1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 SIOBHAN GENESSI, Case No. 2:23-cv-01054-DAD-JDP (PS) 12 Plaintiff, ORDER 13 v. SCREENING PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT,

GRANTING HER MOTION TO PROCEED IN

14 PLACER COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT, FORMA PAUPERIS, AND DENYING HER et al., MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF 15 COUNSEL Defendants. 16 ECF Nos. 1, 2, & 3

17 RESPONSE DUE IN THIRTY DAYS 18 Plaintiff Siobhan Genessi filed a complaint against the Placer County Superior Court, 19 Placer County Child Protective Services, Placer County Counsel, and seven individuals, two of 20 whom plaintiff identifies as CPS employees, alleging that her due process rights were violated in 21 connection with her son’s custody determination. Her complaint, however, fails to state a claim. 22 I will give plaintiff a chance to amend her complaint before recommending dismissal. I will also 23 grant her application to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2, which makes the showing 24 required by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)(1) and (2), and deny her motion for appointment of counsel. 25 Motion to Appoint Counsel 26 Plaintiff moves for appointment of counsel. ECF No. 3. Plaintiff does not have a 27 constitutional right to appointed counsel, see Rand v. Rowland, 113 F.3d 1520, 1525 (9th Cir. 28 1 1997), and the court lacks the authority to require an attorney to represent plaintiff. See Mallard 2 v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). The court can request the 3 voluntary assistance of counsel. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) (“The court may request an attorney 4 to represent any person unable to afford counsel”); Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525. But without means to 5 compensate counsel, the court will seek volunteer counsel only in exceptional circumstances. In 6 determining whether such circumstances exist, “the district court must evaluate both the 7 likelihood of success on the merits [and] the ability of the [plaintiff] to articulate [her] claims pro 8 se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” Rand, 113 F.3d at 1525 (internal 9 quotation marks and citations omitted). 10 Plaintiff argues that while she can communicate the facts of her case well, she struggles to 11 understand the law. ECF No. 3 at 1. Plaintiff explains that she previously had counsel for her 12 state court matter, but she fired the lawyer in November 2021 when he failed to appeal the 13 custody determination. Id. at 2. The court finds that this case does not demonstrate exceptional 14 circumstances warranting appointment of counsel. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that she is 15 likely to succeed on the merits, and the allegations in the complaint are not exceptionally 16 complicated. 17 Screening and Pleading Requirements 18 A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief, 19 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 20 face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not 21 require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 22 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 23 possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not 24 identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 25 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that 26 give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264 27 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted). 28 1 The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 2 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it 3 appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 4 would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017). 5 However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements 6 of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 7 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)). 8 Analysis 9 Plaintiff Siobhan Genessi brings this civil rights action against Placer County Superior 10 Court, Placer County Child Protective Services (“CPS”), Placer County Counsel, Hilary Trauth, 11 Bridget Riley, Bianca Yarmaluk, Roger Coffman, Kee Ann Smith, Kristina Shramek, and Jason 12 Folker. ECF No. 1. The complaint alleges that on June 5, 2019, Placer County CPS removed her 13 minor son under the pretext of a non-existent warrant. Id. at 1-2. Plaintiff discovered at a 14 custody proceeding that the “charging documents” were identical to a complaint filed in Alabama 15 family court three years prior. Id. at 2. The complaint alleges the Placer Court failed to give Full 16 Faith and Credit to the Alabama decision, which was dismissed. Id. 17 After plaintiff’s son was removed from her care, CPS employee defendant Bridge Riley 18 supervised plaintiff’s visits with her son. Id. The complaint alleges that Riley would threaten 19 plaintiff with ending the visits early when plaintiff’s son would misbehave. CPS suspended 20 plaintiff’s visits in September 2019 and plaintiff has not seen her son since, despite court orders 21 that she be allowed therapeutic visits with her son in December 2019 and January 2020. Id. at 3. 22 In April 2020, CPS sent plaintiff’s son to live with plaintiff’s father’s family in Texas. Id. 23 While in Texas, her son was not enrolled in school or seen by a doctor, dentist, or therapist (to 24 treat his autism). Id. at 4. The Placer Court held a hearing in August 2020 to determine custody 25 of plaintiff’s son. Id. at 4. Plaintiff claims that Franklin (plaintiff’s son’s father) paid Placer 26 County Counsel to represent his interests at the hearing and that CPS employee defendant Trauth 27 admitted on the stand that she tried to “get a confession out of” plaintiff. Id. at 4-5. The Placer 28 1 Court awarded custody to the family in Texas and Franklin “accepted” custody of plaintiff’s son 2 in January 2021. Id. 3 Plaintiff seeks $10 million in compensatory damages, $20 million in punitive damages, 4 and full custody of her son. Id. at 6. 5 This court does not have jurisdiction over child custody claims, which are exclusively 6 matters of state law. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 702-04 (1992) (holding that the 7 domestic relations exception to federal subject matter jurisdiction “divests the federal courts of 8 power to issue divorce, alimony and child custody decrees”); see also Peterson v. Babbitt, 708 9 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that “federal courts have uniformly held that they should 10 not adjudicate cases involving domestic relations, including ‘the custody of minors and a fortiori, 11 right of visitation[’;] the whole subject of domestic relations and particularly child custody 12 problems is generally considered a state law matter”). “Even when a federal question is 13 presented, federal courts decline to hear disputes [that] would deeply involve them in adjudicating 14 domestic matters.” Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547, 1558 (9th Cir. 1986). 