1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 RAYCHELLE FIELDS, et al., No. 2:22-cv-00748-MCE-DB 12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 14 STOCKTON UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., 15 Defendants. 16

17 18 Plaintiffs Raychelle Fields, Ben Nakamura, and Yvonne Wright (collectively, 19 “Plaintiffs”) initiated this action against Defendant Stockton Unified School District 20 (“SUSD”) and Individual Defendants Brian Biederman, John Ramirez, Jr., Cecilia 21 Mendez, Maria Mendez, Alicia Rico, Ray C. Zulueta, Jr., Scot Mcbrian, and Zachary 22 Avelar, (collectively, “Defendants”) seeking to recover for injuries sustained as a result 23 of, very generally, Defendants’ alleged race discrimination and retaliation against them in 24 violation of federal and state law. The Court previously granted with leave to amend two 25 Motions to Dismiss filed by all Defendants. ECF Nos. 13, 14, 21. Plaintiff thereafter filed 26 a timely First Amended Complaint (“FAC”). ECF No. 22. Defendants again filed 27 separate Motions to Dismiss, ECF Nos. 23, 24, which the Court granted, ECF No. 30. 28 The Court dismissed SUSD without further leave to amend, but granted final leave to 1 amend as to the Individual Defendants. Plaintiffs then filed the currently operative 2 Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”), ECF No. 31, and the Individual Defendants 3 responded by again moving to dismiss, ECF No. 32. For the following reasons, the 4 Individual Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED without leave to amend.1 5 6 STANDARD 7 8 On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil 9 Procedure 12(b)(6),2 all allegations of material fact must be accepted as true and 10 construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. 11 Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir. 1996). Rule 8(a)(2) “requires only ‘a short and plain 12 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’ in order to ‘give the 13 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell 14 Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 15 47 (1957)). A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not require 16 detailed factual allegations. However, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of 17 his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 18 recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (internal citations and 19 quotations omitted). A court is not required to accept as true a “legal conclusion 20 couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 21 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief 22 above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing 5 Charles Alan Wright & 23 Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1216 (3d ed. 2004) (stating that the 24 pleading must contain something more than “a statement of facts that merely creates a 25 suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action”)). 26 1 Because oral argument would not be of material assistance, the Court ordered this matter 27 submitted on the briefs. See E.D. Cal. Local R. 230(g).

28 2 All further references to “Rule” or “Rules” are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 1 Furthermore, “Rule 8(a)(2) . . . requires a showing, rather than a blanket 2 assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (internal citations and 3 quotations omitted). Thus, “[w]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, it is hard 4 to see how a claimant could satisfy the requirement of providing not only ‘fair notice’ of 5 the nature of the claim, but also ‘grounds’ on which the claim rests.” Id. (citing Wright & 6 Miller, supra, at 94, 95). A pleading must contain “only enough facts to state a claim to 7 relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. If the “plaintiffs . . . have not nudged their 8 claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, their complaint must be dismissed.” 9 Id. However, “a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that 10 actual proof of those facts is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and 11 unlikely.’” Id. at 556 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)). 12 A court granting a motion to dismiss a complaint must then decide whether to 13 grant leave to amend. Leave to amend should be “freely given” where there is no 14 “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice 15 to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of [the] 16 amendment . . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Capital, LLC v. 17 Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the Foman factors as those to 18 be considered when deciding whether to grant leave to amend). Not all of these factors 19 merit equal weight. Rather, “the consideration of prejudice to the opposing party . . . 20 carries the greatest weight.” Id. (citing DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833 F.2d 183, 21 185 (9th Cir. 1987)). Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only if it is clear that 22 “the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” Intri-Plex Techs., Inc. v. Crest 23 Group, Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing In re Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 24 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005); Ascon Props., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1160 25 (9th Cir. 1989) (“Leave need not be granted where the amendment of the complaint . . . 26 constitutes an exercise in futility . . . .”)). 27 28 1 ANALYSIS 2 3 This Court has twice dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims against the Individual 4 | Defendants, and those decisions are incorporated herein by reference. ECF Nos. 21, 5 | 30. Plaintiffs have once again amended their allegations, adding multiple pages in the 6 | SAC, but no substance. Plaintiffs continue to rely on: (1) conclusory allegations 7 | indicating they believe they were treated differently based on their races; and (2) legal 8 | conclusions as to the potential constitutional ramifications of their conclusory 9 | contentions. Still lacking are any actual factual allegations indicating how any of the 10 | Individual Defendants participated in depriving Plaintiffs of any of their constitutional 11 | rights. There is simply nothing new here, and the Individual Defendants’ Motion to 12 | Dismiss is GRANTED without leave to amend.* 13 14 15 CONCLUSION 16 17 For the reasons just stated, the Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF 18 | No. 32) is GRANTED without leave to amend. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close 19 | this case. 20 IT |S SO ORDERED. 21 | Dated: January 17, 2024 Eo 22 f{ late rf LEK. 3 SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 24 25 26 27 | second cause of Action. Thet claim, which arses under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, s drected at SUSD, however and SUSD is no longer a party to this action. There was no reason for the Individual Defendants to 28 || address that cause of action.