I. BACKGROUND

1 A. Factual Background 2 Relator filed this qui tam action against Sutter Defendants, Doctor Defendants, and 3 unknown Does 1–10 (collectively, “Defendants”). Relator alleges that Defendants’ “fraudulent 4 billing practices” violated the False Claims Act (“FCA”), 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33, and the 5 California False Claims Act (“CFCA”), Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12650–56. FAC ¶ 2, ECF No. 13. 6 Specifically, Relator alleges that “through her expert analysis of thousands of adjudicated 7 Medicare claims,” she has “showed that Sutter [Health] and its surgeons freely took advantage of a 8 flawed medical payment system by regularly upcoding and unbundling major surgical codes for 9 breast cancer surgery, and coding ‘first-time’ immediate mastectomy reconstruction codes multiple 10 times in the same patient.” Id.; see FAC ¶¶ 4 (similar allegation against all Defendants), 22 11 (defining Defendant Sutter Health as “Sutter”). 12 To obtain the Medicare claims she analyzed, Relator made two Freedom of Information 13 Act (“FOIA”) requests to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (“CMS”). The first FOIA 14 request was made “in or about November 2016” and sought “billing and coding records for [Dr.] 15 Hong and Sutter [Health].” FAC ¶ 94. The second FOIA request was made sometime before 16 March 2017 and sought “Medicare billing and payment data for other Sutter [Health] plastic and 17 reconstructive surgeons from 2010 through 2016.” FAC ¶ 98. Relator’s analysis of the FOIA data 18 allegedly showed that “Sutter [Health] had pattern billed and received federal and State funds for 19 breast surgery claims which did not appear to conform to NCCI [CMS’ National Correct Coding 20 Initiative], were incompatible code combinations, and failed to adhere to CMS mandates.” FAC 21 ¶ 100. Altogether, Defendants allegedly miscoded and overbilled surgical services. See FAC 22 ¶¶ 115–131 (alleging that Defendants “routinely upcoded and unbundled mastectomy 23 reconstruction claims”). 24 B. Procedural History 25 The instant case is one of two that Relator has pseudonymously brought against Doctor 26 Defendants. In December 2012, Relator underwent a bilateral preventative mastectomy at 27 1 Defendant Palo Alto Medical Foundation. FAC ¶ 41. In November 2016, Relator allegedly 2 reviewed the medical bills from her December 2012 mastectomy and noticed billing irregularities. 3 FAC ¶ 94. On March 5, 2014, Relator brought a malpractice case against Defendants Dr. Hong, 4 Palo Alto Foundation Medical Group, and other parties in Santa Clara County Superior Court. See 5 Compl. for Damages, Doe vs. Hong, No. 1-14-CV-261702 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 05, 2014). Relator 6 brought her malpractice case under the pseudonym “Jane Doe.” Compare FAC ¶ 41 (alleging a 7 December 2012 bilateral mastectomy performed by Dr. Hong), with, e.g., Compl. for Damages 8 ¶¶ 17–19 (same). On November 29, 2017, the Superior Court dismissed Relator’s malpractice case 9 after she failed to appear for trial. See Doctor Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice in Support 10 of Motion to Dismiss (“Doctor RJN”) at Ex. B, ECF No. 72-2 (Order re: Defendants’ Motion to 11 Dismiss dismissing case pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 581(b)(5)). 12 On April 4, 2018, Relator brought the instant qui tam action. ECF No. 1 (original 13 complaint). On October 19, 2018, Relator filed the FAC, which is the operative complaint. ECF 14 No. 13. The FAC cites discovery obtained in Relator’s dismissed Superior Court malpractice case. 15 See, e.g., FAC ¶¶ 96, 118, 119 (deposition testimony). 16 On June 11, 2019, the United States declined to intervene in the instant qui tam action. 17 ECF No. 23. On June 19, 2019, California followed suit. ECF No. 29. 18 At first, the FAC alleged violations of not only the FCA and CFCA, but also the California 19 Insurance Fraud Prevention Act. However, on December 4, 2019, Relator voluntarily dismissed 20 without prejudice her California Insurance Fraud Prevention Act claim. ECF No. 39. Thus, only 21 the FCA and CFCA claims remain. 22 On June 15, 2020, Sutter Defendants and Doctor Defendants each filed a motion to dismiss 23 (ECF Nos. 72, 73),1 and Doctor Defendants filed a request for judicial notice in support of their 24

