinion persuasive because it is based on a recent in-person 21 examination of the claimant and is accompanied with explanatory notes. This examination also involved Dr. Stafford’s area of medical expertise. More 22 importantly, her assessment is consistent with the objective medical evidence which substantiates the existence of severe mental impairments and symptoms that do not 23 wholly defeat the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities.” 24 Id. at 25-26. 25 The ALJ found there was no evidence that Plaintiff’s prior work qualifies as “past relevant 26 work” and there is no evidence that she has performed any work since her application date. Id. at 27 27. Instead, the ALJ adopted the findings of a prior disability decision with regard to Plaintiff’s 28 1 past relevant work (step four). Id. The ALJ held Plaintiff could perform a significant number of 2 other jobs in the national economy including retail price marker, routing clerk/mail sorter, and 3 housekeeper/cleaner (step five). Id. The ALJ concluded Plaintiff has not been under a disability, 4 as defined in the Social Security Act, since December 27, 2018, the date the application was filed. 5 Id. at 28-29. 6 On December 1, 2020, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making 7 the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Id. at 1-6. Plaintiff filed this action 8 on January 18, 2021, seeking judicial review of the denial of his application for benefits. (Doc. 9 1). The Commissioner lodged the administrative record on August 12, 2021. (Doc. 11). Plaintiff 10 filed an opening brief on October 26, 2021. (Doc. 15). On April 11, 2022, Defendant timely 11 filed a responsive brief and Plaintiff filed a reply brief on April 26, 2022. (Docs. 21-22). 12 II. LEGAL STANDARD 13 A. The Disability Standard 14 Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income are available for every 15 eligible individual who is “disabled.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d)(1)(B)(ii) and 1381(a). An individual 16 is “disabled” if unable to “engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically 17 determinable physical or mental impairment …”2 Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987) 18 (quoting identically worded provisions of 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A)). To 19 achieve uniformity in the decision-making process, the Social Security regulations set out a five- 20 step sequential evaluation process to be used in determining if an individual is disabled. See 20 21 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Batson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 359 F.3d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir. 2004). 22 Specifically, the ALJ is required to determine:

23 (1) whether a claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity during the period of 24 alleged disability, (2) whether the claimant had medically determinable “severe” impairments, (3) whether these impairments meet or are medically equivalent to one 25 of the listed impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, (4) 26 2 A “physical or mental impairment” is one resulting from anatomical, physiological, or 27 psychological abnormalities that are demonstrated by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3). 28 1 whether the claimant retained the RFC to perform past relevant work and (5) whether the claimant had the ability to perform other jobs existing in significant 2 numbers at the national and regional level. 3 4 Stout v. Comm’r. Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1052 (9th Cir. 2006). The burden of proof is 5 on a claimant at steps one through four. Ford v. Saul, 950 F.3d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing 6 Valentine v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin, 574 F.3d 685, 689 (9th Cir. 2009)). 7 Before making the step four determinations, the ALJ first must determine the claimant’s 8 RFC. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). The RFC is the most a claimant can still do despite their 9 limitations and represents an assessment based on all relevant evidence. 20 C.F.R. §§ 10 404.1545(a)(1); 416.945(a)(1)). The RFC must consider all of the claimant’s impairments, 11 including those that are not severe. