1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 BOARD OF TRUSTEES, IN THEIR Case No. 22-cv-01438-JSC

CAPACITIES AS TRUSTEES OF THE

8 LABORERS HEALTH AND WELFARE

TRUST FUND FOR NORTHERN ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR

9 CALIFORNIA, et al., DEFAULT JUDGMENT 10 Plaintiffs, Re: Dkt. No. 11 v. 11

12 GEMINIS DEMOLITION &

CONSTRUCTION, INC.,

13 Defendant. 14 15 Plaintiffs, several employee benefit plans and their trustees, allege Defendant Geminis 16 Demolition & Construction, Inc. (“Defendant”) breached their Trust Agreement by failing to 17 comply with Plaintiffs’ audit request, as required by the Agreement. (Dkt. No. 11 at 8.)1 Plaintiffs 18 allege that Defendant further breached the Agreement by failing to make proper contributions to 19 the Trust Funds. (Id.) Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment requesting an injunction ordering an 20 audit, liquidated damages, interest, unpaid contributions, and attorneys’ fees and costs is now 21 pending before the Court. For the reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion 22 for default judgment. 23 BACKGROUND 24 A. Complaint Allegations 25 Plaintiffs include employee benefit plans created by a written Trust Agreement under 26 Section 302 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1974 (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 186, and 27 1 Sections 3, 4 and 502 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), 29 2 U.S.C. § 1002, 1003 and 1132. Plaintiffs are Trustees of the Laborers Health and Welfare Trust 3 Fund for Northern California; Laborers Vacation-Holiday Trust Fund for Northern California; 4 Laborers Pension Trust Fund for Northern California; and Laborers Training and Retraining Trust 5 Fund for Northern California, (collectively the “Trust Funds”). (Dkt. No. 1 at 2.) Each Trust Fund 6 is administered by a Board of Trustees, which has the authority to bring an action in the name of 7 the Trust Funds. (Id.) Collectively, these parties are all referred to as “Plaintiffs.” Defendant is “an 8 employer with within the meaning of Section 3(5) and Section 515 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 9 1002(5), 1145, and an employer in an industry affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 10 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185.” (Id.) 11 On February 12, 2018, the Northern California District Council of Laborers (“Union”) and 12 Defendant entered into The Laborers’ Master Agreement for Northern California (“Master 13 Agreement”), effective from July 1, 2018 to June 30, 2023. (Id. at 10.) Defendant became bound 14 to the Master Agreement, which incorporates the Trust Agreements establishing each of the Trust 15 Funds, by signing a Memorandum of Agreement (“MOA”) and a Letter of Understanding 16 (“LOU”) with the Union. (Dkt. No. 1 at 3.) Collectively, the Master Agreement, MOA, LOU, and 17 Trust Agreements are referred to as the “Agreements.” The Agreements required Defendant to pay 18 Plaintiffs the hourly amounts stipulated for each hour paid for or worked by any of Plaintiffs’ 19 employees that performed work covered under the Agreements. (Dkt. No. 11-2 ¶ 7.) 20 Additionally, the Trust Agreements require prompt payment of employer contributions to 21 the Trust Funds, payments for liquidated damages in case of employer breach, interest payments 22 on delinquent contributions, attorneys’ fees, and collection costs. (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) The Trust 23 Agreements also allow Plaintiffs to audit the signatory employer’s books and records to determine 24 whether all benefit contributions have been paid. (Id. ¶ 11.) Defendant has never given notice, as 25 required under the Agreements, to terminate the Agreement; therefore it continues in full effect. 26 (Id. ¶ 8.) 27 On January 25, 2021, Plaintiffs requested an audit for the period of January 2019 to the last 1 (Dkt. No. 1 at 75.) More than 10 months later, Plaintiffs contacted Defendant again to warn that 2 the matter would be referred to Plaintiffs’ counsel if Defendant did not contact Plaintiffs’ auditor 3 within 10 business days. (Id. at 77.) Defendant failed to submit contributions reports and 4 applicable pay contributions for the period of January 2019 to the last completed quarter and 5 books and records for compliance with the audit. (Id. at 4.) 