1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ESTATE OF WILLIAM HAYDEN Case No.: 3:23-cv-00785-DMS-AHG SCHUCK, et al., 12

ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

Plaintiffs, 13 DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFFS’ v. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO 14

CONDUCT LIMITED DISCOVERY

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al., 15 TO ASCERTAIN DOE DEFENDANTS Defendants. 16 [ECF No. 10] 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Motion for Leave to Conduct Limited 25 Discovery to Ascertain “Doe” Defendants’ Identities. ECF No. 10. Plaintiffs ask the Court 26 to permit them to propound special interrogatories prior to the Rule 26(f) conference, to 27 identify approximately 22 unnamed defendants. Id. at 8–9. For the reasons set forth below, 28 the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs’ motion. 1 I. BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiffs Sabrina Schuck and Timothy Schuck (“Plaintiffs”), the parents of deceased 3 Hayden Schuck (“Hayden”), filed a Complaint1 against the County of San Diego 4 (“County”), Correctional Healthcare Partners (“CHP”), various individual defendants, 5 “Defendant Deputy Does [4]2-14,” “Defendant Medical Provider Does 2-6,”3 and 6 “Defendant Deputy Supervisor Does 1-6.” ECF No. 25 at ¶¶ 12, 24, 26–31. Plaintiffs allege 7 “causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Defendants’ deliberate indifference to 8 Hayden’s serious medical needs as well as state law claims for violations of the Bane Act, 9 failure to summon medical care, wrongful death, negligence, and negligent training and 10 supervision.” ECF No. 10 at 2; see ECF No. 25. 11 In the instant motion, Plaintiffs seek leave to conduct discovery prior to the 12 Rule 26(f) conference to learn the Doe Defendants’ identities. ECF No. 10. Specifically, 13 Plaintiffs seek an order permitting them to propound eleven special interrogatories on the 14 County. Id. at 8–9. The County and CHP oppose Plaintiffs’ motion. ECF Nos. 23, 24. This 15 Order follows. 16 II. LEGAL STANDARD 17 A party is generally not permitted to obtain discovery before the parties have 18

19 20 1 On April 28, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their original complaint. ECF No. 1. On June 2, 2023, Plaintiffs filed their amended complaint. ECF No. 25; see ECF No. 20 (both parties 21 consented to the filing of the amended complaint). Though the instant motion was filed 22 before the amended complaint, the Court will consider the operative amended complaint in its analysis. 23 2 Defendant Deputy Does 1, 2, and 3 have been identified in the amended complaint. ECF 24 No. 25 at ¶¶ 18–20 (“Defendant Deputy Thomas Mace [was] formerly Defendant Deputy 25 Doe 1[,] Defendant Deputy Jeff Amado [was] formerly Defendant Deputy Doe 2)[, and] Defendant Deputy Sven Soderberg [was] formerly Defendant Deputy Doe 3”). 26 27 3 Defendant Medical Provider Doe 1 has been identified in the amended complaint. ECF No. 25 at ¶ 17 (“Defendant Jennifer Vivona RN [was] formerly Defendant Medical 28 1 conferred pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f). FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(1) (“A 2 party may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have conferred as required 3 by Rule 26(f), except … by stipulation, or by court order.”). However, courts have made 4 exceptions to allow limited early discovery when there is good cause. Rovio Entm’t Ltd. v. 5 Royal Plush Toys, Inc., 907 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1099 (N.D. Cal. 2012). (“In the Ninth 6 Circuit, courts use the good cause standard to determine whether discovery should be 7 allowed to proceed prior to a Rule 26(f) conference.”). Good cause exists “where the need 8 for expedited discovery, in consideration of the administration of justice, outweighs the 9 prejudice to the responding party.” Semitool, Inc. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc., 208 F.R.D. 10 273, 276 (N.D. Cal. 2002). In determining whether a party has shown good cause to grant 11 expedited discovery, courts “commonly consider[]” the following non-exhaustive factors: 12 “(1) whether a preliminary injunction is pending; (2) the breadth of the discovery requests; 13 (3) the purpose for requesting the expedited discovery; (4) the burden on the defendants to 14 comply with the requests; and (5) how far in advance of the typical discovery process the 15 request was made.” Am. LegalNet, Inc. v. Davis, 673 F. Supp. 2d 1063, 1067 (C.D. Cal. 16 2009) (internal quotation omitted); see, e.g., Synopsys, Inc. v. AzurEngine Techs., Inc., 401 17 F. Supp. 3d 1068, 1076–77 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (applying the same factors); Palermo v. 18 Underground Solutions, Inc., No. 12cv1223-WQH-BLM, 2012 WL 2106228, at *2 (S.D. 19 Cal. June 11, 2012) (same). 