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(e), 416.945(a)(2). E.g., Wells v. 12 Colvin, 727 F.3d 1061, 1065 (10th Cir. 2013) (“These regulations inform us, first, that in 13 assessing the claimant’s RFC, the ALJ must consider the combined effect of all of the claimant’s 14 medically determinable impairments, whether severe or not severe.”). The RFC is not a medical 15 opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2). Rather, it is a legal decision that is expressly reserved to 16 the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c); see Vertigan v. Halter, 260 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th 17 Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is the responsibility of the ALJ, not the claimant’s physician, to determine 18 residual functional capacity.”). 19 At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that Plaintiff can perform 20 other work in the national economy given the claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work 21 experience. Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1011 (9th Cir. 2014). To do this, the ALJ can use 22 either the Medical-Vocational Guidelines or rely upon the testimony of a VE. Lounsburry v. 23 Barnhart, 468 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 2006); Osenbrock v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th 24 Cir. 2001). “Throughout the five-step evaluation, the ALJ ‘is responsible for determining 25 credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony and for resolving ambiguities.’” Ford, 950 26 F.3d at 1149 (quoting Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995)).

27 28 1 B. Standard of Review 2 Congress has provided that an individual may obtain judicial review of any final decision 3 of the Commissioner of Social Security regarding entitlement to benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). In 4 determining whether to reverse an ALJ’s decision, a court reviews only those issues raised by the 5 party challenging the decision. See Lewis v. Apfel, 236 F.3d 503, 517 n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). A 6 court may set aside the Commissioner’s denial of benefits when the ALJ’s findings are based on 7 legal error or are not supported by substantial evidence. Tackett v. Apfel, 180 F.3d 1094, 1097 8 (9th Cir. 1999). 9 “Substantial evidence is relevant evidence which, considering the record as a whole, a 10 reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Thomas v. Barnhart, 278 11 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Flaten v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 44 F.3d 1453, 12 1457 (9th Cir, 1995)). “[T]he threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high.” Biestek v. 13 Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). Rather, “[s]ubstantial evidence means more than a 14 scintilla, but less than a preponderance; it is an extremely deferential standard.” Thomas v. 15 CalPortland Co., 993 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2021) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 16 “[A] reviewing court must consider the entire record as a whole and may not affirm 17 simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 18 1159 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations and citations omitted). “If the evidence ‘is susceptible 19 to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be upheld.’” Ford, 20 950 F.3d at 1154 (quoting Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 2005)). Even if the 21 ALJ has erred, the Court may not reverse the ALJ’s decision where the error is harmless. Stout, 22 454 F.3d at 1055-56. An error is harmless where it is “inconsequential to the [ALJ’s] ultimate 23 nondisability determinations.” Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) 24 (quotation and citation omitted). The burden of showing that an error is not harmless “normally 25 falls upon the party attacking the agency’s determination.” Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 26 409 (2009). 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 III. LEGAL ISSUES 2 Plaintiff asserts the ALJ erred by rejecting the limitations endorsed by Dr. Stafford, 3 despite finding her opinion persuasive. (Doc. 15 at 5-8). 4 IV. DISCUSSION 5 Plaintiff asserts that the RFC is unsupported by substantial evidence because it conflicts 6 with Dr. Stafford’s opinion, and the ALJ did not explain why Dr, Stafford’s endorsed limitations 7 were rejected. Id. at 5. 8 An RFC “is the most [one] can still do despite [his or her] limitations” and it is “based on 9 all relevant evidence in [one’s] case record.