I. INTRODUCTION

26 Plaintiff WILLIAM MEYER, an individual, and DANA GASCAY, an individual 27 (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) bring this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) 28 1 against Defendants the COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, a public entity, erroneously sued as 2 the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the “County”); the SAN 3 DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY (the “HHSA”)1; 4 RADY CHILDREN’S HOSPITAL, a California nonprofit organization (“Rady”); 5 REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, a California nonprofit 6 organization (“Regents”); ELIZABETH REESE, an individual (“Reese”); KAYLA 7 VALENZUELA, an individual (“Valenzuela”); DR. SHALON NIENOW, an individual 8 (“Dr. Nienow”); TIFFANY PAUGH, an individual (“Paugh”); CATHERINE CRAFT, an 9 individual (“Craft”); TAMI SNYDER, an individual (“Snyder”); DOE HHSA, manager, 10 an unidentified named individual; DOES 1 through 50.2 ECF No. 1. 11 Before the Court are following motions: (1) the Motion to File Documents Under 12

13 1 HHS was named in the original complaint and is still listed on the docket. Because 14 the County and HHSA are the same entity, and the FAC did not name HHSA, see ECF Nos. 25, 26, the Court dismisses SDCHHS without prejudice. 15 2 Plaintiffs are on the third iteration of their complaint and have yet to serve, much less advance any individual allegations as to how Does 1 through 50 violated their rights. 16 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) neither authorize nor prohibit the use of 17 fictitious parties; however, FRCP 10 does require a plaintiff to include the names of all parties in his complaint. See Rojas by & through Rojas v. Sea World Parks & Ent., Inc., 18 538 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1030-31 (S.D. Cal. 2021) (Benitez, J.). Naming doe defendants further implicates FRCP 4 requiring service of the complaint. Canesco v. Ford Motor Co., 19 -- F. Supp. 3d ---, No. 3:21-cv-00425-BEN-RBB, 2021 WL 5122231, at *21 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2021) (Benitez, J.) (noting that “it is effectively impossible for the United States 20 Marshal or deputy marshal to fulfill his or her duty to serve an unnamed 21 defendant”); Keavney v. Cty. of San Diego, No. 3:19-cv-01947-AJB-BGS, 2020 WL 4192286, at *4-5 (S.D. Cal. July 21, 2020) (Battaglia, J.) (same). “A plaintiff may refer to 22 unknown defendants as Defendant John Doe 1, John Doe 2, John Doe 3, and so on, but he must allege specific facts showing how each particular doe defendant violated his rights.” 23 Id. at *4-5. Where a “[p]laintiff fails to link any particular constitutional violation to any 24 specific, individual state actor,” or seeks “to even minimally explain how any of the unidentified parties he seeks to sue personally caused a violation of his constitutional 25 rights,” the court must dismiss those individuals, especially when they have not been served. See id. at *4 (dismissing the plaintiff’s first amended complaint); see also FED. R. 26 CIV. P. 4(m) (providing that “[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must 27 dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made 28 within a specified time.”); S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 41.1(a). Thus, Does 1 through 50 are dismissed 1 Seal of the County, Valenzuela, Craft, Paugh, and Snyder, ECF No. 70; (2) Dr. Niewnow’s 2 Request for Oral Argument, ECF No. 67; and (3) Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Application for 3 Extension of Time to File Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 74. After 4 considering the papers submitted, supporting documentation, and applicable law, the Court 5 (1) GRANTS-IN-PART and DENIES-IN-PART the Motion to File Documents Under 6 Seal of the County, Valenzuela, Craft, Paugh, and Snyder, ECF No. 70; DENIES Dr. 7 Nienow’s Request for Oral Argument, ECF No. 67; and (2) GRANTS-IN-PART and 8 DENIES-IN-PART Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Application for Extension of Time to File 9 Response to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 74. 10

II. BACKGROUND