25 1 Sutter Defendants’ motion to dismiss contains a notice of motion paginated separately from the 26 memorandum of points and authorities in support of the motion. ECF No. 73 at 2. Civil Local Rule 7-2(b) provides that the notice of motion and points and authorities should be contained in 27 one document with the same pagination. 1 motion to dismiss. ECF No. 72-2 (“Doctor RJN”); ECF No. 81 (errata to same). On August 14, 2 2020, Relator filed identical oppositions to the motions to dismiss and a request for judicial 3 notice.2 ECF Nos. 79 (“Opposition” or “Opp’n”), 80. On September 11, 2020, Sutter Defendants 4 and Doctor Defendants each filed a reply supporting their motion to dismiss (ECF Nos. 84, 87), 5 Doctor Defendants filed a request for judicial notice in support of their reply (ECF No. 85), and 6 Defendants jointly filed an opposition to Relator’s request for judicial notice (ECF Nos. 86, 88). 7 The Court may take judicial notice of matters that are either “generally known within the 8 trial court’s territorial jurisdiction” or “can be accurately and readily determined from sources 9 whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b). Moreover, courts may 10 consider materials referenced in the complaint under the incorporation by reference doctrine, even 11 if a plaintiff failed to attach those materials to the complaint. Knievel v. ESPN, 393 F.3d 1068, 12 1076 (9th Cir. 2005). Public records, including judgments and other publicly filed documents, are 13 proper subjects of judicial notice. See, e.g., United States v. Black, 482 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 14 2007). However, to the extent any facts in documents subject to judicial notice are subject to 15 reasonable dispute, the Court will not take judicial notice of those facts. See Lee v. City of Los 16 Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001), overruled on other grounds by Galbraith v. County of 17 Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002). Here, Doctor Defendants request judicial notice of 18 court filings and a CMS fee schedule available on CMS’s website. ECF No. 72-2; ECF No. 85. 19 These documents are public records. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Doctor Defendants’ 20 requests for judicial notice, ECF No. 72-2 and ECF No. 85. 21 Relator requests judicial notice of 504 pages of documents plus other “redacted” 22 documents that in fact have not been filed on the Court’s docket. ECF No. 79-1. Defendants 23 24 2 The Opposition violates Local Rules 3-4(c)(2) and 7-4(b), which require that opposition papers 25 “may not exceed 25 pages,” and each page “must be double-spaced with no more than 28 lines per 26 page.” The Opposition instead contains 25 pages of at least 32 lines each—and hardly any paragraph breaks. Thus, the Opposition is overlong by 100 lines or 3.5 pages of properly spaced 27 text. 1 correctly note several defects with Relator’s request for judicial notice. See ECF No. 86 at 4–6. 2 However, given that Relator seeks judicial notice of public records (such as court filings and 3 government announcements), the Court also GRANTS Relator’s request for judicial notice. The 4 Court notes again that to the extent any facts in documents subject to judicial notice are subject to 5 reasonable dispute, the Court does not take judicial notice of those facts. See Lee, 250 F.3d at 689. 6 II. LEGAL STANDARD 7 A. Motion to Dismiss Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) 8 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to include “a 9 short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A complaint 10 that fails to meet this standard may be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 12(b)(6). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that Rule 8(a) requires a plaintiff to plead “enough 12 facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 13 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 14 allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 15 alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a 16 probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted 17 unlawfully.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). For purposes of ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) 18 motion, the Court “accept[s] factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe[s] the 19 pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Manzarek v. St. Paul Fire & Marine 20 Ins. Co., 519 F.3d 1025, 1031 (9th Cir. 2008). 21 The Court, however, need not accept as true allegations contradicted by judicially 22 noticeable facts, see Schwarz v. United States, 234 F.3d 428, 435 (9th Cir. 2000), and it “may look 23 beyond the plaintiff’s complaint to matters of public record” without converting the Rule 12(b)(6) 24 motion into a motion for summary judgment, Shaw v. Hahn, 56 F.3d 1128, 1129 n.1 (9th Cir. 25 1995). Nor must the Court “assume the truth of legal conclusions merely because they are cast in 26 the form of factual allegations.” Fayer v. Vaughn, 649 F.3d 1061, 1064 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) 27 (internal quotation marks omitted). Mere “conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted 1 inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 2 (9th Cir. 2004). 3 B. Motion to Dismiss Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) 4 Claims sounding in fraud are subject to the heightened pleading requirements of Federal 5 Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2001). Under 6 the Federal Rules, a plaintiff alleging fraud “must state with particularity the circumstances 7 constituting fraud.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). To satisfy this standard, the allegations must be “specific 8 enough to give defendants notice of the particular misconduct which is alleged to constitute the 9 fraud charged so that they can defend against the charge and not just deny that they have done 10 anything wrong.” Semegen v. Weidner, 780 F.2d 727, 731 (9th Cir. 1985). Thus, claims sounding 11 in fraud must allege “an account of the time, place, and specific content of the false 12 representations as well as the identities of the parties to the misrepresentations.” Swartz v. KPMG 13 LLP, 476 F.3d 756, 764 (9th Cir. 2007). In other words, “[a]verments of fraud must be 14 accompanied by ‘the who, what, when, where, and how’ of the misconduct charged.” Vess v. Ciba- 15 Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Cooper v. Pickett, 137 F.3d 616, 16 627 (9th Cir. 1997)). The plaintiff must also plead facts explaining why the statement was false 17 when it was made. See In re GlenFed, Inc. Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541, 1549 (9th Cir. 1994) (en 18 banc), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Adomitis ex. rel. United States v. San 19 Bernardino Mountains Cmty. Hosp. Dist., 816 F. App’x 64, 66 (9th Cir. 2020). When there are 20 multiple defendants in a case, “Rule 9(b) does not allow a complaint to merely lump multiple 21 defendants together but ‘requires plaintiffs to differentiate their allegations when suing more than 22 one defendant and inform each defendant separately of the allegations surrounding his alleged 23 participation in the fraud.’” Swartz, 476 F.3d at 764–65 (alterations in original omitted) (quoting 24 Haskin v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 995 F. Supp.1437, 1439 (M.D. Fla. 1998)). The heightened 25 pleading requirement of Rule 9(b) does not apply to allegations regarding defendant’s state of 26 mind. Thus, knowledge and intent need only be alleged generally to state a valid claim. See Fed. 27 R. Civ. P. 9(b) (“Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be 1 alleged generally.”). 