6 Defendant also failed to make on-time payments for the period of January 2021, February 7 2021, and April through June 2021, resulting in $750 in liquidated damages and $195.18 in 8 interest. (Dkt. 11-2 at 204.) Defendant failed to make any contributions for the months of July 9 2021 through December 2021, resulting in $900 unpaid contributions. (Id. at 205.) Plaintiffs seek 10 an injunction ordering Defendant to submit to an audit of its books and records, pursuant to the 11 Trust Agreements, for the time period of January 2019 to present and to pay any contributions 12 found due as a result of the audit. (Dkt. No. 11 at 9.) They also demand $1,845.18 in liquated 13 damages, interest, and unpaid contributions and a total of $4,983.15 in attorneys’ fees and costs. 14 (Id.) 15 B. Procedural Background 16 Plaintiffs filed suit on March 7, 2022. (Dkt. No. 11 at 9.) Defendant failed to answer the 17 Complaint and, at Plaintiffs’ request, the Clerk entered default on April 13, 2022. (Dkt. No. 10.) 18 Plaintiffs subsequently filed the now pending motion for default judgment. (Dkt. No. 11.) 19 DISCUSSION 20 A. Jurisdiction 21 The Court has “an affirmative duty to look into its jurisdiction over both the subject matter 22 and the parties” when considering whether to enter a default judgment. In re Tuli, 172 F.3d 707, 23 712 (9th Cir. 1999). Here, the Court has federal question subject matter jurisdiction since Plaintiffs 24 bring suit pursuant to ERISA. See 28 U.S. Code § 1331. 25 The Court also has personal jurisdiction over Defendant. A corporation’s “place of 26 incorporation and principal place of business are paradigm . . . bases for general jurisdiction.” 27 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014) (cleaned up). Here, the Court has personal 1 B. Service of Process 2 The Court must assess whether the party against whom default judgment is sought was 3 properly served with notice of the action. Penpower Tech. Ltd. v. S.P.C. Tech., 627 F. Supp. 2d 4 1083, 1088 (N.D. Cal. 2008). A corporation may be served by delivering a copy of the summons 5 and complaint in accordance with state law where the district court is located. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 4(e)(1), 4(h)(1)(A). Additionally, California law states that a corporation may be served by serving 7 “the person designated as agent for service of process.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 416.10(a). 8 Here, Plaintiffs hired a professional process server to serve Defendant with the Complaint 9 and Summons. (Dkt. No. 6.) The Proof of Service states that on March 14, 2022, the Complaint 10 and Summons was served on Octavio Correa, who is designated by law to accept service of 11 process on Defendant’s behalf. (Id.) Thus, Plaintiffs adequately executed service of process on 12 Defendant. 13 C. Default Judgment 14 After entry of default, a court may grant default judgment on the merits of the case. Fed. R. 15 Civ. P. 55. Upon entry of default, the complaint’s factual allegations related to liability are 16 accepted as true and deemed admitted by the non-moving party. TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. 17 Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987). “The district court’s decision whether to enter a 18 default judgment is a discretionary one.” Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980). 19 Courts consider the following factors in determining whether to enter default judgment:

20 (1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits 21 of plaintiff’s substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action; (5) the 22 possibility of a dispute concerning material facts; (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong 23 policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits. 24 Eitel v. McCool, 728 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986). The majority of the Eitel factors support 25 default judgment. 26 i. Likelihood of Prejudice to Plaintiffs 27 1 The first Eitel factor considers whether the plaintiff will suffer prejudice if the Court does 2 not grant default judgment. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471. Prejudice exists where denying the requested 3 default judgment would leave the plaintiff without a recourse for recovery. See PepsiCo, Inc. v. 4 Cal. Sec. Cans, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1172, 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2002). Here, if the Court denied the motion 5 for default judgment, Plaintiffs would likely be left without an alternative means of recovering 6 damages because Defendant failed to appear or defend this action in any way. (Dkt. No. 11 at 6-7.) 7 Thus, the first factor weighs in favor of default judgment. 8 ii. Merit of Plaintiffs’ Substantive Claims/Sufficiency of the Complaint 9 Courts frequently analyze the second and third Eitel factors together. See Dr. JKL Ltd. v. 10 HPC IT Educ. Ctr., 749 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1048 (N.D. Cal. 2010). These factors consider whether 11 the facts as pleaded in the complaint address the merits and sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claims. 12 Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471. In analyzing these Eitel factors, the Court accepts as true all well-pled 13 allegations regarding liability. See Fair Hous. of Marin v. Combs, 285 F.3d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 14 2002). Here, Plaintiffs assert claims under ERISA § 515, which provides that “[e]very employer 15 who is obligated to make contributions to a multiemployer plan under the terms of the plan or 16 under the terms of a collectively bargained agreement shall . . . make such contributions in 17 accordance with the terms and conditions of such plan or such agreement.” 29 U.S.C. § 1145. 18 Therefore, Plaintiffs must sufficiently plead that “(i) the trusts are multiemployer plans as defined 19 by 29 U.S.C. § 1002(37); (ii) the collective bargaining agreement obligated Defendant to make 20 contributions; and (iii) Defendant did not make the required contributions.” Operating Eng’rs 21 Health & Welfare Tr. Fund for N. Cal. v. Breneman, Inc., No. 17-cv-05172-EDL, 2018 WL 22 5099250, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2018). 23 Here, Plaintiffs allege that the Trust Funds are employment benefit plans under 29 U.S.C. 24 § 1002(37), Defendant was obligated under the Master Agreement and Trust Agreement to pay 25 contributions to the Trust Funds, and Defendant failed to do so. (Dkt. No. 1 at 2, 10; Dkt. No. 11 26 at 7.) This is sufficient to state a claim under ERISA § 515. As a result, the second and third 27 factors also weigh in favor of default judgment. 1 Under the fourth Eitel factor, courts should consider “the amount of money at stake in 2 relation to the seriousness of Defendant’s conduct.” PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1176. 3 Default judgment is discouraged when the money at stake is substantial. Bd. of Trs. v. Core 4 Concrete Constr., Inc., No. 11-02532 LB, 2012 WL 380304, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 17, 2012). 5 However, when “the sum of money at stake is tailored to the specific misconduct of the defendant, 6 default judgment may be appropriate.” Id. (cleaned up). Courts consider the plaintiff’s 7 “declarations, calculations, and other documentation of damages” to determine whether the 8 amount of money at stake is reasonable. Truong Giang Corp. v. Twinstar Tea Corp., No. C 06– 9 03594 JSW, 2007 WL 1545173, at *12 (N.D. Cal. May 29, 2007). 10 Here, Plaintiffs seek a judgment in the amount of $1,845.18 for liquated damages, interest, 11 and unpaid contributions. (Dkt. No. 11 at 9.) They also seek $4,445.00 in attorneys’ fees and 12 $538.15 in costs related to the matter. (Id.) The amount requested, while not nominal, is not as 13 much as other ERISA cases in which default judgment was granted. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of 14 Laborers Health & Welfare Tr. Fund for N. Cal. v. Cal-Kirk Landscaping, Inc., No. C–08–3292 15 EMC, 2012 WL 5869619, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2012) (awarding $230,1130.27 in damages 16 and $434,853.63 in attorneys’ fees and costs). Thus, the fourth factor weighs in favor of default 17 judgment. 