1 2 3 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 5 6 JIAXING SUPER LIGHTING ELECTRIC Case No. 21-cv-08489-MMC

APPLIANCE CO., LTD.,

7 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT 8 SIGNIFY HOLDING B.V.'S MOTION v. TO DISMISS THIRD AMENDED 9 COMPLAINT JOHN BRUGGEMAN, et al., 10 Defendants. 11 12 Before the Court is defendant Signify Holding B.V.’s (“Signify”) motion, filed May 13 25, 2023, “to Dismiss Third Amended Complaint,” whereby Signify seeks dismissal of one 14 of the claims in the Third Amended Verified Complaint (“TAC”), the operative pleading in 15 the instant action. Plaintiff Jiaxing Super Lighting Electric Appliance Co., Ltd. (“Super 16 Lighting”) has filed opposition, to which Signify has replied. Having read and considered 17 the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motion, the Court rules as follows.1 18 BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 19 In the TAC, Super Lighting asserts against Signify a single cause of action for 20 “Actual and Constructive Fraudulent Transfer of Patents” under the California Uniform 21 Voidable Transfer Act (“CUVTA”) and the Delaware Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act 22 (“DUFTA”). (See TAC ¶¶ 245-256.) In particular, Super Lighting, in the Second Cause of 23 Action, alleges that Signify, by purchasing 37 patents (“the Patents”) belonging to debtor 24 and nominal defendant Lunera Lighting, Inc. (“Lunera”) for consideration that was “less 25 than reasonably equivalent value” (see TAC ¶ 250),2 “put the Patents . . . beyond Super 26 1 By order filed June 27, 2023, the Court took the matter under submission. 27 1 Lighting’s reach and delayed, hindered, and impeded its ability to enforce its arbitration 2 award and [j]udgment” against Lunera (see TAC ¶ 253). Based thereon, Super Lighting 3 seeks equitable relief and damages. (See TAC ¶ 256.) 4 By order filed December 2, 2022 (“December 2 Order”), the Court granted in part 5 and denied in part Signify’s Motion to Dismiss the First Amended Verified Complaint 6 (“FAC”) to the extent it alleged a claim against Signify for “Actual and Constructive 7 Fraudulent Transfer of Patents.” In particular, the Court granted the motion to the extent 8 such claim was based on constructive fraudulent transfer of the Patents, and denied the 9 motion in all other respects. (See December 2 Order at 9:19-22.) In so ruling, the Court 10 found Super Lighting “ha[d] not pled facts establishing the actual market value of the 11 [P]atents” (see December 2 Order at 8:15-16), and that Super Lighting’s “conclusory 12 assertion” that the consideration Lunera received for the Patents was “less than 13 reasonably equivalent value” did not, “absent factual support . . . suffice for purposes of 14 pleading its [constructive fraudulent transfer] claim” (see December 2 Order at 8:18-26 15 (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009))). 16 Super Lighting, with leave of Court, filed the Second Amended Verified Complaint 17 (“SAC”), in which Super Lighting added a description of the Patents, namely, that 18 “Lunera’s Patents fall into two categories—structure and circuit—and were used in three 19 categories of Lunera products (i) place-in-lamps; (ii) high intensity discharge lamps; and 20 (iii) linear lighting,” and, as to value, alleged:

21 Lunera’s internal financial and operating data, including Lunera’s own 22 financial statements and historical sales and projections, as well as several industry factors relevant to the Patents such as licensing, remaining patent 23 life, and projected segment revenue growth, establish that the Patents had an actual fair market value of between $5.5 million and $6.9 million on 24 January 18, 2019, the date of their transfer. 25 (See SAC ¶ 162; see also SAC ¶ 110.) 26 $125,000 (see TAC ¶ 161) and, on the same day, “transferred the Patents to Signify in 27 exchange for $160,000 ($125,000 purchase price, plus a $35,000 commission to Tynax) 1 By order filed April 26, 2023 (“April 26 Order”), the Court granted Signify’s Motion 2 to Dismiss the SAC, finding Super Lighting’s additional allegations as to the value of the 3 patents insufficient to cure the deficiencies identified in the December 2 Order. In 4 particular, the Court found the alleged valuation range, to the extent “derive[d] from 5 Lunera’s ‘financial statements and historical sales and projections,’” (see April 26 Order 6 at 4:3-5 (quoting SAC ¶¶ 110, 162)), was unsupported by “specific