20 Consistent with this generally recognized exception to Rule 26(f), the Ninth Circuit 21 has held that “‘where the identity of the alleged defendant[] [is] not [] known prior to the 22 filing of a complaint[,] the plaintiff should be given an opportunity through discovery to 23 identify the unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery would not uncover the 24 identities, or that the complaint would be dismissed on other grounds.’” Wakefield v. 25 Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999) (brackets in original) (quoting Gillespie v. 26 Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980)). Thus, in cases where plaintiffs are seeking to 27 learn the identity of Doe defendants through early discovery, courts examine whether the 28 plaintiff (1) identifies the Doe defendant with sufficient specificity so that the court can 1 determine that the defendant is a real person or entity who can be sued in federal court; (2) 2 describes all previous steps taken to identify and locate the defendant; (3) establishes that 3 the suit could withstand a motion to dismiss; and (4) establishes that the discovery 4 requested is likely to lead to identifying information about the defendant that will permit 5 service of process. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 577 (N.D. Cal. 6 1999). These factors are considered to ensure the expedited discovery procedure “will only 7 be employed in cases where the plaintiff has in good faith exhausted traditional avenues 8 for identifying a civil defendant pre-service, and will prevent use of this method to harass 9 or intimidate.” Id. 10 III. PARTIES’ POSITIONS 11 Plaintiffs seek leave of Court to propound the following Special Interrogatories on 12 the County: 13 1. Identify the Sheriff’s Department deputies whose duties included summoning medical or mental health care, observing any audio or video 14 monitors, and/or conducting wellness or safety checks on Hayden in any 15 housing unit at the San Diego County Jail in which Hayden was housed from March 10, 2022 to March 16, 2022. 16 …4 17 5. Identify the Sheriff’s Department deputies who worked shifts in the booking unit from March 10, 2022 to March 15, 2022. 18 6. Identify the Sheriff’s Department deputies who worked shifts in 19 housing unit “7D” or “Module D” on the seventh floor from March 15, 2022 to March 16, 2022. 20 21

22 23 4 Plaintiffs propose eleven special interrogatories in their motion. ECF No. 10 at 8–9. However, three of the interrogatories have since been answered by other means. Compare 24 Id. (instant motion, proposing the following interrogatories: “Identify Sheriff’s Department 25 Deputy # 4324. [] Identify Sheriff’s Department Deputy # 4193. [] Identify Sheriff’s Department Deputy # 3397.”) with ECF No. 23 at 8 (the County’s opposition, pledging to 26 provide Plaintiffs with the names of the three deputies whose badge numbers were listed 27 in the complaint) and ECF No. 25 at ¶¶ 18–20 (amended complaint, naming deputies #4324, #4193, and #3397). Thus, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion as to Special 28 1 7. Identify the Sheriff’s Department deputies who transported and escorted Hayden to and from court, holding cells, and transportation vehicles 2 on March 15, 2022. 3 8. Identify the Sheriff’s Department deputies who were responsible for training all deputies identified in Special Interrogatories 1-7. 4 9. Identify the Sheriff’s Department deputies who were responsible 5 for supervising all deputies identified in Special Interrogatories 1-7. 10. Identify the County employees, agents, or contractors working 6 within the Sheriff’s Department Medical Services Division from March 10, 7 2022 to March 16, 2022 who were responsible for Hayden’s medical care, including follow-up assessments and referrals for further treatment, whether 8 or not they actually provided Hayden with any medical care. 9 11. Identify the “Qualified Mental Health Provider” referenced within Hayden’s medical records, and described in the Complaint, as having 10 evaluated Hayden during the booking process on or about March 10, 2022. 11 ECF No. 10 at 8–9. Plaintiffs contend that these Special Interrogatories are narrowly 12 tailored and are “highly likely to result in learning the unknown defendants’ identities.” Id. 13 at 9. Plaintiffs argue that these discovery requests are not burdensome to the County 14 because it has already gathered the information. Id. at 10. For example, Plaintiffs note that 15 the County directed and participated in multiple investigations regarding Hayden’s death 16 by the Sheriff’s Homicide Unit, Critical Incident Review Board, County Medical 17 Examiner’s Department, and Citizen’s Law Enforcement Review Board. Id. at 10–11. 