11 A. Statement of Facts 12 Plaintiffs are the parents of a non-party minor child, M.M., who has suffered a long 13 and complicated medical history of repeated injury, chronic pain, and other symptoms 14 related to a diagnosis of Ehlers-Danlo Syndrome, hypermobile type (“hEDS”). SAC at ¶¶ 15 4, 45, 46, 51.3 Defendants Valenzuela, Craft, Paugh, and Snyder are employees of the 16 HHSA. Id. at ¶¶ 6-9. Defendant Rady is a medical center located in San Diego, which 17 operates, manages, and supervises the Chadwick Child Advocacy Center, also known as 18 the Child Protection Team, which includes its members of law enforcement personnel, 19 HHSA personal, and personnel from the prosecution. Id. at ¶¶ 11-12. The Child Protection 20 Team is a multidisciplinary team of individuals who provide a centralized, coordinated, 21 and comprehensive multidisciplinary response to child abuse allegations and 22 investigations, serving as a liaison between the medical professionals and the County 23 investigators. Id. at ¶ 12. Defendant Reese is an employee of Rady and active member of 24 the Child Protection Team at Rady. Id. at ¶ 16. Dr. Nienow was also a Rady and/or 25 Chadwick employee working as the Chadwick Medical Clinical Director. SAC at ¶ 18. 26 Due to the complexity of her condition and uncertainty or disagreement among her 27 28 3 Unless otherwise indicated, all page number references are to the ECF-generated 1 treating physicians as to the condition’s causes, M.M. was treated at various hospitals in 2 2017-2019, including Rady’s outpatient pain program, Kaiser Permanente San Diego, 3 Kaiser Permanente Los Angeles, and Mt. Sinai in New York. Id. at ¶¶ 52-82. 4 On December 13, 2018, Plaintiffs were notified that the County received a referral 5 alleging abuse and neglect of M.M., including that M.M.’s mother “was tampering with 6 M.M.’s IV pump, and was not allowing medical staff to help M.M. get better.” SAC at ¶ 7 71. On December 14, 2018, Defendant Valenzuela, a Protective Services Worker (“PSW”) 8 with the County, spoke with and interviewed the reporting party. Id. at ¶ 72. On December 9 17, 2018, Valenzuela interviewed Plaintiffs individually as well as with M.M. Id. at ¶ 73. 10 On January 23, 2019, and continuing with her investigation, Valenzuela again 11 contacted a physician who told her that (1) M.M.’s diagnosis of Complex Regional Pain 12 Syndrome had been confirmed, (2) Plaintiffs had been cooperative, and (3) there was no 13 evidence of Munchausen by Proxy.4 SAC at ¶ 89. 14 On January 23, 2019, Valenzuela “had no choice to close the referral” for the initial 15 complaint as inconclusive and notified Plaintiffs of the case closure on February 15, 2019. 16 SAC at ¶ 93. Plaintiffs allege that between January 23, 2019 and January 29, 2019, Reese 17 and Dr. Nienow met and conferred to discuss how to develop evidence that M.M. was 18 faking her symptoms and malingering so Valenzuela would have evidence to present to the 19 juvenile court to support an application to remove M.M. from her parents’ care. Id. at ¶ 20 94. Reese and Dr. Nienow decided to place M.M. in a room equipped for covert video 21 recording, which recorded Plaintiffs 24 hours a day, seven days a week for a period of 36 22 days. Id. at ¶¶ 97-98. Plaintiffs were not informed that they were being recorded, and 23

24 4 As another court has noted, “Munchausen syndrome by proxy,” occurs where “an 25 individual produces … physical or emotional symptoms in another person under his or her 26 care,” and “[u]sually the victim is a young child, and the person producing the symptoms may be the child’s parent or caretaker, most often the mother.” Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 27 F.3d 967, 969 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing American Medical Association, Complete Medical 28 Encyclopedia 870 (Jerrold B. Leikin & Martin S. Lipsky eds. 2003); Thomas Lathrop 1 Defendants did not obtain a warrant or judicial authorization for the recording. SAC at ¶¶ 2 97-98. 3 On or around January 29, 2019, M.M. was transferred from Mt. Sinai and admitted 4 to Rady based on decisions made by Kaiser and Dr. Bolognese, M.M.’s treating physician 5 at Mt. Sinai. SAC at ¶¶ 82, 98-99. Two days later, on January 31, 2019, Reese, at Dr. 6 Nienow’s direction, made a child abuse hotline referral claiming that Plaintiffs had 7 Munchausen by Proxy, and that M.M. was purposefully dislocating her arm and faking her 8 symptoms. Id. at ¶¶ 104-05. 9 On February 12, 2019, Dr. Nienow provided a report to Valenzuela, stating, inter 10 alia, that “separation from her parents was essential to preserve her life.” SAC at ¶¶ 124- 11 133. On February 28, 2019, Plaintiffs were informed that they were the subject of another 12 child abuse complaint alleging that Plaintiffs did not support M.M.’s psychiatric needs and 13 were interviewed individually by Valenzuela. Id. at ¶¶ 84, 118-119. 