1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 OPTICURRENT, LLC, Case No. 17-cv-03597-EMC

8 Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S

9 v. MOTION TO STAY EXECUTION OF

JUDGMENT

10 POWER INTEGRATIONS, INC., et al., Docket No. 384 11 Defendants.

12 13 14 Pending before the Court is Power Integrations, Inc.’s (“PI’s”) motion to stay the execution 15 of the judgment against it pending its appeal of this Court’s order denying its motion for a new 16 trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60. See Docket No. 384 (“Stay Mot.”). 17 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62(b) (formerly 62(d)), “[a]t any time after 18 judgment is entered, a party may obtain a stay by providing a bond or other security.” Fed R. Civ. 19 P. 62(b). A supersedeas bond ensures that the appellee—in this case Opticurrent, LLC 20 (“Opticurrent”)—will be able to collect the judgment plus interest should the court of appeals 21 affirm the judgment. See Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d 1503, 1505 n.1 (9th Cir. 22 1987) (“The purpose of a supersedeas bond is to secure the appellees from a loss resulting from 23 the stay of execution and a full supersedeas bond should therefore be required.”). Therefore, when 24 a party posts a supersedeas bond with the district court in compliance with Rule 62(b), “it [is] 25 entitled to a stay as a matter of right.” Bennett v. Franklin Res., Inc., 360 F. Supp. 3d 972, 977 26 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (quoting Am. C.L. Union of Nev. v. Masto, 670 F.3d 1046, 1066 (9th Cir. 2012)); 27 see also Matter of Combined Metals Reduction Co., 557 F.2d 179, 193 (9th Cir. 1977) (“Since no 1 discretion.”). 2 Here, PI has obtained a supersedeas bond equal to 125% of Opticurrent’s $1,199,987 3 award, i.e., $1,499,959.08, plus 125% of subsequent royalties. See Docket No. 394-2 (Decl. of 4 Michael R. Headley in Supp. of Renewed Mot. to Stay Execution, Ex. A (Bond No. 3484412)). 5 The total amount of the bond is $1,943,105.86, and the bond specifies that it is undertaken 6 “pending appeal from Rule 60 order.” Id. Therefore, PI is entitled to a stay of the judgment’s 7 execution because “the funds deposited with the Court [are] sufficient to protect [Opticurrent] 8 from loss while the execution is stayed.” Rachel, 831 F.3d at 1505 n.1. 9 Opticurrent argues that this Court should deny the stay under In re Zapata Gulf Marine 10 Corporation, 941 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1991)—a 1991 Fifth Circuit case—because “where a case is 11 transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404, the choice of law rules that would have been applied by the 12 transferor court—here, the Eastern District of Texas—are applied.” See Docket No. 387 13 (“Opp’n”). But § 1404(a) does not require this Court to apply Fifth Circuit law because whether 14 to stay the execution of the judgment pending appeal is a question of federal law, not state law. 15 See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 523 (1990) (“First, § 1404(a) should not deprive 16 parties of state-law advantages that exist absent diversity jurisdiction.” (emphasis added)). 17 Indeed, this Court’s application of Rule 62(b)—a federal rule of civil procedure—has nothing to 18 do with Texas or California state law. As a result, the aforementioned Ninth Circuit law governs 19 this motion. See Tennant Co. v. Hako Minuteman, Inc., 878 F.2d 1413, 1416 (Fed. Cir. 1989) 20 (“On a procedural issue, this court applies the law of the regional circuit to which district court 21 appeals normally lie, unless the issue pertains to or is unique to patent law.”). 22 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS PI’s motion to stay the execution of the judgment in this 23 case until its appeal of this Court’s Rule 60 motion is decided. 24 This order disposes of Docket No. 384. 25 IT IS SO ORDERED. 26 Dated: April 6, 2021 27 ______________________________________