data” obtained 7 therefrom, or allegations as to “how any such figures are relevant to patent valuation” 8 (see April 26 Order at 4:5-6), and to the extent “derive[d] from ‘industry factors relevant to 9 the Patents such as licensing, remaining patent life, and projected segment revenue 10 growth’” (see April 26 Order at 4:7-9 (quoting SAC ¶ 162)), was lacking in “factual 11 elaboration” (see April 26 Order at 4:9). The Court further noted that, to the extent the 12 alleged valuation range derived from the reports of “outside experts” engaged to “perform 13 a preliminary valuation of the [P]atents,” the SAC “ma[de] no mention of such experts, let 14 alone any of their findings.” (See April 26 Order at 4:24-26.) 15 Super Lighting, again with leave of Court, filed the TAC, which pleading contains 16 revised allegations as to the value of the Patents,3 as well as six supporting Schedules.4 17 (See TAC ¶¶ 162-179.) 18 LEGAL STANDARD 19 Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "can be 20 based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged 21 under a cognizable legal theory." See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 22 699 (9th Cir. 1990). Rule 8(a)(2), however, "requires only 'a short and plain statement of 23 3 Although Super Lighting previously alleged the Patents were worth $5.8 million to 24 $6.9 million (see SAC ¶¶ 110, 162), Super Lighting now asserts the “actual fair market value” of the Patents at the time of their transfer on January 18, 2019, was “between $5.8 25 million and 7.2 million” (see TAC ¶¶ 110, 164). 26 4 The Schedules, which are attached to the TAC as Exhibit A, are titled: (1) “Summary of LED Patents”; (2) “Summary of Values”; (3) “Historical and Projected 27 Income Statements”; (4) “Value of LED Patents (PLs)”; (5) “Value of LED Patents 1 the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. 2 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). Consequently, "a 3 complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual 4 allegations." See id. Nonetheless, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his 5 entitlement to relief requires more than . . . a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 6 cause of action." See id. (internal quotation, citation, and alteration omitted). 7 In analyzing a motion to dismiss, a district court must accept as true all material 8 allegations in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the 9 nonmoving party. See NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). "To 10 survive a motion to dismiss," however, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual 11 material, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft 12 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "Factual 13 allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," 14 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, and courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion 15 couched as a factual allegation," see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation and 16 citation omitted). 17 DISCUSSION 18 By the instant motion, Signify argues Super Lighting has failed to cure the 19 deficiencies noted by the Court in its previous order of dismissal, in that, according to 20 Signify, Super Lighting again fails to plead facts plausibly supporting the alleged market 21 value of the Patents. 22 The pleading requirements for fraudulent transfer under DUFTA and CUVTA are 23 identical. See In re PennySaver USA Publ’g, LLC, 602 B.R. 256, 267 (Bankr. Del. 2019). 24 Under either statute, to state a claim for constructive fraudulent transfer, a plaintiff must 25 allege that a “debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation without receiving a 26 reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation and the debtor was 27 insolvent at the time or . . . became insolvent as a result of the transfer or obligation.” 1 Kim, 2015 WL 7753235, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2015) (“[A]t its core, a constructive 2 fraudulent transfer claim has two elements: reasonable equivalent value and insolvency.” 