14 On March 6, 2019, Dr. Nienow provided a report to Valenzuela, which “stated that 15 in order to prevent M.M. from dying, it was imperative that her parents be ‘immediately 16 removed’ from the hospital.” SAC at ¶ 136. Plaintiffs allege that “[s]he … falsely stated 17 that M.M. suffered substantial physical and emotional harm as a result of the medical 18 decisions [Plaintiffs] made with respect to her condition and care.” Id. Plaintiffs also claim 19 that Dr. Nienow “falsely claimed that Bill and Dana had ‘pushed for numerous invasive, 20 and potentially dangerous procedures, despite a lack of physiologic evidence to support 21 them despite the recommendations of medical providers against them.’” Id. 22 On March 7, 2019, Valenzuela and Craft filed a Petition and Warrant Application as 23 well as a Detention Report, which judges use to rely on in deciding whether to grant such 24 petitions. SAC at ¶ 151. That same day, Plaintiffs were removed from the hospital, and 25 Valenzuela told Plaintiffs that a warrant had been issued preventing them from seeing 26 M.M., but that there would be a hearing the following morning to determine whether M.M. 27 would continue to be detained from Plaintiffs’ care. Id. at ¶¶ 159-162. 28 On March 8, 2019, Plaintiffs were summoned to a juvenile dependency hearing in 1 the juvenile court of San Diego County, at which time the judge found that a “prima facie 2 showing [had] been made” and ordering responsibility for M.M.’s continued care and 3 placement be vested with the County. SAC at ¶¶ 163-165. 4 On March 11, 2019, at the continued Detention Hearing, the Court continued to find 5 separation appropriate but allowed Plaintiffs access to M.M. via supervised visits once per 6 week with a monitor selected by HHSA. SAC at ¶¶ 171-72. On March 15, 2019, 7 Valenzuela transferred management of M.M.’s dependency case to Paugh. SAC at ¶ 173. 8 Around April 2019, Dr. Nienow, with Paugh and Snyder’s approval, directed Rady 9 to perform various invasive tests on M.M., including “an invasive swallow test,” prompted 10 M.M. experiencing difficulties swallowing and being unable to eat consistently by mouth. 11 SAC at ¶¶ 197-98. Plaintiffs were not aware of this test until after it occurred. Id. at ¶ 197. 12 From March 11, 2019 through the trial on February 5, 2020, Plaintiffs remained 13 removed from M.M. while M.M. remained a patient at Rady and continued to suffer from 14 symptoms relating to hEDs. SAC at ¶¶ 163-167, 209. On February 5, 2020, the trial 15 concluded with a ruling in Plaintiffs’ favor. SAC at ¶ 209. 16 On May 1, 2020, Plaintiffs submitted a Notice of Government Claim to the County 17 of San Diego pursuant to California Government Code sections 910 et seq. SAC at ¶ 28. 18 On September 28, 2020, the County rejected Plaintiffs’ claims. SAC at ¶ 29. On February 19 25, 2021, or within six months of receiving the County’s rejection, Plaintiffs filed their 20 initial complaint. SAC at ¶ 30. 21 Plaintiffs accuse Defendants Valenzuela, Craft, Reese, and Dr. Nienow of 22 concocting a plan to secretly surveil and record the Plaintiffs and their daughter in their 23 daughter’s private hospital room. SAC at ¶ 31. They further allege that when the allegedly 24 unlawful surveillance failed to yield the hoped-for results, Defendants “devised a plan to 25 strip M.M. from her parents’ custody” by concocting “a false story about how [Plaintiffs] 26 were the cause of M.M.’s deteriorating medical condition.” Id. at ¶¶ 33. 27 B. Procedural History 28 On February 25, 2021, Plaintiffs filed their 21-page complaint alleging six claims 1 for relief for (1) violation of civil rights pursuant to Section 1983; (2) Monell liability; (3) 2 violation of state civil rights, CAL. CIV. CODE § 43; (4) violation of the Bane Act, CAL. CIV. 3 CODE § 52.1; (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (6) intrusion into private 4 affairs. ECF No. 1. On April 7, 2021, Plaintiffs served the San Diego County Health and 5 Human Services Agency.5 ECF No. 4. 6 On May 14, 2021, Rady and Reese as well as Regents and Dr. Nienow timely filed 7 separate motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. ECF Nos. 11, 13. On May 17, 8 2021, the County Defendants timely filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, 9 ECF No. 17, while Valenzuela and Paugh alone filed a motion to quash for improper 10 service of process, ECF No. 18. On May 25, 2021, Plaintiffs and the County Defendants 11 filed a Joint Motion to modify and extend their briefing schedule. ECF No. 20. On May 12 26, 2021, the Court modified the briefing schedule for all parties. ECF No. 23. 13 On May 26, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a proof of service showing service of the complaint 14 on Paugh and Valenzuela that same day. ECF Nos. 24, 25. 