2 “When an entire complaint . . . is grounded in fraud and its allegations fail to satisfy the 3 heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b), a district court may dismiss the complaint 4 . . . .” Vess, 317 F.3d at 1107. The Ninth Circuit has recognized that “it is established law in this 5 and other circuits that such dismissals are appropriate,” even though “there is no explicit basis in 6 the text of the federal rules for the dismissal of a complaint for failure to satisfy 9(b).” Id. A 7 motion to dismiss a complaint “under Rule 9(b) for failure to plead with particularity is the 8 functional equivalent of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.” Id. 9 C. Leave to Amend 10 If the Court determines that a complaint should be dismissed, it must then decide whether 11 to grant leave to amend. Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend 12 “shall be freely given when justice so requires,” bearing in mind “the underlying purpose of Rule 13 15 to facilitate decisions on the merits, rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.” Lopez v. 14 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (alterations and internal quotation marks 15 omitted). When dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim, “a district court should grant 16 leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the 17 pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.” Id. at 1130 (internal 18 quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, leave to amend generally shall be denied only if allowing 19 amendment would unduly prejudice the opposing party, cause undue delay, or be futile, or if the 20 moving party has acted in bad faith. Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 532 (9th 21 Cir. 2008). 22 III. DISCUSSION 23 The FCA “prohibits submitting false or fraudulent claims for payment to the United States, 24 [31 U.S.C.] § 3729(a), and authorizes qui tam suits, in which private parties bring civil actions in 25 the Government’s name, § 3730(b)(1).” Schindler Elevator Corp. v. U.S. ex rel. Kirk, 563 U.S. 26 401, 404 (2011). The “California analogue” to the FCA, the CFCA, “is nearly identical.” United 27 States ex rel. Mosler v. City of Los Angeles, 414 F. App’x 10, 11 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Cal. Gov’t 1 Code § 12652(d)(3)). “For that reason, California courts look to federal decisions to interpret the 2 public disclosure provision of the state statute.” Id. (citing State of California ex rel. Bowen v. 3 Bank of Am. Corp., 126 Cal. App. 4th 225, 240 n.11 (Ct. App. 2005)); accord, e.g., State of 4 California v. Altus Fin., 116 P.3d 1175, 1184 (Cal. 2005) (“[T]he CFCA ‘is patterned on similar 5 federal legislation’ and it is appropriate to look to precedent construing the equivalent federal act.” 6 (quoting Laraway v. Sutro & Co., 96 Cal. App. 4th 266, 274 (Ct. App. 2002))). 7 Similarly here, the parties assume that the relevant provisions of the CFCA are 8 substantively identical to the corresponding provisions of the FCA. Those provisions are the 9 statutes’ public disclosure bar, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) & Cal. Gov’t Code § 12652(d)(3)(A), 10 and “original source” exception to that bar, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) & Cal. Gov’t Code 11 § 12652(d)(3)(B). Indeed, Plaintiff never cites (let alone analyzes) the CFCA in her Opposition. 12 See, e.g., Opp’n at vi (table of authorities citing federal statutes only); Opp’n at 6–16 (discussing 13 only the FCA and federal case law). Defendants also focus on federal law and argue that “any 14 failure to state a claim under the FCA will similarly foreclose claims alleged under the CFCA.” 15 ECF No. 73 at 3; accord ECF No. 72 (Doctor Defendants’ same argument). Thus, to resolve the 16 instant motions, the Court analyzes the FCA. The parties have waived any argument that the FCA 17 and the CFCA are not functionally identical here. See, e.g., United States v. Chattanooga- 18 Hamilton Cty. Hosp. Auth., 782 F.3d 260, 264 n.3 (6th Cir. 2015) (holding, in a FCA case, that 19 “[i]ssues averted to in a perfunctory manner and without developed argumentation are 20 deemed waived.”); U.S. ex rel. Estate of Cunningham v. Millennium Labs. of California, Inc., 713 21 F.3d 662, 674 (1st Cir. 2013) (similar). 22 Defendants move to dismiss the FAC on three grounds: (1) the public disclosure bar; 23 (2) Relator’s failure to allege fraud—or Defendants’ knowledge of fraud—under Federal Rules of 24 Civil Procedure 8(a), 9(b), and 12(b)(6); (3) and Relator’s use of a pseudonym in violation of 25 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) and the common law. See ECF Nos. 72, 73. However, 26 because the public disclosure bar is dispositive, the Court need not address Defendants’ other 27 arguments. 1 The Court’s analysis below proceeds in two parts. To start, the Court holds that the public 2 disclosure bar requires the Court to dismiss the FAC. The Court then holds that Plaintiff’s 3 arguments to the contrary are meritless. 4 A. The Public Disclosure Bar Requires Dismissing Relator’s Claims. 5 The public disclosure bar provides that “[t]he court shall dismiss” a qui tam action “if 6 substantially the same allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or claim were publicly 7 disclosed” in any of several sources. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A). One source covered by the public 8 disclosure bar is a federal “report.” Id. § 3730(e)(4)(A)(ii). Most relevant here, “a federal agency’s 9 written response to a request for records under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 10 § 552, constitutes a ‘report’ within the meaning of the public disclosure bar.” Schindler Elevator, 11 563 U.S. at 404. 12 As the United States Supreme Court explained in Schindler Elevator, qui tam actions 13 based on FOIA requests are “a classic example of the ‘opportunistic’ litigation that the public 14 disclosure bar is designed to discourage.” Id. at 413. These suits are “opportunistic” or “parasitic” 15 because they are “based on ‘evidence or information in the possession of the United States at the 16 time such suit was brought.’” Id. at 412 (quoting Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. 17 U.S. ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 294 (2010)). “[A]nyone could [] file[] the same FOIA requests 18 and then file[] the same suit.” Id. at 413.3 19 So too here. Relator made FOIA requests to CMS to obtain the Medicare claims data 20 analyzed in the FAC. Thus, Schindler Elevator controls. The Medicare claims data were “publicly 21 22 3 Schindler Elevator analyzed a prior version of the public disclosure bar. In 2010, the Affordable Care Act amended the public disclosure bar but retained the bar’s provision for federal “report[s].” 