1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF No. 2:21-cv-01739-DJC-JDP TOXIC SUBSTANCES CONTROL, et 12 al., 13 Plaintiffs, ORDER

14 v.

15 EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, et al., 16 Defendants. 17 18 This action is one of two Comprehensive Environmental Response, 19 Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) enforcement actions in this Court filed by 20 the California Department of Toxic Substances Control (“DTSC”) and the Toxic 21 Substances Control Account (“TSCA”)1 related to former landfill and hazardous waste 22 sites managed by the IT Environmental Liquidating Trust (“ITELT”).2 Before the Court 23 1 Plaintiff TSCA is an account within the State of California General Fund that may be used by the DTSC 24 to fund response costs. (Pl’s Mot. at 2.) Plaintiff TSCA must be a party to this action under California law, even though Plaintiff DTSC appears to be the main plaintiff in this action. (Id.) Plaintiff DTSC and 25 Plaintiff TSCA will be jointly referred to as “Plaintiffs” for purposes of this order. 2 The ITELT was established to oversee the long-term post-closure operation and maintenance of 26 several landfill sites following the bankruptcy of IT Corporation, the former owner and operator of these facilitates. (Second Am. Compl. (ECF No. 84) ¶ 75.) The other CERLCA suit filed by the Plaintiffs and 27 pending before this Court is California Department of Toxic Substances Control v. Chevron Oronite Company, LLC, et al., No. 2:21-cv-01737-DJC-JDP. Plaintiffs have filed a Motion for Approval and Entry 28 of Consent Decree in that action as well. This order and an order in the other ITELT case will be issued 1 is a Motion for Approval and Entry of a Consent Decree entered into by DTSC and 2 named Defendants who disposed of hazardous waste at a landfill located in Benicia, 3 California. After a careful review, the Court finds that the Consent Decree is fair and 4 reasonable, and GRANTS DTSC’s Motion for Approval and Entry. 5 I. Background 6 A. Factual Background 7 Plaintiffs filed this action seeking declaratory relief and the recovery of 8 “response costs” under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) of CERCLA in connection with the prior 9 and potential future releases of hazardous substances at the Panoche Facility. (Pl’s 10 Mot. (ECF No. 91) at 1.) The Panoche Facility is a ”former hazardous waste and solid 11 waste landfill” located in Benicia, California. (Id. at 2–3.) The Panoche Facility 12 “managed and disposed of” hazardous waste between at least 1968 to 1986. (Id. at 13 3.) Plaintiffs claim the 56 Defendants to this action and their affiliates disposed of 14 hazardous waste at the Panoche Facility. (Id.) Plaintiffs claim that the management of 15 the hazardous waste at this location “resulted in releases of hazardous substances that 16 are present in the soil, soil vapor, and groundwater at the [Panoche] Facility.” (Id.) A 17 certification of the Panoche Facility’s closure was accepted by the DTSC on March 27, 18 2003. (Id.) 19 Until May 1, 2004, the Panoche Facility was operated by the IT Corporation. (Id. 20 at 3.) After the IT Corporation underwent bankruptcy, the ITELT was created to act as 21 operator of the Panoche Facility and provide ongoing oversight of the post-closure 22 operations and maintenance. (Id.) ITELT’s post-closure responsibilities included 23 “routine inspections, maintenance and compliance activities, recovery and 24 management of groundwater, leachate, and soil vapor, long-term groundwater, 25 leachate and soil vapor monitoring, soil vapor and water quality sampling and 26 reporting, and response to potential and immediate threats, newly identified releases, 27

28 simultaneously. 1 and emergency contingencies such as floods, fires, and earthquakes.” (Id. at 4–5.) 2 ITELT was also required to provide adequate financial assurances for these 3 operations. (Id.) 4 On February 29, 2016, Plaintiff DTSC issued a “summary of violations” to ITELT 5 “stat[ing], among other things, that the Facility was in violation of the financial 6 assurance requirements because ITELT’s financial assurance was underfunded and 7 less than the total post-closure cost estimate.” (Id. at 4.) ITELT responded by 8 informing DTSC that it did not have assets or mechanisms to get those assets to meet 9 the financial assurance requirements. (Id.) Plaintiff DTSC determined that ITELT’s 10 inability to meet these requirements would prevent “(a) actions ensuring the 11 protectiveness of the landfill covers, (b) collection and treatment of groundwater and 12 leachate, and (c) monitoring of the surrounding environment for impacts from 13 hazardous waste and solid waste left in place at the [Panoche] Facility[,]” and informed 14 ITELT and parties who had previously disposed of waste at the Panoche Facility 15 (including Defendants) “that termination of [post-closure] activities would pose an 16 imminent and substantial endangerment to human health, the public, and the 17 environment.” (Id.) Plaintiff DTSC then engaged in response actions that, as of 18 December 31, 2022, allegedly cost DTSC $1,138,644.91. (Id. at 5.) 