INTRODUCTION

13 Plaintiff, a detainee at Napa State Hospital (“NSH”) who is proceeding without 14 representation by an attorney, filed this civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the 15 Secretary of the California Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) and a number of auto repair 16 shops and dealerships. The complaint was dismissed with leave to amend, and Plaintiff filed an 17 amended complaint. (ECF Nos. 5, 10.) For the reasons explained below, the case is DISMISSED 18 because the amended complaint repeats the same problems as the original complaint and does not 19 state a claim capable of being judicially heard and decided. 20 STANDARD OF REVIEW 21 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek 22 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 23 1915A(a). The Court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of 24 the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief 25 may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. 26 § 1915A(b). Pleadings filed by litigants unrepresented by an attorney must be liberally construed. 27 Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). 1 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “Specific facts are not necessary; the 2 statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . . claim is and the grounds upon 3 which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citations omitted). Although to 4 state a claim a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations, . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to 5 provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 6 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . . Factual allegations must 7 be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 8 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964-65 (2007) (citations omitted). A complaint must proffer “enough facts to 9 state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 1974. 10 DISCUSSION 11 The order dismissing the complaint with leave to amend explained the problems with 12 Plaintiff’s claims as follows:

13 The[] allegations are not sufficient under Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, because Plaintiff simply states conclusions and labels. 14 Plaintiff does not allege any facts that explain how Defendants violated his civil or contractual rights. He does not, for example, 15 describe the contracts, how they were breached, or who breached them. He also does not allege facts underlying his claims of 16 racketeering, tax evasion, “double dipping,” or privacy invasion. Plaintiff must also allege any actions or omissions by each 17 Defendant that shows how each of them individually caused a violation of his rights. Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633-34 (9th 18 Cir. 1988).

19 Furthermore, all but one Defendant (the DMV Secretary) appears to be a private entity or individual. Private individuals and 20 entities are generally not state actors and are not liable under Section 1983. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980); Van Ort v. 21 Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 835 (9th Cir. 1996). Private individuals or organizations act under color of state law when their 22 actions result from the State’s exercise of coercive power; when the State provides significant encouragement for the activity; or when a 23 private actor operates as a willful participant in joint activity with the State. Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. 24 Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 296 (2001). The Court has treated a nominally private entity as a state actor when it is controlled by a 25 state agency; when it has been delegated a public function by the state; or when it is entwined with government policies or 26 government is entwined in its management or control. Id. Plaintiff has not alleged facts that allow him to hold the private Defendants 27 liable as state actors under Section 1983. 1 (ECF No. 5 at 2-3.) 2 The amended complaint suffers from the same problems as the original complaint. 3 Plaintiff names 16 Defendants whom he claims breached contracts, “suppress[ed] evidence,” 4 “conspire[ed] to the mutilation of currency,” committed “trust fraud,” “trespass[ed]” law, and 5 acted with deliberate indifference. (ECF No. 10 at 4.) These allegations are again simply labels 6 and conclusions, which are insufficient under Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The only fact he alleges 7 is “each Defendant” sold or transferred his “private property” (id.), but he does not allege what, 8 when, or to whom the property was sold, nor does he allege how each Defendant was involved in 9 any such sales. Plaintiff also refers to the “Negotiable Instruments Act,” the Patriot Act, the 10 Administrative Procedures Act, the “1940 Fiduciary Duty Obligations Act,” and the Fifth 11 Amendment. (Id.) However, he does not identify or cite the provisions of these laws, some of 12 which do not appear to be laws of the United States,1 Defendants violated. Lastly, 13 of the 16 13 Defendants are auto dealerships or repair shops, and one other is an employee of Wells Fargo 14 Bank, but Plaintiff has not alleged facts allowing him to hold these private companies and this 15 private person liable as state actors. As a result, the amended complaint, even when liberally 16 construed, does not allege sufficient facts under Twombly to state a plausible claim for relief 17 against any of the Defendants for violating Plaintiff’s rights under federal law. 18 Plaintiff was cautioned this case would be dismissed if the amended complaint was not 19 sufficient. (ECF No. 5 at 3.) Plaintiff received instructions on how to correct the deficiencies in 20 the original complaint, but the amended complaint does not do so. There is no indication, 21 moreover, that further leave to amend would produce a different result. See Janicki Logging Co. 22 v. Mateer, 42 F.3d 561, 566 (9th Cir. 1994) (leave need to amend need not be granted where it 23 constitutes an exercise in futility). Accordingly, the case is dismissed without further leave to 24 amend. 25 Plaintiff has filed a motion for “a preliminary injunction and subpoena duces tecum.” 26 (ECF No. 8.) The motion asserts unidentified “private property” is “within the filings” of a civil 27 1 action in state court and this violates Plaintiffs right to privacy and due process. (/d.) Plaintiff 2 || does not indicate what he wants to be enjoined or subpoenaed. Moreover, a preliminary injunction 3 requires service upon the Defendants or a certificate of the efforts, if any, Plaintiff has made to 4 give notice of the motion to the Defendants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1), (b). Defendants have not 5 been served, and Plaintiff has not certified his efforts to notify Defendants of the motion. A 6 || preliminary injunction also requires Plaintiff to show his claims are likely to succeed. See Winter 7 v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). There is no possibility of the 8 || claims’ success in this case because there are no claims that can be heard and decided by the 9 Court. Accordingly, the motion is denied. 10 CONCLUSION 11 For the reasons explained above, the case is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim that is 12 || capable of being judicially heard and decided. Plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction 5 13 || CECF No. 8) is DENIED. 14 The clerk shall enter judgment and close the file. 3 15 This order resolves docket number 8. a 16 IT IS SO ORDERED. 17 || Dated: April 6, 2023

19 ne

CQUELINE SCOTT CORLEY

20 United States District Judge 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28