1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 EMBOTTELADORA ELECTROPURA Case No.: 3:16-cv-00724-GPC-MSB S.A. de C.V., an El Salvador Corporation, 12

ORDER DENYING JOINT MOTION

Plaintiff, 13 TO STRIKE JURY VERDICT AND v. GRANTING JOINT MOTION TO 14

DISMISS CASE WITH PREJUDICE

ACCUTEK PACKAGING EQUIPMENT

15 COMPANY, INC., a California [ECF Nos. 170, 173, 174] 16 Corporation, 17 Defendant. 18 19 On May 20, 2020, Plaintiff Embotteladora Electropura (“Plaintiff”) and Defendant 20 Accutek Packaging Equipment Company (“Defendant”) (collectively, “Parties”) settled 21 the case. ECF No. 168. On September 14, 2020, the Parties filed a joint motion to 22 dismiss the case with prejudice and to strike the jury verdicts pursuant to the settlement 23 negotiate by the Parties. ECF No. 170. On September 17, 2020, the Court ordered the 24 Parties to file a memorandum of points and authorities identifying the authority for 25 striking the jury verdicts. ECF No. 172. On September 21, 2020, Plaintiff and Defendant 26 each filed a response to the Court’s order. ECF Nos. 173, 174. 27 1 Defendant argues that the Court has the inherent authority to strike the jury verdict 2 from the record pursuant to its power to control the docket. ECF No. 173 at 2–3 (citing 3 Ready Transp., Inc. v. AAR Mfg., Inc., 627 F.3d 402, 404 (9th Cir. 2010)). Defendant 4 states that the purpose of the Parties’ stipulation to strike the jury verdict was to preserve 5 Defendant’s busines reputation. Id. at 3. Plaintiff states that it “was unable to locate any 6 statutory or decisional law which authorizes or empowers this Court to strike lawfully 7 rendered and entered jury verdicts from the official record of the trial proceedings in this 8 action.” ECF No. 174 at 2. 9 A court’s power to control its docket, including the ability to strike a filing from 10 the docket as a sanction for improper litigation conduct, does not give it free reign to 11 strike documents from the public record at the request of the parties. District courts are 12 not required to vacate a prior order in order to facilitate settlement. See Bates v. Union 13 Oil Co., 944 F.2d 647, 650 (9th Cir. 1991). Although the current joint motion seeks to 14 strike the jury verdict, the Court finds case law on motions to vacate court orders 15 pursuant to settlement instructive. See Bancorp Mortg. Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 16 513 U.S. 18, 29 (1994) (requiring a showing of “exceptional circumstances” to justify 17 vacatur of district court judgment when mootness of appeal arose through settlement); 18 Am. Games, Inc. v. Trade Prods., Inc., 142 F.3d 1164, 1169–70 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding 19 that district courts should weigh the equities when determining whether to vacate a prior 20 judgment). 21 Like court orders, jury verdicts “are not merely the property of private litigants” to 22 be used as bargaining chips in settlement negotiations, but exist in part for public benefit 23 and “should stand unless a court concludes that” vacatur is in the public interest. Bonner 24 Mall, 513 U.S. at 26–27 (quoting Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha v. U.S. Philips 25 Corp., 510 U.S. 27, 40 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). “The public interest in 26 preserving the work product of the judicial system should always at least be weighed in 27 1 the balance before . . . a motion [to vacate] is granted.” Izumi, 510 U.S. at 41 (Stevens, J. 2 dissenting). A number of district courts have denied motions to vacate an order pursuant 3 to settlement. See, e.g., BrightEdge Techs., Inc. v. Searchmetrics, GmbH., No. 14-CV- 4 01009-HSG, 2019 WL 1369915, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2019) (finding global 5 settlement did not constitute exceptional circumstances to vacate judgment and declining 6 to exercise equitable discretion to order vacatur); POLAR-Mohr 7 Maschinenvertriebsgesellschaft GmbH, Co. KG v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 17-CV- 8 01804-WHO, 2018 WL 8344296, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2018) (“The parties also 9 stipulated to vacate the Order Regarding Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment . . . . The 10 parties lack the authority to agree to vacate court orders, it is not my practice to vacate 11 orders as part of a settlement, and I will not vacate the one in question.”); Reynolds v. 12 Allstate Ins. Co., No. C-10-4893-SI, 2012 WL 4753499, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2012) 13 (declining to vacate an order on summary judgment as part of a global settlement). 14 Defendant notes only that the stipulation to strike the jury verdict was negotiated as 15 a part of the Parties’ settlement and that striking the jury verdict would protect its 16 business reputation. In contrast, the public interest generally favors public access to 17 judicial records. See Nixon v. Warner Commc’n, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597–98 (1978). 18 Defendant “make[s] no attempt to hide the fact that [it] seek[s] to ‘buy an eraser for the 19 public record’ through conditional settlement.” Gardner v. CafePress Inc., No. 3:13-CV- 20 1108-GPC-JLB, 2015 WL 13427727, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2015) (citing Am. Games, 21 142 F.3d at 1170). The Parties have thus failed to make a showing that the public interest 22 warrants striking the jury verdict. 23 As to the joint motion to dismiss with prejudice, Plaintiff has joined the motion to 24 strike the jury verdict in compliance with the settlement agreement. There was no 25 provision that the granting of the joint motion to strike was a condition precedent to the 26 motion to dismiss. Therefore, the case can be dismissed. 27 1 Accordingly, the Court DENIES the Parties’ joint motion to strike the jury verdict. 2 Court GRANTS the Parties’ joint motion to dismiss the case with prejudice. 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 ||Dated: September 23, 2020 2 5 Hon. athe Cae 6 United States District Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 3:16-cv-00724-GPC-MSB