15 On June 14, 2021, Plaintiffs filed their 44-page First Amended Complaint (the 16 “FAC”), which included the following claims for relief: (1) violation of civil rights 17 pursuant to Section 1983 arising from (a) deception in the presentation of evidence and 18 related Monell claims and (b) unwarranted non-consensual medical procedures/treatment 19 and invasion of privacy and related Monell claims; (2) violation of state civil rights, CAL. 20 CIV. CODE § 43; (3) violation of the Bane Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1; (4) intentional 21 infliction of emotional distress; and (5) intrusion into private affairs. ECF No. 27. Based 22 upon the filing of the FAC, on June 15, 2021, the Court denied the pending motions to 23 dismiss and seal, ECF Nos. 11, 13, 15, 17, 18, as moot and vacated its previously set 24 briefing schedules. ECF No. 28. In its order, the Court noted that while the motion to 25 26 5 Although the dates of service for some of the remaining defendants is not clear, after 27 requests for extensions filed by all defendants in this case, the Court ordered the County, 28 Paugh, and Valenzuela (the “County Defendants”) to respond by May 17, 2021, ECF No. 1 dismiss pertaining to Valenzuela and Paugh was not mooted by the filing of the FAC, the 2 Court denied that motion as well because the record indicated Plaintiffs effected service 3 for those defendants. Id. 4 On June 22, 2021, the Court granted the parties’ another joint motion, this time 5 seeking an extension of time for Defendants to respond to the FAC. ECF No. 30. On July 6 9, 2021, Dr. Nienow, Rady, Reese, the County, Valenzuela, and Paugh timely filed a 7 Motion to Dismiss the FAC for failure to state a claim, ECF Nos. 30, 31, 32, 36. The 8 County Defendants also moved to strike the FAC pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP 9 statute, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 425.16, ECF No. 35, and moved to file documents under 10 seal in support of their motions, ECF Nos. 33, 34. 11 After the parties again sought to modify the briefing schedule, ECF No. 40, the Court 12 set a new briefing schedule, ECF Nos. 39, 41, but Plaintiffs opposed on August 28 and 30, 13 2021, ECF Nos. 42, 43, 44, 45, which was after the Court’s deadline of August 27, 2021. 14 On September 1, 2021, Plaintiffs sought relief due to their untimely filing, explaining that 15 it was due to “unforeseen and inexplicable technological issue[s] with [the] documents.” 16 ECF No. 46 at 5:5-9. On September 2, 2021, the Court granted Plaintiffs relief, deeming 17 their late oppositions timely filed. ECF No. 47. On September 17, 2021, Defendants 18 timely filed their reply briefs. ECF Nos. 39, 41, 48, 49, 50, 51. On October 8, 2021, the 19 Court submitted the pending motions on the papers. ECF No. 54. That same day, Plaintiffs 20 filed an Objection to the County Defendants Request for Judicial Notice in Support of their 21 Motion to Dismiss and Strike the FAC. ECF No. 55. On October 13, 2021, the County 22 Defendants filed an Ex Parte Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Objection. ECF No. 56. 23 On October 21, 2021, the Court issued an Order (1) Granting in Part and Denying in 24 Part Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ FAC by denying Valenuzela’s motion to 25 dismiss the claim of judicial deception and Rady’s motion to dismiss as to the claim of 26 non-consensual medical procedures but granting the motions to dismiss all other claims,, 27 ECF Nos. 31 , 32 , 34 , 35 , 36 , 56; (2) denying the motion to strike Plaintiffs’ objection 28 as moot, ECF No. 56; and (3) ordering Plaintiffs to file their Second Amended Complaint 1 (“SAC”) by November 12, 2021. ECF No. 57 at 27-28. In this order, the Court expressly 2 noted that “Plaintiffs are cautioned … that in future they must timely file according to the 3 deadlines set by this Court.” Id. at 27. 4 On November 4, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a Joint Motion for Extension of Time to File 5 their SAC, seeking an additional 45 days to file their SAC. ECF No. 58. On November 5, 6 2021, the Court granted their joint motion, requiring Plaintiffs to file their SAC by 7 December 27, 2021. ECF No. 59. 8 On December 27, 2021, Plaintiffs timely filed their120-page SAC, alleging eight 9 claims for relief for (1) violation of Section 1983 due to unwarranted search/surveillance 10 and invasion of privacy; (2) violation of Section 1983 due to deception in the presentation 11 of evidence and violation of the rights of familial association; (3) violation of Section 1983 12 arising from the Fourteenth Amendment right to be free of unwarranted medical 13 procedures/exclusion; (4) violation of Section 1983 under Monell against the County; (5) 14 violation of Section 1983 under Monell against Rady; (6) invasion of privacy/intrusion into 15 private affairs; (7) invasion of privacy, CAL. CONST. ART. 1, § 1; and (8) intentional 16 infliction of emotional distress. ECF No. 61. 