23 Compare 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (1986) (“in a congressional, administrative, or Government 24 Accounting Office report”), with id. at § 3730(e)(4)(A)(ii) (2010) (“in a congressional, Government Accountability Office, or other Federal report”). Thus, Schindler Elevator’s analysis 25 of FOIA requests still controls. In fact, even where the amended language has differed more 26 substantially, the Ninth Circuit has held that the court’s analysis “would be the same under either version” of the statute. U.S. ex rel. Mateski v. Raytheon Co., 816 F.3d 565, 569 n.7 (9th Cir. 2016) 27 (analyzing change from “based upon” to “substantially the same”). 1 disclosed” under the public disclosure bar. 2 It follows that “the [C]ourt shall dismiss” Relator’s action if the Medicare claims data 3 comprise “substantially the same allegations or transactions as alleged in the action.” 31 U.S.C. 4 § 3730(e)(4)(A). “The phrase ‘allegations or transactions’ in § 3730(e)(4)(A) [] suggests a wide- 5 reaching public disclosure bar.” Schindler Elevator, 563 U.S. at 408. In particular, the word 6 “transactions” has “broad meaning.” Id. A “‘transaction’ [] refers to facts from which fraud can be 7 inferred.” U.S. ex rel. Mateski v. Raytheon Co., 816 F.3d 565, 571 (9th Cir. 2016). In other words, 8 “the substance of the disclosure need not contain an explicit ‘allegation’ of fraud, so long as the 9 material elements of the allegedly fraudulent ‘transaction’ are disclosed in the public domain.” Id. 10 (original alterations omitted) (quoting United States ex rel. Found. Aiding the Elderly v. Horizon 11 W., Inc., 265 F.3d 1011, 1014 (9th Cir.), amended on denial of reh’g, 275 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 12 2001)). In turn, a “transaction” is “substantially the same” as what is alleged in the qui tam action 13 if the action does not “provide the Government with genuinely new and material information of 14 fraud.” Id. at 579; see id. at 576–77 (describing the appropriate level of generality for “genuinely 15 new and material information”). 16 Here, all “the material elements of the allegedly fraudulent ‘transaction’ are disclosed in” 17 CMS’s responses to Relator’s FOIA requests. The FAC alleges that “Relator’s Investigation” 18 comprised (1) two FOIA requests; (2) CMS’s “reports” of Medicare claims data in response; 19 (3) and Relator’s analysis of that publicly disclosed Medicare claims data. FAC ¶¶ 94, 96, 100. 20 Relator then inferred fraud from that data. For instance, Relator made the following inferences on 21 the face of the Medicare claims data, which Relator attached to the FAC as Exhibits A and B, see 22 FAC ¶¶ 95, 99: 23 • Dr. Hong billed CMS $488,575 for breast-related procedures, see FAC ¶ 95; 24 • Dr. Hong used an allegedly erroneous procedure code, CPT code 19340, 29 times from April 20, 2010 through May 14, 2014, see FAC ¶ 96; and 25 • Defendant Sutter Health also often used CPT code 19340 where other procedure codes 26 allegedly would have been more appropriate, see FAC ¶¶ 101, 107. 27 By the FAC’s own terms, Relator uncovered Defendants’ alleged fraud simply by analyzing data 1 “in the possession of the United States at the time [her] suit was brought.’” Schindler Elevator, 2 563 U.S. at 412 (quoting Graham Cty., 559 U.S. at 294). This analysis fails to offer “genuinely 3 new and material information.” Mateski, 816 F.3d at 579. Rather, Relator’s analysis relies on 4 publicly disclosed procedure codes and CMS billing guidelines. Id. at 576; see also FAC ¶ 75 5 (attaching, as Exhibit C, “CMS guidelines for global surgical codes”). 6 Thus, “it is possible to say that the evidence and information in the possession of the 7 United States at the time the False Claims Act suit was brought was sufficient to enable it 8 adequately to investigate the case and to make a decision whether to prosecute.” Found. Aiding, 9 265 F.3d at 1016 (alteration in original omitted) (quoting United States ex rel. Joseph v. Cannon, 10 642 F.2d 1373, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). Indeed, the United States and California have declined to 11 intervene here. ECF Nos. 23, 29. All told, Relator’s suit is a paradigmatic example of a suit 12 foreclosed by the public disclosure bar. 13 Another court has reached the same conclusion for the same Relator. On December 4, 14 2017, four months before filing the instant action, Relator brought another qui tam action under 15 the FCA and CFCA against Stanford Healthcare. See United States ex rel. Roe v. Stanford 16 Healthcare Billing Department, No. 2:17-CV-8726 (C.D. Cal. filed Dec. 4, 2017). There, as here, 17 Relator alleges pseudonymously that she is a medical coder and physician who underwent a 18 mastectomy in December 2012 and then procured FOIA reports from CMS. Compare Doctor RJN 19 at Ex. C ¶¶ 179–181 (First Am. Compl. filed in No. 2:17-CV-8726 on June 22, 2018), with FAC ¶¶ 20 38–41 (alleging same). 21 The Stanford Healthcare Court dismissed Relator’s action twice under the public 22 disclosure bar. The first time, the court held that “information acquired via a FOIA request 23 qualifies as public disclosure under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)” and dismissed Relator’s complaint 24 with leave to amend. Stanford Healthcare Billing Dep’t, 2020 WL 1074585, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 25 4, 2020). Despite that clear holding and other guidance on how to fix a “poorly organized and 26 extremely repetitive” complaint, Relator’s amended complaint was again defective. Id. at *2. 27 “Essentially nothing was added to bolster Relator’s claim” that the public disclosure bar did not 1 foreclose her lawsuit. Stanford Healthcare, 2020 WL 5033219, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 13, 2020). 2 Thus, the second time around, the court dismissed Relator’s qui tam suit with prejudice. Id. 3 B. Relator’s Contrary Arguments are Meritless. 4 Relator’s arguments to the contrary are meritless. Essentially three arguments can be 5 discerned from Relator’s overlength, rambling, and bombastic Opposition.4 The first argument is 6 that the dissent in Schindler Elevator somehow controls here. The second argument is that, under a 7 district court case from the Central District of California, Relator’s data analysis discovered new 8 evidence outside the public disclosure bar. Lastly, Relator argues that she meets the “original 9 source” exception to the public disclosure bar. The Court rejects each argument in turn. 10 1. Schindler Elevator’s majority opinion, not its dissent, controls here. 11 Relator first argues that “Defendants’ reliance on Schindler [Elevator] is misplaced.” 12 Opp’n at 10. To support this argument, Relator discusses the “significant abstention [sic] of 4 13 justices” in Schindler Elevator and Justice Ginsburg’s “compelling dissenting opinion.” Opp’n at 14 11. Justice Ginsburg argued that “a federal agency’s response to a FOIA request should not 15 automatically qualify as a ‘report, hearing, audit, or investigation’ preclusive of a whistleblower’s 16 lawsuit under the public disclosure bar of the FCA.” Id. (quoting Schindler Elevator, 563 U.S. at 17 417 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). 18 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent is not controlling precedent. The majority opinion in Schindler 19