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). In formulating the RFC, 10 the ALJ must account for all the claimant’s medically determinable impairments, including those 11 that are not “severe,” and evaluate “all of the relevant medical and other evidence.” Id.; Valentine 12 v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 574 F.3d 685, 690 (9th Cir. 2009) (an RFC that “fails to take into 13 account a claimant’s limitations is defective”). Therefore, an ALJ errs when she provides an 14 incomplete RFC ignoring “significant and probative evidence.” Hill v. Astrue, 698 F.3d 1153, 15 1161-62 (9th Cir. 2012). 16 An RFC assessment is ultimately an administrative finding reserved to the Commissioner. 17 20 C.F.R. § 416.946. “Where an ALJ accords substantial or great weight to a physician’s 18 opinion, he must either incorporate their findings into the RFC or offer an explanation for why he 19 chose not to accept them.” Sahyoun v. Saul, No. 2:18-CV-576-EFB, 2020 WL 1492661, at *3 20 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2020) (citing Martin v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 472 F. App’x 580 (9th Cir. 21 2012)); Neufeld v. Berryhill, No. 2:16-CV-03644 (VEB), 2018 WL 4739699, at *6 (C.D. Cal. 22 Sep. 30, 2018) (“Having afforded ‘great weight’ to the opinions of Dr. Bartell and Dr. Loomis, 23 the ALJ was bound to either incorporate their findings as to Plaintiff’s limitations or explain why 24 she decided not to accept them.”); Harell v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20-cv-00614-GSA, 2021 WL 25 4429416, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 27, 2021) (“But having clearly stated that he was according Dr. 26 Stafford’s opinion great weight, the ALJ was under an obligation to account for the moderate 27 limitations Dr. Stafford identified irrespective of the broader reasoning in support of the RFC”); 28 Wascovich v. Saul, No. 2:18-CV-659-EFB, 2019 WL 4572084, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 20, 2019) 1 (citing Betts v. Colvin, 531 F. App’x 799, 800 (9th Cir. 2013)) (“where the ALJ accepts the 2 medical assessment of moderate limitations, those limitations must be accounted for in the 3 RFC”). The RFC does not need to directly correspond to a specific medical opinion, rather, “the 4 ALJ is responsible for translating and incorporating clinical findings into a succinct RFC.” 5 Rounds v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 807 F.3d 996, 1006 (9th Cir. 2015); see Stubbs-Danielson v. 6 Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting the ALJ’s responsibility to weigh conflicting 7 medical evidence and translate accepted medical opinions into “concrete restrictions”). The 8 ALJ’s RFC assessment should be affirmed if the ALJ has applied the proper legal standard and 9 their decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 10 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005). 11 In this case, Dr. Stafford assessed Plaintiff with moderate limitations in her ability to, 12 among other things, “interact with co-workers, supervisors, and the public … due to emotional 13 dysregulation, irritability, difficulty with interpersonal relationships, and low frustration 14 tolerance.” (AR 801). Similarly, Dr. Stafford found Plaintiff’s ability to “complete a normal 15 workday without interruptions from a psychiatric condition due to her symptoms of anxiety and 16 depression” was moderately impaired. Id. Likewise, Plaintiff was found to be moderately 17 impaired in her ability to “deal with the usual stress encountered in the workplace due to her 18 emotional dysregulation, irritability, difficulty with interpersonal relationships, low frustration 19 tolerance, irritability, and limited coping skills.” Id. at 801-02. The ALJ found Dr. Stafford’s 20 opinion persuasive because it was based on a then- recent in-person examination of Plaintiff and 21 was consistent with the objective medical evidence which substantiates the existence of severe 22 mental impairments and symptoms that do not wholly defeat the claimant’s ability to perform 23 basic work activities. Id. at 25-26. 24 Plaintiff contends that despite the ALJ purporting to find the opinions persuasive, the 25 ALJ’s assessment of Plaintiff’s RFC failed to fully adopt Dr. Stafford’s endorsed limitations or 26 explain why she rejected them. (Doc. 15 at 5-6). Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed 27 to acknowledge Dr. Stafford’s opinion that Plaintiff is moderately limited in her ability to interact 28 with supervisors, coworkers, and the public. Id. at 6-7. Plaintiff avers the RFC’s provision for 1 “frequent, but not constant, face-to-face interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and the public” 2 does not sufficiently address Dr. Stafford’s finding of moderate limitation. Id. at 7. Plaintiff also 3 argues the RFC includes no accommodation for Plaintiff’s limited ability to complete a normal 4 workday without interruptions, or her moderate limitations in handling usual workplace stress. 