1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 JASON B., Case No.: 3:20-cv-1781-AHG 12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR

LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA

13 v.

PAUPERIS

14 ANDREW SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, [ECF No. 2] 15 Defendant. 16

17 On September 10, 2020, Plaintiff Jason B. (“Plaintiff”) brought this action against 18 the Commissioner of Social Security, Andrew Saul, seeking judicial review of the 19 Commissioner’s final administrative decision denying his application for Social Security 20 Supplemental Security Income Disability Benefits for lack of disability. ECF No. 1. Along 21 with his Complaint, Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis 22 (“IFP”) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. ECF No. 2. 23

I. LEGAL STANDARD

24 A motion to proceed IFP presents two issues for the Court’s consideration. First, the 25 Court must determine whether an applicant properly shows an inability to pay the $400 26 civil filing fee required by this Court. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a), 1915(a). To that end, an 27 applicant must also provide the Court with a signed affidavit “that includes a statement of 28 1 all assets[,] which shows inability to pay initial fees or give security.” CivLR 3.2(a). 2 Second, § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires the Court to evaluate whether an applicant’s complaint 3 sufficiently states a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 4 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (“1915(e) not only permits but requires a district court to 5 dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.”). 6 II. DISCUSSION 7 A. Motion to Proceed IFP 8 An applicant need not be completely destitute to proceed IFP, but he must adequately 9 prove his indigence. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 339–40 10 (1948). An adequate affidavit should “allege[] that the affiant cannot pay the court costs 11 and still afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th 12 Cir. 2015) (citing Adkins, 335 U.S. at 339). No exact formula is “set forth by statute, 13 regulation, or case law to determine when someone is poor enough to earn IFP status.” 14 Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1235. Consequently, courts must evaluate IFP requests on a case- 15 by-case basis. See id. at 1235–36 (declining to implement a general benchmark of “twenty 16 percent of monthly household income”); see also Cal. Men’s Colony v. Rowland, 939 F.2d 17 854, 858 (9th Cir. 1991) (requiring that district courts evaluate indigency based upon 18 available facts and by exercise of their “sound discretion”), rev’d on other grounds, 506 19 U.S. 194 (1993); Venable v. Meyers, 500 F.2d 1215, 1216 (9th Cir. 1974). 20 An adequate affidavit should also state supporting facts “with some particularity, 21 definiteness and certainty.” United States v. McQuade, 647 F.2d 938, 940 (9th Cir. 1981) 22 (citing Jefferson v. United States, 277 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir. 1960)). The Court should not 23 grant IFP to an applicant who is “financially able, in whole or in material part, to pull his 24 own oar.” Temple v. Ellerthorpe, 586 F. Supp. 848, 850 (D.R.I. 1984); see also Alvarez v. 25 Berryhill, No. 18cv2133-W-BGS, 2018 WL 6265021, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2018) (noting 26 that courts often reject IFP applications when applicants “can pay the filing fee with 27 acceptable sacrifice to other expenses”). Additionally, courts have discretion to make a 28 factual inquiry and to deny a motion to proceed IFP when the moving party is “unable, or 1 unwilling, to verify their poverty.” McQuade, 647 F.2d at 940. 2 Here, Plaintiff states in his affidavit that he receives only $150.00 per month in food 3 stamps, has no money in his checking account, has no valuable assets, and has no other 4 source of income other than a 2019 summer swim seasonal where he made $200.00. ECF 5 No. 2 at 1–3. Plaintiff explains that he lives with his family and is dependent on them for 6 his basic needs since they provide all the income for monthly expenses. Id. at 5. 7 Considering the information in the affidavit, the Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently 8 shown an inability to pay the $400 filing fee under § 1915(a). 9 B. Screening under 28 U.S.C. 1915(e) 10 As discussed above, every complaint filed pursuant to the IFP provisions of 28 11 U.S.C. § 1915 is subject to a mandatory screening by the Court under Section 12 1915(e)(2)(B). Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1127. Under that subprovision, the Court must dismiss 13 complaints that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be 14 granted, or seek monetary relief from defendants who are immune from such relief. See 28 15 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Social Security appeals are not exempt from this screening 16 requirement. See Hoagland v. Astrue, No. 1:12-cv-00973-SMS, 2012 WL 2521753, at *1 17 (E.D. Cal. June 28, 2012) (“Screening is required even if the plaintiff pursues an appeal of 18 right, such as an appeal of the Commissioner's denial of social security disability benefits 19 [under 42 U.S.C. 405(g)].”); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001) 20 (affirming that “the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners”); 21 Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1129. 22 Rule 8 sets forth the federal pleading standard used to determine whether a complaint 23 states a claim upon which relief may be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 8; see also Ashcroft v. 24 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009) (“[A] complaint must contain a “short and plain 25 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”); Bell Atlantic Corp. 26 v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (noting that “detailed factual allegations” are not 27 required, but a plaintiff must provide “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic 28 recitation of the elements of a cause of action” to justify relief). A proper pleading “does 1 not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the- 2 defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers labels and conclusions 3 . . . will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further 4 factual enhancement.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal citations and quotations omitted) 5 (referring to FED. R. CIV. P. 8). 6 For example, in social security cases, “[t]he plaintiff must provide a statement 7 identifying the basis of the plaintiff's disagreement with the ALJ’s determination and must 8 make a showing that he is entitled to relief, ‘in sufficient detail such that the Court can 9 understand the legal and/or factual issues in dispute so that it can meaningfully screen the 10 complaint pursuant to § 1915(e).’” Jaime B. v. Saul, No. 19cv2431-JLB, 2020 WL 11 1169671, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2020) (quoting Graves v. Colvin, No. 15cv106-RFB- 12 NJK, 2015 WL 357121, at *2 (D. Nev. Jan. 26, 2015)). “Every plaintiff appealing an 13 adverse decision of the Commissioner believes that the Commissioner was wrong. The 14 purpose of the complaint is to briefly and plainly allege facts supporting the legal 15 conclusion that the Commissioner’s decision was wrong.” Hoagland, 2012 WL 2521753, 16 at *2. 17 Having reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court finds Plaintiff has sufficiently 18 stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. Specifically, Plaintiff appeals the 19 Commissioner’s denial of his benefits application on the grounds that: (1) “The apparent 20 conflicts1 between the vocational expert’s identification of jobs and the DOT remains 21

