1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 FREDERICK J. JUROSKY, Case No.: 19cv706 JM (BGS)

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. ORDER ON PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES, COSTS

14 BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC,

AND EXPENSES

15 Defendant. 16 17 18 Plaintiff Frederick Jurosky moves the court, pursuant to California’s Song-Beverly 19 Consumer Warranty Act (“the Song-Beverly Act”), CAL. CIV. CODE § 1794(d), to award 20 him $198,716.38 in attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses. (Doc. No. 23-1.) Also before the 21 court are the parties’ cross motions to retax costs. (Doc. Nos. 65, 66.) The motions have 22 been briefed and the court finds them suitable for submission without oral argument in 23 accordance with Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). For the below reasons, the motions are 24 GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 25 I. BACKGROUND 26 On March 5, 2013, Plaintiff purchased a used 2010 BMW 750Li for $61,298.40. As 27 a result of alleged engine, oil consumption, and electrical defects, Plaintiff took the vehicle 28 1 to the dealership multiple times for repairs. BMW was unable to repair the vehicle and did 2 not offer to buy back the vehicle. 3 On July 17, 2018, Plaintiff filed his Complaint against BMW, as well as the 4 dealership,1 in California Superior Court for the County of Sacramento. Plaintiff alleged 5 violations of the Song-Beverly Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1790-1795.8. BMW filed a motion 6 for change of venue on September 6, 2018. On October 10, 2018, the motion for change 7 of venue was granted and the case was transferred to San Diego County. BMW filed a 8 Notice of Removal to this court on April 17, 2019. On April 20, 2020, Plaintiff accepted 9 BMW’s offer of judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68. (Doc. No. 50.) 10 Specifically, Plaintiff accepted judgment in his favor for $122,596.92, exclusive of 11 recoverable attorneys’ fees and costs, for BMW to repurchase the subject vehicle. On April 12 23, 2020, judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff. (Doc. Nos. 51, 52.) On May 7, 2020, 13 Plaintiff filed the instant motion. On June 5, 2020, the parties filed their cross motions to 14 retax costs. (Doc. Nos. 65, 66.) 15 II. LEGAL STANDARD 16 Under the Song-Beverly Act, a prevailing buyer “shall be allowed by the court to 17 recover . . . . costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, 18 determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with 19 the commencement and prosecution of such action.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 1794(d). The court 20 must determine “whether under all the circumstances of the case the amount of actual time 21 expended and the monetary charge being made for the time expended are reasonable.” 22 Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor Am., 31 Cal. App. 4th 99, 104 (1994). “In a diversity case, 23 the law of the state in which the district court sits determines whether a party is entitled to 24 attorney fees, and the procedure for requesting an award of attorney fees is governed by 25 federal law.” Carnes v. Zamani, 488 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007). 26 27 28 1 1 The lodestar method is the prevailing method for calculating attorneys’ fees. 2 Robertson v. Fleetwood Travel Trailers of Cal., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 785, 818-19 (2006); 3 Ketchum v. Moses, 24 Cal. 4th 1122, 1135 (2001). In calculating the lodestar, the court 4 must “‘make an initial determination of the actual time expended; and then . . . . ascertain 5 whether under all the circumstances of the case the amount of the actual time expended 6 and the monetary charge being made for the time expended are reasonable.’” Robertson, 7 144 Cal. App. 4th at 817 (quoting Nightingale, 31 Cal. App. 4th at 104). In determining 8 the reasonableness of the lodestar, courts can consider the complexity of the case, 9 procedural demands, the skill exhibited, and the results achieved. Id. 10 The plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the fees sought were allowable, 11 reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and reasonable in amount. 12 Karapetian v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., 970 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2013). If the 13 reasonableness of fees is challenged, “[g]eneral arguments that fees claimed are excessive, 14 duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.” Premier Med. Mgmt. Sys. v. Cal. Ins. Guar. 15 Assoc., 163 Cal. App. 4th at 550, 564 (2008). In such cases, the opposing party has the 16 burden to demonstrate the hours spent are duplicative or excessive. Id. at 562, 564; see 17 also Gorman v. Tassajara Dev. Corp., 178 Cal. App. 4th 44, 101 (2009) (“The party 18 opposing the fee award can be expected to identify the particular charges it considers 19 objectionable”). Decisions by other courts regarding the reasonableness of the rate sought 20 may also provide evidence to support a finding of reasonableness. See Widrig v. Apfel, 21 140 F.3d 1207, 1210 (9th Cir. 1998). 22 III. DISCUSSION 23 As the prevailing party, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorneys’ fees, costs, and 24 expenses. Billing records provided by Plaintiff show the $198,716.38 he requests consists 25 of the following: (1) $106,703 in attorneys’ fees for Strategic Legal Practices (“SLP”); 26 (2) $5,390 in attorneys’ fees for The Law Offices of Michael Rosenstein (“Rosenstein”); 27 (3) $24,797.50 in attorneys’ fees for EcoTech Law Group (“EcoTech”); (4) $7,914.20 in 28 costs and expenses for SLP; (5) a 1.35 multiplier enhancement (or $47,911.68) on the 1 || attorneys’ fees; and (6) an additional $6,000 for Plaintiff’s counsel to reply to Defendant’s 2 || opposition to the instant motion. (Doc. No. 56 at 2.) 3 A. Hourly Rates 4 Plaintiff seeks fees for attorneys at three different law firms. Plaintiff requests 5 $106,703 for work performed by 13 attorneys at SLP at rates between $350 and $550 per 6 ||hour. (Doc No. 56 at 2.) The rates for each attorney at SLP are as follows: 7 SLP ATTORNEY HOURLY RATES 3 _AttorneyName Position 2019 Rate _ 2020 Rate Gregory Yu $525 $550 _|graduated 2003 9 Jacob Cutler $460 | |admitted 2009 10 Kyle Tracy $445 P| admitted 2010 Johnny Ogata $425 P| admitted 2008 11 $410 | admitted 2013 12 Anh Nguyen Not provided $385 | |admitted 2012 13 Natasha Bhushan $385 admitted 2012 TionnaDolin __Notprovided, $375 | admitted 2014 14 Carey Wood $375 $395 |admitted 2013 15 $365 admitted 2016 16 $350 admitted 2015 Gregory Sogoyan |Not provided $350 $385 jadmitted 2017 17 Yoel Hanohav $350 admitted 2017 18 Plaintiff also requests $24,797.50 for 46 hours of work performed by Dana Tabish, 19 |! of EcoTech, and $5,390 for 10.5 hours of work performed by two attorneys at Rosenstein. 20 || The rates for each attorney are as follows: 21 OTHER ATTORNEY HOURLY RATES 22|/ Name | Firm Position | Rate | Hours Total Experience 23 Not provided} $545 $24,798 |admitted 2002 Not provided| $600 $4,620 |25+ yrs. litigation 24 $275 $770 admitted 2015 25 *Based on the court's calculation. 26 In determining a reasonable hourly rate, the district court should consider: (1) the 27 experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney; (2) the outcome of the proceedings; 28 ||(3) customary fees; and (4) the novelty or difficulty of the question presented. Hiken v.