18 Plaintiffs argue that the Doe Defendants are described with the requisite specificity 19 in the complaint, noting that Plaintiffs alleged “all of the details that the County would 20 need to identify the defendants—Hayden’s identity, the jail Hayden was booked into, the 21 date of his booking, the date of his death, and his housing locations within the jail according 22 to the Medical Examiner’s report, for example.” Id. at 6. Plaintiffs explain that they 23 submitted a Public Records Act request, which was denied, and attempted to contact the 24 County’s counsel to discuss the issue, to no avail. Id. at 6–7. Plaintiffs also searched the 25 reports and press releases issued by the County, Sheriff’s Department, and Medical 26 Examiner for names of those involved, but none were listed. Id. at 7. Plaintiffs contend that 27 their claims against the Doe Defendants can withstand a motion to dismiss because each 28 1 Doe Defendant “owed a duty to Hayden as deputies, supervisors, and medical providers 2 tasked with his health and safety[ and e]ach violated their duties[.]” Id. 3 Plaintiffs also argue that expedited discovery is warranted in this case to avoid 4 irreparable harm. Id. at 9. If the Doe Defendants are not identified within 90 days of the 5 filing of the original complaint, i.e., by July 27, 2023, Plaintiffs risk their newly-amended 6 complaint not relating-back, potentially leading to Plaintiffs’ state law tort claims being 7 time-barred. Id. at 9–10. 8 The County, joined by CHP, opposes Plaintiffs’ request. ECF Nos. 23, 24. The 9 County characterizes Plaintiffs’ request as “seek[ing] to invade the privacy of groups of 10 deputies and medical providers by obtaining their identities and publicly naming them in 11 this lawsuit without waiting to conduct more thorough discovery in the ordinary course[.]” 12 ECF No. 23 at 5. The County argues that identifying and naming the Doe Defendants 13 “invade[s] the privacy of those individuals and intrude[s] on the lives, security and 14 resources of their families.” Id. 15 The County also contends that Plaintiffs’ allegations against the Doe Defendants 16 cannot withstand a motion to dismiss.5 ECF No. 23 at 6. The County argues that Plaintiffs 17 improperly lump all of the Doe Defendants together, when group liability is impermissible 18 under § 1983. Id. at 6–7. The County argues that Plaintiffs do not allege specific facts about 19 each individual Doe Defendant that would give rise to liability, since the grouped 20 allegations against the Doe Defendants in the complaint encompass individuals who had 21 no reason to know of Hayden’s need for immediate medical care, had no roles with respect 22 to his housing, or had no interactions with, or responsibilities to, him. Id. at 7. 23 IV. DISCUSSION 24 To determine whether good cause exists, generally, for early discovery, courts 25 26

27 5 The Court notes that the County and its related individual defendants did not file a motion 28 1 consider the following: “(1) whether a preliminary injunction is pending; (2) the breadth 2 of the discovery requests; (3) the purpose for requesting the expedited discovery; (4) the 3 burden on the defendants to comply with the requests; and (5) how far in advance of the 4 typical discovery process the request was made.” Am. LegalNet, 673 F. Supp. 2d at 1067 5 (internal quotation omitted). Here, the Court finds that four of the five factors clearly 6 support early discovery. Upon review of the Special Interrogatories, the Court finds that 7 Plaintiffs have proposed narrowly tailored discovery requests, for the legitimate purpose 8 of identifying unnamed defendants before the statute of limitations runs. The Court is 9 persuaded that the County readily has the information sought, since “the County is required 10 to keep records regarding their employees’ shifts and logs of safety checks[,]” and had 11 participated in multiple investigations. ECF No. 10 at 9. Of note, neither the County nor 12 CHP argued in their oppositions that any burden exists for gathering the requested 13 information. Also, Plaintiffs’ request is not made too far in advance of the typical discovery 14 process. Since the County and many individual Defendants filed their answer (ECF No. 15 28), the Early Neutral Evaluation Conference and Case Management Conference will be 16 promptly set by the undersigned and that order will include the requirement that the parties 17 meet and confer pursuant to Rule 26(f). Thus, the Court finds good cause, generally. 18 Next, the Court will address whether there is good cause for expedited discovery for 19