3 (internal quotation and citation omitted)).5 4 “Determining reasonable equivalence requires case-by-case adjudication, which 5 depends on all the facts of [the] case, an important element of which is market value.” In 6 re BMT-NW Acquisition, LLC, 582 B.R. 846, 858 (Bankr. D. Del. 2018) (internal quotation 7 and citation omitted). Although, as the Court noted in its December 2 Order, a complaint, 8 “[a]t the pleading stage, . . . need only include allegations specifying in detail the date of 9 the transfer, the amount of the consideration received, and the alleged value of the asset 10 on the date of the transfer” (see December 2 Order at 8:9-12 (citing In re AstroPower 11 Liquidating Tr., 335 B.R. 309, 333-34 (Bankr. D. Del. 2005))), a complaint must still 12 “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is 13 plausible on its face,” see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 14 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). 15 In the instant case, Super Lighting, as noted, alleges the “actual market value” of 16 the Patents on the date of their transfer was “between $5.8 million and $7.2 million.” 17 (See TAC ¶¶ 110, 164.) In contrast to the SAC, however, the TAC contains “factual 18 matter” supporting the alleged valuation. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In particular, the 19 TAC identifies the source of the alleged valuation range, namely, a preliminary valuation 20 analysis performed by B. Riley Advisory Services (“B-Riley”)6 (see TAC ¶ 163), the 21 valuation methodology employed by B-Riley, namely, the Relief-from-Royalty (“RFR”) 22 methodology (see TAC ¶ 165),7 the variables relevant to such methodology, namely 23 5 Here, as before, the parties do not dispute Super Lighting’s insolvency at the 24 time of the transfer at issue. 25 6 Super Lighting alleges it engaged B-Riley, “a leading national financial and expert consulting firm,” in August 2022 for the purpose of “perform[ing] a preliminary 26 valuation of the fair market value of the Patents at the time of their transfer.” (See TAC ¶ 163.) 27 1 “profitability” of the Patents (see TAC ¶¶ 169-170), “remaining patent life” (see TAC 2 ¶ 171), and “projected segment revenue growth” (see TAC ¶ 172), the raw data used to 3 assess such variables, namely, Lunera’s historical financial data and industry information 4 (see TAC ¶¶ 173-75), and the steps performed in connection with the RFR analysis (see 5 TAC ¶¶ 175-178). 6 Signify contends Super Lighting fails to allege facts sufficient to make its asserted 7 valuation range plausible, arguing (1) the new allegations in the TAC are essentially an 8 expert opinion that cannot be considered at the motion to dismiss stage (see Def.’s Reply 9 in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“Reply”) 2:2-4, Dkt. No. 129); (2) the new allegations “fail to 10 follow how patents are valued” (see Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Third Am. Compl. (“Mot.”) 11 10:20-22, Dkt. No. 122); and (3) the remaining facts before the Court do not support a 12 plausible inference that price Signify paid for the Patents was not reasonably equivalent 13 value (see Mot. 14:2-3, 15:17-18). The Court addresses each argument in turn. 14 A. Expert Opinion 15 Signify contends the new allegations in the TAC are “not properly considered” at 16 the motion to dismiss stage because they reflect “an expert opinion that is categorically 17 different in nature than factual allegations.” (See Reply 2:2-4). Such argument is, for the 18 reasons set forth below, unavailing. 19 At the outset, the Court notes such argument is raised for the first time in Signify’s 20 reply in support of the instant motion, leaving Super Lighting with no opportunity to 21 respond. If, as Signify contends, Super Lighting’s reliance on an expert’s findings for 22 purposes of pleading the market value of the Patents is “fatal” to its claims (see Reply 23 4:11), such argument should have been included in its opening brief. See TPK Touch 24 Sols., Inc. v. Wintek Electro-Optics Corp., 2013 WL 5289015, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 18, 25 2013) (holding “[t]he Court does not consider new facts or argument made for the first 26