1 Dep’t of Defense, 836 F. 3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 2016) (citing Chalmers v. City of L.A., 2 796 F.2d 1205, 1211 (9th Cir. 1986)). Additionally, district courts may “rely[ ] on their 3 own knowledge of customary rates and their experience concerning reasonable and proper 4 fees.” Ingram v. Oroudjian, 647 F. 3d 925, 928 (9th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff bears the burden 5 of showing that “the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for 6 similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” 7 Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523 F.3d 973, 980 (9th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). 8 “Affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in the 9 community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the 10 plaintiffs’ attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” United 11 Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990). As a 12 general rule, the forum district represents the relevant legal community. See Gates v. 13 Deukmejian, 987 F.2d 1392, 1405 (9th Cir. 1992). 14 Here, Plaintiff cites multiple cases in this forum where the court approved hourly 15 rates within the $350 and $550 range for attorneys with comparable years of experience. 16 See, e.g., Holcomb v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, Case No.: 18cv475 JM (BGS), 2020 WL 17 759285, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2020) (listing cases). One court from the Central District 18 recently approved the same or similar rates for almost all of the same attorneys Plaintiff 19 used here. See Zargarian v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 442 F. Supp. 3d 1216, 1227 (C.D. Cal. 20 2020). Plaintiff also submits declarations regarding the extensive experience of his 21 attorneys handling Song-Beverly Act cases.2 (See, e.g., Doc. No. 56-12 ¶ 4 (declaration of 22

23 2 BMW objects to these declarations. (See Doc. Nos. 61-7 (objecting to declaration of 24 Payham Shahian); 61-8 (Jacob Cutler); 61-9 (Michael Rosenstein); 61-10 (Dara Tabesh).) 25 As the court found in Zargarian, “[BMW] objects to almost every paragraph of these declarations with nothing more than stating ‘Relevance’ or ‘Hearsay’ and listing the 26 corresponding Federal Rule of Evidence.” 442 F. Supp. 3d at 1227. Accordingly, BMW’s 27 evidentiary objections are OVERULED “because they are without merit and ‘are boilerplate and devoid of any specific argument or analysis as to why any particular exhibit 28 1 SLP’s founding partner stating, “I have extensive experience with claims brought under 2 the [Song-Beverly Act] both as a plaintiff and defense attorney, and I have litigated 3 hundreds of automotive defect cases involving California’s consumer protection statutes, 4 including Song-Beverly.”).) This is sufficient to show the reasonableness of the SLP 5 attorneys’ hourly rates. 6 BMW argues that rates should be reduced based on the Wolters Kluwer “2018 Real 7 Rate Report: The Industry’s Leading Analysis of Law Firm Rates, Trends, and Practices” 8 (“the Real Rate Report”). (Doc. No. 61 at 12-13.) Based on this report, BMW argues that 9 the rates should be $263 for partners and $200 for associates because those are the median 10 rates for “general liability” attorneys, which includes attorneys handling “consumer related 11 claims,” in Los Angeles at firms with 50 attorneys or less. (Id. at 13.) Certainly, some 12 district courts, including one in this forum, have lowered plaintiffs’ attorneys’ hourly rates 13 based on the Real Rate Report. See Di Gioia v. Ford Motor Co., Case No. EDCV 18-1724 14 JGB (KKx), 2020 WL 1955311, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2020) (adjusting rates to $325 for 15 partners and $225 for associates); Arias v. Ford Motor Co., Case No. EDCV 18-1928 PSG 16 (SPx), 2020 WL 1940843, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2020) (same); Aispuro v. Ford Motor 17 Co., Case No.: 18-CV-2045 DMS (KSC), 2020 WL 4582677, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 18 2020) (adjusting the rate to $350 for partners and $225 for associates); Hernandez v. FCA 19 US LLC, Case No. CV 17-5452-GW(ASx), 2019 WL 2932637, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 20 2019) (adjusting rates to $346.30 for partners and $257.92 for associates). 21 Other courts, however, have declined to adjust rates based on the Real Rate Report. 22 See Foulkrod v. Ford Motor Co., Case No.: 5:18-cv-02613 SJO (KKx), 2020 WL 2891989, 23 at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2020) (approving rates between $320 and $550 because this was 24 in the range of the Real Rate Report for general litigation partners); Nai Hung Li v. FCA 25 US LLC, Case No. 2:17-cv-06290-R-JEM, 2019 WL 6317769, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 1, 26 2019) (approving rates between $250 and $550). Furthermore, the cases in which the court 27 decreased the hourly rate did not involve the attorneys who represented Plaintiff here. 28 1 Accordingly, the court declines to adjust Plaintiff’s attorneys’ hourly rates based on the 2 Real Rate Report. 