1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 HILDA MATOS, Case No. 19-cv-02505-TSH

8 Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR

9 v. ATTORNEY’S FEES

10 ANDREW M. SAUL, Re: Dkt. No. 24 11 Defendant.

12 13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 After Plaintiff Hilda Matos brought this action for review of the Commissioner of Social 15 Security’s decision to deny benefits, the Court remanded the case and the Commissioner issued a 16 decision in her favor. Matos’s attorney, Katherine R. Siegfried, now seeks $10,980.88 in 17 attorney’s fees under section 206(b) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). ECF No. 24. 18 For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion. 19 II. BACKGROUND 20 Matos brought this action for judicial review under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 21 405(g). On March 23, 2020, the Court granted her summary judgment motion and remanded for 22 further proceedings. ECF No. 16. The Court subsequently granted Siegfried’s motion for 23 attorney’s fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, in the amount 24 of $10,980.88. ECF No. 22. 25 On remand, the Commissioner granted Matos’s application, entitling her to receive 26 $109,899.60 in retroactive benefits. Siegfried Decl. ¶ 5 & Ex. 2 (Notice of Award), ECF No. 24- 27 1, 24-3. Under a contingent-fee agreement, Matos agreed to pay counsel up to 25% of any past- 1 Notice of Award further states that the Social Security Administration paid Matos’s administrative 2 attorney $6,000 and was withholding the rest of the 25 percent of past-due benefits. Thus, 3 Siegried requests a fee award of $21,474.60. 4 III. LEGAL STANDARD 5 Attorneys handling social security proceedings may seek fees for their work under both the 6 EAJA and the Social Security Act. While the government pays an award pursuant to the EAJA, 7 an award pursuant to § 406 of the Social Security Act is paid out of a successful claimant’s past- 8 due benefits. Russell v. Sullivan, 930 F.2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991), abrogated on other 9 grounds by Sorensen v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001). In passing § 406, Congress 10 sought to protect attorneys from the nonpayment of fees, while also shielding clients from unfairly 11 large fees. Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 805 (2002). 12 Under the Act, when a court renders judgment in favor of a claimant, it may award the 13 claimant’s counsel a reasonable attorney’s fee, not to exceed 25% of the past-due benefits. 42 14 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A); see also Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808 (holding that contingent-fee 15 agreements are not enforceable to the extent that they provide for fees exceeding 25% of the past- 16 due benefits); Culbertson v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 517, 523 (2019) (“the 25% cap in § 406(b)(1)(A) 17 applies only to fees for court representation, and not to the aggregate fees awarded under §§ 18 406(a) and (b)”). The court provides “an independent check” to assure that contingency fee 19 agreements between Social Security claimants and their attorneys will “yield reasonable results in 20 particular cases.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. 21 In determining a reasonable fee award, the district court “must respect ‘the primacy of 22 lawful attorney-client fee agreements,’” by “‘looking first to the contingent-fee agreement, then 23 testing it for reasonableness.’” Crawford v. Astrue, 586 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 24 Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 793, 808). A fee based on a contingent-fee agreement is unreasonable and 25 subject to reduction “if the attorney provided substandard representation or engaged in dilatory 26 conduct in order to increase the accrued amount of past-due benefits, or if the ‘benefits are large in 27 comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case.’” Id. (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 1 determining whether a fee is reasonable, the court may look to the lodestar calculation “only as an 2 aid in assessing the reasonableness of the fee.” Id. at 1151 (quoting Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 808) 3 (emphasis in original). 4 Additionally, a § 406(b) fee award is offset by any award of EAJA fees. Thus, if the court 5 awards fees under both the EAJA and § 406(b), “the claimant’s attorney must refun[d] to the 6 claimant the amount of the smaller fee.” Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796 (citation omitted). 7 IV. DISCUSSION 8 The Court finds counsel has met her burden to demonstrate that the requested fees are 9 reasonable. As noted above, Matos entered into a contingent fee agreement providing for a 25% 10 fee, which is consistent with the statutory cap. There is no evidence that Siegfried’s performance 11 was substandard. To the contrary, counsel’s representation resulted in Matos receiving substantial 12 past-due benefits. After the Court granted Matos’s motion and remanded for further proceedings, 13 the Commissioner issued a decision in Matos’s favor in the amount of $109,899.60. See Khlopoff 14 v. Saul, 2020 WL 7043878, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2020) (awarding attorney’s fees under § 15 406(b) where plaintiff received $73,209.00 in benefits upon remand); Card v. Comm’r of Soc. 16 Sec., 2019 WL 3554410, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2019) (awarding attorney’s fees where plaintiff 17 received $57,722.52 in benefits upon remand). Further, the requested fees are not excessively 18 large in relation to the benefits achieved. Although counsel is under no obligation to do so, 19 Siegfried requests less than the full 25% contemplated by the fee agreement to account for the fees 20 the Social Security Administration withheld to pay Matos’s administrative lawyer. Thus, although 21 she is entitled to $27,474.90 under the agreement, Siegfried seeks only $21,474.90 for 53.5 hours 22 of work. Siegfried Decl. ¶¶ 8-9. The fees she seeks would result in an effective hourly rate of 23 approximately $401 per hour. The Court finds this rate reasonable considering the results 24 Siegfried achieved, the amount of time she spent on the case, and her assumption of risk in 25 agreeing to represent Matos on a contingency basis. See Crawford, 586 F.3d at 1153 (affirming 26 the reasonableness of the fees where the effective hourly rates were $519, $875 and $902); Hearn 27 v. Barnhart, 262 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2003) (awarding hourly rate of $450.00 and 1 citing cases with much higher effective rates approved). The Court therefore finds the requested 2 || fees are reasonable taking into account all these factors. 3 Once the Court determines that the fee sought under § 406(b) is reasonable, it must 4 || account for the attorney’s fees paid by the Commissioner under the EAJA. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 5 796. “Congress harmonized fees payable by the Government under EAJA with fees payable under 6 § 406(b) out of the claimant’s past-due Social Security benefits” by requiring the claimant’s 7 attorney to refund to the claimant the amount of the smaller fee up to the point where the claimant 8 receives 100% of the past-due benefits. Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 796. Here, the Court finds 9 || counsel’s § 406(b) request reasonable, and therefore counsel shall refund to Matos the $10,980.88 10 || in EAJA fees previously awarded. See Khlopoff, 2020 WL 7043878, at *2 (finding § 406(b) 11 request reasonable and directing counsel to refund to client fees previously awarded under the 12 || EAJA). 13 V. CONCLUSION 14 For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS counsel’s motion for attorney’s fees. 3 15 The Commissioner is directed to certify fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) in the amount of a 16 $21,474.90, payable to Katherine Siegfried. Counsel is ORDERED to refund the $10,980.88 3 17 EAJA fee award to Matos.

S 18 IT IS SO ORDERED.

19 20 || Dated: April 14, 2021 21 7 LU \ - Ly

THOMAS S. HIXSON

22 United States Magistrate Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28