27 licensing it and having to pay license fees to a third party that hypothetically owns the 1 time in a reply brief”). 2 Moreover, the cases on which Signify relies for the proposition that courts 3 “routinely ignore expert opinions” at the motion to dismiss stage do not preclude Super 4 Lighting’s incorporating B. Riley’s findings in the TAC. (See Reply 4:7.) Although “[m]ost 5 district courts within the circuit have concluded that it is inappropriate to consider an 6 expert affidavit [attached to the complaint] on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),” 7 see City of Royal Oak Ret. Sys. v. Juniper Networks, Inc., 2013 WL 2156358, at *7 (N.D. 8 Cal. May 17, 2013), plaintiffs may “include [an] expert’s nonconclusory assertions within 9 specific paragraphs in the complaint, see DeMarco v. DepoTech Corp., 149 F. Supp. 2d 10 1212, 1222 (S.D. Cal. 2001) (granting defendant’s motion to strike expert affidavit 11 attached to operative complaint; denying motion to strike portions of operative complaint 12 derived from said affidavit). Here, to the extent the allegations in the TAC reflect 13 B-Riley’s analysis, such allegations constitute “non-conclusory assertions” as to market 14 value,8 which are properly considered in determining whether plaintiff has plausibly made 15 out the elements of a constructive fraudulent conveyance claim.9 16

17 8 The Court has not considered, however, the supporting “Schedules” attached to the TAC. See Benzon v. Morgan Stanley Distributors, Inc., 2004 WL 62747, at *3 (M.D. 18 Tenn. Jan. 8, 2004), aff'd, 420 F.3d 598 (6th Cir. 2005) (declining to consider “expert witness’ analysis and graphs” attached to complaint). 19 9 The cases cited by Signify are distinguishable, in that they concerned either (1) 20 expert reports/affidavits attached to complaints, rather than allegations in the complaints 21 based on such materials, see Rivac v. Ndex W. LLC, 2013 WL 3476659, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 10, 2013) (denying plaintiff’s request to deem 125-page “Mortgage Securitization 22 Audit & Analysis Report” incorporated in complaint by reference; noting “the facts alleged in the complaint [were] not related in any comprehensible way to any facts” in said 23 report); Stuart v. Cadbury Adams USA, LLC, 2010 WL 1407303, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2010), aff'd, 458 F. App'x 689 (9th Cir. 2011) (declining to consider expert report attached 24 to complaint); or (2) allegations in a complaint reflecting expert opinions on questions of 25 law, see Yuan v. Facebook, Inc., 2021 WL 4503105, at *1-3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2021) (declining to consider expert’s “opinions as set forth in . . . the [complaint]”; noting such 26 opinions consisted of inadmissible conclusions regarding whether alleged misstatements would mislead reasonable investors and whether alleged losses were proximately caused 27 by such misrepresentations, rather than “new facts or evidence”); City of Royal Oak, 1 Accordingly, the TAC is not subject to dismissal on the ground that it is supported 2 by B-Riley’s analysis. 3 B. Valuation Methodology 4 Next, Signify argues that, for five reasons, B-Riley’s preliminary valuation analysis 5 “fails to follow how patents are valued.” (See Mot. 10:20-22.) Such argument is, for the 6 reasons set forth below, unavailing. 7 First, Signify contends B. Riley’s valuation of the Patents is “facially deficient” (see 8 Mot. 10:24-25) because it is based on the RFR method, and therefore assumes, 9 incorrectly, that “the patent owner (Lunera) will be selling products in the future that would 10 otherwise incur a royalty” (see Mot. 11:1-2). Signify cites no authority, however, for the 11 idea that intellectual property belonging to a company in the process of dissolving cannot 12 be valued using the RFR method,10 and indeed, such proposition appears inconsistent 13 with the general concept of valuation in a fraudulent transfer case, where, as Super 14 Lighting points out, the “debtor is often insolvent, dissolved and/or in bankruptcy and no 15 longer engaged in ongoing operations.” (See Pltf.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss Third Am. 16 Compl. (“Opp.”) 9:13-15, Dkt. No. 128.) Moreover, the new allegations in the TAC 17 explain how such analysis, which aims to calculate value “based on the hypothetical 18 royalty payments that would be saved by owning the asset” (see TAC ¶ 165), can be 19 performed using a combination of Lunera’s historical financial information and industry 20 data (see TAC ¶ 172 (noting “B-Riley conservatively estimated expected revenue growth 21

22 its adoption of new revenue recognition rules); Kohler v. Litehouse, Inc., 2012 WL 23 6217635, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2012) (striking from complaint quotations from expert report that “relay[ed] [expert’s] opinion, but ma[de] no statements of fact”); In re 24 Ashworth, Inc. Securities Litigation, 2001 WL 37119391, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2001) (striking from complaint allegations based on expert’s “legal conclusions”). 25