3 BMW also urges the court to follow Morris v. Hyundai Motor Am., 41 Cal. App. 5th 4 24, 32, 40, (2019), as modified (Oct. 11, 2019), review denied (Jan. 2, 2020), in which the 5 court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by reducing $650 rates to $500, 6 $500 rates to $400, and associates’ rates from $450, $375, and $350 to $300. The appellate 7 court reasoned that “[t]he [trial] court reasonably could have reduced the rates based on its 8 finding that the matter was not complex; that it did not go to trial; that the named partners 9 were doing work that could have been done by lower-billing attorneys; and that all the 10 attorneys were doing work that could have been done by paralegals.” Id. at 41. The 11 specific rates in the Morris case are not determinative here, however, because the appellate 12 court did not discuss why the trial court reduced the rates, and BMW makes no attempt at 13 explaining why the Morris case is more influential than the multiple other cases approving 14 rates similar to those sought here. Accordingly, the court approves the hourly rates charged 15 by Plaintiff’s attorneys at the SLP firm. The reasonableness of rates and hours charged by 16 Plaintiff’s attorneys at EcoTech and Rosenstein are discussed below. 17 B. Number of Attorneys and Hours Worked 18 Plaintiff argues this case actually and reasonably required a total of 297.6 hours of 19 work by 16 different attorneys at three different law firms. BMW generally objects to the 20 number of attorneys and firms that worked on this case. For the below reasons, the number 21 of attorneys and hours worked is reasonable. 22 1. SLP Attorneys 23 Plaintiff claims that 13 attorneys from SLP spent 241.6 hours working on this case. 24 (Doc. 56-28 at 11.) Although Plaintiff provides detailed and itemized records showing the 25 time it took to complete each task throughout the litigation, Plaintiff does not provide a 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 breakdown of the time each one of the 13 attorneys spent on the case. Plaintiff also offers 2 no explanation as to why this case required the attention of 13 attorneys at SLP. As 3 recognized by other courts, reliance on multiple attorneys necessarily requires each 4 attorney to get “up-to-speed” on the case. See Luna v. FCA US LLC, Case No. 2:17-cv- 5 08272-ODW (RAOx), 2020 WL 491462, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2020) (imposing a 10% 6 across-the-board cut because “[a]s a result of having twelve attorneys from two firms 7 billing on this matter, the billing records are riddled with duplicative inter-office 8 communications and entries reviewing prior filings and case materials”); Base v. FCA US 9 LLC, Case No. 17-cv-01532-JCS, 2020 WL 363006, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2020) (noting 10 that significant billings for meetings between attorneys was “one of the potential 11 inefficiencies of using a large number of attorneys to staff a case”); Durham v. FCA US 12 LLC, Case No.: 2:17-cv-00596-JLT, 2020 WL 243115, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 13 2020) (noting a “significant amount of time spent on the preparation of internal 14 memorandums and summaries for co-counsel”). Based on the above, the expertise and 15 experience of Plaintiff’s counsel, upon which Plaintiff relies to justify his attorneys’ high 16 rates, is therefore uncertain given that it took 13 of them, along with three attorneys from 17 two outside firms, to handle this single unextraordinary case. Other Song-Beverly Act 18 cases, albeit ones settling prior to any significant discovery, have required far fewer 19 attorneys. See Chavez v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am., LLC, Case No.: 18-cv-2811 W (JLB), 20 2020 WL 376209, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2020) (awarding fees to five attorneys at 21 Plaintiffs’ counsel’s firm for a total of 43.6 hours of work); Anderson v. BMW of N. Am., 22 LLC, Case No.: 18-CV-57-WVG, 2018 WL 2011006, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 23 /// 24 /// 25 26 3 Without a breakdown of the hours spent on the case by each attorney, it makes it far more 27 difficult for the court to double check Plaintiff’s math and evaluate the reasonableness of the amount of work Plaintiff’s attorneys reportedly performed. 28 1 018) (awarding fees to one attorney for 40 hours of work). At first blush, therefore, the 2 amount of personnel and time SLP devoted to this case appears excessive. 3 As explained by Plaintiff, however, “[a]lthough there were 16 [total] time-billers in 4 this case, only 2 billers, Mr. Yu, and Mr. Sogoyan accounted for about 148.9 hours of the 5 total 241.6 hours expended by [SLP] in this case [which] represents about 62% of the time 6 submitted by SLP by these two billers alone.” (Doc. No. 56-1 at 18 n.11.) Other courts 7 have not faulted the plaintiff for utilizing a large number of attorneys at multiple 8 firms. See Hamm v. FCA US LLC, Case No.: 3:17-cv-0577-AJB-BGS, 2019 WL 3891139, 9 at *3 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2019) (in case that settled the day of trial, awarding fees to 12 10 attorneys at two firms for 150 hours of work); Petropoulos v. FCA US LLC, Case No.: 17- 11 CV-0398 W (KSC), 2019 WL 2289399, at *2-3 (S.D. Cal. May 29, 2019) (in a case that 12 was litigated for over two years, awarding fees for 11 attorneys at two firms). Additionally, 13 for better or worse, the use of a large number of attorneys in Song-Beverly Act cases 14 appears relatively common. See Ortega v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, Case No. 2:18-cv-06637- 15 R-SK, 2019 WL 6792798, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 2019) (noting that defendant used 15 16 attorneys and that is was “not uncommon” to use a large number of attorneys in lemon law 17 cases). Moreover, the billing records do not show that a significant amount of time was 18 unreasonably spent getting over a dozen attorneys up-to-speed on this case. See id. (“This 19 Court declines to admonish the use of a larger number of attorneys, as it appears there was 20 no duplicative billing[.]”). As pointed out by Plaintiff, this case involved a not insignificant 21 amount of discovery, motions practice, and settlement discussions (Doc. No. 56-1 at 9-11), 22 and there is no obvious indication that a fewer number of attorneys would have generated 23 significantly fewer hours. Plaintiff also submits a declaration from SLP’s founding partner, 24 Payam Shahian, stating that each billing entry was contemporaneously recorded, then 25 audited by Mr. Shahian, and in multiple cases reduced or eliminated, including the 26 elimination of 5.5 hours of Mr. Shahian’s time. (Doc. No. 56-12 ¶¶ 50-51.) Plaintiff also 27 states, and BMW does not dispute, that SLP, EcoTech, and Rosenstein “routinely work on 28 1 BMW cases together” and “in the same distinct roles.” (Doc. No. 56-1 at 20 n.12); see, 2 e.g., Zargarian, 442 F. Supp. 3d at 1220. Overall, the court has no persuasive reason to 3 doubt the honesty or judgment of Plaintiff’s counsel regarding the number of attorneys 4 reasonably required to litigate this case. Accordingly, Plaintiff has met his burden of 5 showing that the number of SLP attorneys who worked on this case, and the hours they 6 worked on this case, were reasonable. Plaintiff also seeks an additional $6,000 for replying 7 to BMW’s opposition to the instant motion and to attend a hearing on the instant motion. 8 (Doc. No. 56-12 ¶ 52.) Because no hearing was held, however, the $6,000 requested by 9 Plaintiff is reduced by $2,275. See Hellenberg v. Ford Motor Co., Case No.: 18cv2202 JM 10 (KSC), 2020 WL 1820126, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2020). 11 2. Dana Tabesh 12 Plaintiff claims that Dana Tabesh, of EcoTech Law Group, worked on this case for 13 a total of 5.5 hours at a rate of $545 per hour for a total of $24,797.50. (Doc. No. 56-33 ¶ 14 10.) Additionally, in a declaration, Mr. Tabesh states, “[i]n total, I am seeking on behalf 15 of my firm, EcoTech Law Group, P.C., compensation for the 5.5 hours I billed to this 16 matter, at an hourly rate of $545, for a total lodestar of $24,797.50.” Id. Given that 5.5 17 hours at $545 totals $2,997.50, not $24,797.50, this is an obvious error. Contrary to his 18 declaration, Mr. Tabesh’s bill shows that he billed for 46 hours of work,5 which accurately 19 totals $24,797.50. (Doc. No. 56-34.) In support of his 46 hours of work on this case, Mr. 20 Tabesh states that he “focused on resolving discovery issues and engaging in discovery 21 motion practice related to document production and compelling the deposition of BMW’s 22

23 4 Plaintiff also points out that BMW staffed this case with two different law firms. (Doc. 24 No. 56-1 at 20 n.12.) 25 5 Because Mr. Tabesh failed to state the total number of hours he worked on his bill, and 26 because Mr. Tabesh demonstrated a carelessness with regard to his arithmetic, the court 27 was required to parse out and add up each entry from Mr. Tabesh’s bill in order to decipher the total number of hours he allegedly worked on this case and to determine whether the 28 1 Senior Product Engineer, Mr. Michael Murray and of BMW’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness.” 2 (Doc. No. 56-33 ¶ 8.) Mr. Tabesh also states that he “prepared various letters and 3 submissions regarding Plaintiff’s Rule 11 Sanctions Motion against BMW.” (Id.) 4 Here, BMW argues generally that “[t]here is no reason why Plaintiff needed a third 5 law firm to litigate this simple lemon law dispute.” (Doc. No. 61 at 11.) Indeed, there is 6 nothing in the record to suggest that attorneys at SLP, all of whom charge lower rates, were 7 incapable of performing the work Mr. Tabesh performed in the same amount of time. 8 Regardless, Plaintiff claims that her attorneys at SLP had a legitimate reason for associating 9 with Mr. Tabesh based on his experience litigating against BMW. Specifically, Plaintiff 10 states, and BMW does not dispute, that “Mr. Tabesh was associated into this case because 11 of his experience litigating cases against BMW, particularly his experience filing 12 successful motions to compel BMW to produce its internal documents and produce Mr. 13 Murray’s testimony.” (Doc. No. 52 at 2 n.3.) Plaintiff further states that “Mr. Tabesh has, 14 across several cases, been working (alongside SLP and [Rosenstein]) on federal court 15 motions against BMW, so he is familiar with BMW’s strategies for avoiding its discovery 16 obligations, he is familiar with the documents in BMW’s possession, custody, and control 17 and he is familiar with how BMW stores its information such that it can be easily 18 retrieved.” (Id. at 20 n.12.) Based on the billing records, it does not appear as if the work 19 performed by Mr. Tabesh was duplicative, or that he wasted time getting up-to-speed on 20 the case. Additionally, any inefficiencies resulting from his initial unfamiliarity with the 21 case and higher rate, were likely mitigated by his specific experience litigating against 22 BMW. Based on the record, it was generally reasonable for the SLP attorneys to associate 23 with Mr. Tabesh. A review of his bill also reveals that his time spent on the case was not 24 unreasonable or duplicative. 25 BMW argues that the 22.6 hours of work Mr. Tabesh purportedly devoted to filing 26 a Rule 11 motion should be struck because the motion was frivolous and ultimately 27 /// 28 /// 1 withdrawn. (Doc. No. 61 at 11-12.) Plaintiff argues the fees related to the Rule 11 motion 2 should be included because “[a]t the time of filing, Plaintiff possessed a good faith, 3 colorable argument that BMW’s failure to disclose controlling Ninth Circuit authority in 4 its motion [to compel arbitration] constituted sanctionable conduct” and because “parts of 5 the Rule 11 motion drafted by Mr. Tabesh were ultimately incorporated into the Court’s 6 order denying the motion to compel arbitration.” (Doc. No. 63 at 4-5.) 