15 Further, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review final determinations of state 16 court custody proceedings. See Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 890 (9th Cir. 17 1986) (“The United States District Court . . . has no authority to review the final determinations 18 of a state court in judicial proceedings.”). Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a federal district 19 court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the judgment of a state 20 court. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283-84 (2005); see also 21 Dist. of Columbia Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust 22 Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415 (1923). To determine whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a case, a 23 court must first determine if the federal action contains a forbidden de facto appeal of a state court 24 judicial decision. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003). If it does not, “the Rooker- 25 Feldman inquiry ends.” Bell v. City of Boise, 709 F.3d 890, 897 (9th Cir. 2013). If a court 26 determines that the action is a “forbidden de facto appeal,” the court cannot hear the de facto 27 appeal portion of the case, and, “[a]s part of that refusal, it must also refuse to decide any issue 28 raised in the suit that is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with an issue resolved by the state court in its 1 judicial decision.” Noel, 341 F.3d at 1158; see also Bell, 709 F.3d at 897 (“The ‘inextricably 2 intertwined’ language from Feldman is not a test to determine whether a claim is a de facto 3 appeal, but is rather a second and distinct step in the Rooker-Feldman analysis.”). A complaint is 4 a “de facto appeal” of a state court decision where the plaintiff “complains of a legal wrong 5 allegedly committed by the state cour[t] and seeks relief from the judgment of that court.” Noel, 6 341 F.3d at 1163. 7 Plaintiff asks this court to invalidate a state court decision granting custody of her son to 8 her son’s father—which is squarely what Rooker-Feldman prohibits. In re Gruntz, 202 F.3d 9 1074, 1079 (9th Cir. 2000). A request to vacate a family court order is generally considered a de 10 facto appeal and barred by Rooker-Feldman. See Moore v. Cnty. of Butte, 547 F. App’x 826, 829 11 (9th Cir. 2013); Riley v. Knowles, No. 1:16-CV-0057-JLT, 2016 WL 259336, at *3 (E.D. Cal. 12 Jan. 21, 2016). Plaintiff’s action constitutes a “forbidden de facto appeal,” and the court lacks 13 subject matter jurisdiction. See Davis v. California Dep’t of Child Servs., No. 2:20-cv-01393- 14 TLN-AC (PS), 2020 WL 5039243, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2020) (finding that plaintiff’s civil 15 action regarding a state court’s child custody determination constituted a forbidden “de facto 16 appeal” that was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine). 17 The complaint also alleges a denial of familial association. Parents have a constitutionally 18 protected liberty interest in the care and custody of their children. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 19 745, 753 (1982). “While a constitutional liberty interest in the maintenance of the familial 20 relationship exists, this right is not absolute. The interest of the parents must be balanced against 21 the interests of the state and, when conflicting, against the interests of the children.” Woodrum v. 22 Woodward Cty., Okl., 866 F.2d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1989). The right to familial association has 23 both a substantive and a procedural component. Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1236 (9th Cir. 24 2018). “While the right is a fundamental liberty interest, officials may interfere with the right if 25 they provide the parents with fundamentally fair procedures[.]” Id. at 883 F.3d at 1236 (internal 26 citations omitted); see also Kirkpatrick v. Cty. of Washoe, 843 F.3d 784, 789 (9th Cir. 2016) 27 (quoting Wallis v. Spencer, 202 F.3d 1126, 1136 (9th Cir. 1999)) (The Fourteenth Amendment 28 guarantees “that parents and children will not be separated by the state without due process of law 1 except in an emergency”). “Officials may not remove children from their parents without a court 2 order unless they have ‘information at the time of the seizure that establishes reasonable cause to 3 believe that the child is in imminent danger of serious bodily injury.’” Keates, 883 F.3d at 1236 4 (citing Rogers v. Cnty. of San Joaquin, 487 F.3d 1288, 1294 (9th Cir. 2007)). 5 Here, plaintiff alleges that CPS falsely represented that they had a warrant to remove her 6 child. While this allegation could potentially state a familial associate claim, plaintiff’s allegation 7 is conclusory and in need of elaboration. Plaintiff will be afforded an opportunity to amend her 8 complaint and elaborate on the circumstances surrounding her son’s removal by CPS. The court 9 understands the thrust of plaintiff’s complaint to center around her son’s custody determination, 10 which, as explained above, is outside this court’s jurisdiction. 11 I will allow plaintiff a chance to amend her complaint before recommending that this 12 action be dismissed. Plaintiff should also take care to add specific factual allegations against each 13 defendant. Indeed, several of the listed defendants are mentioned nowhere in the complaint. If 14 plaintiff decides to file an amended complaint, the amended complaint will supersede the current 15 one. See Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc). This means 16 that the amended complaint will need to be complete on its face without reference to the prior 17 pleading. See E.D. Cal. Local Rule 220. Once an amended complaint is filed, the current one no 18 longer serves any function. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in the original, plaintiff will 19 need to assert each claim and allege each defendant’s involvement in sufficient detail. The 20 amended complaint should be titled “First Amended Complaint” and refer to the appropriate case 21 number. If plaintiff does not file an amended complaint, I will recommend that this action be 22 dismissed. 23 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that: 24 1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2, is granted. 25 2. Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of counsel, ECF No. 3, is denied. 26 3. Within thirty days from the service of this order, plaintiff must either file an 27 amended complaint or advise the court she wishes to stand by her current complaint. If she 28 selects the latter option, I will recommend that this action be dismissed. 1 4. Failure to comply with this order will result in the dismissal of this action. 2 5. The Clerk of Court is directed to send plaintiff a new form complaint. 3 4 5 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: _ December 19, 2023 Q_——_. 7 JEREMY D. PETERSON 8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28