5 Id. Plaintiff claims “[a]ny assertion that a moderate difficulty handling usual stress is 6 accommodated by a limitation to simple work is inconsistent with the language of SSR 85-15”, 7 and thus, the RFC does not accurately capture Dr. Stafford’s proffered limitations. Id. at 7-8. 8 Defendant contends that the ALJ’s mental RFC is supported by evidence that undercuts 9 Plaintiff’s allegations of difficulty in completing a workday, handling stress, and interacting with 10 others. (Doc. 21 at 9-11). Defendant argues the ALJ examined other evidence that showed 11 Plaintiff was routinely described as polite or cooperative, making good eye contact, and 12 demonstrating normal mood and affect. Id. at 9 (citing AR at 21, 484, 785, 832, 835, 841-42, 13 871, 908, 939, 953, 960, 981, 995, 1002). Defendant also points out that Plaintiff was able to 14 socialize with others, had adequate concentration, could drive, and take public transportation. Id. 15 at 9-10). 16 Defendant argues the ALJ’s RFC properly accounted for Dr. Stafford’s opinion. (Doc. 21 17 at 5). Specifically, Defendant claims the ALJ acknowledged and expressly incorporated the 18 moderate limitations identified by Dr. Stafford into the RFC by finding that Plaintiff could have 19 frequent, but not constant face-to-face interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and the public. Id. 20 at 6-7 (citing Zul v. Kijakazi, No. 20-35404, 2021 WL 5298595, at *1 (9th Cir. Nov. 15, 2021)). 21 Next, Defendant contends the ALJ properly accounted for Dr. Stafford’s endorsed moderate 22 limitations by restricting Plaintiff to unskilled work consisting of simple, routine tasks. Id. at 7-8. 23 Defendant asserts a moderate impairment in social functioning is appropriately captured in an 24 RFC finding for simple, routine tasks. Id. at 7 (citing Rogers v. Comm’r. of Soc. Sec. Admin., 409 25 Fed. Appx. 15, 17-18 (9th Cir. 2012)). Defendant asserts the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff could 26 sustain unskilled-work sufficiently translated Dr. Stafford’s proffered limitations into Plaintiff’s 27 RFC. Id. at 11 (citing Stubbs-Danielson, 539 F.3d at 1171, 1173-74). 28 Because the ALJ found Dr. Stafford’s opinion persuasive, the ALJ was required to 1 account for Dr. Stafford’s moderate limitations in the RFC or offer an explanation as to why she 2 chose not to accept them. The Court finds the ALJ erred in failing to set forth in the RFC Dr. 3 Stafford’s restriction on Plaintiff’s ability to interact with co-workers, supervisors, and the public, 4 complete a normal workday without interruptions, and deal with the usual stress encountered in 5 the workplace. 6 Here, the RFC limits Plaintiff to “frequent, but not constant, face-to-face interaction with 7 supervisors, coworkers, and the public.” AR at 22. This limitation fails to account for Dr. 8 Stafford’s moderate limitation to interact with co-workers, supervisors, and the public. An ALJ 9 adequately accounts for a doctor’s opinion about a claimant’s moderate social limitations by 10 limiting the claimant to occasional coworker interaction. Zul, 2021 WL 5298595, at *1 (citing 11 Shaibi v. Berryhill, 883 F.3d 1102, 1107 (9th Cir. 2018)) (the ALJ adequately accounted for a 12 doctor’s opinion about the claimant’s “moderate” social limitations by limiting him to occasional 13 coworker interaction). Generally, courts have concluded limiting a claimant to occasional social 14 interactions adequately encompasses moderate limitations with respect to social functioning. See 15 Langford v. Astrue, No. CIV S-07-0366 EFB, 2008 WL 2073951, at *2, 7 (E.D. Cal. May 14, 16 2008) (the RFC limited the claimant to physically and mentally simple repetitive, non-hazardous 17 tasks, with limited contacts with others); Ramirez v. Kijakazi, No. 1:22-cv-00445-GSA, 2023 WL 18 4409853, at *4-5 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 7, 2023) (the RFC does not specify any restriction on interaction 19 with peers, supervisors, or the general public, and a limitation to simple and routine tasks does not 20 adequately capture restrictions on social interactions); Kuhn v. Comm’r. of Soc. Sec., No. 1:22-cv- 21 00966-SAB, 2023 WL 3994989, at *2, 7 (E.D. Cal. Jun. 14, 2023) (the ALJ assessed moderate 22 limitation to claimant’s ability to interact with others to no more than occasional