7 In its order denying BMW’s motion to compel arbitration, the court noted that 8 Plaintiff had moved for sanctions against BMW under Rule 11 based on BMW’s failure to 9 cite Ninth Circuit precedent in its motion, and BMW’s subsequent claim that the case was 10 distinguishable based on the language in the arbitration clause. See Jurosky v. BMW of N. 11 Am., LLC, 441 F. Supp. 3d 963, 974 (S.D. Cal. 2020) (noting that in Plaintiff’s 12 November 5, 2019 “supplemental” request for judicial notice, Plaintiff also made 13 representations concerning the case that were, “at best, incorrect”). Specifically, the court 14 found that Plaintiff’s counsel had apparently failed to accurately describe the arbitration 15 clauses at issue in the case, which was the same accusation that Plaintiff made, at least in 16 part, against BMW in his Rule 11 motion. Id. at n.4. Because the court previously found 17 the omission by BMW that served as the basis of Plaintiff’s Rule 11 motion was at least 18 “questionable,” (id. at 974), the court will not find, for the purpose of deciding the instant 19 motion, that Plaintiff’s motion was frivolous or unworthy of any compensation. That 20 Plaintiff failed to recognize that he was apparently committing the same error that he 21 accused BMW of committing suggests that perhaps even more time, and certainly more 22 attention, should have been devoted by Plaintiff’s counsel in drafting the Rule 11 motion. 23 In any event, had BMW simply cited clearly relevant Ninth Circuit precedent in its motion 24

25 6 BMW does not dispute any specific part of Mr. Tabesh’s bill except for an entry for 1.5 26 hours spent on “[r]eview and submit proposed edits of draft expert report to Mr. D. Calef; 27 finalize for service to BMW.” (Doc. No. 61-3 at 8.) BMW claims this is duplicative because SLP already billed for this task. (Id.) BMW also argues that Mr. Tabesh’s hourly 28 1 to compel arbitration this whole issue, and the resulting fees, could have been avoided. 2 Accordingly, the 22.6 hours Mr. Tabesh billed in drafting a Rule 11 motion is reasonable. 3 3. Rosenstein 4 Plaintiff claims Mr. Rosenstein worked on this case for 7.7 hours at $600 per hour 5 for a total of $4,620, and Mr. Martinez, an associate, worked on this case for 2.8 hours at 6 $275 for a total of $770. (Doc. No. 56-29 ¶¶ 3-4.) Plaintiff states that his attorneys 7 associated with Mr. Rosenstein so that he could be lead trial counsel in this case. (Doc. 8 No. 56 at 2 n.2.) Like Mr. Tabesh, Plaintiff claims that Mr. Rosenstein has litigated “many 9 cases” against BMW including trials. (Doc. No. 56-1 at 20 n.12.) 10 In support of his $600 per hour rate, Mr. Rosenstein states in a declaration that he 11 has over 25 years of litigation experience, and he has “litigated hundreds of Lemon Law 12 matters and taken dozens of those matters to jury verdict.” (Doc. No. 56-29 ¶ 3.) He also 13 submits an excerpt from a 2017 “United States Consumer Law Attorney Fee Survey 14 Report” showing that in 2015 and 2016, the 75% median attorney rate for all consumer law 15 attorneys in California was $600. (Doc. No. 56-31 at 48.) Plaintiff also cites two cases in 16 which Mr. Rosenstein’s $600 rate was approved. (Doc. No. 56-1 at 16.) BMW argues that 17 Mr. Rosenstein is not entitled to any fees because the case was settled five months before 18 trial and the parties did not file any pretrial documents. (Doc. No. 61 at 11.) In response, 19 Plaintiff argues that “Mr. Rosenstein’s reputation, skill, and work improved Plaintiff’s 20 settlement posture before trial and gave rise to the settlement that is now before the [c]ourt.” 21 (Doc. No. 63 at 9 n.15.) 22 Here, it is ironic, of course, that a healthy size firm like SLP that apparently 23 specializes in Song-Beverly Act would need so much outside help trying its own cases. 24 However, the decision to associate with experienced outside attorneys, rather than bill for 25 those services themselves, only adds to the apparent legitimacy of SLP’s decision to do so. 26 The court agrees that Mr. Rosenstein’s rate, and that of his associate, is reasonable. 27 Additionally, the 10.5 hours in total that both attorneys spent on the case appears 28 reasonable given that the time related to getting up-to-speed on the case, which, though 1 somewhat duplicative, was still necessary. Plaintiff filed his Complaint on July 17, 2018, 2 but Mr. Rosenstein did not enter his appearance until December 2, 2019. (Doc. No. 33.) 3 Approximately five months later, on April 20, 2020, the case settled. (Doc. No. 50.) 4 Associating with trial counsel well into litigation, but well before the trial date, as 5 Plaintiff’s attorneys did here, is reasonable. The court also has no reason to disbelieve 6 Plaintiff that Mr. Rosenstein’s expertise and his relatively minor involvement in the case 7 helped influence settlement. Accordingly, the 10.5 hours billed by Mr. Rosenstein and Mr. 8 Martinez is reasonable.7 9 C. Multiplier 10 In determining whether to apply a multiplier, courts should consider: “(1) the novelty 11 and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the 12 extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, 13 [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” Ketchum, 24 Cal. 4th at 1131 (internal 14 citation omitted). The purpose of applying a multiplier is to “fix a fee at the fair market 15 value for the particular action.” Id. “In effect, the court determines, retrospectively, 16 whether the litigation involved a contingent risk or required extraordinary legal skill 17 justifying augmentation of the unadorned lodestar in order to approximate the fair market 18 rate for such services.” Id.; see also Pollard, 2020 WL 57270, at *2-3. 19 Plaintiff requests a multiplier of 1.35 (or $47,911.68). (Doc. No. 56-1 at 21.) Here, 20 Plaintiff argues, and the court agrees, that Plaintiff’s counsel achieved an excellent 21 outcome by settling the case for $122,596.92 in compensatory damages alone, which is 22