22 23 1 Plaintiff notes that the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform other work as a food service worker, warehouse worker, and conveyer feeder. ECF No. 1 at 3. Conflicts noted by 24 Plaintiff include: (a) “A limitation to simple routine tasks precludes [Plaintiff’]s ability to 25 perform work as a food service worker because the DOT reports that occupation requires reasoning level three which is incompatible with simple routine work;” (b) “A limitation 26 to frequent handling with the right upper extremity precludes [Plaintiff]’s ability to perform 27 work as a conveyer feeder because the DOT reports that occupation requires handling constantly;” and (c) “A limitation to no climbing ladders, ropes, or scaffolds precludes 28 1 || unresolved which means there is no substantial vocational evidence in the record to support 2 || the legal conclusion [that] plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act;” and (2) 3 “There is no substantial evidence in the record to support the Commissioner’s finding that 4 || plaintiff could perform any substantial gainful activity.” ECF No. | at 3-4. The Court finds 5 ||these allegations sufficiently specific to state a claim for reversal or remand of the 6 ||Commissioner’s decision. 7 CONCLUSION 8 Based on the foregoing considerations, the Court GRANTS the Plaintiffs Motion 9 Proceed IFP (ECF No. 2). 10 In accordance with Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), the Court 11 DIRECTS the Clerk to issue the summons and to send Plaintiff a blank United States 12 Marshal Service (“USMS”) Form 285 along with certified copies of this Order and his 13 ||Complaint (ECF No. 1). Once Plaintiff receives this “IFP Package,” the Court ORDERS 14 to complete the Form 285 and forward all documents in the package to the USMS. 15 Upon receipt, the USMS will serve a copy of the Amended Complaint and summons on 16 || Defendant as directed by Plaintiff on the USMS Form 285. The United States will advance 17 || all costs of service. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d); FED. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) 18 19 IT IS SO ORDERED. 20 Dated: September 30, 2020 _ArwiorwH. Xyolard Honorable Allison H. Goddard 22 United States Magistrate Judge 23 24 25

27 occupation requires climbing occasionally and the DOT’s companion publication defines 28 climbing as ascending or descending ladders, stairs, scaffolding, ramps, poles, and the like, using feet and legs or hands and arms[.]” /d. at 3-4.