1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 TAMMI FUQUA, Case No. 19-cv-05401-HSG

8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO

APPOINT COUNSEL AND

9 v. TERMINATING AS MOOT IN PART

AND DENYING IN PART MOTION

10 UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 11 Defendant. Re: Dkt. Nos. 25, 26

12 13 In its February 15, 2023 Order Terminating Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma 14 Pauperis, the Court explained that “[f]ailure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this 15 order [by March 14, 2023] may result in dismissal of this action without further notice to 16 Plaintiff.” Dkt. No. 24 at 1. As of the date of this order, Plaintiff has not filed an amended 17 complaint. Instead, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Appoint Counsel, Dkt. No. 25, and a Motion for 18 Extension of Time, Dkt. No. 26. 19 I. MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL 20 “There is no constitutional right to appointed counsel for employment discrimination 21 claims.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 269 (9th Cir. 1982). Title VII of 22 the 1964 Civil Rights Act, however, provides that “[u]pon application by the complainant and in 23 such circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for such 24 complainant.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1). A district court is not obligated to appoint counsel in 25 every case. Johnson v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 939 F.2d 820, 824 (9th Cir. 1991). In exercising 26 its discretion regarding whether to appoint counsel, a district court must assess: “(1) the plaintiff’s 27 financial resources, (2) the efforts made by the plaintiff to secure counsel, and (3) whether the 1 Cir. 1981). 2 As to the first factor regarding financial resources, Plaintiff is proceeding in forma 3 pauperis. See Dkt. No. 8 (order by Judge Corley granting Plaintiff’s IFP status). The Court finds 4 that this factor weighs in favor of appointing counsel. 5 Regarding the second factor, Plaintiff does not explain any efforts she has undertaken to 6 secure counsel. Plaintiff only states that she is “not qualified to legally represent” herself and that 7 she “need[s] assistance from the courts so that [she] can consult with a lawyer.” Dkt. No. 25 at 1. 8 In Plaintiff’s Motion for Extension of Time, Plaintiff also states she is “in need of 9 accommodations of the Court to assist in finding a pro bono attorney.” Dkt. No. 26. The Court 10 finds that this factor weighs against appointing counsel, given the absence of any indication that 11 Plaintiff has tried to secure either retained or pro bono counsel on her own. 12 Finally, with respect to the third factor, the Court cannot, at this stage, conclude that 13 Plaintiff’s claims are likely to be meritorious given the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s complaint 14 identified in Judge Corley’s October 8, 2019 order (Dkt. No. 8) and summarized in Judge Corley’s 15 November 25, 2019 report and recommendation (Dkt. No. 13), none of which Plaintiff has 16 corrected. It also is unclear, as referenced below, why Plaintiff’s apparent settlement of the appeal 17 in her 2016 case does not bar this substantially, if not entirely, overlapping case. The Court finds 18 that the third factor weighs against appointing counsel. 19 Plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel is therefore DENIED. 20 II. MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 21 Plaintiff’s motion for extension of time is TERMINATED AS MOOT in light of the new 22 deadline for filing an amended complaint set by this order. To the extent Dkt. No. 26 is also a 23 request for appointment of counsel this request is DENIED for the same reasons set forth above. 24 III. CONCLUSION 25 Plaintiff’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel (Dkt. No. 25) is DENIED and Plaintiff’s 26 Motion for Extension of Time (Dkt. No. 26) is TERMINATED AS MOOT IN PART and 27 DENIED IN PART as set forth above. 1 attachments to an IFP or other motion) that addresses the defects identified by Judge Corley’s 2 October 8, 2019 order, Dkt. No. 8, and summarized in Judge Corley’s November 25, 2019 report 3 and recommendation, Dkt. No. 13.! In particular, given that Plaintiff stipulated to the dismissal of 4 || her appeal in September 2022, see Fuqua v. United Parcel Service, No. 16-cv-01193-HSG, Dkt. 5 |} No. 201, any amended complaint should make clear how the current claims Plaintiff is pursuing in 6 || this case are different from the ones she appears to have settled regarding the 2016 case. If 7 Plaintiff intends to pursue the case, the amended complaint must be filed by August 25, 2023. The 8 || Court once again advises Plaintiff that failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this 9 || order in the time provided very likely will result in dismissal of this action without further notice 10 || to Plaintiff. Having chosen to file this case herself, Plaintiff is required to meet the Court’s 11 deadlines and prosecute the case diligently, whether or not she is able to retain an attorney. 12 The Court again encourages Plaintiff to seek the assistance of the free Legal Help Center 5 13 operated by the Bar Association of San Francisco. The Legal Help Center sets up appointments to 14 speak with a lawyer for basic legal help, but it does not provide legal representation. 3 15 Appointments can be scheduled by emailing fedpro @ sfbar.org or by calling (415) 782-8982. a 16 || Plaintiff may also wish to consult the other resources available on the Court’s website, at 3 17 https://cand.uscourts.gov/pro-se-litigants/, for people who are representing themselves without a 18 lawyer. 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 || Dated: 7/21/2023 21 Absurd 5 Mb).

HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR.

United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28 ' The Court also advises Plaintiff to review the guidance for preparing an amended complaint the Court summarized in its February 15, 2023 order, Dkt. No. 24.