1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6

DARRYL GADDIS,

7 Case No. 22-cv-01680-DMR (PR) Plaintiff, 8 v. ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT 9 WITH LEAVE TO AMEND HOWARD E. MOSELEY, et al., 10 Defendants. 11

12 I. INTRODUCTION 13 Plaintiff, who is currently incarcerated at High Desert State Prison (“HDSP”), filed this pro 14 se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging constitutional violations stemming from 15 an incident when he was being transported either to or from Salinas Valley State Prison (“SVSP”), 16 where he was previously incarcerated. See Dkt. 1 at 2-3. Plaintiff’s application to proceed in 17 forma pauperis will be granted in a separate Order. 18 In his complaint, plaintiff names the following defendants from SVSP both individually 19 and in their official capacity: Director Howard E. Moseley; and Transportation Officers Ramirez 20 and Cruz. Id. at 2. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief as well as monetary and punitive damages. Id. 21 at 3. 22 Venue is proper because certain events giving rise to the claims are alleged to have 23 occurred while plaintiff was being transported either to or from SVSP, which is located in this 24 judicial district. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). 25 For the reasons explained below, the complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. 26 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 27 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 1 § 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of 2 the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief 3 may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. 4 § 1915A(b). Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep’t, 5 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 6 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the 7 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the 8 statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the grounds upon 9 which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations omitted). Although to 10 state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to 11 provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 12 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must 13 be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to 14 state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 1974. 15 To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. ‘ 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) that a 16 right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged 17 violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 18 42, 48 (1988). 19

III. LEGAL CLAIMS

20 A. Injunctive Relief 21 The threshold question presented is whether the court has jurisdiction to consider 22 plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief, in light of his transfer from SVSP to HSDP. When an 23 inmate has been transferred to another prison and there is no reasonable expectation nor 24 demonstrated probability that he will again be subjected to the prison conditions from which he 25 seeks injunctive relief, the claim for injunctive relief should be dismissed as moot. See Dilley v. 26 Gunn, 64 F.3d 1365, 1368-69 (9th Cir. 1995). A claim that the inmate might be returned to the 27 prison where the injury occurred is too speculative to overcome mootness. Id. 1 Here, plaintiff’s transfer from SVSP to HSDP could render moot his claims for injunctive 2 relief. Therefore, the court DISMISSES plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief, and he shall be 3 granted leave to amend, provided he can do so in good faith. 4 B. Monetary Damages 5 Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that on an unknown date he was “injured with a broken leg.” Dkt. 1 at 3. Plaintiff claims that he was “temporarily disabled which made him eligible for 6 the safeguards imposed in the operational procedures as they apply to the transportation of inmates 7 in wheelchairs.” Id. However, defendants Moseley, Ramirez, and Cruz 8