20 4 The Opposition violates this district’s Guidelines for Professional Conduct, https://www.cand.uscourts.gov/forms/guidelines-for-professional-conduct/. Among other things, 21 the Guidelines require that “[w]ritten materials submitted to the court should always be factual and 22 concise, accurately state current law, and fairly represent the parties’ positions without unfairly attacking the opposing party or opposing counsel.” By contrast, the Opposition inaccurately states 23 the law, misrepresents Defendants’ arguments, and unfairly attacks Defendants’ counsel. For 24 instance, the Opposition purports to respond to several arguments that neither motion to dismiss raised. See ECF No. 84 at 6 n.6 (Doctor Defendants’ Reply noting such arguments); ECF No. 87 at 25 5 n.2 (Sutter Defendants’ Reply noting same). The Opposition also baselessly asserts that 26 “Defendants and their counsel have knowingly made legally frivolous arguments based on deliberate factual falsehoods.” Opp’n at 2. It is unacceptable for Relator and Relator’s counsel, 27 Anthony George Graham, to make such accusations without basis. 1 Elevator is. Suffice it to say, this Court is bound by the Supreme Court’s holding that “a request 2 for records under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, constitutes a ‘report’ 3 within the meaning of the public disclosure bar.” Schindler Elevator, 563 U.S. at 404. 4 2. Notwithstanding Integra Med, the publicly disclosed Medicare claims data comprise “substantially the same allegations or transactions” alleged in the FAC. 5 Relator next argues that her “data analysis” of FOIA reports “discover[ed] ‘previously 6 unknown’ evidence” outside the public disclosure bar. Opp’n at 14 (quoting David C. Gryce & 7 Roxanne A. Esch, 1 World Online Business Law § 6:4 (2010)). For support, Relator relies on 8 United States ex rel. Integra Med Analytics LLC v. Providence Health and Services, No. 17-CV- 9 1694-PSG, 2019 WL 3282619 (C.D. Cal. July 16, 2019), motion to certify appeal granted, 2019 10 WL 6973547 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2019). See Opp’n at 13–14 (discussing Integra Med). Specifically, 11 Relator quotes a holding from Integra Med that “public disclosure of the Medicare claims data 12 alone did not publicly disclose ‘substantially the same allegations or transactions’ of fraud that are 13 alleged in [the Integra Med relator’s] complaint.” Id. at 14 (emphasis added) (quoting Integra 14 Med, 2019 WL 3282619, at *17).5 15 If anything, Integra Med explains why Relator’s suit fails. The holding quoted by Relator 16 above pertains to alleged facts missing from the Integra Med Medicare data. Specifically, the 17 Integra Med complaint alleged facts “taken from [a defendant’s] business practice information” 18 that, though posted online, potentially failed to meet the public disclosure bar’s provision for 19 “news media.” Integra Med, 2019 WL 3282619, at *17 (discussing 31 U.S.C. 20 § 3730(e)(4)(A)(iii)). That business practice information was “key to [r]elator’s fraud claim.” Id. 21 Without that information, the Integra Med relator would have had only Medicare claims data— 22 23