18 iv. Possibility of Dispute Regarding Material Facts 19 The fifth Eitel factor reviews the possibility of material facts being in dispute. Eitel, 782 20 F.2d at 1471-72. Here, Plaintiffs notified Defendant prior to filing the Complaint that the matter 21 would be referred to Plaintiffs’ counsel if Defendant did not contact Plaintiffs’ auditor. (Dkt. No. 1 22 at 77.) Additionally, Plaintiffs properly served Defendant with the Complaint and Summons. (Dkt. 23 No. 6.) Therefore, it is unlikely that there is a dispute as to the material facts and thus this factor 24 weighs in favor of default judgment. 25 v. Excusable Neglect 26 The sixth Eitel factor considers whether a defendant’s default is a result of excusable 27 neglect. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471-72. “This factor favors default judgment when the defendant has 1 Wecosign, Inc. v. IFG Holdings, Inc., 845 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2012); see Shanghai 2 Automation Instrument Co. v. Kuei, 194 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (noting that 3 default cannot be attributed to excusable neglect after proper service). Here, Defendant’s default 4 was not likely due to excusable neglect because Plaintiffs properly served Defendant with the 5 Summons and Complaint, but Defendant failed to respond. (Dkt. No. 6.) Moreover, Defendant 6 was later served with Plaintiffs’ Request for an Entry of Default, but Defendant did not respond. 7 (Dkt. No. 9-2.) Therefore, the sixth factor weighs in favor of default. 8 vi. Policy Favoring a Decision on the Merits 9 The final Eitel factor typically weighs against default judgment because it favors a decision 10 on the merits. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1472. However, the "existence of [Rule] 55(b) indicates that this 11 preference, standing alone, is not dispositive." PepsiCo, 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1177 (cleaned up). 12 When a defendant fails to answer the complaint it "makes a decision on the merits impractical, if 13 not impossible." Id. at 1178. Here, given Defendant’s failure to respond, a decision on the merits is 14 impossible. 15 Taking all the Eitel factors into consideration, the factors weigh in favor of default 16 judgment. 17 D. Relief Sought 18 Having determined that the motion for default should be granted, the Court must move to 19 the relief to which Plaintiffs are entitled. The scope of relief is limited only by Federal Rule of 20 Civil Procedure 54(c), which mandates that a “default judgment must not differ in kind from, or 21 exceed in amount, what is demanded in the pleadings.” PepsiCo, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d at 1175. 22 Since the Court does not assume the truth of any factual allegations related to damages in 23 assessing the appropriate amount, Plaintiffs are required to prove all damages sought in the 24 Complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b); see also TeleVideo Sys., 826 F.2d at 917-18 (stating that the 25 general rule of law is that all factual allegations except the amount of damages are taken as true on 26 default judgment). 27 Under ERISA, an employee benefit plan that obtains judgment in its favor in an action 1 damages not in excess of 20% of the unpaid contributions; (3) interest on the unpaid contributions; 2 (4) reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs; and (5) other legal or equitable relief in the discretion of 3 the court. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2) (stating that the court “shall award” these types of relief). 4 Here, Plaintiffs request all five forms of relief under 29 U.S.C. § 1132. (Dkt. No. 11 at 9.) 5 i. Damages 6 Plaintiffs seek to recover $750 in liquated damages for late-paid contributions for the 7 months of January 2021, February 2021, and April through June 2021 and $900 in unpaid 8 contributions for the months of July 2021 through December 2021 for a total of $1,650. (Dkt. 11-2 9 at 203, 204.) To date, Defendant has failed to report or pay fringe benefit contributions to the Trust 10 Funds for the hours worked by employees doing work covered by the Agreements for the period 11 of July 2021 through December 2021. (Id. ¶ 17.) Moreover, “[w]hen contributions are not paid, or 12 not paid timely, liquidated damages are assessed at a flat fee of $150.00 per month, along with 13 simple interest of 1.5% per month on all unpaid contributions.” (Dkt. 11-2 ¶ 12.) Therefore, 14 Plaintiffs also seek $195.18 in interest incurred for the months of April 2021 through June 2021. 