1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ANGEL TAPIA VIVANCO, an Case No.: 22-CV-23 TWR (DEB) individual, 12

ORDER REMANDING ACTION

Plaintiff, 13 TO THE SUPERIOR COURT OF v. CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN 14

DIEGO

FORD MOTOR COMPANY, a Delaware 15 Corporation, and DOES 1 through 10, (ECF No. 9) 16 inclusive, 17 Defendants. 18

19 Presently before the Court is Defendant Ford Motor Company’s Response (“Resp.,” 20 ECF No. 9) to Court’s Order for Defendant Ford Motor Company to Show Cause Why 21 This Action Should Not Be Remanded to State Court for Lack of Subject-Matter 22 Jurisdiction (“OSC,” ECF No. 6). Having carefully considered Defendant’s arguments, 23 the record, and the relevant law, the Court REMANDS this action to the Superior Court of 24 California, County of San Diego. 25 BACKGROUND 26 On December 1, 2021, Plaintiff Angel Tapia Vivanco filed a Complaint against Ford 27 Motor Company in the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego. (See generally 28 ECF No. 1-3 (“Compl.”).) In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he purchased a used 1 2019 Ford Mustang, VIN 1FATP8UHOK5148684 (the “Vehicle”) from Perry Ford of 2 National City on August 31, 2020. (See id. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff made a $6,500 cash down 3 payment and financed $23.930.81. (See id.) Including all associated fees, the total amount 4 payable on the purchase of the Vehicle was $54,018.56. (See id.) 5 Although Defendant made express and implied warranties regarding the Vehicle, 6 (see id. ¶¶ 9–12), the “Vehicle was delivered to Plaintiff with “serious defects and 7 nonconformities to warranty and developed other serious defects and nonconformities to 8 warranty including, but not limited to, engine system defects.” (See id. ¶ 10; see also id. 9 ¶¶ 17–30.) Plaintiff therefore alleges three causes of action for violation of the Song- 10 Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (the “Act”), California Civil Code §§ 1790, et seq.: 11 (1) breach of express warranty, (2) breach of implied warranty, and (3) failure to service in 12 violation of Section 1793.2. (See id. ¶¶ 5–8.) 13 On January 7, 2022, Defendant removed this action to federal court on the basis of 14 diversity subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). (See generally ECF 15 No. 1, “NOR.”) Specifically, Defendant alleges that “there is diversity of citizenship 16 between Plaintiff, California citizens, and Ford, a citizen of Michigan and Delaware” (see 17 id. ¶¶ 19–21), and that the amount in controversy, including the civil penalties under the 18 Act and prospective attorneys’ fees, exceeds $75,000. (See id. ¶¶ 9–18.) 19 Upon review of Plaintiff’s Complaint and Defendant’s Notice of Removal, the Court 20 ordered Defendant to show cause why this action should not be remanded to the Superior 21 Court of California, County of San Diego, for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction on 22 February 9, 2022. (See generally OSC.) On February 23, 2022, Defendant timely filed the 23 instant Response. (See generally Resp.) 24 LEGAL STANDARD 25 “The right of removal is entirely a creature of statute and a suit commenced in a state 26 court must remain there until cause is shown for its transfer under some act of Congress.” 27 Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002). A suit filed in state 28 court may be removed to federal court if the federal court would have had original 1 jurisdiction over the suit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “Federal courts are courts of limited 2 jurisdiction. They possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” 3 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Removal is proper 4 when a case originally filed in state court presents a federal question or where there is 5 diversity of citizenship among the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. 6 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a). “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the 7 district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” 28 U.S.C. 8 § 1447(c). 9 The party invoking the removal statute bears the burden of establishing that federal 10 subject-matter jurisdiction exists. Emrich v. Touche Ross & Co., 846 F.2d 1190, 1195 (9th 11 Cir. 1988). It is “presume[d] that federal courts lack jurisdiction unless the contrary 12 appears affirmatively from the record,” DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 13 (2006) (quoting Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 316 (1991)), and courts “strictly construe 14 the removal statute against removal jurisdiction.” Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 15 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Boggs v. Lewis, 863 F.2d 662, 663 (9th Cir. 1988)); Takeda v. Nw. 16 Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 765 F.2d 815, 818 (9th Cir. 1985)). Therefore, “[f]ederal jurisdiction 17 must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” Gaus, 18 980 F.2d at 566 (citing Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 592 F.2d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 19 1979)). 20 ANALYSIS 21 Defendant removed Plaintiff’s Complaint based on diversity jurisdiction under 28 22 U.S.C. § 1332(a). (See, e.g., NOR ¶ 9.) Federal courts have diversity jurisdiction “where 23 the amount in controversy” exceeds $75,000, and the parties are of “diverse” state 24 citizenship. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). A defendant seeking to remove a case to federal 25 court must provide only a “short and plain statement of the grounds for removal.” See 28 26 U.S.C. § 1446(a). Consequently, “when a defendant seeks federal-court adjudication, the 27 defendant’s amount-in-controversy allegation should be accepted when not contested by 28 the plaintiff or questioned by the court.” See Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 1 574 U.S. 81, 87 (2014). But “[i]f the plaintiff [or the court] contests the defendant’s 2 allegation, § 1446(c)(2)(B) instructs: ‘[R]emoval . . . is proper on the basis of an amount 3 in controversy asserted’ by the defendant ‘if the district court finds, by the preponderance 4 of the evidence, that the amount in controversy exceeds’ the jurisdictional threshold.” See 5 id. at 88 (third and fourth alterations in original). 6 “[T]he plaintiff can contest the amount in controversy by making either a ‘facial’ or 7 ‘factual’ attack on the defendant’s jurisdictional allegations.” Harris v. KM Indus., Inc., 8 980 F.3d 694, 699 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing Salter v. Quality Carriers, 974 F.3d 959, 964 (9th 9 Cir. 2020)). “A ‘facial’ attack accepts the truth of the [defendant’s] allegations but asserts 10 that they ‘are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.’” Id. (alteration in 11 original) (quoting Salter, 974 F.3d at 964). “A factual attack ‘contests the truth of the . . . 12 allegations’ themselves,” id. (alteration in original) (quoting Salter, 974 F.3d at 964), or 13 “make[s] a reasoned argument as to why any assumptions on which they are based are not 14 supported by evidence.” Id. at 700 (citing Salter, 974 F.3d at 964; Ibarra v. Manheim Invs., 15 Inc., 775 F.3d 1193, 1199 (9th Cir. 2015)). “When a plaintiff mounts a factual attack, the 16 burden is on the defendant to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount 17 in controversy exceeds the . . . jurisdictional threshold.” Id. at 699 (citing Ibarra, 775 F.3d 18 at 1197). “[W]hen the defendant relies on a chain of reasoning that includes assumptions 19 to satisfy its burden of proof, the chain of reasoning and its underlying assumptions must 20 be reasonable ones.” LaCross v. Knight Transp. Inc., 775 F.3d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 2015) 21 (citing Ibarra, 775 F.3d. at 1199). “Both parties may submit evidence supporting the 22 amount in controversy before the district court rules.”1 Harris, 980 F.3d at 699 23 (citing Salter, 974 F.3d at 963; Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1197). 24 “In determining the amount in controversy, courts first look to the complaint.” 25 Ibarra, 775 F.3d at 1197. “Generally, ‘the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the 26