24 5 Relator also cites United States ex rel. Ormsby v. Sutter Health, 444 F. Supp. 3d 1010 (N.D. Cal. 2020), for the proposition that this district has “disregard[ed] many of the same frivolous 25 arguments made by Sutter Defendants here.” Opp’n at 8. Not so. As Sutter Defendants rightly 26 note, Ormsby is “not relevant to the Court’s analysis of whether a prior public disclosure bars Relator’s qui tam action.” ECF No. 87 at 6. Ormsby does not cite—let alone discuss—the public 27 disclosure bar. 1 and “[n]othing in the claims data reveals [defendant]’s role in the alleged scheme, or even 2 [defendant]’s existence.” Id. 3 The Medicare claims data by themselves “constituted a federal report within the meaning 4 of the public disclosure bar.” Id. at *6. To reach this conclusion, the Integra Med Court expanded 5 the public disclosure bar beyond FOIA. The Medicare data in Integra Med had not been disclosed 6 through FOIA. Rather, CMS had disclosed the data only to researchers “subject to various privacy 7 provisions.” Id. at *7. Even so, the Integra Med Court found that the public disclosure bar applied. 8 The court reasoned that “[j]ust as the FOIA responses in Schindler Elevator disclosed the contents 9 of reports filed with the government, the Medicare data that CMS provided to Integra disclosed 10 the contents of Medicare claims filed with the government.” Id. at *6. 11 In short, Integra Med reached two holdings. First, the public disclosure bar might not 12 categorically apply to business practice information found online. See also Integra Med, 2019 WL 13 6973547, at *8 (certifying for interlocutory appeal “[w]hether all online information is disclosed 14 from the ‘news media’ such that it would fall under the public disclosure bar”). Second, even 15 though some online information might not trigger the public disclosure bar, semi-private Medicare 16 claims data reported by CMS certainly does. 17 The instant case is much easier than Integra Med. Here, the “facts from which fraud can be 18 inferred” are all in the Medicare data that the FAC discusses at length. Mateski, 816 F.3d at 571; 19 see FAC ¶¶ 94–108 (analysis of FOIA reports of Medicare data). Far from “[n]othing in the claims 20 data reveal[ing] [defendant]’s role in the alleged scheme, or even [defendant]’s existence,” Integra 21 Med, 2019 WL 3282619, at *17, the Medicare claims data here contain Defendants’ “unique 22 National Provider Identifier[s] (NPI).” FAC ¶ 54. The NPIs identify “each institution, physician, 23 non-physician practitioner, or medical group practice requesting or receiving payment for services 24 provided to beneficiaries.” Id.; see id. ¶¶ 55–58 (listing Defendants’ NPIs). Relator used these 25 NPIs to attribute allegedly fraudulent billing practices to Defendants. See, e.g., FAC ¶¶ 99, 121, 26 128–130 (quoting data tables with NPIs attributed to Defendants). Anyone can use NPIs to look up 27 a healthcare provider. See CMS, NPPES NPI Registry, https://npiregistry.cms.hhs.gov/ (last visited 1 Oct. 28, 2020) (searchable database of NPIs). 2 Furthermore, Relator’s unclear argument still fails even if it relies not on Integra Med, but 3 on Relator’s alleged expertise in data analysis. Precedent rejects expertise as an exception to the 4 public disclosure bar. As the Ninth Circuit has explained, “[t]he mere fact that [relator’s] own 5 expertise . . . may have enabled it to formulate [her] novel legal theory of fraud is irrelevant to the 6 question of whether the material transactions giving rise to the alleged fraud were already 7 disclosed in the public domain in the first place.” A-1 Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. California, 202 F.3d 8 1238, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000); see also, e.g., United States ex rel. Zizic v. Q2Adm’rs., LLC, 728 F.3d 9 228, 240 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[W]e have repeatedly rejected the argument that a [relator’s] knowledge 10 is independent when it is gained through the application of expertise to information publicly 11 disclosed.”). In sum, Relator’s analysis of the data in FOIA reports does not exempt those reports 12 from the public disclosure bar. 13 3. Relator is not an “original source.” 14 Lastly, Relator claims that she is “the original source of the allegations in” the FAC. Opp’n 15 at 11. The FCA exempts “original source[s]” from the public disclosure bar. 31 U.S.C. 16 § 3730(e)(4)(A)(iii). The FCA defines two types of individuals who are an “original source”: 17 “original source” means an individual who either (i) prior to a public disclosure under subsection (e)(4)(A), has voluntarily disclosed to the Government the 18 information on which allegations or transactions in a claim are based, or (2) [sic] 19 who has knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions, and who has voluntarily provided the 20 information to the Government before filing an action under this section. 21 Id. § 3730(e)(4)(B). Relator argues she is the latter type of original source. Relator specifically 22 argues that she “has ‘direct and independent knowledge’ of the information underlying the 23 allegations in the lawsuit . . . . Relator was inside the ‘belly of the beast’. Thus, Relator was an 24 ‘insider’, and a Sutter healthcare surgeon client. Relator witnessed firsthand Defendants’ efforts to 25 intentionally mislead the government.” Opp’n at 12. 