9 intentionally conspired with each other to deliberately cast aside plaintiff[’]s safety, for which they had a duty to protect and uphold, 10 by den[y]ing him a wheelchair accessible van to transport him (from) SVSP to the outside clinic and upon returning and trying to exit [the] 11 van resulting in Plaintiff falling back and hitting his head [and] neck, and upper and lower back for which he still suffers from throughout 12 his daily activities. Id. 13 1. Official Capacity Claim 14 Plaintiff has sued the named defendants individually and in their official capacity seeking 15 monetary relief. Dkt. 1 at 1-2. “[A]n official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be 16 treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). Unless 17 waived, the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal court award of damages against a state, state 18 agency, or state official sued in an official capacity. Id. at 169. As there has been no waiver here, 19 plaintiff’s claim against defendants in their official capacity for monetary damages is 20 DISMISSED, and plaintiff shall be granted leave to amend, provided he can do so in good faith. 21 2. Eighth Amendment Claim 22 A prisoner may state a section 1983 claim under the Eighth Amendment based on unsafe 23 conditions only where the officials acted with “deliberate indifference” to the threat of serious 24 harm from physical conditions at the prison. Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 25 1998). Neither negligence nor gross negligence will constitute deliberate indifference. Farmer v. 26 Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-36 & n.4 (1994); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). A 27 prison official cannot be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for denying an inmate humane 1 conditions of confinement unless the standard for criminal recklessness is met, i.e., the official 2 knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. 3 The official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 4 substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference. See id. 5 Here, however, plaintiff has failed to allege even the most basic facts regarding the alleged 6 incident, such as the date or exact location, i.e., he simply states “upon returning” but does not 7 specify whether he was returning to SVSP or to the clinic. See Dkt. 1 at 3. Most importantly, he 8 has failed to allege what each defendant did individually to contribute to the alleged deliberate 9 indifference other than stating in a conclusory manner that they “intentionally conspired with each 10 other to deliberately cast aside plaintiff[’]s safety . . . by den[y]ing him a wheelchair accessible 11 van to transport him . . . .” See id. To state a cognizable claim against individual defendants, 12 plaintiff must “set forth specific facts as to each individual defendant’s” role in depriving plaintiff 13 of his protected rights. See Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 634 (9th Cir. 1988). Furthermore, 14 liability may be imposed only if plaintiff can allege and show that the defendant actually and 15 proximately caused the deprivation of a federally protected right. See id. Plaintiff will be given 16 leave to amend the complaint to set forth additional facts regarding the alleged deliberate 17 indifference, and to set forth specific facts showing that each individual defendant’s actions 18 proximately caused a violation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights, provided he can do so in good 19 faith. In amending his complaint, plaintiff must pay close attention to the following: “A person 20 deprives another ‘of a constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an 21 affirmative act, participates in another’s affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is 22 legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which [plaintiff complains].’” Leer, 844 F.2d 23 at 633 (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). The inquiry into causation 24 must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant 25 whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation. Id. Defendants 26 cannot be held liable for a constitutional violation under section 1983 unless they were integral 27 participants in the unlawful conduct. Keates v. Koile, 883 F.3d 1228, 1241 (9th Cir. 2018). 1 In addition, supervisory defendants are not responsible simply because they are 2 supervisors. There is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983. Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 3 1040, 1045 (9th Cir.1989). It is not enough that the supervisor merely has a supervisory 4 relationship over the defendants; the plaintiff must show that the supervisor “participated in or 5 directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Id. 6 Furthermore, supervisor defendants are entitled to qualified immunity where the allegations 7 against them are simply “bald” or “conclusory” because such allegations do not “plausibly” 8 establish the supervisors’ personal involvement in their subordinates’ constitutional wrong. 9 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676-83 (2009). 10 IV. CONCLUSION 11 For the foregoing reasons, the court orders as follows: 12 1. Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend in order to give him the 13 opportunity to file an Amended Complaint which corrects the deficiencies of his claims of 14 injunctive relief and monetary damages, as outlined above. 15 2. Within twenty-eight (28) days from the date of this Order, plaintiff shall file his 16 Amended Complaint as set forth above. Plaintiff must use the attached civil rights form, write the 17 case number for this action—Case No. C 22-cv-01680-DMR (PR)—on the form, clearly label the 18 complaint “Amended Complaint,” and complete all sections of the form. Because the Amended 19 Complaint completely replaces the original complaint, plaintiff must include in it all the claims he 20 wishes to present. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 21 915 (1992). He may not incorporate material from the original complaint by reference. If plaintiff 22 wishes to attach any additional pages to the civil rights form, he shall maintain the same format as 23 the form, i.e., answer only the questions asked in the “Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies” 24 section without including a narrative explanation of each grievance filed. Plaintiff’s failure to 25 file his Amended Complaint by the twenty-eight-day deadline or to correct the 26 aforementioned deficiencies outlined above will result in the dismissal of this action without 27 prejudice. 1 informed of any change of address and must comply with the court’s orders in a timely fashion. 2 Pursuant to Northern District Local Rule 3-11 a party proceeding pro se whose address changes 3 while an action is pending must promptly file a notice of change of address specifying the new 4 address. See L.R. 3-11(a). The court may dismiss without prejudice a complaint when: (1) mail 5 directed to the pro se party by the court has been returned to the court as not deliverable, and 6 (2)the court fails to receive within sixty days of this return a written communication from the pro 7 se party indicating a current address. See L.R. 3-11(b). 8 4. The Clerk of the Court shall send plaintiff a blank civil rights form along with a 9 copy of this Order. 10 IT IS SO ORDERED. 11 Dated: August 25, 2022 12 ______________________________________

DONNA M. RYU

13 United States Magistrate Judge 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27