27 1 To the extent the Court views that Ford Motor Company is precluded from proving up a mileage 28 offset, civil penalties, and attorneys’ fees in its Order to Show Cause, (see generally “OSC”), this argument 1 claim is apparently made in good faith.’” Id. (quoting St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red 2 Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289 (1938)). But “[w]here it is not facially evident from the 3 complaint that more than $75,000 is in controversy, the removing party must prove, by a 4 preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional 5 threshold.” Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 6 2003) (per curiam). When a damages estimate is articulated in the complaint and not 7 “repeated in the Prayer for Relief . . . , the complaint fails to allege a sufficiently specific 8 total amount in controversy,” and the preponderance of evidence standard applies. See 9 Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp., 506 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 2007). 10 Here, it is undisputed that the Parties are completely diverse; however, the Court sua 11 sponte questioned whether Defendant had met its burden of establishing that the amount in 12 amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. (See generally OSC.) In the Complaint, Plaintiff 13 requests only “rescission of the purchase contract and restitution of all monies expended” 14 and does not explicitly plead that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. (See 15 generally Compl.; see also id. Prayer for Relief.) In its Response, Defendant makes certain 16 assumptions—including that (1) the amount paid for the Vehicle is equal to the sales price 17 in the contract, (2) there is no statutory mileage offset to be calculated, (3) a jury would 18 award Plaintiffs the maximum civil penalty under the Act, and (4) Plaintiffs would be 19 entitled to significant attorneys’ fees, (see Resp. at 6–7; see also NOR ¶¶ 9–18)—to 20 establish that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Because the Court has 21 questioned those assumptions, however, Defendant must establish by a preponderance of 22 the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See, e.g., Dart Cherokee, 23 574 U.S. at 88. 24 On the present record, the Court concludes that Defendant has failed to establish that 25 the assumptions it used in calculating an amount in controversy exceeding the $75,000 26 threshold are reasonable and supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Under the 27 Act, “if the manufacturer . . . does not service or repair the goods to conform to the 28 applicable express warranties . . . , the manufacturer shall . . . reimburse the buyer in an 1 amount equal to the purchase price paid by the buyer, less that amount directly attributable 2 to use by the buyer prior to the discovery of the nonconformity.” Cal. Civ. Code 3 § 1793.2(d)(1). Defendant’s first two challenged assumptions relate to this calculation. 4 As for Defendant’s first assumption, it has introduced evidence establishing by a 5 preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiffs agreed to pay $54,018.56 under the contract 6 for the purchase of the Vehicle. (See NOR ¶ 13; see also Resp. at 2.) Plaintiff requests 7 “rescission of the purchase contract and restitution of all monies expended.” (See Compl. 8 Prayer for Relief ¶ 2.) The Act provides that, “[i]n the case of restitution, the manufacturer 9 shall make restitution in an amount equal to the actual price paid or payable by the buyer.” 10 Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Defendant assumes that the “actual 11 price paid or payable by the buyer” for the Vehicle is equal to the Total Sale Price in the 12 Retail Installment Sale Contract (“RISC,” ECF No. 1-5), which is $54,018.56. (See id. at 13 2;2 see also NOR ¶ 13; Resp. at 2.) Although there is some disagreement among the federal 14 district courts regarding the financed charges that are recoverable, see, e.g., Canesco v. 15 Ford Motor Co., 570 F. Supp. 3d 872, 895 (S.D. Cal. 2021) (“[W]ith respect to a vehicle 16 that is purchased, courts have been left with little guidance as to whether the purchaser 17 should recover the outstanding loan balance in addition to amounts paid under a financing 18 agreement.”), the California Court of Appeals has found that “plaintiffs are entitled to 19 recover the paid finance charges from defendant.” See Mitchell v. Blue Bird Body Co., 80 20 Cal. App. 4th 32, 39 (2000) (emphasis added). Where, as here, “the record does not show 21 whether a plaintiff has made all installment payments for the amount financed, courts have 22 found the total ‘cash price’ listed on a Retail Installment Sale Contract is a reasonable 23 estimate of ‘the actual price paid or payable’ for the vehicle.” See Smith v. FCA US, LLC, 24 No. 221CV05347FLAGJSX, 2022 WL 2438355, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 5, 2022) (citing 25 Luna v. FCA US LLC, No. 21-cv-01230-LHK, 2021 WL 4893567, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 26 2021); Messih v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 21-cv-03032-WHO, 2021 WL 2588977, 27