20 21 6 The County represents that the factors the Court should consider are (1) identifying the Doe Defendants with specificity, (2) making a good faith effort to identify the Doe 22 Defendants, and (3) being able to withstand a motion to dismiss, quoting Palermo. 23 However, upon review of the case, Palermo does not include any of the County’s quoted material and, in fact, it utilizes the same standard Plaintiffs reference. Compare ECF No. 24 23 at 5–6 (attributing factors paraphrased from Columbia Ins. Co., as quotations from 25 Palermo) with Palermo, 2012 WL 2106228, at *2 (never mentioned Columbia Ins. Co. factors and instead explained: “In considering whether good cause exists, factors courts 26 may consider include “(1) whether a preliminary injunction is pending; (2) the breadth of 27 the discovery request; (3) the purpose for requesting the expedited discovery; (4) the burden on the defendants to comply with the requests; and (5) how far in advance of the 28 1 the specific purpose of ascertaining the identities of the Doe Defendants. The Court will 2 examine whether Plaintiffs (1) identify the Doe Defendants with sufficient specificity so 3 that the Court can determine that the defendant is a real person or entity who can be sued 4 in federal court; (2) describe all previous steps taken to identify and locate the defendants; 5 (3) establish that the suit could withstand a motion to dismiss; and (4) establish that the 6 discovery requested is likely to lead to identifying information about the defendants that 7 will permit service of process. See Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 578–80. 8 Though the County does not address the first, second, or fourth factors in its 9 opposition, the Court will briefly address them for completeness. As to the first and fourth 10 factors, the Court finds that Plaintiffs describe the Doe Defendants with sufficient 11 specificity that they may be identified and then served, by referencing the dates and 12 locations of the incidents. ECF No. 25 at ¶¶ 27–31, 56, 58, 121–22, 147–48, 151; see Raiser 13 v. San Diego Cnty., No. 19cv751-GPC-KSC, 2019 WL 4675773, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 14 2019) (finding plaintiff sufficiently and specifically identified unnamed deputies where 15 plaintiff “identifie[d] the times, dates, and locations” of stops). As to the second factor, the 16 Court finds that Plaintiffs made diligent, good faith efforts to identify the Doe Defendants, 17 by submitting a Public Records Act request, contacting the County’s counsel, and 18 searching reports and press releases. ECF No. 23 at 6–7; see Raiser, 2019 WL 4675773, at 19 *2 (plaintiff made a good faith effort to identify the unnamed deputies when he contacted 20 the clerk in the Records Department of the San Diego County Sheriff). 21 As to the third factor, the Court is not persuaded by the County’s contention that 22 Plaintiffs’ allegations against the Doe Defendants could not withstand a motion to dismiss 23 and do not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that 24 is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 25 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The County cites to Finefeuiaki v. Maui 26 Cmty. Corrs. Ctr. Staff & Affiliates, No. 18cv249-DKW-KJM, 2018 WL 3580764, at *6 27 (D. Haw. July 25, 2018) for the proposition that, to withstand a motion to dismiss, a 28 plaintiff must allege specific facts regarding how each particular doe defendant violated 1 his rights. ECF No. 23 at 7–8. However, though the court in Finefeuiaki noted that the 2 plaintiff “adequately identifies the MCCC Staff as Doe Defendants for the purposes of 3 commencing this action, because he clearly refers to specific MCCC Staff who took action 4 on identified days in identified places,” the court was referring to staff in the plural form, 5 because the plaintiff in fact lumped groups of prison staff together in his complaint. 6 Finefeuiaki, 2018 WL 3580764, at *6; see Finefeuiaki, Complaint, at 6 (June 25, 2018) 7 (“the backup staffs came down to contain these three inmates…. No staffs and its affiliates 8 closed my door”); id. at 7 (“staffs and affiliates, they were writing reports about my incident 9 … I asked to be housed under the camera, I was denied”); id. at 8 (“I was denied by staff 10 to be in a safe and proper haven…. Finally back up staffs came running to pull [the] inmate 11 away…. I was set up to be attacked by ignoring my request for safety”). Here, the Court 12 finds that Plaintiffs’ groupings are likewise descriptive enough to withstand a motion to 13 dismiss. For example, Plaintiffs allege that one group of Doe