17 On December 28, 2021, this case was transferred to the Hon. Linda Lopez. ECF No. 18 63. On January 19, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a Waiver of Service of Summons as to the SAC, 19 executed by counsel for the County Defendants.6 ECF No. 65 20 On January 26, 2022, Dr. Nienow filed a Request for Oral Argument, arguing that, 21 inter alia, “this case presents a novel issue of state law, i.e., whether visitors have a 22 reasonable expectation of privacy in their daughter’s hospital room under the factual 23 24 6 The SAC, although alleging three more claims for relief than the FAC, in substance, does not add new claims. Thus, while no waiver of service of summons was filed as to 25 the other defendants, the Court finds that service of the SAC was not governed by FRCP 26 4. See, e.g., Emp. Painters’ Tr. v. Ethan Enterprises, Inc., 480 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting an amended complaint qualifies as a “pleading subsequent to the original 27 complaint,” governing by FRCP 5(b), permitting service by mail, whereas an original 28 complaint is governed by FRCP 4; however, where an amended complaint adds “new or 1 circumstances alleged in this case.” ECF No. 67. 2 On January 26, 2022, Nienow filed a Motion to Dismiss Claims 1, 3, 6, 7, and 8 of 3 the SAC, ECF No. 66; Rady & Reese filed a motion to dismiss the entire SAC, ECF No. 4 68; the County Defendants along with Craft and Snyder filed a motion to dismiss the SAC 5 for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, ECF No. 69, 71; 6 That same day, the County Defendants, Craft, and Snyder filed a motion to file 7 documents under seal, ECF No. 70, and Motion to Strike the SAC pursuant to Cal. Code 8 Civ. Proc. § 425.16, ECF No. 72. 9 On February 1, 2022, Plaintiffs filed an Ex Parte Application to Extend Deadlines 10 and re-set the briefing schedule, which is their fourth request to seek an extension in this 11 case. ECF No. 74. On February 9, 2022, the County Defendants, Craft, and Snyder 12 opposed this application, asking the Court to deny the requested extension, which is one 13 of many extensions requested throughout this case. ECF No. 75 at 2. On February 3, 14 2022, Plaintiffs replied proposing their alternative briefing schedule and reiterating the 15 need for an extension. ECF No. 76 at 5:1-9. 16

III. LEGAL STANDARD

17 A. Motions to Seal 18 Except for certain documents “traditionally kept secret,” federal courts begin a 19 sealing analysis with “a strong presumption in favor of access to court records.” Foltz v. 20 State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003). A party seeking to 21 seal a judicial record then must “articulate [] compelling reasons supported by specific 22 factual findings,” id., that outweigh the general history of access and the public policies 23 favoring disclosure, such as the “public interest in understanding the judicial process,” 24 Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1995). The Court “conscientiously 25 balance[s] . . . the competing interests” of the public and the party who seeks to keep certain 26 judicial records secret. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135. After considering these interests, if the 27 Court decides to seal certain judicial records, it “base[s] its decision on a compelling reason 28 and articulate[s] the factual basis for its ruling, without relying on hypothesis or 1 conjecture.” Hagestad, 49 F.3d at 1434; see also Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of Honolulu, 2 447 F.3d 1172, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006) (applying compelling reasons standard to dispositive 3 motions). 4 A party must satisfy the compelling reasons standard even if the motion, or its 5 attachments, were previously filed under seal or protective order. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1136 6 (“[T]he presumption of access is not rebutted where . . . documents subject to a protective 7 order are filed under seal as attachments to a dispositive motion.”). A party’s failure to 8 meet the burden of articulating specific facts showing a “compelling reason” means that 9 the “default posture of public access prevails.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1182. In ruling on 10 motions to seal, this Court has recognized that “compelling reasons sufficient to outweigh 11 the public’s interest in disclosure and justify sealing court records exist when such court 12 files might . . . become a vehicle for improper purposes, such as the use of records to . . . 13 release trade secrets.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179. Similarly, other “sources of business 14 information that might harm a litigant’s competitive standing” may also constitute a 15 compelling reason to seal, see Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598, such as a company’s confidential 16 profit, cost, and pricing information, which if publicly disclosed could put the company at 17 a competitive disadvantage, see Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elec. Co., 727 F.3d 1214, 1225 18 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“[I]t seems clear that if Apple’s and Samsung’s suppliers have access to 19 their profit, cost, and margin data, it could give the suppliers an advantage in contract 20 negotiations, which they could use to extract price increases for components.”). 