28 2 Pin citations to the RISC refer to the CM/ECF pagination electronically stamped in the top, 1 at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2021)). Here, the “Total Cash Price” of the Vehicle is $24,740.00. 2 (See RISC at 2.) 3 “To determine the restitution amount, the cash price is then reduced by a ‘mileage 4 offset’ to account for the vehicle’s reduction in value attributable to use by the plaintiff, as 5 required by Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(C).” See Smith, 2022 WL 2438355, at *3 (citing 6 Messih v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 210cv093932-WHO, 2021 WL 2588977, at *4 7 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2021)). Regarding Defendant’s second assumption, Defendant fails to 8 introduce any evidence as to how many miles Plaintiff drove the Vehicle prior to the first 9 repair. (See generally NOR; Resp.) “In the absence of such evidence, the Court finds that 10 “[Defendant] fails prove by a preponderance of the evidence [Plaintiff’s] actual damages 11 based on the purchase price of the vehicle.” See McDermott v. FCA US LLC, No. 12 EDCV211734JGBKKX, 2022 WL 159696, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2022) (citing Mullin 13 v. FCA US, LLC, No. CV 20-2061-RSWL-PJW, 2020 WL 2509081, at *3–4 (C.D. Cal. 14 May 14, 2020)); see also Hernandez v. FCA US, LLC, No. CV 20-1058-RSWL-MAA, 15 2020 WL 3497399, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 29, 2020) (“Here, Defendant neglected to take 16 into account the mileage offset when alleging that the amount in controversy exceeds the 17 jurisdictional minimum. Accordingly, Defendant has failed to prove actual damages by a 18 preponderance of the evidence.” (collecting cases)). 19 Turning to Defendant’s third assumption, “[i]f the buyer establishes that the failure 20 to comply was willful, the judgment may include . . . a civil penalty which shall not exceed 21 two times the amount of actual damages.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1794(c); accord Cal. Civ. 22 Code §§ 1794(e)(1), (5). Defendant assumes that the full civil penalty is in controversy, 23 (see Resp. at 7), but “when a defendant ‘fail[s] to establish the amount of damages at issue,’ 24 then ‘the Court cannot determine the amount of any potential civil penalty.’”3 See 25 3 Even if Defendant had established the amount of damages at issue in this case, “[d]istrict courts in 26 the Ninth Circuit are split on whether to include Song-Beverly Act civil penalties in calculations to assess the amount in controversy.” See Ferguson v. KIA Motors Am. Inc., No. 2:20-CV-01192-KJM-DB, 2021 27 WL 1997550, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 2021) (collecting cases); see also Modiano v. BMW of N. Am. 28 LLC, No. 21-CV-00040-DMS-MDD, 2021 WL 973566, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2021) (collecting cases 1 McDermott, 2022 WL 159696, at *4 (alteration in original) (quoting Edwards v. Ford 2 Motor Co., No. CV 16-05852 BRO (PLAx), 2016 WL 6583585, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 3 2016)); see also Nash v. FCA US LLC, No. 521CV02092MEMFKKX, 2022 WL 2304030, 4 at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 27, 2022) (“Because this Court finds that [the defendant] has not 5 established actual damages by a preponderance of the evidence, the Court similarly finds 6 that [the defendant]’s estimate of civil penalties in this case are not supported by the 7 evidence and remain speculative.”). 8 This brings the Court to Defendant’s final assumption regarding the recovery of 9 attorneys’ fees. It is true that, “when a statute or contract provides for the recovery of 10 attorneys’ fees, prospective attorneys’ fees must be included in the assessment of the 11 amount in controversy.” Arias v. Residence Inn by Marriott, 936 F.3d 920, 922 (9th Cir. 12 2019) (citing Fritsch v. Swift Transp. Co. of Ariz., LLC, 899 F.3d 785, 794 (9th Cir. 2018)). 13 assumption . . . appears more consistent with the general principle that where the state-court complaint 14 does not specify a damage figure, the defendant must provide evidence establishing that it is more likely than not that the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied.” See Ronquillo v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 15 No. 3:20-CV-1413-W-WVG, 2020 WL 6741317, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2020) (quoting Sanchez, 102 16 F.3d at 404) (citing Matheson, 319 F.3d at 1090); see also Zawaideh v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. 17-CV- 2151 W (KSC), 2018 WL 1805103, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2018) (concluding that, as with punitive 17 damages, “[r]ather than simply assume that because a civil penalty is available, one will be awarded, the defendant must make some effort to justify the assumption by, for example, pointing to allegations in the 18 Complaint suggesting award of a civil penalty would be appropriate, and providing evidence—such as verdicts or judgments from similar cases—regarding the likely amount of the penalty.”). 19