Deputies were those “who 14 were responsible for transporting Hayden to and from court, holding cells, and 15 transportation vehicles on March 15, 2022,” and another group of Doe Deputies were those 16 “who were responsible for summoning medical or mental health care, observing any audio 17 or video monitors, or conducting wellness or safety checks on Hayden in any housing unit 18 in which Hayden was housed from March 10, 2022 to March 16, 2022.” ECF No. 25 at ¶¶ 19 27–28. Plaintiffs allege that Doe Deputy Supervisors were those who were responsible for 20 training and supervising the Doe Deputies. Id. at ¶ 30. Plaintiffs allege that the Doe Medical 21 Providers were those “who were responsible for Hayden’s medical care, including [mental 22 health and intake,] follow-up assessments and referrals for further treatment, whether or 23 not they actually provided Hayden with any medical care.” Id. at ¶ 31. Further, Plaintiffs 24 point to specific events. Compare Keavney v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 19cv1947-AJB- 25 BGS, 2020 WL 4192286, at *4–*5 (S.D. Cal. July 20, 2020) (sua sponte dismissing claims 26 against doe defendants pursuant to in forma pauperis screening because plaintiff “fail[ed] 27 to even minimally explain how any of the unidentified parties he seeks to sue personally 28 caused a violation of his constitutional rights.”) with ECF No. 25 at ¶ 121 (Doe Deputies 1 witnessed Hayden slumped down the wall and losing balance but left him in his cell without 2 summoning medical attention) and id. at ¶ 122 (between 8:00 p.m. and 9:00 p.m., two Doe 3 Deputies escorted Hayden to a cell) and id. at ¶¶147, 148, 151 (Doe Deputies failed to 4 perform timely or adequate wellness checks and violated internal policies) and id. at ¶¶ 56, 5 58 (Doe Medical Provider was present during the “receiving screening” process and knew 6 or should have known that Hayden was under the influence of drugs or suffering 7 withdrawal). Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have “made some showing that an act 8 giving rise to civil liability actually occurred.” Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 580. As 9 such, the Court finds good cause for expedited discovery to ascertain the identities of the 10 Doe Defendants. 11 Lastly, the Court will consider whether “the need for expedited discovery, in 12 consideration of the administration of justice, outweighs the prejudice to the responding 13 party.” Semitool, 208 F.R.D. at 276. The Court finds that the irreparable harm of Plaintiffs 14 being unable to preserve their rights and bring claims in this matter outweighs the County’s 15 concern for the unnamed defendants’ privacy. Should the County believe a defendant was 16 named in the lawsuit frivolously, without evidentiary support, the County has the ability to 17 file an appropriate motion. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3) (by presenting a pleading to the Court, 18 the filer certifies that “the claims [] are warranted by existing law” and “the factual 19 contentions have evidentiary support or … will likely have evidentiary support after a 20 reasonable opportunity for further investigation”); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state 21 a claim upon which relief can be granted). Plaintiffs, however, would have no recourse if 22 their claims are found to be time-barred due to a failure to relate-back. Therefore, the 23 balancing test likewise confirms that Plaintiffs’ motion should be granted. 24 V. CONCLUSION 25 For the reasons set forth above, and for good cause shown, the Court GRANTS IN 26 PART and DENIES IN PART Plaintiffs’ Ex Parte Motion for Leave to Conduct Limited 27 Discovery to Ascertain Doe Defendants’ Identities. ECF No. 10. Plaintiffs’ Special 28 Interrogatory Nos. 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 are deemed served as of the date of this order. 1 || The County, and CHP to the extent the request is applicable, must serve responses on 2 || Plaintiffs no later than June 30, 2023.’ 3 IT IS SO ORDERED. 4 || Dated: June 16, 2023 My WD HH. HY oulolan yA / 5 Honorable Allison H. Goddard 6 United States Magistrate Judge 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 ||’ Good cause exists to shorten the normal thirty-day deadline to respond, given that the Defendants have been aware of these requests for a substantial period of time, the 6 information appears to be readily available to them, and Plaintiffs need sufficient time to 27 ||review the information and seek leave to amend their complaint to add additional defendants. See FED. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(2) (time for responding to interrogatories may be 28 shortened by court order).