15 (Dkt. 11-2 at 203.) Thus, the evidence supports the damages amount for late-paid contributions, 16 unpaid contributions, and interest for the time period of January 2021, February 2021, April 17 through June 2021, and July 2021 through December 2021. 18 ERISA requires an award of liquidated damages if “(1) the fiduciary obtains a judgment in 19 favor of the plan, (2) unpaid contributions exist at the time of suit, and (3) the plan provides for 20 liquidated damages.” Idaho Plumbers & Pipefitters Health & Welfare Fund v. United Mech. 21 Contractors, Inc., 875 F.2d 212, 215 (9th Cir. 1989). Here, those requirements are satisfied. First, 22 if this order is adopted, then Plaintiffs will have obtained a judgment in their favor. Second, as 23 stated in the Complaint, there are outstanding unpaid contributions at the time of suit. (Dkt. No. 1 24 at 5.) Third, the Trust Agreement states that liquidated damages are assessed at a flat fee of 25 $150.00 per month for contributions not paid or untimely paid with interest of 1.5% per month. 26 (Dkt. No. 11-2 ¶ 12.) Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ request for $750 in liquated 27 damages for late-paid contributions, $900 in unpaid contributions, and $195.18 in interest. 1 Plaintiffs request an injunction ordering Defendant “to submit to an audit of their books 2 and records for the period of January 2019 to date, as required by the agreements to which it is 3 bound.” (Dkt. No. 11 at 9.) “The Ninth Circuit has held that when the trust agreement terms allow 4 for such an audit, the court may compel the audit specified in the trust agreement terms.” Bd. of 5 Trustees of IBEW Local Union No. 100 Pension Tr. Fund v. Porges, No. 1:11–cv–02048–LJO– 6 SKO, 2013 WL 4012009, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2013). Here, the trust agreement terms allow 7 for Plaintiffs to conduct an audit. (Dkt. No. 1 at 4.) Thus, the Court grants Plaintiffs’ request for an 8 injunction. 9 Additionally, Plaintiffs request damages for unpaid contributions and interest that they 10 may discover after conducting the audit for the period of January 2019 to date. (Dkt. No. 11 at 9.) 11 The Court can allow Plaintiffs to file a supplemental declaration requesting damages once the 12 audit is conducted. See Operating Engineers Health & Welfare Tr. Fund for N. Cal. v. Osmun 13 Constr., Inc., No. 20-CV-02332-JSC, 2020 WL 13094014, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2020); see 14 also Dist. Council 16 N. Cal. Health & Welfare Tr. Fund v. Garfias, No. C 09-3801 JSW (JL), 15 2010 WL 11575442, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2010) (recommending granting default judgment 16 requesting an audit and ordering plaintiffs to submit a supplemental declaration regarding damages 17 after the audit was completed). “The declaration shall include a detailed breakdown of the 18 amounts Plaintiffs seek with regard to: unpaid or delinquent contributions; interest on unpaid 19 contributions; liquidated damages; and reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.” Osmun Constr., Inc., 20 No. 20-CV-02332-JSC, 2020 WL 13094014, at *7. Thus, the Court allows Plaintiffs to file a 21 detailed supplemental declaration once Plaintiffs ascertain the existence and amounts, if any, of 22 unpaid contributions from the audit for the period of January 2019 to date. 23 Plaintiffs have asked the Court to retain jurisdiction to ensure payment of additional 24 delinquent amounts uncovered by the audit. (Dkt. 11 at 14.) “In ERISA cases, a court may retain 25 jurisdiction to adjust the damages award based on the results of the audit.” Bd. of Trustees v. KMA 26 Concrete Const. Co., No. C-10-05774 JCS, 2011 WL 7446345, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2011); 27 see Walters v. Shaw/Guehgnemann Corp., 2004 WL 1465721, at * 3 (N.D. Cal.) (entering default 1 retaining jurisdiction to amend the judgment upon a proper showing by plaintiff following audit). 2 Therefore, the Court shall retain jurisdiction to adjust the damage award. 