26 To support her conclusory argument, Relator quotes the pre-2010 definition of original 27 source (“direct and independent knowledge,” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (1986)) and cites four 1 paragraphs from the FAC: paragraphs 17, 43, 96, and 118. Opp’n at 12. None shows that Relator 2 “has knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or 3 transactions.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (2010). The general hurdle posed by the knowledge 4 requirement and specific flaws with Relator’s cited paragraphs explain why. 5 As a general matter, the requirement of “independent” and “material[]” knowledge is a 6 meaningful hurdle to overcoming the public disclosure bar. Case law from courts of appeals and a 7 court in this district support this conclusion. 8 Courts of appeals have set slightly different—but all rigorous—thresholds for satisfying 9 materiality. The Ninth Circuit has held in a memorandum disposition that “[a]llegations do not 10 materially add to public disclosures when they provide only background information and details 11 relating to the alleged fraud—they must add value to what the government already knew.” United 12 States ex rel. Hastings v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, Inc., 656 F. App’x 328, 331 (9th Cir. 2016). Other 13 circuits have construed the materiality requirement even more strictly in published opinions. The 14 First, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits have held that materiality “requires the claimant to show [she] had 15 information ‘of such a nature that knowledge of the item would affect a person’s decision-making,’ 16 is ‘significant,’ or is ‘essential.’” U.S. ex rel. Advocates for Basic Legal Equal., Inc. v. U.S. Bank, 17 N.A., 816 F.3d 428, 431 (6th Cir. 2016) (Sutton, J.) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1124 (10th 18 ed. 2014)); accord United States ex rel. Reed v. KeyPoint Gov’t Sols., 923 F.3d 729, 756 (10th Cir. 19 2019) (holding same and discussing case law); United States ex rel. Winkelman v. CVS Caremark 20 Corp., 827 F.3d 201, 211 (1st Cir. 2016) (same). The Eleventh Circuit has held that relator’s 21 contribution of “background information and details relating to the value of the services offered” 22 was immaterial—even though those details “ma[de] it somewhat more plain that [defendants]’ 23 programs could violate” the FCA. U.S. ex rel. Osheroff v. Humana Inc., 776 F.3d 805, 815 (11th 24 Cir. 2015) (discussing FCA claim based on the Anti-Kickback Statute). Lastly, the strictest circuit 25 definition of materiality perhaps comes from the Seventh Circuit. There, if a relator’s “allegations 26 are substantially similar to those contained in the [public disclosure], [relator’s] allegations has not 27 ‘materially added’ to the public disclosure.” Cause of Action v. Chicago Transit Auth., 815 F.3d 1 267, 283 (7th Cir. 2016). 2 As for case law from this district, one court has held that a few “inconsistencies” in 3 defendants’ statements across different legal proceedings, without more, “is hardly the stuff of an 4 original source.” Silbersher v. Valeant Pharm. Int’l, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 3d 393, 407 (N.D. Cal. 5 2020) (citing United States ex rel. Solis v. Millennium Pharm., Inc., 885 F.3d 623, 627 (9th Cir. 6 2018)). Overall, whatever the precise definition of “independent” and “material[]” knowledge, the 7 FCA requires rigorous scrutiny of Relator’s argument that she is an original source. Under 8 scrutiny, Relator’s specific citations to FAC ¶¶ 17, 43, 96, and 118 fail to show that Relator is an 9 original source. The Court addresses each cited FAC paragraph in turn. 10 FAC ¶ 17 states that Relator served the original complaint and “material evidence” on 11 federal and California officials, in accordance with 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2)’s service requirement. 12 This paragraph thus merely shows Relator’s compliance with a procedural requirement of qui tam 13 actions. 14 FAC ¶ 43 purports to justify why Relator brings this action anonymously. The first reason 15 is “to protect Relator’s medical privacy.” The second is that “as a practicing physician and 16 surgeon, Relator relies on referrals from other medical professionals. . . . [I]f her identity were to 17 become publicly known, . . . Sutter [Health] and an entire cadre of its referring physicians could 18 adversely impact both her family’s finances and her career.” This paragraph at most suggests that 19 Relator has some medical and surgical expertise. Relator’s expertise, however, “is irrelevant to the 20 question of whether the material transactions giving rise to the alleged fraud were already 21 disclosed in the public domain in the first place.” A-1 Ambulance Serv., Inc, 202 F.3d at 1245. 22 FAC ¶ 96 alleges that “[t]he CMS reports obtained by Relator conflicted sharply with the 23 deposition testimony given by Hong in another matter, in which he testified that he had not 24 performed any, or at most a couple of single stage immediate implant-based mastectomy 25 reconstructions (CPT 19340). The CMS reports obtained by Relator show that Hong in fact billed 26 Medicare and received payment for CPT Code 19340 twenty-nine times from 4/20/2010 through 27 5/14/2014.” 