20 Here, “[o]ther than referring to Plaintiff[s’] allegation that [Ford Motor Company] acted willfully, however, [Ford Motor Company] provides no support for the likelihood that a civil penalty based on its 21 willfulness would actually be awarded in this case, or that the full civil penalty would be awarded.” See Savall v. FCA US LLC, No. 21CV195 JM (KSC), 2021 WL 1661051, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2021). 22 “Moreover, even Plaintiff[s’] lengthy Complaint alleges only that [Ford Motor Company]’s obligations were willfully violated because, in effect, [Ford Motor Company] . . . failed to promptly provide 23 Plaintiff[s] with satisfactory redress.” Id.; see also Compl. ¶¶ 24-26, 47–49. “If such boilerplate 24 allegations were sufficient . . . , then virtually any Song-Beverley action involving a new vehicle purchase would remain in federal court.” See Savall, 2021 WL 1661051, at *3. Consequently, even if Defendant 25 had established the amount of damages at issue by a preponderance of the evidence, the Court would still conclude that it has failed to meet its burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the 26 full civil penalty authorized under the Act should be included in the amount in controversy. See, e.g., id.; cf. Zeto v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, No. 20-CV-1380-GPC-KSC, 2020 WL 6708061, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 27 16, 2020) (including civil penalties in amount-in-controversy where the “[d]efendant submitted a detailed 28 breakdown of how the civil penalties were calculated, backed up by passages from the complaint and other 1 “The defendant retains the burden, however, of proving the amount of future attorneys’ 2 fees by a preponderance of the evidence.” See id. at 927–28 (quoting Fritsch, 899 F.3d at 3 788). “The type of evidence that courts have considered to estimate reasonable future 4 attorney’s fees include a percentage of economic damages alleged, fee awards in similar 5 cases, and estimates of the number of hours that will likely be required to litigate the 6 pending case multiplied by the opposing counsel’s hourly rate.” Peck v. First Student, Inc., 7 No. 3:17-CV-0863-SI, 2017 WL 3288116, at *3 (D. Or. Aug. 2, 2017) (collecting cases). 8 The district court retains discretion, however, “to determine whether defendants have 9 carried their burden of proving future attorneys’ fees, and to determine when a fee estimate 10 is too speculative because of the likelihood of a prompt settlement.” See Fritsch, 899 F.3d 11 at 795. 12 Here, Plaintiff alleges that they are entitled to attorneys’ fees under the Act, (see 13 Compl. ¶ 29), which explicitly authorizes the recovery of attorneys’ fees. See Cal. Civ. 14 Code § 1794(d). The Court therefore must include Plaintiff’s prospective attorneys’ fees 15 in the amount in controversy, so long as Defendant provides a reasonable estimate 16 supported by the preponderance of the evidence. See Arias, 936 F.3d at 922; Fritsch, 899 17 F.3d at 794. To meet its burden, Defendant cites cases in which “substantial” attorneys’ 18 fees were awarded, (see Resp. at 8–9 (citing Pappas v. Ford Motor Co., No. 3:21-CV- 19 00584-BEN KSC, 2021 WL 5810661 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2021) (awarding $21,660 where 20 the plaintiff sought $48,947.80); Tapia v. Ford Motor Co., No. 3:20-CV-01510-W-MSB, 21 2021 WL 5863597 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2021) (awarding $22,828.00 where the plaintiff 22 sought $44,399.39)4), and introduces evidence of billing rates for Plaintiff’s counsel. (See 23 id. at 9 ($510 per hour in Pappas and a range of $335 to $530 per hour in Tapia).) 24 Defendant also makes certain assumptions regarding depositions, concluding that “the 25 most conservative assumption is $16,750.00 and as much as $26,500.00 in fees for 26 depositions alone.” (See Resp. at 9 (emphasis in original).) 27