3 iii. Attorneys’ Fees 4 Plaintiffs are also seeking attorneys’ fees in the amount of $4,445.00. (Dkt. No. 11 at 9.) 5 Attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in an action to recover unpaid contributions and to compel an 6 audit are provided under Section 502(g)(2) of the ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2). Federal courts 7 use the lodestar method to determine a reasonable fee award. Grove v. Wells Fargo Fin. Cal., Inc., 8 606 F.3d 577, 582 (9th Cir. 2010). The “lodestar amount” is the number of hours counsel 9 reasonably spent on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Id. In reaching this 10 number, the court “should exclude hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” 11 McCown v. City of Fontana, 565 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). A reasonable 12 hourly rate is the prevailing rate in the community for similar work performed by attorneys of 13 “comparable skill, experience, and reputation.” Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 14 979 (9th Cir. 2008). Plaintiffs should provide evidence to the court regarding the number of hours 15 worked and hourly rate of the legal team. McCown, 565 F.3d at 1102. 16 Here, Plaintiffs’ counsels’ rates are $150 per hour for a paralegal, $300 per hour for an 17 attorney, and $350 for a shareholder attorney. (Dkt. No. 11-1 ¶ 5.) The Ninth Circuit has found 18 that rates between $375-$400 were in line with rates charged by ERISA counsel in 2007. See, e.g., 19 Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 480 F.3d 942, 947 (9th Cir. 2007). Thus, given that Plaintiffs’ 20 counsels’ rates are below this range, they are reasonable. 21 Next, the Court looks at the reasonableness of the hours billed. Here, counsel billed a total 22 of 16.30 hours, which include 3.30 hours worked by paralegal Teresa Rojas Alou, 12.00 hours 23 worked by attorney Craig L. Schechter, and 1.00 hour worked by shareholder attorney Concepción 24 E. Lozano-Batista. (Dkt. No. 11-1 ¶ 5.) The declaration of Craig L. Schechter outlines in detail the 25 tasks performed by each member of the legal team. (Id. at 6-7.) “Fees for . . . paralegals are 26 compensable as attorney’s fees so long as the work is legal rather than clerical in nature.” 27 Jacobson v. Persolve, LLC, No. 14-CV-00735-LHK, 2016 WL 7230873, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 1 exhibits, and preparing the Complaint and .30 hours reviewing and revising the Complaint. (Dkt. 2 || No. 11-1 at 6.) These tasks are legal rather than clerical and thus compensable. See Nadarajah v. 3 || Holder, 569 F.3d 906, 921 (9th Cir. 2009) (“[F]iling, transcript, and document organization time 4 || was clerical in nature and should have been subsumed in firm overhead rather than billed at 5 || paralegal rates ....”). Therefore, the Court grants attorneys’ fees totaling $4,445.00. 6 Lastly, Plaintiffs request $538.15 for reproduction costs, filing fees, and service of 7 documents on Defendant. (Dkt. 11-1 at 9.) Because these costs are reasonable and both ERISA, 29 8 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(2), and the Trust Agreements provide for recovery of costs (Dkt. No. 11-2 4 12- 9 13), the Court awards Plaintiffs costs in the amount of $538.15. 10 CONCLUSION 11 For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment 12 and awards Plaintiffs $1,845.18 in damages, $4,445.00 in attorneys’ fees, and $538.15 in costs, for 5 13 a total judgment of $6,828.33. The Court also GRANTS Plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief 14 || compelling Defendant to submit to an audit of its books and records for the period of January 2019 3 15 || to the present and allow Plaintiffs to file a detailed supplemental declaration regarding any further a 16 || damages it seeks to collect from Defendants as a result of the audit. The Court will retain 3 17 || jurisdiction pending completion of the audit so that the judgment may be amended, if appropriate, 18 || to reflect the correct amount due. 19 The Court will enter judgment and the Clerk shall close the file. 20 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 || Dated: fu Sutlloly 24 mM. 25 JACQUELINE SCOTT CORLE United States District Judge 26 27 28