21 B. Ex Parte Application for Extension of Time 22 Rule 7(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires all motions to (1) be 23 made in writing unless made during a hearing or trial; (2) “state with particularity the 24 grounds for seeking the order”; and (3) “state the relief sought.” Local Rule 7.1 provides 25 that a party moving the Court for relief must file their papers 28 days before the hearing 26 date. S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1 (e)(1). Subdivision (e)(5)7, governing motion practice and 27 28 7 While state courts often offer a procedure to secure relief that could be secured by 1 enlargements or shortening of time, provides: “All applications for orders shortening time 2 under these rules must be submitted ex parte, be accompanied by a proposed order, and be 3 served on all opposing parties.” S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(e)(5). Further, Local Rule 73.3(g)(2) 4 provides that “[a] motion for an order must not be made ex parte unless it appears by 5 affidavit or declaration” that (1) “within a reasonable time before the motion the party 6 informed the opposing party or the opposing party’s attorney when and where the motion 7 would be made” or (2) “the party in good faith attempted to inform the opposing party and 8 the opposing party’s attorney but was unable to do so, specifying the efforts made to inform 9 them”; or (3) “for reasons specified the party should not be required to inform the opposing 10 party or the opposing party’s attorney.” S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 73.3(g)(2). Further, while a 11 district court may shorten the usual notice period, courts generally only do so when 12 circumstances warrant an expedited hearing. See Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 156 13 (3rd Cir. 1997). 14

IV. DISCUSSION

15 A. Motion to Seal 16 The County Defendants, Craft, and Snyder seek to seal Exhibits A through D as well 17 as an unredacted copy of their motion. ECF No. 70 at 2:1-4. They argue that compelling 18 reasons exist to seal the exhibits “because they contain sensitive, statutorily-protected 19 information regarding juvenile dependency proceedings.” Id. at 2:5-6. 20 California law fiercely protects the confidentiality of juvenile records. See, e.g., CAL. 21 WELF. & INST. CODE § 827 (providing that “the Legislature reaffirms its believe that 22 juvenile court records, in general, should be confidential”); In re Keisha T., 38 Cal. App. 23

24 noticed motion on a shortened timeline, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contain no 25 provisions directly addressing the filing and service of papers seeking to seek relief on a 26 shortened notice period. Instead, Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs temporary restraining orders, and Rule 3.5 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct 27 governs ex parte communications with chambers; however, there is no Federal Rule of 28 Civil Procedure covering ex parte applications similar to Rule 3.1200 of the California 1 4th 220, 231 (1995), as modified (Oct. 10, 1995) (“The strong public policy of 2 confidentiality of juvenile proceedings and records has long been recognized.”). Federal 3 courts have likewise adhered to this confidentiality. See T.T. v. Cty. of San Diego, No. 4 3:19-cv-00407-AJB-AGS, 2020 WL 6118781, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2020) (Battaglia, 5 J.) (granting a motion to seal juvenile records because “given the confidential status of 6 Plaintiff's juvenile records pursuant to section 827 of the Welfare and Institutional Code, 7 the Court finds that Defendants have articulated compelling reasons in support of their 8 motion to seal”). 9 The moving Defendants seek to seal the following exhibits: 10 Sealed Request to Seal Portions of: Doc. 11 Basis: ECF Ex. Description: 12 No. Copies of the April 12, 2021 and May 20, 2021 orders of 13 the superior court granting County Defendants’ request and 14 ordering that any records from the juvenile court Juvenile 73-1 A Court 15 proceedings for In the matter of M.M.—a minor, Petition Records No. NJ015489 used as exhibits be filed and/or maintained 16 in a confidential manner (filed conditionally under seal) 17 Copies of the juvenile court’s orders dated March 7, 2019, March 8, 2019, March 11, 2019, March 27, 2019, April 2, 18 2019, April 15, 2019, June 3, 2019, June 10, 2019, June 25, 19 2019, July 11, 2019, July 18, 2019, August 5, 2019, August 12, 2019, September 20, 2019, October 1, 2019, October 3, 20 2019, October 4, 2019, October 7, 2019, October 8, 2019, 21 October 10, 2019, October 23, 2019, October 29, 2019, Juvenile 73-2 B October Court 22 31, 2019, November 13, 2019, November 18, 2019, Records 23 November 20, 2019, December 11, 2019, December 12, 2019, December 16, 2019, December 20, 2019, January 8, 24 2020, January 15, 2020, January 31, 2020, February 4, 25 2020, and February 5, 2020 from the juvenile court proceedings for In the matter of M.M.