23 7 BMW also makes a cursory argument that Plaintiff engaged in improper block-billing. 24 (Doc. No. 61 at 10.) The only specific examples that BMW provides, however, are that 25 1.) “on May 5, 2020, SLP billed 10.70 hours to ‘draft fee motion,’” (id.), and 2.) on August 14, 2019, Mr. Sogoyan spent 9.4 hours attending an ENE in San Diego, (Doc. No. 61-1 at 26 10). BMW provides no specific argument as to why either entry is unreasonable. Thus, 27 the court declines to find that these are improper block billed entries, or that they constitute an unreasonable amount of time. Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees is 375 pages, and 28 1 twice the vehicle’s purchase price. (Id. at 21-22.) Plaintiff further argues that his counsel’s 2 skill was displayed not only by the settlement, but the favorable result achieved in 3 defending against BMW’s motion to compel arbitration. (Id. at 22.) This is somewhat 4 persuasive given the settlement amount, but is only minimally so because Plaintiff 5 identifies no specific skill that was applied to reach that result. Plaintiff’s attorneys’ 6 expertise in handling this particular type of case is already accounted for in the approval of 7 their relatively high hourly rates. Also, Plaintiff’s counsel’s skill in handling BMW’s 8 motion does not support the application of a multiplier. See Jurosky, 441 F. Supp. 3d at 9 974 (noting that Plaintiff’s counsel made representations about a controlling case that were 10 “at best, incorrect”). 11 Plaintiff also argues that a multiplier is appropriate based on the fact that his counsel 12 took the case on a contingency basis and has suffered a delay in payment. (Doc. No. 56-1 13 at 23-24.) Plaintiff cites no applicable caselaw supporting the application of a multiplier 14 based on the delay in payment incurred as a result of his own attorneys’ choice to take a 15 case on a contingency basis. See Arias, 2020 WL 1940843, at *5 (“Given that [p]laintiff's 16 counsel regularly undertakes this type of work, the [c]ourt does not find that counsel 17 reasonably faced an uncertainty of prevailing on the merits.”). Plaintiff also points to 18 nothing in the record suggesting that his attorneys acted reasonably in attempting to settle 19 the case sooner, or that BMW’s attorneys did not. 20 Finally, Plaintiff argues that this case was not “simple” because it involved 21 “numerous obstacles to resolution, including filing motions to transfer venue, to compel 22 arbitration in state court, to compel arbitration in federal court, and for judgment on the 23 pleadings, and a notice of removal.” (Doc. No. 63 at 11.) While perhaps not simple, 24 Plaintiff does not dispute that these types of cases, and BMW’s defense tactics, are not 25 novel or difficult. As pointed out by BMW, this is one of at least 24 other cases SLP 26 attorneys have filed against BMW involving the same alleged engine defect. (Doc. No. 61 27 at 14.) Recent cases decided by this court have all declined to apply a multiplier based on 28 a lack of novelty. See Arias, 2020 WL 1940843, at *5 (“The Court does not find any issues 1 that were particularly novel or complex nor any special skill employed. The parties 2 exchanged discovery, Plaintiff's counsel took depositions, and the parties settled the case 3 before proceeding to trial. Furthermore, Plaintiff did not forgo any other employment for 4 this case and in fact seems to engage in dozens of lemon law matters at once.”); Chavez, 5 2020 WL 376209, at *3 (rejecting a 0.3 multiplier based on the posture and lack of 6 complexity of the case); Hamm, 2019 WL 3891139, at *4 (rejecting a 0.5 multiplier 7 because the case did not involve complexity or novel or difficult questions of law or fact); 8 Petropoulos, 2019 WL 2289399, at *4 (“Plaintiffs were not litigating important 9 constitutional rights here. Nor were they representing the public interest. . . . They were 10 seeking compensation and statutory penalties for a defective Durango.”). Accordingly, no 11 multiplier to the lodestar amount is warranted in this case. 12 D. Costs 13 Plaintiff filed a request with the Clerk of the Court for costs in the amount of 14 $7,914.20, consisting of $3,790.26 for costs incurred prior to removal, and $4,123.94 for 15 costs incurred after removal. (Doc. Nos. 53, 54.) After holding a hearing, the Clerk 16 awarded costs in the amount of $3,938.36. (Doc. No. 62 at 6.) Both parties filed motions 17 challenging the Clerk’s decision. (Doc. Nos. 65, 66.) 18 1. State Court Costs 19 a. Court Fees 20 The Clerk granted Plaintiff’s request for $1,070 in state court fees. (Doc. No. 62 at 21 2-3.) The fees included a $435 fee to file the Complaint in Sacramento County Superior 22 Court, a $50 transfer fee when the case was transferred to San Diego, and a $435 filing fee 23 and a $150 jury fee to the San Diego County Superior Court. (Id. at 3.) The Clerk reasoned 24 that Local Rule 54.1.b.10 requires the recovery of costs incurred in state court prior to 25 removal “to the extent they are covered in this rule or otherwise permitted by state law.” 26 (Id.) The Clerk further reasoned that section 1794(d) of the Song-Beverly Act allows for 27 the recovery of costs and expenses that are “reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection 28 with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” CAL. CIV. CODE §1794(d). 