10 Signify’s reliance on Humane Soc'y of United States v. Perdue, 290 F. Supp. 3d 26 5 (D.D.C. 2018) is misplaced, in that the trademarks at issue therein had “been declared to be obsolete,” see id. at *9; further, the valuation method on which the court’s decision 27 rested was not the RFR method, but, rather, a “cost approach,” which “considers how 1 rates as of the valuation date, which estimates also considered estimated market share 2 for the different product types based on historical Lunera revenue data and the broader 3 lighting industry data from the commonly used data sources, including TrendForce, 4 LEDinside, and IBISWorld”)). 5 Second, Signify contends the TAC is devoid of allegations that “Lunera’s products 6 practice the Patents in question” (see Mot. 11:18-19), such that “there is no proof that any 7 royalty would be avoided by ownership of that patent” (see Mot. 12:8-10). This argument 8 likewise is unsupported by any authority cited by Signify. Rather, the cases on which 9 Signify relies, namely, QuickLogic Corp. v. Konda Techs., Inc., 618 F. Supp. 3d 873 (N.D. 10 Cal. 2022) and UTTO Inc. v. Metrotech Corp., 2022 WL 17968846 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 11 2022), concern the question of infringement and hold that a defendant’s products, not the 12 plaintiff’s, must practice the patented claims. Moreover, as Super Lighting points out, to 13 the extent Signify argues Super Lighting has provided “no proof that any Lunera 14 product—past or present—practices any claim of any patent” (see Mot. 1:22-24), such 15 argument ignores the TAC’s numerous allegations regarding Lunera products “using” the 16 Patents here at issue (see TAC ¶ 167 (noting “Lunera’s own financial statements through 17 the valuation date showing its historical sales and revenues of the product lines in which 18 the Patents were used are relevant and important to the RFR Method”); ¶ 169 (“noting 19 B-Riley reviewed and analyzed Lunera documents pertaining to the Patents, including . . . 20 their relevant products”); ¶ 170 (noting “[t]he Patents used in the three product groups 21 varied from low to high profitability”); ¶ 173 (noting “B-Riley also analyzed Lunera’s 22 historical revenues from the Lunera products that used the Patents, including data 23 showing the percentage of total sales revenue for each of the three product groups”); 24 ¶ 174 (noting “[t]he Lunera sales data was also used to project the future revenue stream 25 for each group of products that used the Patents”)). 26 Third, Signify asserts the new allegations in the TAC are insufficient to plausibly 27 establish the value of the Patents because the TAC “does not allege that the preliminary 1 “identify a single non-Lunera license that would be comparable to any of the 37 Patents.” 2 (See Mot. 12:24-26.) According to Signify, the absence of such allegations is fatal to 3 Super Lighting’s ability to plead a constructive fraudulent transfer claim because “patent 4 valuation values the asserted patent based on comparable licenses.” (See Mot. 12:12-13 5 (internal quotation and citation omitted).) Signify does not, however, cite any authority for 6 the proposition that a plaintiff must identify specific comparable patents and/or licenses to 7 survive a motion to dismiss, and the Court finds the TAC’s general allegations regarding 8 comparable licenses sufficient at this stage. (See TAC ¶ 176 (alleging, for purposes of 9 estimating fair royalty rate for the Patents, B-Riley “analyzed publicly available lighting 10 industry license agreements for lighting patents suitable for comparison with the Patents, 11 including relevant patent licensing agreements previously entered into by Super Lighting,” 12 as well as “royalty rate data from RoyaltySource in conjunction with other patent license 13 agreements in the lighting industry”).) 14 Fourth, Signify argues, Super Lighting “has not alleged . . . any facts from which it 15 can possibly be determined what the Patents cover in comparison with other patents in 16 the relevant market” (see Mot. 13:8-10), and, consequently, “has not alleged any facts 17 from which to deduce” the value of the Patents at issue (see Mot. 13:15-16). Such 18 argument, however, fails for the reason stated above, namely, Signify’s failure to cite any 19 authority demanding such specificity at the pleading stage. 