1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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10 In the matter of the Complaint of

11 BRIAN CHRISTOPHER AMBLE as the No. 20-03713 WHA alleged owner of a certain 1971 Far East 12 Mariner 40 bearing hull identification number GM82 and her engines, tackle, 13 appurtenances, etc. ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY

ACTION SHOULD NOT BE

14 For exoneration from, or limitation of, DISMISSED FOR LACK OF liability. SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION 15

BRIAN CHRISTOPHER AMBLE,

16 Third-Party Plaintiff, 17 v. 18

JESSICA PLANTE,

19 Third-Party Defendant. 20

21 22 23 The parties are hereby ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE why this action should not be 24 dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction given petitioner Amble’s refusal to admit 25 ownership of the boat at the time of the fire in light of the following authorities: American Car 26 & Foundry Co. v. Brassert, 289 U.S. 261 (1933); Admiral Towing Co. v. Woolen, 290 F.2d 641 27 (9th Cir. 1961); Calkins v. Graham, 667 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir. 1982); Marine Recreational 1 In Admiral Towing Co., 290 F.2d at 645, our court of appeals held: 2 [it is clear that] possession and control standing alone are insufficient to confer ownership. When, however, a mortgagee 3 such as [petitioner] comes into possession and control of a vessel as the first step in a process which is to culminate uninterruptedly 4 in his becoming the holder of legal title to her, we think he becomes an owner for purposes of limiting his liability. This for 5 the reason that his relationship to the vessel is such as might reasonably afford grounds upon which a claim of liability for 6 damages might be asserted against him, a claim predicated on his status as the person perhaps ultimately responsible for the vessel’s 7 maintenance and operation . . . . 8 In Calkins v. Graham, our court of appeals construed the final sentence quoted above 9 from Admiral Towing. The Court of Appeals held: 10 Although this contention may have had some merit while [petitioner] was in exclusive possession and control of the vessel . . 11 . it does not apply to the situation as it existed at the time of the accident. When the accident occurred, [petitioner] no longer had 12 possession or control of the vessel, nor was he responsible for its maintenance and operation . . . The circumstances which make 13 one a ‘likely target,’ as in Admiral Towing, supra, 290 F.2d 641, must exist at the time of the accident or loss. 14 Calkins, 667 F.2d at 1294–95. 15 Under Admiral Towing and Calkins, an “owner” under the Limitation Act is one who, if 16 not a titleholder to the vessel, must, at minimum, have possession or control of the vessel, or 17 ultimate responsibility for the vessel’s maintenance and operation; and one of those conditions 18 must exist at the time of the accident or loss. 19 We are aware of only a single decision holding that a former owner who retained no 20 interest whatsoever in the vessel at the time of the accident qualified as an “owner” under the 21 Act: In re The Trojan, 167 F.Supp. 576 (N.D. Cal. 1958), aff’d sub. nom. Todd Shipyards 22 Corp. v. United States, 274 F.2d 402 (9th Cir. 1960). The weight of Todd Shipyards, however, 23 is undermined by the fact that it was a decision on an interlocutory appeal, and by the later 24 decisions of Admiral Towing and Calkins. 25

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27 1 Here, petitioner Amble expressly disclaims “any interest in, dominion over, or possession 2 of” the boat at the time of the fire (Dkt. No. 1 at ¥ 9). 3 Under the authorities cited above, how is subject matter jurisdiction satisfied here? 4 The parties must file their responses by MAY 11 AT NOON. 5 6 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 9 Dated: April 30, 2021 i ee ll ~

WILLIAM ALSUP

12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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