1 BMW objects to the $435 filing fee in Sacramento County and the $50 transfer fee 2 because “Plaintiff improperly filed his initial complaint in Sacramento Superior Court” and 3 “BMW NA should not now be required to reimburse Plaintiff for the costs he incurred as 4 a result of his own filing error.” (Doc. No. 66 at 4.) Other than failing to prevail on the 5 motion, however, there is no indication that filing the Complaint in Sacramento was 6 unreasonable, or that Plaintiff’s attorneys did not actually or reasonably incur costs related 7 to defending the motion. Accordingly, an award of $1,070 in state court fees is reasonable. 8 b. Service of Process 9 The Clerk granted Plaintiff’s request for $161.50 for service of the summons and 10 complaint on BMW and the dealership. (Doc. No. 62 at 3.) The Clerk reasoned that Local 11 Rule 54.1.b.1 allows for the taxation of fees for service of process including costs “for 12 service of summonses.” (Id.) The Clerk also reasoned that Local Rule 54.1.b.10 requires 13 the recovery of costs incurred in state court prior to removal “to the extent they are covered 14 in this rule or otherwise permitted by state law.” (Id.) BMW does not object to this cost. 15 The court finds $161.50 in service of process costs to be reasonable. 16 c. Other Costs Prior to Removal 17 The Clerk granted Plaintiff’s requests for other costs that were incurred prior to 18 removal in the amount of $2,472.76. (Id. at 3-4.) This includes costs for filing documents 19 in state court, service of documents upon opposing counsel, court calls to attend state court 20 telephonic hearings, court reporting and a reporter’s transcript, and the purchase of a copy 21 of an order from the San Diego County Superior Court. (Id. at 4.) The Clerk reasoned that 22 even if most, if not all, of these costs would not be grantable by the Clerk if they had been 23 incurred during proceedings in this court, under Local Rule 54.1.b.10, they are recoverable 24 to the extent they are permitted by section 1794(d) of the Song-Beverly Act. (Id.) The 25 Clerk declined, however, to award $86 for a court call charge because the Plaintiff did not 26 submit an invoice and Plaintiff’s counsel admitted at the hearing that it could not be located. 27 (Id.) Plaintiff does not object to the $86 deduction. BMW does object, however, to the 28 award of $357.27 for a court reporter, filing, and court call fees associated with serving 1 Plaintiff’s unsuccessful opposition to the motion to transfer. (Doc. No. 66 at 3-4.) For the 2 same reasons discussed above, the court will not find, for the purpose of deciding the 3 instant motion, that Plaintiff’s counsel’s work towards filing the Complaint in Sacramento, 4 and opposing BMW’s motion to transfer, was unworthy of compensation. The court finds 5 the $2,472.76 in other pre-removal costs to be reasonable. 6 2. Costs After Removal 7 a. Courtesy Copies 8 The Clerk granted Plaintiff’s request for costs related to producing courtesy copies 9 for the court in the amount of $234.10. (Doc. No. 62 at 4-5.) This included copying costs 10 related to providing the court with copies of Plaintiff’s opposition ($37.00), supplemental 11 request for judicial notice ($46.90), Rule 11 notice ($55.15), and statement on a discovery 12 dispute ($95.05). (Id. at 5.) The Clerk reasoned that under Civil Local Rule 54.1.b.6.a.1, 13 copies obtained for use in the case are taxable if the copies were provided to the court by 14 court order or rule. Section 2(e) of the Southern District of California’s Electronic Case 15 Filing Administrative Policies and Procedures Manual provides that “parties must deliver 16 to the Clerk’s Office or mail directly to the judge’s chambers, within 24 hours after filing, 17 any criminal or civil case filing which exceeds 20 pages in length including attachments 18 and exhibits.” The Clerk declined to grant $28.75 in copying costs related to a three-page 19 Notice of Appearance. (Id.) BMW objects to $183.40 in costs associated with Plaintiff’s 20 withdrawn Rule 11 motion because, as stated by the court, “Plaintiff also made 21 representations concerning [a controlling case] that were, at best, incorrect.” (Doc. No. 22 62.) For the same reasons discussed above, the court will not find, for the purpose of 23 deciding the instant motion, that Plaintiff’s Rule 11 motion was frivolous or unworthy of 24 compensation. The court finds that $234.10 in courtesy copy costs is reasonable. 25 b. Other Costs 26 The Clerk denied Plaintiff’s request for $3,861.09 in other costs incurred after the 27 removal of the action to this court. This includes $231.26 for travel to San Diego to attend 28 this court’s proceedings, $463.37 for service of documents upon opposing counsel, and 1 $3,166.46 in expert witness fees. (Doc. No. 62 at 5-6.) The Clerk also noted that although 2 it was possible that these expenses are recoverable under the Song-Beverly Act, under 3 Local Rule 54.1.b.10, they are not reimbursable because they were incurred after removal. 