1 FAC ¶ 96 rests on an internally inconsistent premise. Relator presumes that the Medicare 2 billing code “CPT Code 19340” appears only when an implant is inserted “immediate[ly]” after 3 “implant-based mastectomy reconstructions.” Id. (emphasis added) Yet the definition of CPT Code 4 19340 recited in the FAC states, on its face, that the code is also used in three operations: 5 “mastopexy, mastectomy or in reconstruction.” FAC ¶ 87 (emphasis added); id. ¶ 89 (stating 6 same). Thus, there is no apparent conflict in Dr. Hong’s deposition testimony. Dr. Hong could have 7 performed at most two “immediate implant-based mastectomy reconstructions” while also 8 performing dozens of mastopexy or non-mastectomy reconstructions billed to CPT Code 19340. 9 Id. ¶ 96. 10 Moreover, even if Relator identified a conflict between deposition testimony and data on 11 one billing code, the FAC fails to “state with particularity” how that is material. Fed. R. Civ. 12 P. 9(b); see Section II-B, supra (discussing pleading standard). Materiality for the “original 13 source” knowledge requirement requires Relator to at least add more than “background 14 information and details relating to the alleged fraud.” Hastings, 656 F. App’x at 331. A few 15 “inconsistencies” in Defendants’ statements across different legal proceedings, without more, “is 16 hardly the stuff of an original source.” Silbersher, 445 F. Supp. 3d at 407. Here, Relator presents 17 one alleged inconsistency from one deposition about one billing code. This alleged inconsistency 18 is merely an immaterial “detail[] relating to the value of the services offered” that, at most, 19 “mak[es] it somewhat more plain” that one Defendant allegedly broke the law. Osheroff, 776 F.3d 20 at 815. 21 Lastly, FAC ¶ 118 is entirely unclear. FAC ¶ 118 appears to reallege FAC ¶ 96 with all its 22 flaws. Specifically, FAC ¶ 118 alleges that Dr. Hong “testified at his deposition in another matter 23 that he had only performed possibly two total ‘single-stage’ mastectomy reconstructions (CPT 24 19340).” FAC ¶ 118 (emphasis in original). Again, however, this allegation wrongly presumes that 25 “CPT 19340” refers only to mastectomy reconstructions. 26 To support its false premise, FAC ¶ 118 quotes an excerpt of Dr. Hong’s deposition in 27 another matter brought by Relator. FAC ¶ 118, unclear as it is, seems to argue that this deposition 1 excerpt shows that CPT 19340 refers only to “‘single-stage’ mastectomy reconstructions.” FAC 2 ¶ 118. However, the deposition excerpt in no way supports Relator’s argument. The excerpt in its 3 entirety reads: 4 Q. So on -- on both of those, you did an immediate reconstruction after mastectomy? 5 A. Uh-huh. 6 Q. And you did a subcutaneous implant? 7 A. Yes. 8 Q. And did you use AlloDerm? 9 A. No. Did not. 10 Id. This deposition excerpt fails to show any inconsistency between Dr. Hong’s deposition in 11 another matter and the Medicare claims data here. 12 In sum, because Relator lacks “knowledge that is independent of and materially adds to the 13 publicly disclosed allegations or transactions,” she is not an “original source.” 31 U.S.C. 14 § 3730(e)(4)(B). This conclusion, which is exhaustively supported by this record, was also reached 15 for the same Relator in Stanford Healthcare. There too, the court held that “little can be inferred 16 from a single instance of incorrect billing” and dismissed Relator’s FCA and CFCA claims. 17 Stanford Healthcare, 2020 WL 5033219, at *1; accord 2020 WL 1074585, at *2 (“Relator’s 18 experiences do not appear to add anything to the allegations of improper added billing . . . . These 19 allegations appear to be entirely based on a review of Medicare records.”). The Stanford 20 Healthcare Court gave Relator one chance to amend and then dismissed her claims with prejudice. 21 2020 WL 5033219, at *2. 22 This Court agrees with Stanford Healthcare’s approach. The Court dismisses Relator’s 23 FAC with leave to amend because allowing amendment would not unduly prejudice the opposing 24 party, cause undue delay, or be futile. See Leadsinger, 512 F.3d at 532. The Court warns, however, 25 that failure to cure the deficiencies identified in this order and in the motions to dismiss will result 26 in dismissal of the deficient claims with prejudice. 27

IV. CONCLUSION

5 For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to dismiss the First

3 Amended Complaint with leave to amend. Should Relator elect to file a second amended

4 complaint curing the deficiencies identified herein, Relator shall do so within 21 days of the date

5 of this Order. Failure to meet the 21 day deadline to file a second amended complaint or failure to

‘ cure the deficiencies identified in this Order and in Defendants’ motions to dismiss will result in

4 dismissal of deficient claims with prejudice. Relator may not add new causes of action or parties without leave of the Court or stipulation of the parties pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

9 Procedure 15.

10 IT IS SO ORDERED.

11 Dated: November 6, 2020 g 2 Ko

LUCY @ KOH

. 14 United States District Judge

15 16

Z 18

19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 20 Case No. 18-CV-02067-LHK