1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 ONE FAIR WAGE, INC., Case No. 21-cv-02695-EMC

8 Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S

9 v. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

10 DARDEN RESTAURANTS INC., 11 Defendant. Docket No. 65

12 13 14 Currently pending before the Court is a motion for leave to file a motion for 15 reconsideration filed by Plaintiff One Fair Wage, Inc. (“OFW”). Having considered the parties’ 16 briefs, the Court hereby finds the matter suitable for resolution without oral argument. OFW’s 17 motion is DENIED. It has filed to satisfy any of the requirements of Civil Local Rule 7-9(b). For 18 example: 19 • OFW argues that there is a material difference in law compared to what was 20 presented to the Court before it issued its order on statutory standing. See Civ. L.R. 21 7-9(b)(1). OFW cites to (1) a case, see McGhee v. Healthcare Servs. Group, No. 22 5:10-cv-279-RS-EMT, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126886 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 2, 2011), 23 and (2) legislative history for Title VII. OFW has failed to show that it could not 24 have, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, discovered these authorities earlier. 25 Denial of the motion is warranted on this ground alone. Even if the Court were to 26 consider the merits, McGhee is distinguishable because, there, the plaintiff suffered 27 a direct harm (retaliation) whereas here OFW’s injury is essentially derivative of 1 there is no indication that the New Deal statutes and Title VII should be deemed 2 statutes dealing with similar subjects for purposes of statutory interpretation. In 3 addition to the substantial separation in time (decades) between the legislation, the 4 subject matters of the respective legislation differ. 5 • According to OFW, there are new material facts that did not exist at the time of the 6 Court’s prior order on statutory standing, see Civ. L.R. 7-9(b)(2) – i.e., that not 7 only Darden employees but also OFW itself suffers harm as a result of Darden’s 8 discrimination. Here, OFW is trying to force a square peg in a round hole. The 9 Court has never been under the impression that OFW was not claiming harm as a 10 result of Darden’s actions. There are no new material facts here. 11 • Finally, OFW argues that the Court failed to consider two dispositive legal 12 arguments in its prior order on statutory standing, see Civ. L.R. 7-9(b)(3): (1) OFW 13 has statutory standing because it and Darden employees “at least arguably shar[e] 14 the same interest – an interest in employment non-discrimination”; and (2) OFW’s 15 “statutory standing is compelled by [the text of] 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a), a statute the 16 Court declined to cite at all, let alone explain why its text ought to be ignored.” 17 Mot. at 13, 15 (emphasis in original). Neither argument is compelling. Whether a 18 person/entity may have an interest aligned with someone else does not establish 19 that the person/entity is within the zone of interest of Title VII; the question here is 20 whether Title VII was intended to permit a person/entity (OFW) to raise the rights 21 of others (Darden employees) who are the ones who suffer the direct harm. The 22 second argument lacks merit because the Court correctly noted that, under Title 23 VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, a plaintiff must be “a person claiming to be aggrieved” 24 in order to have statutory standing. See Docket No. 30 (Order at 24) (stating that, 25 “[t]o have standing to bring such an action the plaintiff must be ‘a person claiming 26 to be aggrieved . . . ‘ under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5”); Waters v. Heublein, Inc., 547 27 F.2d 466, 469 (9th Cir. 1976) (stating that, “[w]hether [plaintiff] has standing to sue 1 whether she is a ‘person claiming to be aggrieved’ by such discrimination”; citing 2 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) in support). That the Court did not specifically refer to the 3 definition of “person” in § 2000e(a) is not material. While 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) 4 provides that “[t]he term ‘person’ includes one or more individuals, governments, 5 governmental agencies, political subdivisions, labor unions, partnerships, 6 associations, corporations, legal representatives, mutual companies, joint-stock 7 companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in cases under 8 title 11, United States Code, or receivers,” the Court’s analysis on statutory 9 standing did not hinge on OFW being an entity instead of an individual. Rather, it 10 was based on the collateral nature of OF W‘s asserted harm that was not a direct 11 injury resulting from the alleged discriminatory policies (and thus being outside the 12 protected zone of interest). 13 Because the Court is denying OF W’s motion, the Court directs the Clerk of the Court to 14 || enter a final judgment and close the file in the case. 15 This order disposes of Docket No. 65.

i IT IS SO ORDERED. 18 19 || Dated: April 24, 2024 20 21

EDWARD MRSCHEN

22 United States District Judge 23 24 25 26 27 28