19 In filing this action Plaintiffs seeks past costs for Plaintiff DTSC’s response at the 20 Panoche Facility as well as a declaratory judgment that Defendants are liable3 for 21 future costs Plaintiff DTSC will incur addressing the release of or threatened release of 22 hazardous waste. (Id. at 6.) Pursuant to a settlement between the parties, Plaintiffs 23 now request the Court approve and enter the Proposed Consent Decree previously 24 lodged with the Court. (Proposed Consent Decree (ECF No. 85-1).) The Defendants 25 //// 26

27 3 Under CERCLA, parties that are responsible for disposing of hazardous waste are generally jointly and severally liable for the costs associated with the management of that waste. Arizona v. City of Tucson, 28 761 F.3d 1005, 1011 (9th Cir. 2014). 1 jointly do not oppose the present motion (Notice of Pl’s Mot (ECF No. 91) at 3–4) and 2 are signatories to the Proposed Consent Decree (Pl’s Mot. at 1 n.1). 3 B. Proposed Consent Decree 4 The Proposed Consent Decree has been agreed to and signed by all parties. 5 (See Proposed Consent Decree at 40–96.) For purposes of the Consent Decree, DTSC 6 estimated that the cost of post-closure activities will amount to $151,676,518 over the 7 next 500 years. (Pl’s Mot. at 5.) Under the terms of the agreement, the “Settling 8 Defendants” are split into two groups: the Participating Parties and the Cashout 9 Parties, each with a different set of obligations. (Proposed Consent Decree at 9, 14.) 10 The Participating Parties will be required to establish a Qualified Settlement 11 Fund (“QSF”) which shall be responsible for funding the future costs of operating the 12 Panoche Facility. (Id. at 9.) A Non-Qualified Settlement Fund (“Non-QSF”) will also be 13 established by the Participating Parties. (Qualified Settlement Fund Agreement (ECF 14 No. 85-1, App. B) at 2–3.) Where the QSF is intended to hold settlement funds 15 required by the Proposed Consent Decree, the Non-QSF is designated “to hold and 16 disburse any Settlement Funds received in connection with the Consent Decree that 17 cannot be placed into the QSF, including, but not limited to, revenue generated at the 18 Facility if applicable, together with any investment returns on such Non-QSF funds.” 19 (Id.) The QSF and Non-QSF will provide a continual source of funding for the ongoing 20 operation of the Panoche Facility. (Pl’s Mot. at 9–10.) The principal of the QSF — 21 $8,197,543 — will remain constant over the duration of the consent decree and any 22 return on the investment of the principal funds will be used to pay the annual 23 expenses of the Panoche Facility. (Pl’s Mot. at 8–9.) 24 The Participating Parties, which have collectively contributed the plurality of the 25 waste, will be required to make an initial payment into the QSF of $2,000,000. 26 (Proposed Consent Decree at 11.) The Participating Parties will also be responsible 27 for making additional payments into the QSF “in the following circumstances: (1) if the 28 amount of the non-principal in the QSF plus the cumulative net return on investment is 1 less than the annual expenses budgeted for the Facility for the upcoming fiscal year; 2 (2) if unanticipated expenses or contingencies occur and available amounts in the QSF 3 or Non-QSF are insufficient to pay such costs; (3) if principal was used to pay for 4 contingencies in the prior fiscal year; or (4) if the amount of principal is less than the 5 cumulative amount of the settlement funds over a five year period.” (Pl’s Mot. at 9; see 6 Proposed Consent Decree at 12–13.) The Participating Parties will also be required to 7 pay “no less than $407,591.00” of Plaintiff DTSC’s past response costs as well as any 8 future response costs incurred by Plaintiff DTSC that are “(a) associated with any work 9 takeover initiated by DTSC, (b) incurred to address alleged noncompliance with the 10 Consent Decree, or (c) incurred in connection with the pursuit of non-settling 11 potentially responsible parties.” (Pl’s Mot. at 10; Proposed Consent Decree at 13–14.) 