—a minor, Petition 26 No. NJ015489 (filed conditionally under seal). 27 Excerpts from the certified reporter transcripts from Juvenile 73-3 C hearings dated March 8, 2019 and March 11, 2019, from Court 28 the juvenile court proceedings for In the matter of M.M.—a Records 1 minor, Petition No. NJ015489 (filed conditionally under seal) 2 Copies of the Detention Report filed March 8, 2019 and the 3 Addendum to the Detention Report filed March 11, 2019, Juvenile 73-4 D from the juvenile court proceedings for In the matter of Court 4 M.M.—a minor, Petition No. NJ015489 (filed conditionally Records 5 under seal) 6 As for the County Defendants memorandum of points and authorities, the County 7 seeks limited redactions. First, they seek to redact two words on Page 9, line 7 and a 8 sentence on Page 9, lines 19 to 20. However, the Court does not find the two words, which 9 were “very severe,” or the sentence quoting a statement from the judge convey any 10 confidential information concerning the minor in this case that is not already public record 11 (e.g., that her case was very severe). The Court finds this does not warrant sealing and 12 DENIES the motion to seal as to these redactions. 13 Second, the County Defendants seek to seal an opinion from a psychologist 14 concerning the child’s case in this case. ECF No. 19:13-17. The Court finds this warrants 15 sealing and GRANTS the motion as to this quote. 16 Third, the County Defendants seek to seal five words on Page 22, lines 20 and 23- 17 25. However, the five words on Page 22, line 20 are “and any of its particulars,” which in 18 no way reveals any confidential information. The Court finds this does not warrant sealing 19 and DENIES the motion to seal as to these redactions. However, the other sentence they 20 seek to seal at Page 22, lines 22-26 (citing RJN, Ex. C, March 11, 2019 hearing transcript 21 at 7-10) warrants sealing, and the motion is GRANTED as to that quote. 22 As for the exhibits, given that other district courts have lodged under seal the very 23 type of documents at issue here, the confidential and privileged nature of the records 24 involved, and the fact that these records remain under seal in state court, the Court 25 concludes there exist compelling reasons to exercise its discretion and inherent authority 26 to similarly lodge these materials under seal. See Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179. 27 Accordingly, the Motion to Seal is GRANTED as to Exhibits A through D. The Clerk is 28 DIRECTED to lodge Exhibits A through D contained in ECF No. 73 UNDER SEAL. 1 The moving defendants shall submit a new version of the redacted memorandum of points 2 and authorities containing only the redactions permitted by the Court within ten (10) days 3 for the Clerk of the Court to lodge under seal. 4 B. Ex Parte Application for Extension of Time 5 On February 1, 2022, Plaintiffs filed an Ex Parte Application to Extend Deadlines 6 and re-set the briefing schedule. ECF No. 74. On February 9, 2022, the County 7 Defendants, Craft, and Snyder opposed this application, asking the Court to deny the 8 extension. ECF No. 75 at 2. They argue that the Court should deny the application because 9 (1) this case has been filed over a year ago and has made little progress, id. at 2:8; (2) 10 Plaintiffs have filed several amended complaints, and Defendants have stipulated to 11 extensions repeatedly, id. at 2:8-11 (citing ECF Nos. 20, 40, 58); (3) Plaintiffs were already 12 granted a 45-day extension to file their SAC after Defendants stipulated to an additional 45 13 days on top of the 21-days already imposed by the Court, id. at 2:11-14 (citing ECF Nos. 14 57, 58, 61); (4) Plaintiffs now request an additional 45 days to oppose the motions filed in 15 response to the SAC; and (5) Plaintiffs’ repeated requests for extensions “is at odds with 16 their obligation ‘to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination’ of this action,” 17 id. at 2:14-20 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 1; see also In re PPA Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 18 1217, 1227 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that delay “is costly in money, memory, 19 manageability, and confidence in the process”). Defendants also point out that “Plaintiffs 20 claim they require more time to respond to the County Defendants’ motions because of the 21 number of motions and the complex factual and legal questions presented,” but “the factual 22 allegations and causes of action in the SAC were similar to those in the first amended 23 complaint, and as a result,” similar to the motions filed by Defendants in response to the 24 previous complaints. ECF No. 75:21-22:3. Finally, they note that while “Mr. McMillan, 25 counsel for Plaintiffs, cites workload and personal issues as reasons why his office cannot 26 meet the briefing schedule” even though “there are currently three separate law firms and 27 five attorneys of record representing Plaintiffs in this case.” ECF No. 75 at 3:4-7 (citing 28 ECF No. 74-2 at ¶¶ 12-16). 