contact); 23 Wofford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:19-CV-0792-WBS-DMC, 2021 WL 765262, at *7 (E.D. 24 Cal. Feb. 26, 2021) (holding that “a limitation to occasional interaction with co-workers” in the 25 plaintiff’s RFC adequately encompassed the earlier finding that the plaintiff was “moderately 26 limited in various social interactions”); Henry v. Colvin, No. 1:15-cv-00100-JLT, 2016 WL 27 164956, at *10 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 7, 2023) (limiting plaintiff to having no more than occasional 28 contact with coworkers and the public); Orso v. Colvin, 658 F. App’x 418, 420 (10th Cir. 2016) 1 (finding that the plaintiff’s “moderate difficulty with social functioning encompassed by the 2 limitation of ‘occasional contact’ with coworkers [and] supervisors”). In this case, Plaintiff’s 3 RFC limits her to frequent interactions with coworkers, supervisors, and the public. Therefore, 4 the Court finds the RFC’s limitation to frequent interactions does not comport with the moderate 5 limitation expressed in Dr. Stafford’s opinion. 6 Defendant’s reliance on Zul (Doc. 21 at 5-6) is misplaced. In that case, similar to Plaintiff 7 here, a doctor found the claimant’s ability to interact at work “moderately impaired.” 2021 WL 8 5298595, at *1. The Court of Appeals upheld the ALJ’s translation of this impairment into an 9 RFC that restricted the claimant’s ability to work under supervision “in limited contexts” (e.g., 10 without public interaction). Id. Here, the ALJ’s RFC incorporated no such restriction. 11 Defendant argues even if the ALJ erred in failing to incorporate Dr. Stafford’s moderate 12 limitation as to Plaintiff’s ability to engage in social interactions, the error was harmless as the 13 jobs that the ALJ identified did not even require social interaction. (Doc. 21 at 8) (citing Henry, 14 2016 WL 164956, at *18). The ALJ found Plaintiff was capable of performing a significant 15 number of other jobs in the national economy including retail price marker, routing clerk/mail 16 sorter, and housekeeper/cleaner. AR at 28. Although the unskilled jobs at issue here and their 17 corresponding Dictionary of Occupational Titles descriptions suggest they may not necessarily 18 require significant social interaction, the hypotheticals to the VE needed to reflect the correct 19 social interaction limitations in order for the VE’s testimony to serve as substantial evidence in 20 support of the ALJ’s step five finding. Alexander v. Saul, 817 F. App’x 401, 404 (9th Cir. 2020) 21 (“If the hypothetical does not reflect all the claimant's limitations,…the expert’s testimony has no 22 evidentiary value to support a finding that the claimant can perform jobs in the national 23 economy.”). Here, the VE was not provided a hypothetical that captured restrictions consistent 24 with Dr. Stafford’s moderate limitation. See AR at 112-20. Thus, the error was not harmless as it 25 is not clear from the record whether the inclusion of the social interaction limitation opined by Dr. 26 Stafford, would have eliminated the available jobs. See Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F.3d 1035, 27 1038 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting that an error is harmless when it is “clear from the record” that the 28 error was inconsequential to the ultimate non-disability determination). 1 Additionally, Defendant’s claim the ALJ properly accounted for Dr. Stafford’s endorsed 2 moderate limitations by restricting Plaintiff to unskilled work consisting of simple, routine tasks 3 is unavailing. “[T]he weight of more recent case law [ ] tends to refute the argument that a 4 limitation to simple, routine tasks in the RFC adequately accounts for moderate limitations in the 5 ability to complete a normal workday and the ability to handle stress.” Slover v. Kijakazi, No. 6 1:21-cv-01089-ADA-BAM, 2023 WL 5488416, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2023); Harrell, 2021 7 WL 4429416, at *7 (collecting cases); Ramirez v. Kijakazi, No. 1:22-cv-00445, GSA, 2023 WL 8 4409853, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 7, 2023) (explaining that “case law in this circuit is split but tends 9 to favor the view that a restriction to simple/routine tasks is not a catchall and does not account 10 for all moderate limitations”); Berenisia Madrigal v. Saul, No. 1:18-cv-01129-SKO, 2020 WL 11 58289, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2020) (finding that a restriction to simple, routine tasks does not 12 account for mental limitations in the ability to complete a normal