12 Finally, the Proposed Consent Decree imposes a number of ongoing obligations on 13 the Participating Parties including “to (1) assure a facility operator is in place to 14 perform the Facility work, (2) demonstrate adequate and available funding for the 15 financial assurance required by California Code of Regulations title 22, § 66264.145 or 16 any then-existing regulations (i) no later than one-hundred- twenty days after the 17 Consent Decree effective date, and (ii) when the financial assurance amount is 18 reevaluated by DTSC, and (3) assure that an appropriate settlement funds manager is 19 in place to manage and administer the QSF and Non-QSF.” (Pl’s Mot. at 10–11; 20 Proposed Consent Decree at 10–11.) 21 The Cashout Parties’ obligations are comparatively simple: based on a 22 “Cashout Schedule” set by the Proposed Consent Decree, each of the Cashout Parties 23 will pay an amount into the QSF. (Proposed Consent Decree at 14; see Payment 24 Calculation of Cashout Parties (ECF No. 85-1, App. C-1) at 1.) The total amount to be 25 paid into the QSF by the Cashout Parties will be $102,881,027. (Pl’s Mot. at 11.) 26 After agreeing to the terms of the Consent Decree, DTSC invited public opinion 27 by publishing a notice of Proposed Consent Decree on its website and in multiple 28 newspapers, and making the complete Proposed Consent Decree available to the 1 public “at the DTSC Regional Center File Room in Sacramento, California and on 2 DTSC’s online EnviroStor database.” (Id. at 13–14.) DTSC has received no comments, 3 much less any opposition, from any member of the public or any other potentially 4 responsible party. (Id.) 5 Plaintiffs now move the Court for approval and entry of the Proposed Consent 6 Decree. (Pl’s Mot.) None of the Defendants have opposed the Motion. At the Court’s 7 request, the Parties filed a supplemental brief providing more information about the 8 financial commitment and financial risks the Participating Parties would be assuming. 9 (See Supplemental Brief (ECF No. 95).) The matter was submitted without oral 10 argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g). 11 II. Legal Standard 12 “In order to approve a CERCLA consent decree, a district court must conclude 13 that the agreement is procedurally and substantively ‘fair, reasonable, and consistent 14 with CERCLA's objectives.’” Arizona v. City of Tucson, 761 F.3d 1005, 1011–12 (9th 15 Cir.2014) (quoting United States v. Montrose Chem. Corp. of Cal., 50 F.3d 741, 748 16 (9th Cir.1995)). Once a consent decree is entered, the settling parties are protected 17 from contribution claims from non-settling parties. United States v. Aerojet Gen. Corp, 18 606 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2010); 42 U.S.C. § 9613. Thus, a district court has an 19 “obligation to independently scrutinize the terms of [the agreement],” Montrose, 50 20 F.3d at 748, and “gauge the adequacy of settlement amounts to be paid by settling 21 [parties].” Arizona, 761, F.3d at 1012 (quoting States v. Charter Int'l Oil Co., 83 F.3d 22 510, 515 (1st Cir. 1996)). While federal agencies are afforded significant deference, a 23 court may only grant “some deference” to a state agency’s expertise as to the 24 environmental issues. Id. at 1014–15. A state agency is not entitled to any deference 25 as to its interpretation of federal law or its finding that the consent decree is fair and 26 reasonable. Id. 27 //// 28 //// 1 III. Discussion 2 A. Procedural Fairness 3 “To measure procedural fairness, a court should ordinarily look to the 4 negotiation process and attempt to gauge its candor, openness, and bargaining 5 balance.” United States v. Cannons Eng'g Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 86 (1st Cir. 1990); 6 accord California Dep't of Toxic Substances Control v. Allen's Formal Wear, Inc., No. 7 CV-13-5069-GHK-JCG, 2016 WL 5936888, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2016); Ariz. ex rel. 8 Woods v. Nucor Corp., 825 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (D. Ariz. 1992). The court may 9 consider whether the settling parties contributed the bulk of the waste, the 10 opportunity of the parties to participate in arm’s length negotiations, whether the 11 parties were represented by counsel, and whether any of the defendants, including 12 non-settling defendants, objected