20 Lastly, and inconsistent with the first of the above-discussed arguments, Signify 21 contends “the fact that [Super Lighting] chose not to attach the purported preliminary 22 valuation report [authored by B-Riley] renders all of the allegations based upon the report 23 unreliable.” (See Mot. 13:17-19.) In support thereof, however, Signify cites cases 24 applying the doctrine of incorporation by reference, which doctrine allows district courts to 25 consider, as incorporated in the complaint, any document “the authenticity of which is not 26 contested, and upon which the plaintiff’s complaint necessarily relies.” See Parrino v. 27 FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699, 706 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 1 insurance coverage is based on the contents of a coverage plan, or when a plaintiff’s 2 claim about stock fraud is based on the contents of SEC filings” (internal citations 3 omitted)). Here, however, Signify does not ask the Court to consider any document 4 referenced in the TAC. 5 Accordingly, the TAC is not subject to dismissal on the ground that it “fail[s] to 6 follow how patents are valued.” (See Mot. 10:20-22.) 7 C. Plausibility 8 Lastly, Signify argues there are “no other factual allegations in the SAC related to 9 the Patents sale which support a plausible inference that [the price Signify paid for the 10 patents] was not reasonably equivalent value” (see Mot. 14:2-3), and that “other 11 allegations and facts before the Court make [p]laintiff’s claim [as to value] . . . 12 implausible” (see Mot. 15:17-19). The Court is, again, unpersuaded. 13 First, to the extent Signify argues Super Lighting has failed to plead “facts 14 regarding whether the Patent transactions between Lunera and Tynax, and Tynax and 15 Signify were at ‘arms-length’ and whether Signify ‘acted in good faith’” (see Mot. 14:4-6; 16 see also Reply 9:26-10:7), the Court has already found such facts, while potentially 17 relevant to the question of whether the Patents were sold for reasonably equivalent 18 value, are not themselves necessary elements of Super Lighting’s claim (see December 19 2 Order at 8:9-12 (noting “[a]t the pleading stage . . . the complaint need only include 20 allegations specifying in detail the date of the transfer, the amount of the consideration 21 received, and the alleged value of the asset on the date of the transfer” (internal 22 quotation, citation, and alteration omitted)). 23 Further, to the extent Signify argues the alleged valuation range is facially 24 implausible, in that it would have been “completely irrational” for Lunera to sell the 25 Patents for $125,000 if they were worth between $5.8 million and $7.2 million (see Mot. 26 16:8-10), such argument overlooks the central premise of this lawsuit as alleged in the 27 TAC, namely, that Lunera’s directors “caused Lunera to fraudulently transfer its 1 Super Lighting” (see TAC § 2; see also December 2 Order at 6:3-5 (noting Super 2 || Lighting’s allegations “suffice to support a reasonable inference of actual fraudulent intent 3 || on the part of’ Lunera’s directors)). Similarly, to the extent Signify contends the alleged 4 || valuation range is implausible absent facts showing why a “third-party bidder only bid 5 || $100,000 for the patents, . .. why Tynax did not cash in its winning lottery ticket when it 6 || acquired both the Patents for $125,000 and the freedom to sell the Patents to whomever 7 || it wished,’ and why Signify balked at paying $125,000 plus commission for the Patents” 8 || (see Mot. 17:2-8), such arguments go to the weight of Super Lighting’s case, rather than 9 || its ability to plead a constructive fraudulent transfer claim. 10 Accordingly, the TAC is not subject to dismissal on the ground that it lacks 11 allegations sufficient to support a plausible inference that the Patents were not sold for g 12 || reasonably equivalent value. 13 D. Summary 14 In sum, the Court finds each of the above arguments asserted by Signify 2 15 || unpersuasive, and, accordingly, finds the factual allegations in the TAC sufficient to state a 16 || aclaim for constructive fraudulent transfer. g 17 CONCLUSION S 18 For the reasons stated above, Signify’s motion to dismiss the TAC is herby 19 || DENIED. 20 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 23 || Dated: July 18, 2023 LY.

M. CHESNEY □

24 United States District Judge 25 26 27 41 There is nothing in the TAC stating Tynax, which is alleged to have been acting 2g || as Signify’s agent (see TAC { 161), was in a position to sell the patents on its own behalf.