1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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10 J.R., a minor, by and through her parent and Guardian ad Litem, S. RINGER, and O.G., 11 a minor, by and through his parent and No. C 18-06211 WHA Guardian ad Litem, A. VALDENEGRO, 12

Plaintiffs,

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ORDER DENYING

v.

MOTION TO SEAL

14

LAKEPORT UNIFIED SCHOOL

15 DISTRICT, KELSEYVILLE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, and DOES 1 16 through 50, inclusive, 17 Defendants.

18 19 In this settled case regarding the sexual assault of two minors, plaintiffs seek to file under 20 seal an ex parte petition. For the reasons that follow, the motion is DENIED. 21 The public has “a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, 22 including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 23 597 (1978). “This right is justified by the interests of citizens in keeping a watchful eye on the 24 workings of public agencies.” Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 25 (9th Cir. 2006). 26 “Unless a particular court record is one traditionally kept secret, a strong presumption in 27 favor of access is the starting point. A party seeking to seal a judicial record then bears the 1 That is, the party must articulate compelling reasons supported by specific factual findings that 2 outweigh the general history of access and the public policies favoring disclosure, such as the 3 public interest in understanding the judicial process. . . . [T]he court must conscientiously 4 balance the competing interests of the public and the party who seeks to keep certain judicial 5 records secret.” Id. at 1178–79 (cleaned up) (citation omitted). Thus, “[w]hat constitutes a 6 compelling reason is best left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Examples include when 7 a court record might be used to gratify private spite or promote public scandal, to circulate 8 libelous statements, or as sources of business information that might harm a litigant’s 9 competitive standing.” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1097 10 (9th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). 11 The compelling reasons standard applies to the sealing of documents at class certification 12 and summary judgment because such motions are “more than tangentially related to the 13 underlying [claim].” The compelling reasons standard applies to most judicial records. But a 14 good cause standard applies to the sealing of documents that are unrelated or only tangentially 15 related to the underlying claim. Id. at 1098–99. “For good cause to exist, the party seeking 16 protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective 17 order is granted.” Phillips ex rel. Ests. of Byrd v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206, 1210–11 18 (9th Cir. 2002). 19 “A party must explore all reasonable alternatives to filing documents under seal, 20 minimize the number of documents filed under seal, and avoid wherever possible sealing entire 21 documents (as opposed to merely redacting the truly sensitive information in a document).” 22 Civ. L. R. 79-5(a). “Reference to a stipulation or protective order that allows a party to 23 designate certain documents as confidential is not sufficient to establish that a document, or 24 portions thereof, are sealable.” Civ. L. R. 79-5(c). 25 Here, plaintiffs’ petition requests an order to withdraw and provide the settlement funds 26 to plaintiffs, who are now adults eligible to receive the funds. In addition, plaintiffs’ counsel 27 request to withdraw the remaining half of the attorney’s fees from their client trust account. 1 Because the petition relates to disbursement of settlement funds, it is only tangentially related 2 to the underlying claims. Thus, the good cause standard applies to plaintiffs’ motion to seal. 3 Plaintiffs have not met that standard. The administrative motion states only that the 4 documents are sealable “pursuant to prior order of this court sealing documents filed in this 5 case.” Dkt. No. 118. But the prior sealing order merely (1) permitted plaintiffs to proceed 6 using their first and last initials, (2) permitted plaintiffs’ guardians to proceed using their first 7 initials (but full last names), and (3) sealed two declarations of plaintiffs’ guardians. Dkt. No. 8 43 at 2. Without any justification, plaintiffs now seek to seal much more than that order 9 allowed. This does not suffice. 10 Moreover, the prior sealing order stated that, “[g]oing forward, a specific court order is 11 required each time plaintiffs seek to redact personal information.” Plaintiffs must explain, with 12 particularity, why any document or portion thereof is sealable under the applicable legal 13 standard. Thus, plaintiffs’ administrative motion is DENIED. Plaintiffs shall file a revised 14 motion consistent with this order by AUGUST 22, 2022, at NOON. 15 For the benefit of the parties and for the sake of efficiency, this order notes the following 16 issues. First, per Dkt. No. 112 at 7, plaintiff O.G.’s guardian was ordered to “file proof that 17 $81,939.62 was deposited into a blocked account with a federally insured bank for the benefit 18 of O.G. and that O.G. can access the account when he reaches the age of majority.” Such proof 19 was never filed. Along with the revised motion, plaintiffs SHALL FILE SUCH PROOF. 20 Second, per Dkt. No. 112 at 7, the amount of the settlement fund left for O.G. (after 21 deduction of attorney’s fees and funds for O.G.’s guardian to purchase a vehicle) is $64,604.22. 22 The ex parte petition, however, seeks to withdraw “$64,664.22 held in a blocked account at 23 Wells Fargo Bank.” The petition must either explain the discrepancy or be corrected. 24 Third, the ex parte petition and declaration use both of plaintiffs’ full names rather than 25 their initials in several locations. Plaintiffs must correct those errors. 26 Fourth, the ex parte petition seeks disbursement of the remaining half of the attorney’s 27 fees concurrent with the disbursement of plaintiffs’ net settlement awards. But a prior order 1 until counsel certify with this Court that all funds have been properly distributed ....” 2 Dkt. No. 112 at 7 (emphasis added). Thus, the remaining attorney’s fees shall not be disbursed 3 concurrent with the disbursement of plaintiffs’ awards. After plaintiffs receive their awards, 4 then plaintiffs’ counsel must move for an order permitting withdrawal of the remaining 5 attorney’s fees. Plaintiffs shall adjust the petition accordingly. 6 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 9 Dated: August 15, 2022. 10 1 LA Pee

WILLIAM ALSUP

12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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