to the consent decree. See Dep't of Toxic 13 Substance Control v. Technichem, Inc., No. 12-cv-5845-CRB, 2013 WL 3856386, at *3 14 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2013); California Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Jim Dobbas, 15 Inc., No. 2:14-595-WBS-EFB, 2015 WL 7188230, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2015); United 16 States v. Andruss Fam. Tr., No. 07-cv-6873-ABC-RC, 2011 WL 1334391, at *2 (C.D. Cal. 17 Apr. 7, 2011); California Dep't of Toxic Substances Control v. Allen's Formal Wear, Inc., 18 No. 13-cv-5069-GHK-JCG, 2016 WL 5936888, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2016). Where 19 the decree results from “‘good faith, arms-length negotiations,’ it is ‘presumptively 20 valid and [an] objecting party has a heavy burden of demonstrating the decree in 21 unreasonable.’” See Technichem, Inc., 2013 WL 3856386, at *2 (citing United States v. 22 Oregon, 913 F.2d 576, 581 (9th Cir. 1990)). 23 Here, the Proposed Consent Decree appears procedurally fair. Plaintiffs and all 24 56 Defendants agreed and are signatories to the Proposed Consent Degree. (Pl’s. 25 Mot at 1.) All parties are represented by experienced counsel.4 Negotiations 26 4 Plaintiff DTSC is experienced at litigating CERCLA claims and negotiating settlements in such cases. 27 See e.g., California Department of Toxic Substances Control v. NL Industries Inc., No. 2:20-cv-11293- SVW-JPR, 2023 WL 6194098 (C.D. Cal. Aug 18, 2023); California Department of Toxic Substances 28 Control v. Allen's Formal Wear, Inc., No. 13-cv-5069-GHK, 2016 WL 5936888 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2016). 1 between the parties purportedly lasted years and were conducted at arm’s length. (Id. 2 at 15.) Moreover, Plaintiffs also took active steps to ensure the procedural fairness of 3 the Proposed Consent Decree to non-parties and the general public by publishing a 4 notice about the Proposed Consent Decree “in the California Regulatory Notice 5 Register and in three different newspapers.” (Id.; see Pl’s Ex. A (ECF No. 91-2); Pl’s Ex. 6 B (ECF No. 91-3); Pl’s Ex. C (ECF No. 91-4); Pl’s Ex. D (ECF No. 91-5).) These postings 7 all invited comment on the Proposed Consent Decree but Plaintiffs did not receive any 8 comments. (Pl’s Mot. at 15.) Similarly, none of the parties to this action have objected 9 to the Proposed Consent Decree, in part or in full. Therefore, the Proposed Consent 10 Decree appears to have involved good faith, arms-length negotiations that resulted in 11 a procedurally fair agreement. See Technichem, Inc., 2013 WL 3856386, at *2. 12 B. Substantive Fairness and Reasonableness 13 To determine whether the terms of a consent decree are substantively fair and 14 reasonable, the court must assess how the total costs are apportioned among the 15 defendants while considering other factors like litigation risk and time saving. See 16 Montrose, 50 F.3d at 747 (“’fair’ and ‘reasonable’ are, by their very nature, comparative 17 terms.”). However, apportionment does not necessarily need to be exactly 18 proportional to fault. United States v. Coeur d'Alenes Co., 767 F.3d 873, 877 (9th Cir. 19 2014) (“[T]he potential for disproportionate liability is an integral and purposeful 20 component of CERCLA”). The Court’s role is not to determine “whether the settlement 21 is one which the court itself might have fashioned, or considers as ideal. . . .” Cannons, 22 899 F.2d at 84. The apportionment must only be fair and reasonable in light of the 23 specific circumstances and be “roughly correlated with[] some acceptable measure of 24 comparative fault.” Id. at 87; Coeur d’Alenes Co., 767 F.3d at 877. For example, it 25 may be fair and reasonable for an earlier settler to receive more favorable terms, 26 including a disproportionate share of liability, in order to encourage settlement and 27 The 56 named Defendants include numerous large corporate entities that are individually represented 28 by experienced attorneys and firms. 1 avoid litigation costs. Because a later settler or non-settler would continue to be 2 jointly and severally liable for the remaining costs, such a scheme would not be unfair 3 or unreasonable to the state. Cannons, 899 F.2d at 92. 