1 On February 3, 2022, Plaintiffs replied, arguing that Mr. McMillan, due to his 2 “particularized and narrow expertise, as well as the fact that he drafted the [SAC], he has 3 been allocated the responsibility for researching and drafting the oppositions to the bulk of 4 the Defendants’ five various motions,” Reply, ECF No. 76 at 3, ¶ B. Plaintiffs propose the 5 following schedule: 6 Event Current Date Proposed Date 7 Plaintiffs’ Oppositions Due Wednesday, Friday, (Non-County Defendants) February 16, 2022 March 18, 2022 8 Plaintiffs’ Oppositions Due Wednesday, Friday, 9 (All County Defendants) February 16, 2022 April 1, 2022 10 Non-County Defendants’ Wednesday, Friday, 11 Replies Due February 23, 2022 April 8, 2022 12 County Replies Due Wednesday, Friday, February 23, 2022 April 8, 2022 13 Hearing Date on All Wednesday, Friday, 14 Motions March 2, 2022 April 15, 2022 15 ECF No. 76 at 5:1-9. 16 The Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiffs have repeatedly requested 17 extensions in this case and failed to adhere to filing deadlines. The Court GRANTS-IN- 18 PART the request for a modification, as outlined in the conclusion of this order, but 19 cautions that absent a strong showing of good cause, no further extensions or 20 modifications will be granted to either party in this case. Further, the Court finds that 21 given the similarity in arguments advanced by Defendants for dismissing this case, 22 judicial economy warrants the Court striking all Defendants’ pending motions to dismiss. 23 Instead, Defendants shall coordinate and file a consolidated joint motion to dismiss as 24 outlined below. 25 V. CONCLUSION 26 For the above reasons, the Court ORDERS as follows: 27 1. The County Defendants’ Motion to Seal is DENIED-IN-PART and 28 GRANTED-IN-PART. The Motion to Seal is GRANTED as to Exhibits A through D. 1 The Clerk is DIRECTED to lodge Exhibits A through D contained in ECF No. 73 UNDER 2 SEAL. The moving defendants shall submit a new version of the redacted memorandum 3 of points and authorities containing only the redactions permitted by the Court within ten 4 (10) days for the Clerk of the Court to lodge under seal. 5 2. Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Application to Alter the Briefing Schedule is 6 GRANTED-IN-PART. In the duration of this case, Plaintiffs have requested an extension 7 for nearly every filing and only recently received a 45-day extension. The Court grants a 8 final extension, while reiterating that further extensions must be supported by good cause. 9 Plaintiffs are cautioned, however, that in future they must timely file according to the 10 deadlines set by this Court. The briefing schedule is altered as follows: 11 Event: Deadline: 12 All Defendants’ Combined Motion to Monday, February 28, 2022 13 Dismiss: 14 Plaintiffs’ Oppositions to All Monday, March 28, 2022 Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss: 15 16 All Defendants’ Combined Motion to Monday, April 11, 2022 Dismiss: 17 Vacated. The Court finds this matter 18 Hearing Date on All Pending Motions: appropriate for submission on the papers. 19 3. Finally, the Court orders that all Defendants pending motions to dismiss, but 20 not the pending motion to strike, are STRICKEN from the record. All of the motions 21 address related issues, and as such, all Defendants must submit a joint motion to dismiss. 22 Because the Court is requesting a combined brief, but there are several defendants, the 23 Court extends the page limit for the combined brief to no more than 35 pages. The County 24 Defendants’ motion to strike may remain on the docket as a separate motion. Plaintiffs’ 25 opposition brief must also not exceed 35 pages. Reply briefs shall not exceed 15 pages. 26 4. Plaintiffs are cautioned that without having determined the matter, should the 27 Court grant the pending motions, absent a showing in their opposition brief of what facts, 28 if any, they can allege to remedy the alleged deficiencies in their SAC, the Court may grant | the motions without leave to amend in light of (1) the number of chances Plaintiffs have had to cure the deficiencies in their complaint and (2) the Court’s detailed previous order 3 explaining the failures of the previous complaint. 4 IT IS SO ORDERED. et >|| DATED: February 8, 2022 6 HON. LINDA LOPEZ 7 United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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