28 4 Defendant disingenuously cites the amount sought by the plaintiffs in each case, while the amount 1 While a defendant may meet its burden to establish a reasonable estimate of 2 attorneys’ fees by identifying awards in other cases, those cases must be similar enough to 3 the case at hand that the court can conclude that it is more likely than not that the plaintiff 4 may incur a similar fee award. See, e.g., Cruz v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 5 220CV05167ODWJCX, 2020 WL 5797917, at *3–4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2020); Peck, 6 2017 WL 3288116, at *3. Here, “[a]ll that Defendant[] claim[s] is that the same counsel 7 appears in each case and that the subject-matter of the cases are the same.” See Schneider 8 v. Ford Motor Co., 441 F. Supp. 3d 909, 914 (N.D. Cal. 2020). In other words, Defendant 9 “has failed to establish why this action is similar to th[e selected] . . . cases.” See Cruz, 10 2020 WL 5797917, at *3. “Because [Ford Motor Company] only offers conclusions and 11 speculative assumptions to substantiate its attorneys’ fees calculation, [Ford Motor 12 Company]’s statements fall short of the required summary judgment-type evidence.” See 13 id. Given Ford Motor Company’s failure to substantiate a reasonable estimate of the 14 attorneys’ fees Plaintiffs may incur in this case, the Court declines to consider those fees 15 as part of the amount in controversy. See, e.g., Schneider, 441 F. Supp. 3d at 914 16 (“[B]ecause Defendants fail to provide the Court with specific evidence showing that the 17 attorneys’ fees in this case are ‘more likely than not’ to exceed $75,000, attorneys’ fees 18 cannot be used to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement.” (emphasis in original).) 19 In sum, Ford Motor Company has failed to meet its burden of establishing by a 20 preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. The Court 21 therefore concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this action. 22 / / / 23 / / / 24 / / / 25 / / / 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Defendant has failed to prove by 3 ||a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 such that 4 Court has diversity jurisdiction over this matter. The Court therefore REMANDS this 5 || action to the Superior Court of California, County of San Diego. The Clerk of the Court 6 ||SHALL CLOSE the file. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 |! Dated: September 1, 2022 9 “Ten (2 D (oe 10 Honorable Todd W. Robinson United States District Judge 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28