4 Here, the Proposed Consent Decree appears to establish a substantively fair 5 and reasonable apportionment of costs and liability, taking into account the trade-offs 6 and risks undertaken by both the Participating Parties and the Cashout Parties. Under 7 the Proposed Consent Decree, the Cashout Parties will pay $102,881,027 into the 8 QSF. (See Pl.’s Mot. at 11.) Based on the past costs and Plaintiffs estimate of the 9 ongoing costs associated with the Panoche Facility, the Cashout Parties will be 10 contributing about 67.32% of the estimated future operation costs. (See id. at 16.) 11 Plaintiffs estimate that the Cashout Parties contributed 34.57% of the total tonnage 12 disposed at the Panoche Facility. (Id.) The Cashout Parties have agreed to pay a 13 premium in exchange for a full release from liability and finality. (See id.; Proposed 14 Consent Decree at 23.) Unlike the Participating Parties, the Cashout parties are not 15 assuming the risk for future response costs. The Cashout Parties’ proportional share 16 of the DTSC response costs, without a premium, is also factored into the total amount 17 each party will pay. (Pl’s Mot. at 11.) 18 By contrast, the remaining Participating Parties are estimated to have 19 contributed 36.96% of the total tonnage disposed at the Panoche Facility. (Id. at 16– 20 17.) While, based on Plaintiffs’ 500-year estimate, the Participating Parties are 21 expected to contribute less than the Cashout Parties, the Participating Parties will be 22 required to make an initial $2,000,000 contribution to the QSF and will be required to 23 make significant ongoing commitments. (Id.) This includes continuing joint and 24 several liability for funding the Panoche Facility’s ongoing operations including any 25 differences from the current estimated costs, “payments to effectively keep the QSF 26 principal at its current value for the duration of the consent decree[,]” establishing the 27 QSF and non-QSF, ensuring the Panoche Facility has a facility operator, “assure the 28 availability of adequate funding to meet financial assurance requirements[,]” and 1 selection and authorization of the Settlement Funds Manager in charge of managing 2 and administering the QSF and non-QSF. (Id. at 25.) Specifically, Plaintiffs estimate 3 that the annual facility costs will be roughly $1,181,817 and that the return on 4 investment from the QSF will only account for an estimated $799,014.5 (Pl’s Suppl. Br. 5 (ECF No. 95) at 5.) The Participating Parties are thus expected to contribute an 6 estimated $382,803 or 32% of yearly costs to account for this shortfall. (Id. at 5.) 7 While based on the estimates, the Participating Parties are expected to pay only 8 approximately 32% of the future costs despite contributing more tonnage than the 9 Cashout Parties, this is, as noted by Plaintiffs, “roughly correlated to the Participating 10 Parties’ collective 36.96% contribution of the total tonnage disposed of at the 11 [Panoche] Facility.” (Id. at 5–6.) The reduction in contribution is also accounted for 12 based on the ongoing and open-ended financial responsibilities of the Participating 13 Parties as well as the liabilities the Participating Parties undertake via the Proposed 14 Consent Decree. Parties who assume open-ended financial and legal risks may often 15 entitled to a discount whereas those who assume no ongoing responsibilities may be 16 required to pay a premium. See Cannons, 899 F.2d at 88 (“Common sense suggests 17 that a [participating party’s] assumption of open-ended risks may merit a discount on 18 comparative fault, while obtaining a complete release from uncertain future liability 19 may call for a premium.” (citations omitted)). Such is the case here, where the 20 discount for Participating Parties and related premium for Cashout Parties is relatively 21 modest. 22 As one example of the ongoing responsibilities and financial risks faced by the 23 Participating Parties, Plaintiff’s note that none of the costs estimates include costs for 24 “contingencies” such as natural disasters or “new releases of contaminants” from the 25 Panoche Facility. (Pl’s Suppl. Br. at 6–7.) These are costs that would be wholly taken 26

