1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 SCOTT JOHNSON, Case No. 3:21-cv-01620-JD

8 Plaintiff,

ORDER RE MOTION TO DISMISS

v. 9

10 THE CHRISTENI GROUP LLC, Defendant. 11

12 13 Plaintiff Scott Johnson is a quadriplegic and requires a wheelchair for mobility. Dkt. No. 1 14 ¶ 1. He has alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. 15 (ADA), and the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51-53, against defendant 16 The Christeni Group LLC (Christeni), which owns and operates a restaurant called Willard Hicks 17 Campbell in Campbell, California. Id. ¶¶ 2-3. 18 The complaint alleged that Christeni “failed to provide wheelchair accessible dining 19 surfaces in conformance with the ADA Standards,” id. ¶ 10, and specifically that there was a “lack 20 of sufficient knee and toe clearance under the dining surfaces for wheelchair users,” id. ¶ 13. 21 Christeni has asked to dismiss Johnson’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 22 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Dkt. No. 30. Christeni says that it brought the 23 restaurant’s dining surfaces into compliance soon after being served with the complaint, thus 24 rendering moot Johnson’s claim for injunctive relief under the ADA. Id.; see also Dkt. No. 30-2 25 ¶ 14 (declaration of Bassam Altwal, certified access specialist, certifying that the dining surfaces 26 are ADA-compliant). 27 Johnson acknowledges that Christeni has fixed the problem and “concedes that his current 1 No. 29. He does not dispute that his ADA claim is now moot. Dkt. No. 32. The Court agrees that 2 || the claim is moot, and it is dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Bayer v. Neiman 3 || Marcus Grp., 861 F.3d 853, 864 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[A] claim for injunctive relief becomes moot 4 || once subsequent events have made clear the conduct alleged as the basis for the requested relief 5 ‘could not reasonably be expected to recur.””). 6 Even so, Johnson asks the Court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Unruh Act 7 || claim. Dkt. No. 32. The request is declined. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (district court “may 8 decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim” if “the district court has dismissed all 9 || claims over which it has original jurisdiction”). “In the usual case in which all federal-law claims 10 || are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction 11 doctrine -- judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity -- will point toward declining to 12 || exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.” Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 5 13 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation, citation, and brackets omitted). That is the case 14 || here, especially considering that the Court did not rule on the merits of Johnson’s ADA claim. See 3 15 Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 654 F.3d 903, 911 (9th Cir. 2011) (district court did not abuse its a 16 || discretion -- after granting summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff's ADA claim -- in 3 17 declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims under 18 § 1367(c)(3)). The state-law claim is dismissed without prejudice. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 || Dated: September 30, 2022 21 22

JAMESYPONATO

23 United f$tates District Judge 24 25 26 27 28