Durant

DISCUSSION

It was not objectively unreasonable for the state courts to conclude that the trial court’s failure to give jury instructions on the heat of passion defense, self-defense, defense of others, imperfect self-defense, imperfect defense of others and accomplice liability did not violate Durant’s constitutional rights. See Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611 (1982); United States v. Boulware, 558 F.3d 971, 974 (9th Cir. 2009). Walker v. Endell, 850 F.2d 470, 475-76 (9th Cir. 1987) (omission of an instruction less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law). It was not objectively unreasonable for the state courts to conclude that admission of evidence of “rumors on the street” about a “beef” between Durant and Sheppard did not violate Durant’s constitutional rights. See Jammal v. Van de Kamp, 926 F.2d 918, 920 (9th Cir. 1991) (only if there are no permissible inferences that the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission even potentially violate due process). It was not objectively unreasonable for the state courts to conclude that the prosecutor’s conduct did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. See Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181…