workday or workweek without 13 interruptions from a psychiatric condition and the ability to deal with stress and changes 14 encountered in the workplace); Sahyoun, 2020 WL 1492661, at *4 (rejecting argument that the 15 RFC determination that plaintiff could sustain work involving simple, repetitive tasks adequately 16 captured moderate limitations in maintaining regular attendance, completing a normal workday or 17 work week without interruption from a psychiatric condition, and handling normal work-related 18 stress). The Court finds the ALJ’s decision to limit Plaintiff to unskilled work consisting of 19 simple, routine tasks did not adequately address or account for Dr. Stafford’s moderate limitations 20 as to Plaintiff’s ability to complete a normal workday without interruptions and her ability to deal 21 with the usual stress encountered in the workplace. 22 While moderate limitations are not per se disabling, they may translate into concrete work 23 restrictions, which when considered in connection with Plaintiff’s other restrictions may render 24 the claimant disabled. See Corrales v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20-cv-01646-SKO, 2022 WL 2292065, at 25 *6 (E.D. Cal. Jun. 24, 2022); Wiles v. Berryhill, No. 2:16-cv-09558-GJS, 2017 WL 5186333, at 26 *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2017). The ALJ failed to adequately address Dr. Stafford’s moderate 27 limitations as to Plaintiff’s ability to complete a normal workday without interruptions and deal 28 with the usual stress encountered in the workplace. See AR at 22 (the ALJ found Plaintiff 1 retained the RFC to “perform unskilled work consisting of simple, routine tasks with frequent, but 2 not constant, face-to-face interaction with supervisors, coworkers, and the public.”). As a result, 3 the moderate limitations that the ALJ failed to address or account for were not inconsequential to 4 the ultimate disability determination. See Stout v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 454 F.3d 1050, 1055 5 (9th Cir. 2006) (error harmless where mistake nonprejudicial to the claimant or irrelevant to the 6 ALJ’s ultimate disability conclusion). 7 V. REMAND 8 The decision whether to remand a matter pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) 9 or to order immediate payment of benefits is within the discretion of the district court. Harman v. 10 Apfel, 211 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2000). Except in rare instances, when a court reverses an 11 administrative agency determination, the proper course is to remand to the agency for additional 12 investigation or explanation. Moisa v. Barnhart, 367 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing INS v. 13 Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002)). Generally, an award of benefits is directed when: 14 (1) the ALJ has failed to provide legally sufficient reasons for rejecting such evidence, 15 (2) there are no outstanding issues that must be resolved before a determination of 16 disability can be made, and (3) it is clear from the record that the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled were such evidence credited. 17 18 Smolen, 80 F.3d at 1292. In addition, an award of benefits is directed where no useful purpose 19 would be served by further administrative proceedings, or where the record is fully developed. 20 Varney v. Sec’y of Health & Human Serv., 859 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir. 1998). 21 Here, the ALJ did not account for Dr. Stafford’s moderate limitations in the RFC or offer 22 an adequate explanation as to why she chose not to accept them. Accordingly, remand is 23 appropriate for proper consideration of the medical evidence. 24 VI. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 25 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that substantial evidence and applicable law do 26 not support the ALJ’s conclusion, and IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 27 1. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 15) is GRANTED; 28 1 2. The decision of the Commissioner is reversed, and the matter is REMANDED for 2 further proceedings pursuant to Sentence 4 of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); and 3 3. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Plaintiff Melissa 4 Lee Macquarrie and against Defendant Kilolo Kijyakazi, Acting Commissioner of 5 Social Security. 6 | IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 Dated: _ November 27, 2023 | Ww VL D R~ 8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 14