4 (Id.) 5 As noted above, the Song-Beverly Act allows for the recovery of “a sum equal to 6 the aggregate amount of costs and expenses.” CAL. CIV. CODE § 1794(d). Under Federal 7 Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d), however, costs available to the prevailing party are limited 8 to those listed in 28 U.S.C. § 1920. See also Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 9 482 U.S. 437, 441-42 (1987) (“[Section] 1920 defines the term ‘costs’ as used in Rule 10 54(d). Section 1920 enumerates expenses that a federal court may tax as a cost under the 11 discretionary authority found in Rule 54(d).”). District courts have reached different 12 conclusions as to whether the costs and expenses provision in the Song-Beverly Act is 13 procedural or substantive. See Johnson, 2019 WL 3891148, at *4 (“In general, an award 14 of costs in federal district court is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and 15 not applicable state law, even in diversity cases.”); but see Base, 2020 WL 363006, at *7 16 (finding that “state law governs Plaintiff’s request for costs,” but listing several cases in 17 the Eastern District of California finding otherwise); Petropoulos, 2019 WL 2289399, at 18 *4 (“As this is a diversity action over which the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 19 § 1332, California substantive law governs the award of costs.”); Forouzan v. BMW of N. 20 Am., LLC, 390 F. Supp. 3d 1184, 1187 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (finding the cost provision to be 21 substantive based on the state legislature’s intent); O’Brien v. FCA US LLC, No. 17cv4042 22 JCS, 2019 WL 5295066, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2019) (same). 23 i. Travel Costs 24 The Clerk denied Plaintiff’s request for $231.26 in travel costs because no invoices 25 or receipts were submitted, and even if they were, Local Rule 54.1 provides no authority 26 for the Clerk to grant these costs. (Doc. No. 62 at 5-6.) The court agrees with Plaintiff that 27 costs and expenses related to travel are not necessarily limited by Rule 54(d) or by Local 28 Rule 54.1. The costs and expenses provision in the Song-Beverly Act is substantive for 1 the same reasons as the courts found persuasive in Base, Petropoulos, Forouzan, and 2 O’Brien. Moreover, federal courts consistently award travel expenses to prevailing 3 plaintiffs in Song-Beverly Act cases. See, e.g., Aviles v. Subaru of Am., Inc., No. 1:18-cv- 4 01544-DAD-SKO, 2020 WL 868842, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2020); Holcomb, 2020 WL 5 759285, at *8; Rueda v. FCA US LLC, No. 1:17-cv-00968-DAD-JLT, 2020 WL 469333, 6 at *8 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2020). According to SLP’s bill, Mr. Sogoyan incurred $231.26 in 7 travel costs to attend an ENE ($181.35 in mileage, $30 for parking, and $19.91 for meals). 8 (Doc. No. 56-18 at 13.) Plaintiff does not dispute the Clerk’s finding that no invoices or 9 receipts were submitted for his travel expenses. Plaintiff submitted a declaration, however, 10 stating that “Mr. Sogoyan spent $231.26 in mileage, parking and meals to attend the Early 11 Neutral Evaluation in this case.” (Doc. No. 65-4 ¶ 19.) This is sufficient to find that 12 $231.26 in travel costs were reasonably incurred. 13 ii. Service of Documents 14 The Clerk denied Plaintiff’s request for $463.37 in costs related to serving 15 documents on BMW because Local Rule 54.1 provides no authority for the Clerk to do so. 16 (Doc. No. 62 at 5-6.) Plaintiff argues that this cost should be recouped because the court 17 is not limited by Rule 54(d) and Local Rule 54.1. (Doc. No. 65-1 at 4.) BMW does not 18 specifically object. As discussed above, the court agrees that it is not limited by Rule 54(d) 19 and Local Rule 54.1. The court also finds that $463.37 in costs related to serving 20 documents is reasonable. 21 iii. Expert Witnesses 22 The Clerk denied Plaintiff’s request for $3,166.46 in expert witness fees because 23 there is no indication that fees are from a “court-appointed” expert, and there is also no 24 authority for the Clerk to grant costs for the expert witness fees under Local Rule 54.1.b.5. 25 (Doc. No. 62 at 5-6.) Plaintiff argues that this expert witness fee was reasonably incurred 26 because “BMW denied all liability in this matter, and this report was necessary for Plaintiff 27 to prove up his case (including establishing that there was a defect that substantially 28 impaired use, value or safety that BMW was unable to repair within a reasonable number 1 repair opportunities).” (Doc. No. 65-1 at 15.) In its motion objecting to the Clerk’s 2 || order taxing costs, BMW stated that it anticipated that Plaintiff would seek to recover the 3 || $3,166.46 in costs he incurred in connection with the expert report of Dan Calef, and BMW 4 ||reserved its right “to file a cross-motion to retax to address this particular issue,” (id.) but 5 || BMW never did so. (Doc. No. 66 at 4.) As pointed out by plaintiffs, multiple federal 6 || courts have allowed a prevailing plaintiff to recoup expert witness fees. See, e.g., Gordillo 7 \|v. Ford Motor Co., No. 1:11-cv-01786 MIS, 2014 WL 2801243, at *8 (E.D. Cal. June 19, 8 ||2014). The court finds that $3,166.46 in expert witness fees were reasonably incurred. 9 IV. CONCLUSION 10 Based on the forgoing, the court awards: 1.) $106,703 in attorneys’ fees for the 11 attorneys at SLP; 2.) $5,390 for the attorneys at Rosenstein; 3.) $24,797.50 for attorney 12 || Tabesh; 4.) $1,070 in pre-removal state court fees; 5.) $161.50 in pre-removal service of 13 || process costs; 6.) $2,472.76 in other pre-removal costs; 7.) $234.10 in courtesy copy costs; 14 || 8.) $231.26 in travel costs; 9.) $463.37 in costs related to serving documents post-removal; 15 |] 10.) $3,166.46 in expert witness fees; and 11.) $3,725 for Plaintiff's counsel to reply to 16 || Defendant’s opposition to the instant motion. The court declines to award a 1.35 multiplier 17 the amount of $47,911.68, or any other multiplier or additional amount. The court 18 || therefore GRANTS IN PART Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees, and Plaintiff's motion 19 || to retax costs, in the amount of $148,414.95. To the extent the parties ask the court to take 20 || judicial notice of various documents, mostly consisting of state court orders, those requests 21 DENIED AS MOOT. 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 || DATED: August 25, 2020 passe SL. demmaited-

T JEFFREY T. MILLER

nited States District Judge 25 26 27 28