27 5 As noted by Plaintiff, these costs and returns are subject to the effects of inflation and/or deflation. (Pl’s Suppl. Br. at 9–10.) Plaintiff appears to have accounted for these effects to whatever degree 28 possible but these numbers remain estimates and the actual costs and returns may differ. 1 on by the Participating Parties under the Proposed Consent Decree. (Id.) Plaintiffs 2 also note that costs that are considered “expenses” including the cost to administer 3 the QSF, “costs to acquire financial assurance mechanisms,” and more, are also not 4 included in the settlement cost estimates. (Id. at 6.) If the settlement funds are unable 5 to pay for these expenses, the Participating Parties would also be expected to bear 6 those costs. (Id.) 7 In addition, the Participating Parties will reimburse nearly half of past response 8 costs incurred by DTSC, collectively $407,591.00. (Pl’s Mot. at 10.) Although DTSC 9 will not be recovering the full costs, it is reasonable and fair for DTSC to settle for a 10 lower amount in order to avoid litigation costs and save time and resources. 11 Moreover, DTSC may in the future collect the balance of response costs from the 12 remaining waste contributors who are not parties to this agreement. (Id. at 12 –13.) 13 Any non-settling party will be afforded similar settlement terms as the Cashout Parties, 14 making the agreement fair to non-settling parties as well. Importantly, if adopted, the 15 Proposed Consent Decree will obviate the need for future DTSC response actions and 16 future litigation over this Facility. 17 Given the above, the Proposed Consent Decree appears substantively fair and 18 reasonable based on the apportionment of the costs to the parties and the rough 19 correlation of those costs to the comparative fault of the parties. 20 C. Consistency with CERCLA Objectives 21 The objectives of CERCLA are to (1) “ensure the prompt and effective cleanup 22 of waste disposal sites,” (2) “assure that parties responsible for hazardous substances 23 [bear] the cost of remedying the conditions they created,” and (3) “foster settlement 24 through its system of incentives and without unnecessarily further complicating 25 already complicated litigation.” Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 26 F.3d 946, 968, 971 (9th Cir. 2013). 27 The Proposed Consent Decree satisfies the objectives of CERCLA. The 28 agreement would create a fund the ensure the ongoing operation of the Panoche 1 Facility and ensure that funds are readily available for prompt response to any 2 releases or threatened releases from the Facility moving forward. (Proposed Consent 3 Decree at 11.) It also places clear responsibility for guaranteeing the operations of the 4 Panoche facility with the Participating Parties so as to ensure that these efforts do not 5 lapse. (Id. at 10–14.) 6 The Proposed Consent Decree also ensures contribution from all of the 7 Defendants and that such contribution will fully satisfy the costs of remedying the 8 conditions at the Panoche Facility. (Pl’s Mot. at 8–11.) The Cashout Parties will make 9 significant financial contributions to this account, and the Participating Parties, which 10 have contributed the majority of the waste, will ensure the account is replenished and 11 cover future operation costs. (Id. at 9, 11.) If DTSC undertakes any future response 12 actions, it will be reimbursed through the QSF. (Id. at 9–10.) As discussed above, the 13 apportionment of those costs roughly correlates to the comparative fault of the 14 parties. 15 While the DTSC may not be fully reimbursed for past costs under the 16 agreement as this depends on the funds available in the QSF and non-QSF, the 17 agreement does provide that the DTSC will receive some reimbursement for those 18 past costs and ensures that any future costs will be funded by the parties. The 19 Proposed Consent Decree also helps the parties to avoid complicated litigation that 20 would be undoubtedly lengthy and costly given the 57 parties, along with their 21 affiliates, that are involved in this action. In addition, as part of the Consent Decree, 22 the Defendants have agreed to dismiss a writ action filed against the DTSC for other 23 administrative actions related to the Facility. (Id. at 6–7.) The objectives of CERCLA 24 are satisfied by the entry of a consent decree, signed and agreed to by all parties, that 25 resolves this action without the need for further complex litigation. 26 Accordingly, approval of the Proposed Consent Decree satisfies the objectives 27 of CERCLA. See Chubb Custom Ins. Co., 710 F.3d at 968, 971. 28 //// 1 IV. Conclusion 2 For the above reasons, IT |S HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiffs’ Motion for Approval 3 | and Entry of Consent Decree (ECF No. ) is GRANTED and the Consent Decree is 4 | APPROVED. 5 6 IT IS SO ORDERED. 7 | Dated: _February 14, 2024 “Dinel J CoO □□□□ Hon. Daniel alabretta 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | DJC1 - DTSCExxon21¢cv01739.consent_decree 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 13